Haiti is truly a failed state. Its history over 500 years since first ”œdiscovery” by Christopher Columbus in 1492 has been a succession of invasion, extermination, colonization, exploitation, repression, revolution, occupation, degradation and essentially now, disintegration. Over Haiti’s troubled his- tory, Spain, France, the United States and more recently the UN (including Canada), the Organization of American States and CARICOM have all been involved ”” and we are at it again. To add to the historical diffi- culties, the recent floods have ravaged an already vul- nerable land. Is it not time to assess what should be done and done differently? Is this not an opportunity to put the full ”œ3-D” concept ”” defence, diplomacy and devel- opment ”” into action?
The island named Hispaniola by Columbus in 1492 was originally inhabited by the Arawak Indians, who were virtu- ally extinguished during the first 25 years of Spanish occu- pation. The western portion of the island that is now Haiti, was ceded to the French by Spain in 1697. Aided by slaves imported from Africa, the French developed a thriving and wealthy colony growing sugar and coffee and exploiting the forest resources ”” the beginning of the systemic environ- mental degradation on the island. Haiti was among the wealthiest of Caribbean colonies, until the slaves revolted in 1794, eventually declaring independence as a republic in 1804 after a war of attrition against the French. Independence did not end the struggles for power, and vio- lence characterized Haiti’s history, with 22 changes in gov- ernment between 1843 and 1915. This led to military intervention by the United States in 1915 and an occupa- tion that lasted 19 years. A dictatorship under the Duvalier family then ruled Haiti until overthrown in 1986. A period with a series of provisional governments was ended in 1991 with the free election of Roman Catholic priest Jean- Bertrand Aristide as president, but he was overthrown in a military coup within eight months.
The overthrow of President Aristide in 1992 resulted in no fewer than five UN or joint UN-OAS missions over the next decade. Over the next three years of repressive military rule, a UN- OAS mission, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was attempting to mediate and subse- quently implement the 1993 Governors Island Agreement for restoration of democratic government. The mission included a joint task force of 600 US and 110 Canadian military personnel but was expelled in 1994. This led to UN Security Council Resolution 940 authorizing a multi- national military force to restore the elected government of Aristide, with a revised mandate ”œto enable the Mission to assist the democratic Government to sustain a stable envi- ronment, professionalize the armed forces and create a separate police force, and establish an environment conducive to free and fair elections.”
A new mission, the UN Support Mission In Haiti (UNSMIH) was subse- quently established (July 1996-97) ”œto assist the Government in the profes- sionalization of the police, mainte- nance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of efforts to establish and train an effective national police force, and to coordinate activities of the United Nations system in promoting institu- tion-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.” Then the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) was established in 1997 ”œto assist the government of Haiti by sup- porting and contributing to the profes- sionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Tasks of UNTMIH’s police element included training HNP specialized units in crowd control, the rapid reaction force and palace securi- ty, areas considered to be of distinct importance.
Next, the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was ”œestablished to assist the Government in the professionalization of the National Police” (Aug-Nov 1997). The mission placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Other tasks included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the police funded by the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral donors. Having determined that the situation in Haiti continued to constitute a threat to international peace and secu- rity in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1542 of April 2004, decided to estab- lish the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorized by the Security Council in February 2004, to MINUS- TAH on June 1, 2004.
The total cost of the first four oper- ations to date has been $401 million! Canada, a contributor of troops, police and aid in each of the UN operations has recently been back again in Haiti. In the spring of 2004, there was also a strong commitment from other OAS members (US, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Guatemala). In March, some 500 Canadian troops, including helicopter support ”” were deployed to Haiti, ini- tially for 90 days, but then extended to the end of September 2004 under UN auspices. With such a limited time and resource commitment, is this another ”œband-aid” operation?
Haiti is important to Canada. It is a Caribbean nation ”” an area of significant interest to Canada. There are close to 100,000 Haitians living in Montreal alone. Other Caribbean nations are also heavily represented in the Canadian mosaic ”” about 200,000 Jamaicans in Toronto plus those from Barbados, Trinidad and other Caribbean states for a total of some 550,000. This number is more than twice the number from all of Latin, Central and South America combined and more than all of those plus those of Arab, Mahgrebi and African origins, according to the 2001 census.
In addition, there are thousands of Canadians living in the Caribbean in general, and during the tourist sea- son, tens to hundreds of thousands are present. There is also a consistent and long-standing Canadian business involvement in the Caribbean. The Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Nova Scotia have been very active in the finance sector for decades, and resource companies such as Alcan and Imperial Oil are well invested in the region.
Failed states like Haiti are impor- tant to us for other reasons ”” they harbour organized crime, drug run- ning, money laundering and are havens for and breeding grounds of terrorists. The employment of Cana- dian military forces to further Cana- dian policy aims or interests outside of perhaps NATO or UN contexts is uncommon. Since 1960, however, Canada has used its military forces at least 19 times in the Caribbean to support Canadian foreign policy, and further planned four additional oper- ations, including two unilateral inter- ventions into Caribbean states. Ten out of these 23 operations have involved the use or planned use of Canadian maritime forces. The three Caribbean nations that have seen the most Canadian military activity since 1970 are Grenada, Jamaica and Haiti.
At the same time, the Canadian gov- ernment is increasingly vocal about its ”œ3-D” interagency policy ”” a co-ordinated effort of defence, diploma- cy and development ”” as the means to managing post-conflict environments in the future. Prime Minister Paul Martin made this point clear in a speech last April, stating: ”œElements of defence, diplomacy and development are woven tightly together as part of the (Afghanistan) mission. The Canadian Forces, for example, provide the security that, in turn, allows organizations like Canada’s International Development Agency to support Afghanistan’s election process and democratic development.”
This ”œ3-D” approach ”” the inte- gration of diplomacy, defence and development ”” will serve as the model for Canada’s involvement in international crises in the future, crises that will take many forms. For instance, multilateralism is clearly our preferred approach to resolving inter- national crises. But the absence of international consensus must never condemn us to inaction.
Far too often in recent times, coun- tries that could have stepped for- ward as leaders in times of crisis failed to do so. Far too often they’ve felt that it was not their responsibility and have looked to others to do the job. And far too often we have seen the tragic con- sequences that result from the failure of the international community to act on the principles that form the very basis of the United Nations Charter. In addition, there is the ”œhuman secu- rity” fallout document, ”œThe Responsibility to Protect,” widely trum- peted, but so far not widely supported. This document supports a doctrine of intervention by the international com- munity, including the use of military force if necessary, to protect popula- tions being abused by their govern- ments ”” even if it means contravening a state’s ”œsovereignty rights.”
It appears, therefore, that from relatively recent history, the Caribbean is clearly an area of Canadian interest. In addition, it is clear that a combined military, diplo- matic and development approach is very much part of Canada’s current and expected future policy, and the need to take extraordinary measures to support oppressed peoples is equal- ly clear. So, what should we do about the Caribbean in general, and cur- rently Haiti, in particular?
It is well recognized that there is a practical equation or sequence ”” security is a pre-con- dition of economic development, which is itself a pre-condition of social development.
Security must first be established before any real political, economic or social progress or development can occur ”” it is the sine qua non. Security, in this context, is intended to con- tribute to the establishment of the rule of law ”” effective police, courts and a civilian- controlled professional military under a freely elected democratic leadership ”” without which the follow-on economic and social development will be stilted, at best. In Haiti, police were retrained, but the judiciary were not, and the leadership remained autocratic and cor- rupted. Well-intentioned newly- trained police would arrest and charge criminals only to have them quickly back on the streets, having paid the necessary bribes to judicial or other officials.
Without security, there is virtual- ly no opportunity for economic development. The hurricane and flood devastation in Haiti last fall ”” Gonaives in particular ”” and the absence of general security on the ground, contributed to the serious difficulties in delivering food, water and aid to the inhabitants of that part of Haiti. The situation overall was further complicated by the subse- quent demonstrations against the government in Port au Prince and the deaths of several policemen. An inse- cure environment represents too great a risk for a major presence of NGO workers. It further discourages legitimate investors, but indeed does encourage the corrupt practitioners of smuggling and extortion. They, of course, have little interest in social development, especially education.
Legitimate and successful invest- ment does contribute to economic development, which then reinforces security and thus permits social development. Social development then reinforces security and con- tributes to further economic devel- opment ”” an effective feedback system. But it must be emphasized from the outset: without security, progress will not occur.
This is what must be understood as we hear of the 3D approach ”” defence, diplomacy and development ”” a recognition of the absolutely essential interconnection of the three for the long-term rehabilitation of failing or failed states. Canada’s G8/ Kananaskis Africa policy also recog- nizes the linkage between democracy, the rule of law and a market economy as precursors for effective long-term development and stability in unsta- ble states.
The question for Haiti is, ”œHow do we get there from here?”
For Canada to do anything worthwhile in this situation, sev- eral factors must be understood and accepted. The first is to rec- ognize that the history of such failed states clearly demonstrates that the short-term band-aid approach does not produce long- term change.
Second, without co-ordi- nated and long-term policies and implementation, any change will be limited to non- existent.
Third, the US, notwith- standing its best intentions, is probably not the best leader of such change in this region.
Fourth, Canada does not have all the human or finan- cial resources necessary to undertake such long-term change alone.
Fifth, as the largest and sec- ond-wealthiest nation in the Western Hemisphere, Canada may be seen to have not only a responsibility, but also the potential that no other hemispheric nation would have, and with no other agenda other than help and stability.
Canada also has some unique strengths to offer in terms of linguistic and cultural resources. Within our Haitian and other Caribbean commu- nities and populations there are edu- cated professionals who could and should be encouraged to provide leadership in these activities ”” return- ing to their heritage country and cul- ture the lessons of living in a democratic and prosperous Canada ”” similar to what some Baltic and Balkan Canadians have done.
It is time for Canada to grab hold of the situation and put its theories, policies and experience to the test.
We must recognize, as the ”œsequence” indicates, security is a pre-condition. This is
not just a military intervention, but also the creation and training of police (already done in the 90s) and the reforma- tion, supervision and operation of a rule-of- law-based judiciary (NOT done in the 90s!).
Simultaneously, a system of ”œappropriate democracy” must be established and nurtured. It may not look like Canada, but it should include free and supervised elections ”” also a matter in which we have some experience. In addition, however, a democratic establishment of the rule of law will be challenged to rootout the embedded and all-perva- sive culture of corruption that has existed for over a century. Professional military and police forces under demo- cratic civilian control will be the essen- tial foundations of progress.
Plans for economic development ”” from a ”œbrownfield start-up” ”” must include a rejuvenation of the Haitian agricultural sector, to permit ultimate food self-sufficiency and the basis for agricultural / farmers’ markets. Massive deforestation has led to fertile soil erosion, which has in turn prompt- ed the collapse of the coastal fishing. The recent floods can only have added to the devastation of croplands. Recovery of this sector, even in tropical lands, will take time and know-how, but agricultural know-how is indeed something Canada has ”” another area for Canadian leadership.
Transportation and utilities infra- structure will be essential. Establishing the necessary infrastruc- ture can be a source of employment in the construction industry. But, there must be employment opportu- nities developed intentionally ”” per- haps initially based on construction and even existing textile/clothing and other low-tech manufacturing. The single greatest, and perhaps fastest, economic development and foreign currency earner could be in tourism ”” resorts and hotels. Canadian corporations rushed to invest in Cuban facilities; is there not perhaps opportunity for such invest- ment in Haiti?
All of these initiatives would also include the need for education and training ”” a long term undertak- ing ”” plus health and welfare efforts, and of course substantial private investment. Clearly, however, foreign investment and economic activity will be necessary to bring economic prosperity to a level where it will start impacting favourably on security and stability. Finally, and again, the cul- ture of corruption will have to be overcome, but ultimately possible only through a combination of an established rule of law in a confident- ly secure environment, economic opportunity for the majority and, of course, at least a generation of edu- cated leaders and workers. This will take time ”” probably generations ”” but we must be prepared to under- take and manage such a project for whatever time it takes if we are truly interested in turning around a failed state, remembering, however, that it is in our common, best and long- term interests to do so. If we do not do so, we will be condemned to fre- quent, almost continuous repetition of the last decade of band-aid inter- ventions, and no real change for Haiti and Haitians.
The prime minister has endorsed ”œthe responsibility to protect” as a doctrine in his most recent address to the United Nations. This implies act- ing early and quickly to prevent sce- narios involving inhumane conditions, genocide or intense suffer- ing. With deployable capabilities such as the Canadian Forces Disaster Assis- tance Response Team, including emer- gency field hospital and water purification capacities, together with judicial and police training experi- ence, and NGOs with development and democratization experience in different cultures and dimensions abroad, Canada does have the capaci- ty to provide both assistance and lead- ership, and to do so without taxing existing resources.
Haiti is the poorest country in our hemisphere with what are arguably the most distressing and dis- couraging prospects. That is not a reason to disengage or to look the other way. If the ”œ3-D” public policy of joined-up defence, diplomacy and development is to mean anything, it must mean something in our own hemisphere. Canada has an opportu- nity to lead in a way that no other country may be better suited or even able to do.
