In 1972, I published Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. It explored the dynamics of intergovernmental relations as they played out through the 1960s, on issues such as the development of the Canada and Quebec pension plans, fiscal arrangements, and the constitution. These were dramatic years for the federation, with the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and its aspiration to be “maitres chez nous”; the completion of the post-war welfare state not only in pension reform, but also with medicare; the Canada Assistance Plan and other measures; and the start of the tortuous search for patriation of the constitution and a domestic amending formula. These were also transitional years— from the paternalistic, Ottawa-led postwar model of “cooperative federalism,” characterized by “tax rental” agreement and highly conditional shared-cost programs, to a newer model of assertive provinces claiming equal partnership with the federal government, and resisting perceived “intrusions” into their jurisdiction. At the time, Donald Smiley worried about “the attenuation of federal power.” All these debates found expression in a massive expansion of executive federalism, carried out in intergovernmental conferences— which came to be labelled “federalprovincial” rather than “Dominion-provincial.”

Now more than three decades later, it is worth asking whether and how the patterns of intergovernmental relations that I identified in the 1960s— and which Ian Robinson and I tried to summarize in our report for the Macdonald Commission— State, Society and the Development of Canadian Federalism, 1985— have changed. Is the process more or less adversarial, more or less institutionalized, more of less effective, more or less open and transparent?

Major change might have been expected. The steady postwar economic growth continued through the 1960s; we had not yet encountered the energy crises of the 1970s and the subsequent volatility in the economy. Debts, deficits and the politics of restraint were not yet on the agenda, nor were globalization, free trade and NAFTA (though the Autopact signed in 1968 was a harbinger of later developments). Neoliberalism and its attack on big government and the welfare state were still to arise. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which many predicted would transform Canadian political culture, was not yet in effect; the “decline of deference” with its critique of elitist policy-making and distrust of politicians had not yet become evident. The Parti Québécois had yet to come to power in Quebec, and no referendum on sovereignty had been held. “Multiculturalism” and the increasing ethnic diversity of Canada’s major cities was not yet a policy priority. “Aboriginal self-government” was not on the agenda. All of these changes might well have been expected to radically alter the dynamics and processes of intergovernmental relations that characterized the period from 1960 until the end of my study, the failure of the Victoria Charter in 1971.

But what is remarkable is not so much change but continuity in intergovernmental relations. Intergovernmental players from the 1960s would be on familiar ground were they to join the fray today. Indeed, many of the elements of the process that we observe today were first coming into focus in the tumultuous decade of the 1960s.

The 1960s witnessed the emergence of executive federalism as one of the central elements of Canadian governance. The number of intergovernmental meetings— among first ministers, ministers and senior officials— grew exponentially in the period as compared with the previous decade, as did the range and scope of policy issues that they addressed. These meetings became the arena in which the fundamental questions of Quebec’s role in the federation came to the fore, in the search for non-constitutional asymmetry, reflected in the “opting out arrangements” of 1964, the establishment of two pension plans— the CPP for nine provinces and the QPP for Quebec— and in other areas. At the end of the decade executive federalism became the forum for debating constitutional change and, increasingly, for the articulation of quite different views of the Canadian federation.

Intergovernmental relations in the 1960s were also the vehicle for a fundamental transformation in intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. As their ambitions (“province-building” was soon to enter the lexicon) and their responsibilities (with the maturation of the welfare state) grew, provinces increasingly asserted that there should be a major transfer of revenues from Ottawa to the provinces, the better to match revenues and responsibilities. They perceived a severe “fiscal imbalance” to use the contemporary term. And they were immensely successful. Provincial pressures led to a federal withdrawal from the income tax field, in which the provincial share rose from 10 percent in 1956 to 24 percent in 1966. Provinces then regained their ability to set their own tax rates and, later, to make their own adjustments to the tax base, allowing them more autonomy in shaping their taxation systems. The fiscal decentralization evident today began in the 1960s.

So too did the modern equalization system. Once provinces became able to set their own tax policies— rather than receive per-capita grants from Ottawa as under the postwar tax rental agreements— addressing provincial disparities in revenueraising capacity became crucial. It was in the 1960s that the equalization formula was fully developed, and which, with important tweaking, has remained in place ever since. The principle was enshrined as Section 36 in the Constitution Act of 1982. This was another way in which the pattern developed in the 1960s has persisted. Canada found a way to reconcile a high degree of provincial fiscal autonomy with the reality of large discrepancies in the revenue-raising capacity of different provinces.

It is much the same story with respect to the use of the federal spending power to pursue social policy in areas of largely provincial jurisdiction. By the 1960s, provinces— especially Quebec, which had always opposed federal initiatives through this device— argued increasingly that federal conditions were unjustified intrusions into provincial jurisdiction and that provinces were subject to unilateral federal decisions about funding and programs. Provinces argued for “block grants,” less subject to federal conditions.

The results were again decentralizing. The Established Programs (Interim Arrangements) Act of 1965 provided for provincial opting-out of several shared programs, in return for additional tax points (taken on by Quebec); later, in 1977, the “EPF” arrangements included a combination of tax and cash transfers (without conditions) for federal support to postsecondary education and health care; medicare and the Canada Assistance Plan, also negotiated in this period, involved only very broad conditions. The debates involving these programs anticipate the current debates with respect to “conditionality” in transfers under the Canada Health Act, and proposed programs such as early childhood care and education.

What is most striking about these developments is that Canadian federalism was at the same time both decentralizing dramatically and advancing nationwide social policy. But now, provinces were playing a much larger role in shaping the programs, and federal conditions on social transfers were becoming fewer and less onerous. The term “collaborative federalism” had not yet been invented, but collaboration it was.

The executive federalism of first ministers’ conferences in the 1960s foreshadowed the predominant role they would play after the founding of this magazine in 1980. The September 1980 summit on patriating the constitution with a charter ultimately led to the Kitchen Accord of November 1981. Subsequently, the Meech Lake Accord was the outcome of two FMCs in 1987, and a third one the result of a week-long marathon that died when it wasn’t ratified by Newfoundland and Manitoba in 1990. The 1992 Charlottetown Accord, defeated in a referendum, was the last of the big-time FMCs.

With the arrival of Jean Chrétien in 1993, the FMC was downgraded to first ministers’ meetings, called infrequently on an ad hoc basis, and typically focused on a single issue of dispute, such as health care. And the Ottawa railway station— site of the Meech Lake failure— was no longer the venue of choice. The diminished role of the FMC reflected the dropping of the constitution from the intergovernmental agenda, and the deep hostility with which Prime Minister Chrétien, echoing Pierre Trudeau, regarded the first ministers conferences, seeing them as arenas for the assertion of provincial power. With the coming of the government of Paul Martin, first ministers’ meetings on health and other matters have become more prominent, but their role as panCanadian forums for broad policy debate has yet to be restored.

Another innovation in the 1960s was the growth of inter-provincial coordinating mechanisms. In 1960, Jean Lesage proposed the revival of annual meetings of premiers, and they have been held annually since. Then, as now, meetings combined social events, discussion of mutual provincial concerns, and strategy with respect to the federal government. The annual Premiers’ Conference has become increasingly important over the years, culminating most recently in the establishment of the Council of the Federation. In the 1960s, as well, regional cooperation among provinces grew, leading to the establishment of the Atlantic and western premier’s councils. In the 1960s, the two (now three) northern territories remained subordinate to Ottawa. Now, as they approach provincial status, in fact, if not in law, they have become part of the network. The consequences of this strong PT network may be two-fold: to heighten the polarization between federal and provincial governments, and to increase the ability of provinces to reconcile differences among themselves.

Beyond the specific institutions of intergovernmental relations, much also remains similar in terms of the dynamics of the discussions themselves. Then, as now, policy debate became increasingly subject to considerations of turf, status, blameavoidance and credit-claiming as the issues moved toward the higher political levels. Then as now, there was a tendency for virtually every substantive policy issue to be transmuted into a debate about funding. Then as now, each level of government sought maximum influence over the other, while minimizing limits on their autonomy imposed by others. Then as now, the process had no statutory or constitutional standing; there was no set schedule for first ministers’ meetings; there were no formal decision rules; and agreements had no formal status or mechanisms for enforcement.

The issues addressed in the intergovernmental arena in the 1960s were profound and contentious, linked together in complex ways. My impression, however, and it is just that, is that there was less mutual hostility and distrust in the 1960s than has become evident more recently. There are several possible reasons. The predominance of almost continuous constitutional discussions from the 1970s on raised the political stakes of intergovernmental relations at least until the failure of the Charlottetown round in 1992. The fiscal crisis of the 1990s also raised the financial stakes, as governments sought to pass the burden on to others. The completion of the welfare state and the subsequent attacks on “big government” eroded the sense among governments that, whatever their political disagreements about financing and “who should do what,” they were engaged in a common policy project. The centralization of intergovernmental affairs in first ministers’ offices and specialized agencies concentrated attention on political considerations. In addition, there appears to have been much more continuity in the service of senior officials responsible for intergovernmental affairs in the 1960s. Whatever the political disagreements between their political masters, they were able to maintain communications, based on long association. Today, rapid turnover of staff both in political and bureaucratic central agencies has eroded that common experience, and thus the possibility of shared values and concerns, and the possibility of carefully crafting compromise behind the scenes. Hence the competitive and adversarial nature of intergovernmental relations appears to be even more prominent today than it was in the 1960s, despite the stated commitments to sharing, cooperation and shared values that characterize documents such as the Social Union Framework Agreement and other recent intergovernmental accords.

In my 1972 study, the “democratic deficit” associated with the conduct of intergovernmental relations played little role. Yet Donald Smiley’s acerbic critique— that executive federalism undermines democracy by placing crucial decision-making in the hands of federal-provincial elites— was soon to appear. Then as now, intergovernmental relations were simply an executive process. As the process became more important in the 1960s, however, many critiques that ring true today began to be articulated. Parliamentarians argued that in the FMC a new order of government, resting on executive power, may be emerging, one that was immune from legislative scrutiny. Others raised issues of accountability: if transfers were to be increased with fewer conditions, how could federal politicians be held accountable for spending funds over which they had little control, and how could provinces be held to account for spending money that they had not raised? Here, too, the preoccupations of the present find echoes in the past.

What can explain this continuity of intergovernmental relations, in the face of the extensive changes that we have seen in Canada’s society, economy and international position? The answer seems to lie in what political scientists call “path dependency” and “institutional constraints and incentives.” The fundamental determinants of intergovernmental relations in Canada are to be found in the basic institutional structure of Canadian politics: the combination of federalism, with Ottawa and the provinces endowed with broad jurisdictional and fiscal freedom, with a division of powers between federal and provincial governments predicated on a watertight compartments division of powers (despite the reality of effective interdependence across most policy areas); with a Westminster-style system of cabinet government that concentrates power within central executives at both levels; and with a federal political structure that provides for weak representation and expression of provincial and regional interests within the central government. The result is two orders of government, each endowed with extensive jurisdictional, fiscal and bureaucratic resources; each responding to its distinctive electoral environment; and with very few mechanisms— other than the intergovernmental processes themselves— for integrating Canadawide and regional politics. Hence the adversarial and competitive intergovernmental relations in Canada relative to other federations.

In the years following the period that I explored in the 1960s, in which a rough balance was found between the shared values and distinctive interests inherent in a federal model of governance, the pendulum shifted briefly in the opposite direction. The government of Pierre Trudeau sought to establish a national citizenship regime, based on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and which would enshrine the “equality of the provinces,” and establish “national standards” in social policy. These are powerful and persuasive ideas; but in modern Canada, the patterns established in the 1960s may be closer to the mark.

But historical and institutional factors are not the whole story. It must include social and economic factors as well. Prior to the decade that I studied, the conventional wisdom among students of federalism was that modernization and centralization went together; that the inexorable forces were leading towards a diminution of ethnic and regional considerations in favour of a national conception of citizenship, and a politics based on identities that bypassed and transcended such old identities. The implication was centralization. Then, later, in the 1990s, writers like Tom Courchene argued that new forces were equally inexorably leading to “glocalization”— a flow of influence from national governments upward to supranational forces of globalization, and downward to the local level: decentralization. The story of Canadian federalism in the 1960s is of the revival of provincial and regional forces in the Canadian federation. The story, yet unknown, of federalism in the 21st century is how things will play out in the future. The implication of the 1960s was, as Donald Smiley put it, an apparent “attenuation of federal power.” Today’s story seems much the same: yes, greater funding to assure Ottawa’s place in leading areas, such as child care; but no, you have no right to tell us what to do, because you no longer have the political and fiscal levers to make it so. If we are to have national standards, they cannot be dictated; they can only emerge from intergovernmental consensus. This was also the message of the 1960s. A pessimist would say this is no way to run a federation; an optimist would say we did a pretty good job then, and there is no reason why we should not do so now.