As the Canadian government considers how to structure and implement its promised ban of imports made with forced labour, it is important that policymakers take specific steps to ensure that any new measures do not unwittingly inflict further harm on already-exploited workers.

Halting the import of goods made with forced labour is required under the 2020 United States(US)-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement. The U.S. ban, which was introduced to protect the U.S. market from unfair competition, has been on the books since 1930, though enforcement has increased significantly over the last eight years, with 2,831 shipments detained to investigate forced labour as of March 31, 2024.

The EU has recently introduced a regulation that would prohibit placing goods made with forced labour in the internal market or exporting such goods from the EU.

Today the stated purpose of the bans is to eliminate forced labour by reducing the market for goods produced under these conditions. However, as these efforts gain momentum and Ottawa prepares to roll out Canada’s ban, it is important to ask: Does this regulatory approach benefit or harm workers who are experiencing forced labour?

There is little reliable data on how enforcement of these bans affects the workers who made the goods, but some advocates raise concerns that simply banning imports could result in widespread job loss, unpaid severance pay, and other adverse consequences for workers who are already struggling.

Canada needs to address the issue of modern slavery

Canada’s contribution to ending slavery

New bill fails to address human rights abuses in supply chains

Policymakers tend to overlook the potential of forced-labour import bans to worsen, rather than improve, the situation of workers who perform forced labour. Banning products made with forced labour could push workers into more precarious situations. If a factory or farm closes following an import ban, employees are often left without work or any alternative means of making a living.

If Canada’s import ban is supposed to combat forced labour, policymakers need to understand these risks and how to avoid adverse impacts for workers. Policymakers must also ensure that implementation strategies do not undermine any worker-led initiatives that are already addressing poor working conditions in supply chains.

One recent U.S. enforcement provides a cautionary tale.

In July 2022, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency issued a ban, known as a Withhold and Release Order (WRO), against an Indian garment factory, Natchi Apparel, which is owned by Eastman Exports, one of India’s largest textile companies. The WRO was issued after a report had been published by the Workers Rights Consortium — an independent labour rights monitoring organization — noting serious violations in the factory, including indicators of forced labour.

However, during the period between the labour report and the WRO, workers in the factory had begun to pioneer their own solutions, which included freedom of association, an independent union’s access to the workers and shop floor, and a grievance mechanism, to deal with these problems. The issuing of the WRO threatened to derail this progress because of economic pressures it put on the supplier.

Indeed, in the wake of the Worker Rights Consortium factory investigation, a women-led union of Dalit garment workers had negotiated agreements with major garment companies including H&M, Gap Inc., and Natchi Apparel. These accords, called “The Dindigul Agreement,” aim to end gender-based violence and harassment, and had already begun to remediate poor working conditions documented in the factory.

Known within academic and advocacy circles as a “worker-driven social responsibility” agreement, the Dindigul Agreement is a powerful example of how worker-led strategies can improve conditions through collective action, shop-floor monitoring by trained workers, and remediation.

In the Natchi Apparel case, evidence provided by the local union and other labour advocacy organizations indicated that the conditions resulting in forced labour had already been remedied. This led the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency to modify the WRO and lift the ban, enabling the Dindigul Agreement to continue to be implemented.

A potentially disastrous result was narrowly avoided. If the WRO had not been lifted quickly, the ban would likely have undermined the gains that workers had achieved for themselves. In the worst case, they could have been laid off en masse as the factories scrambled to respond to the WRO.

This incident holds an important warning for the architects of Canada’s import ban. Without close consultation with workers’ groups, import-ban enforcement can be negative for workers and undercut hard-won efforts to improve working conditions in supply chains.

Three ways that policymakers can build safeguards into Canada’s import ban are:

• before issuing a ban, consult with labour stakeholders and develop a risk-oriented enforcement strategy, incorporating the input of workers who are alleged to be working in conditions of forced labour;
• require suppliers and importers to remedy any employment practices giving rise to forced labour and compensate workers who have been subject to forced labour, before the goods are released or exported;
• actively encourage worker-driven social responsibility agreements like the Dindigul agreement, treating them as a successful remediation of forced labour.

Innovative models of worker-led agreements such as the Dindigul Agreement can achieve a lot in a short time to improve working conditions.

It is critical that import bans are carefully designed so they do not derail existing initiatives that are already helping end forced labour and other bad employment practices.