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Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Ottawa has aligned itself with Washington: sanctions, military aid to Kyiv, reinforced deployments in Eastern Europe, suspended diplomatic channels. But in a multipolar world, can Canada maintain this course? Supporting Ukraine remains essential, but Canada must also protect its interests and play its historic role as mediator.

When Pierre Elliott Trudeau went to Moscow in 1971, Canada was in the thick of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was the West’s adversary, yet Ottawa chose dialogue, balancing deterrence and diplomacy. Half a century later, in a new era of great-power rivalry, that lesson bears repeating.

Today, the international system is no longer unipolar. The post-1991 era of uncontested U.S. dominance has given way to a more fragmented world. Emerging powers such as China, India, Turkey, and Brazil are reshaping the global order. As for Russia, despite sanctions and the costs of the war, it remains a central player: a nuclear power, an Arctic neighbour and, a state embedded in energy markets, diplomacy and security networks.

A long history of shifts

Russia’s place in the world has never been fixed. Since Peter the Great’s reforms in the early eighteenth century, the country has alternated between European integration and inward-looking autocracy. The late nineteenth century brought industrialisation and a measure of liberalisation, quickly followed by revolution and the rigid centralisation of Soviet power.

The Soviet Union projected power worldwide but collapsed under the weight of its contradictions in 1991. In the late Soviet period, Mikhail Gorbachev began limited political liberalisation (glasnost, perestroika, competitive elections). After 1991, that liberalisation continued briefly. In 1993, under President Boris Yeltsin, the constitutional crisis and the new constitution entrenched a strong presidential system; from then on the authoritarian turn gathered pace.

Canada had to adapt to these shifts in Russia’s orientation. During the Cold War, Ottawa condemned Soviet repression while maintaining exchanges and pursuing détente. From the 1950s onward, Canadian peacekeepers were deployed to conflicts shaped by East–West rivalry. Canada supported NATO and NORAD but also sustained cultural and scientific exchanges, convinced that isolation alone was untenable.

What is at stake for Canada today

Russia and Canada share an Arctic geography that is more than symbolic. During the Cold War, radar stations on the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in the Arctic reminded Canadians daily that Soviet bombers could reach North America within hours. Today, climate change is opening new Arctic sea routes. If Canada wants to assert its sovereignty in the North, it cannot ignore Russia as a key actor.

The Ukrainian diaspora is another dimension. Canada hosts one of the world’s largest Ukrainian communities, which has naturally shaped Ottawa’s pro-Kyiv policy since 2014. Yet Canada’s own history also reminds us of the need to balance solidarity with dialogue. Even at the height of the Cold War, Ottawa kept communication channels with Moscow open, recognizing that engagement and deterrence can coexist.

Canada’s commitments to its alliances are real. NATO, NORAD and the G7 remain the pillars of its security. But the country has always aspired to be more than a loyal ally: a mediator, a bridge-builder, a moderate voice. In a multipolar world, aligning exclusively with Washington risks narrowing Ottawa’s strategic room for manoeuvre.

This approach must also take into account Canada’s domestic constraints: the importance of the Ukrainian diaspora, its commitment to NATO and the G7, and public opinion. The policy focus should therefore focus on risk management and crisis-prevention mechanisms where Canadian interests are direct and measurable.

Multipolarity and realism

Recognizing multipolarity does not mean condoning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine or abandoning a rules-based international order. It means acknowledging that the global system is no longer organised around a single pole of power. Russia has tightened ties with China, expanded its presence in the Middle East and sought greater influence in Africa.

For Canada, the task is to defend its national interests while accepting the realities of a multipolar system. That means preparing for long-term coexistence with Russia. At times this coexistence will be conflictual, at times cooperative.

We should distinguish two tracks. First, the need to keep communication channels open to manage crises, avoid miscalculation, and state Canada’s positions directly. Second, the idea of deep security or environmental partnerships, which is not realistic so long as Moscow continues to violate international law and wages a war of aggression. This article addresses the first track.

A forward-looking Canadian policy

A pragmatic approach should start with limited, verifiable measures in the Arctic: search and rescue; air and maritime deconfliction; spill prevention; and tightly scoped scientific exchanges on permafrost and climate risks. Gradually revitalising the Arctic Council would focus on risk management that directly affects northern communities.

Since 2014, and even more since 2022, Russia has acted reactively (at times over-reactively) and in defiance of several treaties and international frameworks. That does not make it unpredictable. Its priorities and red lines have been relatively consistent. Since 2014, Moscow has repeated them: NATO enlargement, Crimea, Western deployments, and Belarus’s security. What is often read as unpredictability largely reflects weakened Western analytical capacity and channels of understanding. Hence the case for crisis hotlines and renewed expertise to reduce misperception.

Diplomatic channels must also remain open. Canada kept talking to the Soviet Union at the height of Cold War hostilities; the same logic holds today. It ensures that crises can be managed and that Canadian positions are not filtered only through allies. In practice, that means maintaining crisis channels, military points of contact to prevent incidents and very targeted technical exchanges when Canadian interests require them.

Lean into our middle-power identity

Energy and resource security is another area where Canada makes a distinct contribution. As a reliable supplier to partners seeking to reduce dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, Canada can strengthen its position as a credible alternative. At the same time, it should not shy away from including Russia in global discussions on energy and climate, because those debates lose relevance if major powers are excluded.

Diaspora communities matter as well. Canada’s large Ukrainian community has shaped Ottawa’s policy, but Russian-speaking Canadians should also be part of the conversation. Encouraging dialogue among communities helps ensure Canadian policy reflects a plurality of perspectives.

Finally, Canada should lean into its middle-power identity. Its credibility has always rested more on constructive mediation than on military might. It should champion global governance frameworks that do not close the door to Russia when concrete interests converge, when compliance with rules can be verified, and when safeguards are in place.

Drawing on Canada’s past

Canada’s Cold War experience shows that principled pragmatism is not weakness but strategy. Ottawa condemned the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia while pursuing arms-control talks. Canadian universities welcomed Soviet students. Cultural exchanges continued. Canadian officials pressed for human rights within the Helsinki framework.

From 1945, Canada emerged from the Second World War as a founding member of the United Nations precisely because it understood that adversaries had to be included. Excluding the Soviet Union from the post-war architecture was never an option. The same logic applied during the 1956 Suez Crisis, when Lester B. Pearson proposed the first UN peacekeeping force, a solution that won the support of the United States and the Soviet bloc and hastened British and French withdrawals. Canadian influence did not come from military force but from creativity and credibility as an honest broker.

Canada was also at the forefront of disarmament and arms-control initiatives. In the 1980s, as Cold War tensions intensified, its diplomats pushed for a ban on chemical weapons and for nuclear non-proliferation frameworks.

These precedents show that Canada has long understood a basic truth: global governance cannot function if adversaries are absent from the table. In today’s multipolar era, trying to exclude Russia risks weakening the very institutions Canada has championed for decades.

Diplomatic imagination

As Russia redefines its place in a multipolar world, Canada must also reposition itself. The choice is not between naive engagement and total isolation; it is between a reactive role that trails great-power rivalries and a proactive middle-power role that helps shape the terms of coexistence.

Trudeau’s 1971 trip to Moscow was controversial, but it reflected Canada’s confidence in its ability to play its own game on the world stage. Pearson’s initiative during the Suez Crisis reflected the same intuition: Canadian influence has come less from military strength than from diplomatic imagination. Half a century later, that confidence – together with vision and initiative – is needed again.

If Canada defines its Russia policy solely by Washington’s preferences, it risks shrinking its own role in a multipolar world. If instead it draws on its history of engagement, combining firmness with dialogue, loyalty to allies with independent judgment, it can speak with a voice that matters. Canada does not choose the Russia it has; it chooses the policy it pursues.

A strategy of selective engagement, backed by deterrence, law and verifiable safeguards, reduces the risk of miscalculation and creates space for action when interests align. Over time, it can also rebuild a minimum of trust and stabilise the relationship, while steering away from a dangerous collision course, including the risk of nuclear escalation.