Gertrude Stein is famously remembered for saying of Oakland, California, “there is no there there.” The same might be said of Canada’s strategic and defence interests in the Americas, outside of its alliance with the United States. There has been an evident lack of preoccupation with anything beyond Canada-U.S. links. But recently there have been some significant developments in hemispheric defence and Canada’s involvement in it. In short, Canada does have strategic hemispheric interests outside its relationship with the United States and those interests are expanding.
Canada’s defence interests in the Americas are determined by two imperatives. First, of course, is the U.S. relationship, the primary trajectory of Canadian defence policy. But there is also the Canadian tradition of multilateralism”” our history of working with other partners in order to forge a more independent policy.
Acting unilaterally to exert foreign policy influence is usually not an option for Canada. That leaves the alternatives of working with great powers bilaterally or many powers multilaterally. Independence is crucial: we don’t merely wish to establish a foreign policy position; we want to do so in an autonomous manner. This is particularly true of security matters, where, despite this hankering for autonomy, Canada’s alliance with the United States so often conditions the substance of our policy-making. The upside of that constraint is that Canada has a greater degree of access to and input in decision-making in the United States, which allows””at times””for greater influence in international affairs than we would otherwise have.
Canadian strategic foreign policy has been created and sustained largely in a broader multilateral context. Notwithstanding the importance of close relations with the United States, the defining elements of Canadian strategic concerns are of a wider, multilateral pattern. Our role has largely been determined by the context of our multilateral relationships””that is, by whom we are dealing with””and by the functional capacity of which Canada is capable.
Decisions made by parties to a multilateral arrangement are the product of a conscious coordination of national policies, usually within an international political structure or organization. States employing multilateralism do so in the expectation that such behaviour will reap gains that could not be achieved through unilateral action. Multilateralism is not merely the interaction of states in the international arena, but involves the assumptions of shared benefits, reciprocity among participants, and a regulated environment. It involves several areas of interaction among parties. There is a degree of integrated decision-making, in order to account for the views and concerns of allies. There is at least some coordination of policies so as to avoid or at least reduce negative effects felt by participants. And there is cooperation in the actual alignment of national policies so that mutual benefits may be maximized. Finally, in its most extreme representation, multilateralism may also include integration of policies, creating common objectives and goals among several states.
Multilateralism is not necessarily a threat to great powers. After all, the U.S. itself is part of many multilateral arrangements, and as such is able to better coordinate policies with allies without having to resort to coercion. Moreover, multilateralism allows the U.S. to legitimize its broader foreign policy interests””assuming it is willing to permit flexibility on particular issues. Even for powerful countries, multilateralism creates an environment for collective action where otherwise unilateral action would be challenged or even disdained.
By acting multilaterally, Canada is in a better position to shape and influence the policies of the states with which it associates. By maintaining favorable multilateral memberships, Canada can affect international affairs in ways it could not through individual action. Canada has had a unique experience in this regard, maintaining close relations and influence with both of its great power partners (the United States and Great Britain) during the 20th century and also securing foreign policy objectives through multilateral action. Canada’s emphasis on multilateralism, in concert with its middle power status, brought about a distinctive state of affairs for Canadian foreign policy: the ability to have its objectives achieved in the international system, even without being a “great” power.
Canada’s strategic relations within the American hemisphere highlight the inconsistency of its regional foreign policy. Canada does consider itself an American nation; its home region is the Americas. But Canadian strategic interests have emerged either from its transatlantic connection or from its sharing of the North American continent with the United States. Unlike the United States, it has not maintained a parallel emphasis on a hemispheric presence. There are indications, however, that this may be changing.
During the Cold War, Canadian policy in the hemisphere was tightly connected to U.S. policy. The Americans led the region via the Organization of American States (of which Canada was not a member until 1990), the collective defence mechanism of the Rio Pact of 1947, bilateral links with hemispheric states through the Mutual Assistance Pacts (MAPs) in the 1950s, and their pre-eminence in the InterAmerican Defence Board (IADB) and the InterAmerican Defence College (IADC).
Not surprisingly, Canadian involvement in hemispheric affairs was a logical offshoot of a deepening commitment to economic and commercial relationships. However limited, this engagement with the hemisphere has been rooted in economic self-interest. The extension of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement to Mexico in 1994 appeared at first blush to bear out the argument that increased trade and commercial attention (through NAFTA) had a fundamental effect on political and military matters. Yet Canada did not initially envision Mexico as part of a free-trade zone, and sought free trade with that country only after U.S.-Mexico trade talks were set to begin. Moreover, Canadian suggestions that Chile join the NAFTA have not resulted in the inclusion of that country in the free trade bloc.
Moving through the 1990s, Canada began to concentrate more on military and defence matters in the hemisphere. For some large states in the region, such as Mexico, Brazil and Chile, this was not too startling, given their traditionally strong trade and commercial relations with Canada. Other, smaller states have been surprised by Canadian interest in the hemisphere. They shouldn’t have been. Canada has had long-standing military and defence concerns surrounding several compelling issues. Narcotics trafficking, illegal immigration, peacekeeping, prohibited arms transfers and natural disaster response are all aspects of inter-American security in which Canada has played a role, either with its armed forces or through diplomatic channels. The human security agenda is of particular interest here, since concerns about crime continue to grow in the Americas, even as external threats relating to war decline. In 2000, the OAS General Assembly held a plenary dialogue and passed resolutions concerning human security in the region. An issue mainly of academic debate here in Canada, human security is invariably seen as a real security issue in Latin American states. Canada has in recent years set in motion initiatives for human security, and has been increasingly active within hemispheric military institutions. For example, it has been involved in the current development of the Conference of American Armies (CAA), a multinational organization created in 1960 to generate dialogue among the armies of American states. Canada will host the CAA from 2002-2004, and occupy the seat of Permanent Executive Secretary. This is more than a ceremonial role, and Canada’s leadership in this organization is crucial at a time when the armed forces in American states are beginning to be seen by their citizens””and their governments””as more legitimate than in the past.
Canada has also recently expanded its complement of military attachés in the hemisphere. In addition to existing attaché positions in Mexico City and Buenos Aires, Canada has created two new positions in Bogotà¡ and Brasilia. And, with the U.S. decision to allow a rotating chair within the IADB, there is serious speculation that Canada will join with the Board’s 19 other members in its work on humanitarian concerns and confidence-building measures and its support for the hemispheric security goals of the OAS.
A part from our experience with multilateral regimes, Canada brings to the table several sorts of security and defence proficiency. American states understand and appreciate Canada’s peacekeeping history. We are also known for competence in policing and domestic security, a reputation that is a spin-off from our peacekeeping ability.
There can be no doubt that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, delayed many developments in defence and military affairs in the hemisphere. Attention to migration and trafficking, for instance, have either been suppressed or folded into the United States’ new anti-terrorism program. But inter-American efforts on military and defence issues have not been completely abandoned. Rather, with increasing attention being paid to “homeland” and continental defence in the United States, now is clearly the time for Canada to pursue effective multilateral initiatives in order to consolidate its interests in the region and to further peace and security in the area.
Whereas Canada’s concerns were largely non-military until the 1990s, there are clear indications that military and defence matters are finally getting more attention in Ottawa. Although Canada’s enlarging agenda in the Americas is still balanced by attention to other regions (such as the Asia-Pacific), Hal Klepak is right that Canada is “turn[ing] its back on a century of aloofness.” It may not be a sea change in Canadian hemispheric policy, but it does represent a general expansion of Canadian interests in the region.
Such interests will continue to be framed by Canada’s natural alliance with the United States, based on long-standing geostrategic and interdependent concerns. But Canada’s experience within the OAS, for instance, is an example of how multilateral bodies permit alternate ideas and forums for debate. Canada has argued against the opinion of the United States within the OAS, notably in 2000 on the matter of human security. This willingness to speak out in opposition to the United States is recognized by other members of the OAS, which are often unable to take such a position.
In a relatively short period of time, inattention in the American hemisphere has given way to a new outlook for Canadian regional policy. Whereas Canadian interests in the region were once almost entirely defined either by United States strategy, or our own limited trade and commercial links, Canadian security policy in the hemisphere has taken on a new role of more active involvement, and deeper membership.
Canada’s “traditional” linkages were largely formed on the basis of history. The Commonwealth, la francophonie and our bilateral relationship with the United States are all functional representations of our history, and our political development. The American hemisphere offers something different for Canada. With no common history and little in the way of convergence regarding political and economic development, the hemisphere provides a regional alternative and a “home” for trade, commercial, political and security affairs that would better reflect Canadian interests and strengthen our bilateral relationship with the United States, to say nothing of NAFTA. In short, the extension of Canadian economic and security interests south of the Rio Grande is both a reflection of U.S. economic and security interests, and also a manifestation of Canadian desires to stake out an independent role in the region.
For Canada’s new security agenda, the Americas offer a growing and increasingly stable environment for economic development, democratization and the pursuit of peace. But the region requires more attention to matters of defence and security. In this domain, given our strengths and our close connection to the United States, Canada may have a key role to play. Military and defence relations in the region will require more modernization, more interoperability and added transparency. The United States will undoubtedly take the lead in forging these developments, but as the United States’ closest military ally, Canada must also assume a fundamental position. As armed forces in the region take up non-traditional challenges ranging from drug trafficking enforcement, to border controls, to armed forces’ interoperability, Canadian experience could help stimulate a new hemispheric defence and security policy, particularly in light of our close affinity to the United States.
We should not seek a broader role in the hemisphere simply as a counterweight to our bilateral relationship, but rather as a logical offshoot of it: as the United States intensifies its position in the Americas, it is incumbent on Canada to do so as well. To do otherwise would be to lose influence in the region, and also with the United States.
