When Paul Martin assumes the leadership of the Liberal party, he will face an enormous challenge, and enormous expectations. The last eighteen months of torpor and drift have resulted in critical public policy issues stacking up on the political agenda. The Liberal party, and Canadians, will anticipate action on many fronts. The broad range of issues— trade policy, health care, social policy, and foreign and defence policy— will pose a significant test of Martin’s skill and acumen. How Martin handles this will not only mark his tenure as prime minister, but will mark how Canada will begin to adapt to the emerging realities of the 21st century.
Perhaps no issue begs for more sustained attention and fresh thinking than the defence and security policy agenda. Whether it will receive the consideration it so clearly deserves, is an open question. During his time in waiting, Martin has on several occasions spoken of his intent to tackle the defence and security policy challenge. If he follows through, this might be a radical departure from our historical experience. For much of Canada’s history, defence and national security have tended to play out in the background, of interest only to a limited circle of defence experts, interest groups, and academics.
Our traditional approach to matters of national security is no longer adequate for the complexities and problems in the world today. A foreign policy built on platitudes or Canadian conceits may be comforting, but it will not, as recent events have manifestly made clear, ensure the protection and promotion of our strategic interests. Similarly, a defence policy based on the myth of peacekeeping will be equally insufficient, particularly since the gap between the pervasive cliché and the reality of peace enforcement operations of the past decade has become an unbridgeable chasm. Perhaps most discomfiting, Canada’s ad hoc national security policy-making apparatus seems unable to bring policy coherence to the various departments and agencies with an interest in security affairs. Nor is this ad hoc approach able to mobilize the country’s disparate elements of national power in ways appropriate for new circumstances.
Hopefully, Martin will be different than most of his predecessors. Hopefully he will undertake a complete review of the national security and defence agenda from first principles. Yet another series of parallel foreign and defence policy reviews, such as those conducted over the past decade will be woefully inadequate. What is necessary is a fundamental rethinking of how Canada will go about securing its national interests and pursuing its national objectives. Anything short of that will be a major disappointment, and will run the risk of courting irrelevance in the 21st century.
Canada confronts an uncomfortable situation in the aftermath of the US action against Iraq. We find ourselves standing at one of those proverbial forks in the road. How we reached this point is less important than decisions we face about the direction we must now take. Sadly, it is not clear that Canada, as a nation, as a people and as a government, is able to make a clear and forthright decision on the best direction to take, and how we will get there. The inability to consider something as fundamental as our strategic interests is a reflection of a lack of strategic culture— or at the very least an immaturity in strategic culture— that has plagued this country for much of the past decade, if not longer.
Now that the period termed, for want of a better description, the post-Cold War era has ended, we stand at the threshold of a new security environment. The contours of this new security environment have only begun to emerge, but it seems probable that this will portend significant implications for our long-term strategic interests. At root, the challenge that Paul Martin faces is far more complex than finding additional resources, even though additional resources are sorely needed. The real challenge involves restructuring the national security policy-making apparatus of government, or perhaps more appropriately, creating a national security apparatus.
In doing so, Martin will be able draw on an emerging consensus that a clear understanding of strategic interests and a more coherent national security strategy are essential preconditions for success and relevance in the 21st century security environment. This consensus is strongest on a number of key points. First Mr Martin will need to address the very basic, but by no means straightforward matter of identifying strategic interests or national interests. Then, there will need to be a general discussion of national security policy planning, with a view to implementing a more comprehensive and responsive apparatus. Finally, that in doing so, it will be necessary to overcome a strong and pervasive overhang that makes discussing national security policy difficult and challenging. Desmond Morton, in his recent book Understanding Canadian Defence, captures neatly the challenge.
While Morton provides a broad and by and large accurate reading of how we reached our current nadir, he then basically shrugs his shoulders and suggests that we are condemned to continue down the same path. This attitude is representative of a school of thought that could be best characterized as the “historical drag school.” While it is important to understand how we reached the point we are at, it is equally important to look to alternate paths for the future. This will be Martin’s test. Can he contemplate something different?
In contemplating the range of possibilities, Martin will face a number of obstacles. First and foremost will be the challenge of energizing the bureaucracy. New approaches are necessary, and so far there is little indication that the various government departments that have a stake in national security and defence policy are willing to engage in this type of fresh thinking. Second, and nearly as challenging, is the need to fend off the blandishments of the various interest groups that periodically issue reports on the state of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. While interest groups have an important role to play in this re-assessment, their contributions have been remarkably unimaginative. Most recommendations consist, at bottom, of the need to spend more money. In some cases they advocate certain equipment procurements, force structure changes, improvements to recruiting and retention policies, reforms of internal practices, and a consideration of scaling back commitments.
While resources are vital, what is more important is an appreciation of how these resources will be spent, and on what. Few suggest anything that will aid in evaluating where any additional resources will provide the most bang for the buck. Clearly, this is the Gordian knot that Martin will have to cut. More of the same is not the answer. A slightly larger version of the same model is inadequate. The challenges that have arisen over the past two years, and those that will arise in the years ahead will require new capabilities, in addition to the current capabilities. In other words, the existing force model will need to be both broadened and deepened. Whether the existing policy planning and force development apparatus can deliver is an open question. This is the task that Martin will confront. Can he cajole the many components of the national security apparatus into rising to the challenge, or will he need to impose a new, higher order national security framework on a reluctant system?
The remainder of this discussion will concentrate on the latter part of the question. There will be no shortage of recommendations rising out of the bureaucracy and interest groups. For the most part, these will be well intentioned and will contain sound and necessary proposals. However, they will, in all likelihood, offer up more of the same, and, as should be apparent, more of the same will not be sufficient. I will first explore the vexing question of creating a national security policy framework suitable for new and difficult circumstances. I will then offer a mechanism for considering competing force design options with a view to providing judgements about what is needed and what risks are attached to the various options. For Martin, facing multiple demands on the public treasury, and on political capital, it is absolutely necessary that he have in place a means to take action.
The objective underlying any national security policy planning system is to help make coherent choices for the future. Choices are necessary to align ends with means, where ends are the objectives sought, and means are the tools necessary to secure those ends. The process itself consists of a series of evaluations, assessments and judgements about future trends and how these will affect the ability of armed forces to support national defence policies and strategies. Based on these judgements, the process enables planners to devise force structure models that will guide future acquisition decisions. Figure 1 illustrates, at least in a notional sense, the various considerations that must be taken into account, the interrelationships between these considerations, and the fact that the process is iterative in nature.
The process is top-down, and at least as depicted here, intended to be “rational” in nature. There are two major components to the process. The first leads to what can be called “strategic choices.” This involves the identification of national interests, national objectives, national strategy and national military strategy. The second major component involves the making of the force choices necessary to support the national strategy. It calls for an assessment of the existing force model and judgements about the future geo-strategic environment in order to identify deficiencies and/or future options. The defence strategy sets the context for the second component identified at Figure 1, which is intended to guide the process of making choices with respect to defence planning and force development. Through an assessment of the requirements necessary to support the national strategy, judgements regarding the ability of the existing force structure to secure the objectives are made. This overall assessment leads to further assessments pertaining to deficiencies in the force structure, and points up alternatives for future consideration.
That, at least in theory, is how the process is intended to function. However, recent work by Don MacNamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald argues that while the United States, the United Kingdom and others have a more or less functioning system in place to develop a coherent representation of national interests and national strategy, such is not the case in Canada. They remark, “it is now widely acknowledged, both inside and outside of government…that there is no national security framework or clear and distinct national security policy….” The implication of this absence of a rational approach to national security and defence planning is that it will result in continued confusion regarding national security policy and defence policy, and by extension, in the development of the armed forces necessary to support national interests.
The first step in rectifying the situation is a “clear articulation of Canada’s national interests, based in a clear statement of fundamental values and goals.” Then, and only then, can the process of national strategy and defence strategy formulation begin to approximate the theoretical norm identified by Lloyd. While some would argue that Canada has indeed articulated a set of national interests, goals and values, few would accept that this has been done in anything more than an ad hoc fashion.
There is a large body of literature that addresses the issues of national interests and national security policy frameworks. Perhaps best known is the approach taken by Donald Nuechterlein, which is depicted in Figure 2. The purpose is to identify the range of national interests and impose some measurement of their importance. This is not infallible, but it does constitute a jumping off point.
The left hand column represents a statement of the national interests, and the top row represents an assessment of how important they are to the nation. Against this, any situation can be judged as to its importance, and ultimately what might need to be done. Those situations that are deemed fundamental and critical will merit a stronger response, in many cases an immediate military response. Others may be of lesser importance, and may require a less immediate or robust military response, or perhaps a combination of the other tools of national security.
If such a matrix were to be employed by Canadian national security planners, it would assist in two important ways. First, it would identify those interests for which the use of military means to secure the desired ends is both most likely and most appropriate. Second, it would assist in identifying alternative approaches to securing those less vital interests, particularly when military resources are in scarce supply. Figure 3 depicts one way of considering this type of trade-off. It employs judgements about the probability of occurrence and the degree of danger of threats to the nation.
Admittedly, Figure 3 is a rather simplistic rendering of a complex problem, and in present circumstances, only the armed forces of the United States can even begin to contemplate responses to the full range of scenarios.
For Canada, addressing this is considerably more complicated, and requires a different, and ultimately more complex portrayal, which can be found at Figure 4. In this representation, an effort is made to demonstrate the range of specifically military responses to the various scenarios, and any possible overlap in terms of military capabilities. While Figure 4 is notional, it suggests three things. First, it identifies those scenarios that demand hard military responses. Second, those that may call for non-military responses, and third, those that call for a mixed response.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that reasonable people can agree on the nature and extent of the overlap between the two views of conflict, and that they can agree that there needs to be a sufficient military capability to meet these, then the next step in the process is to develop a force model that could meet the multiple challenges. Developing a force model, however, is no easy task.
Based on past experience, and past practice, one of the most significant obstacles is developing an appreciation of the meaning of risk. Risk, risk assessment and risk management are terms that are widely and frequently used, but it is not clear that the terms are well understood. Given the importance of strategy development and force planning, this is both surprising and unsettling. Within the context of any future consideration of national security, it is clear that the exercise will have to grapple with risk, risk assessment and risk management. Hence, it would be of some benefit if there were some commonly held appreciation of the various dimensions of risk. Such a common appreciation would assist in discussions of the risk inherent in the various options developed to meet the overall objective.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to distinguish three types of risk, namely: national security risk; strategic military risk; and operational risk.
National Security Risk. National security risk is the most nebulous measure, in that it attempts to gauge intangibles, such as diplomatic power. Risk in terms of national security connotes the overall probability that the instruments of national power (diplomatic, military and economic) will be insufficient to meet the goals of higher national policy. Given the somewhat vague nature of the problem at this level, measurement or assessment of risk becomes particularly challenging.
Strategic Military Risk. Strategic military risk connotes the overall probability that a military force will be unable to achieve all of the objectives of a particular defence strategy. Measuring strategic risk involves judgements about the priorities inherent in the strategy and the likelihood of accomplishing all of the stated objectives.
Operational Risk. Operational risk connotes the probability that a military force will be unable to achieve the particular operational objectives contained in the larger strategy. Measuring or assessing operational risk involves examining a given force structure’s potential performance in two areas: First, the ability to meet the objectives in postulated scenarios, and second, the force structure’s ability to sustain long-term readiness across an extended timeframe and a range of operations.
How then, might one approach the task of developing a risk assessment methodology? The following issues should be taken into account in any effort to conduct a risk assessment:
Questions Pertaining to Strategic and Operational Risk. The first question to ask about strategic and operational risk is whether failure is likely. A second, yet equally important question is what are the consequences of failure? Risk, then, is a function of assessing two variables, the likelihood of failure, and the magnitude of the consequences of failure. As the consequences of failure increase, the degree of risk that can be tolerated decreases. The ability of a given force structure to support the mission areas of a given military strategy determines operational risk.
Framing Risk Assessment. Breaking the risk assessment challenge down further yields the following dimensions of risk: force performance, force sustainability, preparation for the future, and affordability.
Figure 5 portrays a risk assessment methodology. It is a logical, coherent and sequential method for examining risk.
If such a methodology were to be employed in conducting a top to bottom review of the national security dilemma facing Canada, then we would be able, at the very least, to identify areas for improvement, and surely this is the overall goal. Without such an approach guiding deliberations, the response will be more of the same, which clearly is not satisfactory.
This should be one of Martin’s first steps in seeking to make good on his public musings on the national security and defence portfolio. Otherwise, he will continue to face the seemingly insurmountable challenge of evaluating competing claims on limited resources in an atmosphere characterized by bureaucratic infighting and special interest pleading, compounded by the uncertainty of the emerging security environment. More to the point, the absence of resolute action intended to remedy the many shortcomings in our national security portfolio will continue to hamper our ability to meet the needs of the future. In short, Martin must find a way!
The views expressed are the author’s alone and in no way represent the views of the RMC, DND or Government of Canada. An earlier version of part of this paper appeared in the Canadian Military Journal.
