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Although months have now passed since his election on November 5, 2024, one question still lingers about Donald Trump: how did a candidate so far outside the norm win the popular vote? The answers may lie partially in his promises, but also in an institutional system that is struggling to respond to the deep-seated frustrations of American society.

Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain Trump’s victory. Some believe that the salient issues – immigration, the economy and security – served the Republican candidate well, as he made sure of championing them with the electorate. Other commentators are more concerned with the rise of the religious right and the influence of social networks.

In an article published on November 15 in Policy Options, Professor Alain Noël highlights the negative effect of inflation on the outgoing government’s popularity. In addition to these probable causes, a much deeper phenomenon must be considered.

The American system of checks and balances has long been seen as a success since it distributes power among several institutions, establishing a form of equilibrium. On the other hand, it seems that this system prevents the political adjustments needed to account for changes in American society. It also hinders innovation.

Three key concepts to understand

In political science, there are three important concepts to support our argument: veto players, institutional friction and the theory of punctuated equilibria – periods of stability marked by sudden change. Their complementarity is revealing for understanding the current situation. Here they are explained:

Veto players

Proposed by political scientist George Tsebelis, the concept of veto players identifies the sources of political power, in particular those with the capacity to maintain the status quo. A veto actor is therefore an institution or political actor with the ability to block a proposal for public policy reform. For example, the U.S. Congress (legislative power) is a veto actor because it can block the initiatives of the president (executive power). Empirical studies following on from Tsebelis’ work have shown that the greater the number of veto players, the less a political regime is able to adjust and innovate.

Institutional friction

This concept was popularized by two giants of political science, Arend Lijphart and Giovanni Sartori. Friction results from opposition between political or institutional players, leading to delays, barriers or additional costs for a policy to be adopted. For example, Canada’s parliamentary system (British-inspired), which merges executive and legislative power, generates less friction than the United States, which is made up of a set of competing actors (political, judicial and bureaucratic) and is subject to external pressures, notably through intensive lobbying. It should be noted that institutional friction is not a flaw in itself; there are good reasons to limit or slow down government action in a liberal democracy.

The theory of punctuated equilibrium

Brian D. Jones and colleagues examined the budgetary decisions of seven liberal democracies over time. They found that spending choices seemed to follow a universal mechanism: governments increase or decrease their spending very little from one year to the next, except on very rare occasions when it will decrease or increase very markedly.

Graphically, spending variation (in percentage terms) does not follow a normal bell-shaped curve, but rather shows a very thin, high peak around the status quo and, at either end, a slight bounce for very high budget variations. Interestingly, this distribution is also present in nature, notably to explain earthquakes. Tectonic plates rub against each other, leading to small adjustments that are insufficient to prevent the accumulation of energy. When this energy becomes too great, it is released by an adjustment as abrupt as it is powerful: an earthquake.

Why do political systems work this way? The authors explain the friction effect discussed above by the inhibiting role of political institutions. In their desire to preserve a certain stability or status quo, political regimes have designed institutions that have the perverse effect of making it harder and more costly to move the electorate’s preferences towards a collective decision. There are potentially so many pitfalls in the development of legislation and public programs that decisions taken at the end of the road have little concrete effect, until the day when a context allows the eruption of major changes that are often poorly controlled.

The U.S.: a greater risk of political earthquakes

Jones and colleagues tested their model with data from seven countries (the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France, Germany, Denmark and Belgium). The results are clear: the more veto players there are, the greater the friction, and therefore the longer, more complex and more arduous the legislative process. The data are indisputable: the country with the most veto players, the U.S., accumulates more energy due to institutional friction, and consequently runs a greater risk of a political earthquake.

This empirical demonstration echoes the many criticisms levelled at American institutions, including the considerable influence of money in electoral campaigns and parliamentary life, the now annual budget ceiling crisis, the increasing recourse to presidential decrees, the dominant influence of the two major political parties, the polarization of politicians, the politicization of core state functions, etc.

The system of checks and balances may be causing more harm than good today. The election of candidate Donald Trump, who has made disruption a trademark, is a symptom of the institutional inability to deal with the economic and social problems afflicting the world’s leading power.

The theatrics of Trump signing executive orders to bypass the system are part of the political narrative of a head of state wanting to signal his ability to undo institutional knots and respond to the demands of public opinion. There are, of course, many explanations for the current situation, but it would be a mistake to ignore the possibility that the American electorate has perhaps clumsily expressed its dissatisfaction with a political system that no longer serves them.

Canada is not immune to tremors

The latest research suggests that punctuated equilibrium theory also applies to Canada, albeit to a lesser degree. It’s not perfect, but the parliamentary system, which merges executive and legislative power, and its majority voting system reduce the number of veto players and institutional friction. But is it enough? Perhaps not. Canada remains susceptible to the same issues of cynicism and dissatisfaction among its voting population.

What’s more, the Canadian political system is struggling to adjust its constitutional architecture to meet the aspirations of Quebec, the Western provinces and Indigenous Peoples.

If a politician with the profile of Donald Trump appeared, we could point the finger at him, but the problem might lie with our institutions. We must appreciate the qualities of Canada’s parliamentary system, but above all remain vigilant.