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Debra Thompson 00:00
From the Institute for Research on Public Policy, this is inequality a special series of the policy options podcast exploring the many facets of inequality in Canada through conversations with experts. I’m your host Deborah Thompson. Today I speak with Dr. Michael Orsini, a professor in the Institute of feminist and gender studies at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. His work focuses on social movements, health, politics, and policy and disability justice. Disability is often left out of the conversation when we discuss inequality. What sorts of issues do we notice when we look at policy with a critical disability lens? Keep listening for this compelling conversation. Michael Orsini thank you for coming on the show with us. I’m so pleased to have you here, in part because, you know, I think your work is incredible. And you were really first on my list of folks that I wanted to talk to, in part because disability justice so often goes undiscussed when we talk or think about inequality. I have a personal connection to, to all of this, my niece, I don’t even think you know, this, Michael, my niece is nonverbal, autistic, she has a Global Developmental Delay. And really watching my sister try to navigate this labyrinth of bureaucratic ineptitude has been just incredibly heartbreaking. You know, she’s worried all the time. And she spends all of her free time trying to figure out physiotherapy and speech therapy and getting support and trying to find summer camps that will take her autistic nonverbal daughter, and trying to make sure that educators understand the unique needs of, of her daughter. It’s so frustrating for her. And ultimately, so important, because we’re talking about somebody’s life, and somebody’s well being. So with that being said, I’m so happy that you’re that you’re here. I’d like you to just start us off by describing the the broad focus of your research and how it is you you came to study it.
Michael Orsini 02:17
Yeah, well, first of all, thanks for the invitation. It’s a real pleasure to be with you. And to talk about what are really a set of complex issues that are not reducible to sort of a one liner response, and so hearing about your experience of your knees is, is something that’s familiar to me as a researcher, and I also need to preface this by sort of kind of explaining my own sort of positionality as a sort of non-disabled critical policy scholar who is trying — consistently trying to learn and sometimes to unlearn, you know, I think, some of the some of the settled assumptions, but I guess I would start my start or, or interest in issues around disability justice and policy was probably about, I don’t know, 15 years ago, or something a long time ago, when I started a project that included you know, as a political scientist, you can appreciate a case related to autism. And it was like, yeah, this will be one of three or four things I was going to be interested in and, and eventually the case, which was around autism kind of overtook the entire project and began to kind of structure my own thinking. And so the experience that you sort of describe of trying to navigate this labyrinth of system in which you have to become kind of full time advocate is one that I began to encounter when I was starting to do kind of field work with folks, including parents. And I think the thing that became really clear to me as somewhat interested in critical stuff and critical policy was that we were talking about disability and not talking to disabled people. And it was kind of like, uhhhhh and so that began for me kind of a journey around how do I as a scholar, who doesn’t have that kind of lived experience begin to think about that and also to think about how parents — parental perspectives are critical, but sometimes parents have a particular way of thinking about disability that, you know, not not to blame folks or to cast any shame, but that that really kind of comes from the perspective of trying to overcome, trying to forget, address in a way that doesn’t emphasize the disability. And from a sort of policy perspective, that has some attraction, right? Because folks don’t want to see disability so much. And so yeah, so the autism was the was the beginning for me. And I kind of have circled back to doing some of that work. But I think the first thing that became really clear to me was that we, as people who were studying or researching, we’re so behind what people in communities were thinking, you know, and to say that was humbling is an understatement, I think. I mean, you know, this is someone who does work in community as well. But I think sometimes people, experts, policy people, political science, experts, claim a kind of moral authority. And that just, it crumbled for me, as far as what I knew and didn’t know and should know. Sorry, for the roundabout response to that.
Debra Thompson 06:08
No, that’s amazing. I want to pick up on something that you mentioned really early on, and kind of in that introduction to your work, you mentioned that you are a critical policy scholar, and I’m wondering if you can give us a sense of how being a critical policy scholar, like what’s the difference between just being a policy scholar, or someone who works in public administration? What does a critical do?
Michael Orsini 06:31
Yeah, thanks for thanks for the question. I think I think about that all the time. But I guess the starting point for me is, with critical policy work is, is to challenge the kind of divide between expert and kind of lay perspectives on knowledge so that the privileged role of experts in policymaking is something that is, you know, has been certainly certainly a constant for a lot of folks. But the starting point for me is always, you know, sometimes I sound like a political scientist, but it’s this kind of puzzle of how do people with no access, very little access, who are with assumptions baked into how they’re understood, how do they actually get stuff done? And so a critical policy sort of lens helps me to think about that helps me to think about how different perspectives make it into policymaking, different perspectives, that kick at the mainstream, you know, really kind of challenge dominant ways of knowing, dominant ways of thinking. And so it’s not specific to disability, but I think it’s been useful for me. Useful and also, you know, like anything, exposes the limitations of your own sort of thinking and approach and sort of one thing critical people have not been super great about is trying to think intersectionally trying to foreground race and sort of that’s coming along. But I think some critical people are really committed to a progressive vision that is, well, not terribly progressive, I guess, I would say because it limits its focus. But yeah, the critical for me is always kind of about subjugated knowledge or knowledge that doesn’t sort of see itself reflected, and how to kind of unearth that and how to bring it to the fore, because it’d be we all look at power, we’re all interested in power for God’s sake. But the critical part, is, is one that certainly accounts for those different kinds of knowledge, but also how they’re embedded in this thing we call neoliberalism or broader kind of structures. I mean, you think about that with your own work, too. I think, every time we feel that we have a handle on how we see the world and how we’re what kind of lens or framework we’re going to use to think about that we’re challenged, you know, and that’s good. But it’s unsettling. And I’ve seen that with the critical stuff. And I’ve seen that in disability, you know, if we have a chance to talk about that, and in terms of how, you know, Equity, Diversity Inclusion, those letters, as we say, really miss disability.
Debra Thompson 09:39
Yeah, that’s exactly right. And I want to I want to pick up on that, in part because you mentioned intersectionality earlier, and it seems to me that in the language of intersectionality, which I think we frequently misinterpret, you know, like it’s always originally meant to be about structures of power and like axes of oppression rather than the subjective identity positions. But when we talk about intersectionality, we do we miss we miss disability all the time, we also miss age, we frequently miss class, race and gender / sexuality seem to be the ones that that we most often kind of get to in this language of intersectionality. But I want to talk a little bit about the shift in awareness. I think that’s happened over the past 10, 15 years, maybe, you know, this is debatable, and let’s talk about it. You know, the ideas of neuro diversity and neuro divergence are now in, I think, the standard lexicon of how we think about human difference. And that really wasn’t the case 10, 15 years ago. Like not, not at all. And I wanted to ask you, you know, to what extent has the shift in our cultural understanding led to, to political action. You have this really great article in the Canadian Journal of Political Science called Autism, neurodiversity in the welfare state. And you write that, and I’m going to quote you here, “autism forces us to confront the ways that disability and disabled people have been marginalized from policy processes and public policy discussions related to diversity and disability.” Is this still the case? You know, I know you probably wrote that article five or six years ago. And, you know, how do you think this, this change the shift in our cultural understanding of disability and autism, like, what are the effects of that shift? And how far do we have left to go?
Michael Orsini 11:36
Yeah, thanks. Yeah, that article was, like, 10 years ago. You know, I think I think in some ways, it’s kind of… a double edged sword is not the is not the right way to describe it. But I think there are some real benefits in thinking about thinking with and hearing lots of talk about neurodiversity. It has been sort of extended outside of autism, but it was initially sort of applied to autism. But I think just as the language of diversity has been kind of drained, emptied, voided of its significance, I think there’s a little bit of that around neurodiversity. So that, you know, sometimes people say, well, we’re all a little neurodiverse, or neurodivergent. And it’s like, no, actually. It’s possible to sort of say that there are folks who, whose brains are wired differently, and they interact with the world differently. That doesn’t mean that it’s a universal experience. Because sometimes that universality kind of flattens difference, you know, but, but so, you know, it’s always concerning for me when a term becomes kind of part of the lexicon at the same time as it’s nice that people don’t have to have a long conversation with with others about what it means to be neurodivergent. And I see that, for instance, like, I don’t know if you experienced that at McGill, but and maybe it’s because I taught a disability studies class, but a bunch of students just kind of said, hey, you know, I’m autistic. I have ADHD, I’m bipolar. And it’s kind of like, Yeah, okay. As and so the lifting of that stigma, I think I would celebrate that I think lots of people should celebrate that. I just think we need to be wary of the way in which it’s mobilized sometimes, in ways that really kind of reinforce… Sometimes I don’t know if you’ve heard this sort of “autistic advantage” being in you know, in Silicon Valley, hire autistic people, because they’ll be great employees, you know, because they will not waste time talking to their colleagues or something. And that makes me really uncomfortable. Like, I think the idea that you would sort of instrumentalize this as a way to kind of helpthe profits of your of your company, or what have you. That’s a perverse way of thinking about the neurodiversity or neurodivergence, I guess.
Debra Thompson 14:10
Yeah. And I mean, I think I’m interested in two things. And based on what you just said, one is that you write in your work about the real identity politics at play within disability justice movements, and the ways in which, you know, almost reminds me about the debates over big tent feminism, you know, like, how can we, you know, if everyone’s a feminist then what is feminism really, you know, is there a core set of ideological principles and feminism that we cannot derogate from and still call it feminism? So on the one hand, you have these complicated identity politics at play that you that you write about, that involve not just you know, the treatment and origin of autism, but also the definition of who is either autistic or has autism and the difference between autism advocates and autistic activists, you know, so really, really feel like complicated field of identity politics on the one hand, and on the other hand, you have policymakers who kind of need concrete categories, classifications and definitions in order to make good policy. So what’s your way of thinking about, like these complexities and the ways in which they get translated into policy?
Michael Orsini 15:29
Yeah, that’s a great question. I don’t think I have a satisfactory answer. But I guess I would start with you know, and you can think about this in other contexts as well, think about it in the context of Indigenous folks as well, this, this idea that you would be able to speak with any authority about what it means to be autistic, what it means to be disabled, what it means to be Indigenous, is deeply, deeply problematic. Because, you know, in the autism world, people say, if you’ve met one autistic person, you’ve met one autistic person, right? It’s like, yes, of course. So the very real concerns that people expressed about how they identify, you know, autistic people, one famous person has sort of said, you’re either too autistic or not autistic enough, you know, this idea that if you’re really super eloquent, and speak in a powerful way, then you mustn’t be autistic, because autistic people don’t speak in that kind of way. You know, it’s kind of used to delegitimize. I think the answer, as far as policy people are concerned, is recognizing that multiplicity and understanding that if you can foreground disability and how you think about policies, and if you adopt a sort of disability lens, then you would understand that it’s important to think about some principles of disability justice, about the most impacted sort of need to be kind of leading those discussions. And be very conscious of the fact that, you know, the world of disability studies, or the field of disability studies has really been a white field for a long time. And, and so, those are some of the stakes that play out. But you know, in some areas, it’s just about a greater sensitivity to how ableism kind of structures are every day. And that’s just, you know, ableism is not just disability. Ableism is how certain bodies and minds are privileged in policymaking. How political debates favor a certain kind of engagement that shuts out some people with cognitive disabilities, like, that’s like a starting point, in many ways, right, is to sort of say, How can we create policies and programs or services that are grounded in a lived experience that is not uniform? But also, how do we sort of even challenge the way we understand policy engagement, policy involvement? I think there’s still a long way to go on that. And then the last thing you mentioned about white tent feminism is important, because I think a lot of folks who claim kind of progressive politic are really reluctant to sort of own their ableism, you know, and I’m starting, I just started some work now looking at ableism and social movements, and I’m looking at, like, the feminist movement and environmental movement and animal rights movements. And and it’s interesting to kind of see how there’s a kind of this internalized ableism, that just gets reproduced, you know. And that’s not reducible to kind of an identity politics. It’s something that’s more baked in, I guess, yeah, that makes sense.
Debra Thompson 19:02
Yeah, that absolutely makes sense. I’m wondering if you could give us a concrete example, maybe two concrete examples of this disability lens, like, give me an example of a policy area that is maybe doing this badly, you know, and one that is maybe trying to do it better. I have my own stories. You know, my, my father is elderly, and has had several strokes and cannot see well, and sometimes in trying to access banking or government services on the internet, just like the contrast, you know, in the icons and the background — like he can, he can’t see which icon he’s supposed to click on because his vision isn’t, you know, isn’t the same as somebody who’s 40 or 50. Yeah, so that’s, that’s just like a small example. But what’s your example of some of an area where this is being done while people are taking the disability lens seriously and one where we really should do some work?
Michael Orsini 20:05
Yeah, I mean, there’s so many. I think the field of education most more broadly — my closest vantage point is to sort of look at higher education. I see that as I, you know, and I’m not I’m not that kind of a person normally, but I see that as a kind of glass half full example, in that there is a greater recognition that there are different kinds of learning. There are different ways to learn there are different — and that the role of the university in this context is to do its best to promote accessibility and move away from a language of accommodation. Accommodation is kind of like we’ll tolerate you, because you’re paying your tuition and will offer you some sort of an accommodation on the basis of your disability. I think that has changed significantly. And I think that’s, in large part owing to student advocates, disabled students who have kind of really pushed universities in that regard. I think it needs to sort of engage a little bit more with those kinds of intersections, because I think racialized students experience disability in a really different way in the university. I’ve had students say to me that profs have said, I didn’t realize you were disabled, you don’t look disabled, and it’s, you know, so yeah, really, really cringey. So I think education is one where I see problems, but in many ways, lots of lots of, you know, I think evidence of real well meaning attempts to do things differently. As far as a poor example, or an example of where there’s, it’s limited, I think, you know, the sort of architecture, the social policy architecture around assistance for disabled people, I think across provinces is a complete and utter mess. You know, it’s not long ago, that we were dealing with the start of COVID, and the introduction of emergency benefits for folks and things like that. And disabled people were crumbling under a lot of those. And they were also asking questions about why we were still able to immediately like, just like, snap a finger, offer $2,000 a month to people who are dislocated from the labour market. But then, you know, disabled people have been experiencing all kinds of dislocation and receiving a pittance as far as assistance. So I think that for me is an example of where we have really not advanced and, you know, I only have some limited experience to with I do a little bit of around disability art. And I remember, a bunch of artists kind of saying, if we sell our work, they have to, it has to be taken from it clawed back from the meager money we receive on social assistance. So what does it do it kind of again, it promotes this idea that a disabled person can’t really be an artist. And if they paint and stuff, it’s just something they do to pass the time. So they don’t have any kind of dignity as artists and deserve to be paid, whatever for a painting. And, you know, it was just again, another example of how long have we known this, that folks who are receiving some form of disability insurance are earning very, very little, and dependent upon the benevolence of the state? The the last part of that is kind of, you were mentioning about your dad, but there are lots of disabled people who just need some support in their home — attendants or what have you. And even that has been really, really challenging where it was assumed that a disabled person could not make the decision about how to access particular care. But you know, there are some good examples of that changing, but again, it’s kind of a really paternalistic system that, we know better than you. And we’re willing about what you need, you know, as opposed to sort of what, you know, people like Barbara Arneil and other political theorists have talked about a notion of interdependence, like, moving toward a model of interdependence is really tough for a lot of us, even if it is kind of it’s the reality for lots of folks who might not be completely dependent on state support, but might need some of that from time to time.
Debra Thompson 25:06
Yeah, it reminds me a lot of the work of one of my favorite political scientists, who is Joe Soss. And he writes a lot about the paternalism of the welfare state, especially under neoliberalism. And we assumed that neoliberalism meant a smaller state. And yet, for so many people, not only does the state still loom large in our lives, but it is coercive, punitive, paternalistic, and it is heavily invested in making sure that we abide by standards of behaviour that are really, really quite restrictive, are really about determining who’s a good citizen and who’s a bad citizen.
Michael Orsini 25:52
Yeah, I had something to say. But go ahead,
Debra Thompson 25:54
I want to actually turn to a kind of a more concrete focus on on the welfare state and inequality, because you mentioned this, that the social policy architecture is is kind of incoherent. And in one of your pieces you write, “disability is a fundamental feature of the welfare state, and therefore welfare state politics,” and it’s true, you know, disability touches on or is encompassed in all aspects of the welfare state, like health care, education, various forms of care, work, income support, disability benefits. And you also mentioned in your work, that there are some challenges that disability poses to the welfare state. So one being this model of provision that centered on redistribution, and the expansion of this universal basket of goods and services that all people are supposed to be able to access in theory. And the second is the way that the welfare state conceives of recognizes and sometimes valorizes disability. And in this article, you’re, you’re talking about autism in particular. And I wanted you to talk a little bit more about these challenges. And I guess, like, what in your mind makes them so challenging?
Michael Orsini 27:09
Yeah, I think I think, well, I guess I would, I would kind of start from this, this, what you were sort of saying earlier with regard to the paternalism of the welfare state, I think, what’s difficult to sort of untether or detach from disability in the welfare state, is the sense in which disabled people have equal, you know, rights to citizenship. You know, Michael Prince a long time ago, wrote this book, you know, really good book called Absent Citizens where, you know, the citizenship of disabled people is not presumed, right. It’s, it needs to sort of it almost needs to be defended. That there are particular entitlements that disabled people are owed. So I think the starting point for some of the difficulties around around this question of redistribution, or universal basket of goods is the sum of the presumptions about the humanity of disabled people. So if your personhood is kind of under threat, well, it’s not surprising that there are going to be questions about whether you are legitimately owed access to particular services or programs. I mean, the debate about medical assistance in dying right now, which just just, you know, unbelievable, really kind of puts this, I think, in sharp relief, where disabled people, they’re saying, you know, I can’t sort of survive on $1,200 a month. I think my life is worth living, I think I have a value, I think there’s quality, I have quality of life. Again, the thing that non-disabled people can’t get their head around. But the situation I find myself in sort of in a socio economic way financially means that I think the best option for me is to end my life. And people are people are kind of saying, well, no, that’s not really that’s not really happening, or that’s not really the case. Well, of course, it is happening, you know, so, from the perspective of if you take a sort of disability lens to medical assistance in dying, yes, it’s complex. It’s nuanced, in all kinds of ways. But at the root of it is this idea that some disabled lives are really not worth living. And a really good scholar, Kelly, Fritsch, she was a prophet at Carleton University has sort of written about sort of the neoliberalism and the governance of disabled life. And she talks about how under neoliberalism, it’s not that all disabled lives don’t matter. Some actually do matter. And that’s what’s really critical. Some lives are kind of lifted up. Some people are capacitated, like she says, and others are kind of relegated or to the periphery, right. So that’s how neoliberalism sort of works. And so it’s not like you were saying earlier, we talked about the contraction of the welfare state the retention of the welfare state, like good political science nerds. But actually, these things are sort of happening simultaneously. There’s a kind of expansion and there’s a contraction, but there’s an expansion of surveillance of people. You know, there’s the sort of disability con you hear about on the internet a lot like people who are faking their disability. This gets people really wild, like, how could you do that? How could you pretend to be disabled just for for the sake of, you know, like the welfare queen sort of debates, you know, how that idea that people are gaming the system?
Debra Thompson 30:43
Yeah, you can’t talk about the welfare state without talking about these ideas of deservedness and undeservedness. You know, they’re just baked into our conceptualization conceptualizations, of redistributed politics.
Michael Orsini 30:59
Absolutely. And I think the idea that they’re, you know, that folks are looking for or asking for particular access to a particular set of programs or services. That’s seen, you know, a colleague of mine has sort of said this, that, you know, in talking about the welfare state, it’s always like, when austerity sort of comes to town, everybody has to wait, you have to be patient. But the cuts, they come with a ferocity that is felt really deeply by people who, who depend upon certain services and programs, right. So that’s the cruelty of the system in some way. That it’s, it’s its presence is felt in a really significant way by folks. And then when people say, well, what about kind of increasing the minimum wage? What about increasing social assistance? Disability insurance? You have to be patient, right? You have to wait. Right? Anyway.
Debra Thompson 32:00
So we’re running out of time, but I just want to ask you two last questions. One is, what are you what are you working on these days? What are you thinking about?
Michael Orsini 32:08
Oh, yeah, I’ve just started a new project actually, called Disability and Movement. And I mentioned in a little bit earlier, it’s trying to kind of take seriously this idea that if ableism is something that moves through societies and systems, then if you want to study disability, you need to sort of look at social movements that are interested in forms of progressive politics. So you know, even all this sort of discourses of strength and overcoming and that kind of thing in social movements, we just take for granted, you know. So I’m trying to look at that kind of in the feminist movement, which kind of, you know, initially sort of really thought deeply about ableism, the environmental movement, which has gotten into a lot of trouble for its kind of ablest ways around even sort of debate about plastic straws. And the animal rights movement is a really fascinating and troubling one, because it the defense of animals has come at the expense of disabled people. And, and so there’s, there’s, there’s some really deep, deep, deep disagreements in those communities. So I guess the bottom line is sort of if you want to think about ableism, and social justice, and kind of the different kinds of political contestation, what happens when you centre things that we don’t really think about. And so ableism is the kind of the centerpiece of that.
Debra Thompson 33:49
Michael, that sounds amazing. I’m super, I can’t wait, I can’t wait to read it. And the last question is a question that we always end this podcast with. It’s called, I’m calling it Academic Dominos. And the question I have for you is, you know who else in your world, either in political science or the social sciences, or outside the social sciences, who’s doing the most interesting work? You know, what? Whose work? Are you really excited about? What have you read recently that excites you? Who’s doing cool stuff? Tell us.
Michael Orsini 34:21
Yeah, I think, you know, the trouble with me is that I kind of feel like political science is not where all the cool stuff is happening. So, but I would say…
Debra Thompson 34:30
We’re gonna revoke your membership card but that’s fine.
Michael Orsini 34:32
I think Kelly Fritsch, who’s a sociologist at Carleton University, I think is really doing cool stuff. Especially she just published a book, which we didn’t talk about much, but sort of on disability justice and incarceration. How can you think about incarceration without kind of a real explicit lens around disability. Folks like Laverne Jacobs, who is at the University of Windsor has been leading some international movement around sort of disability rights, but also as a legal scholar taking seriously issues around critical race. But then there are folks, you know, Nirmala Ervelles in the US, I think, is one of the most important people working on race and disability. And I take a lot from her. And then on the education, I think somebody named Gillian Parekh, who’s a professor at York University is one of the only people in Canada right now, taking seriously the concerns and this explicit interplay of race and disability and educational outcomes that are producing horrible, horrible outcomes for kids, black kids and racialized kids in Ontario, specifically. So sometimes people talk about that in more theoretical ways. But she’s kind of doing research really on the ground. But there are so many people! There are lots of folks who are doing great work and it’s clear that it’s not happening only in certain political science spaces. It’s happening in other places. But it’s good to see that work kind of emerging and not sort of being kind of like, hey, what about me? Can I can I have a seat at the table? I think it’s more explicitly acknowledged right now.
Debra Thompson 36:32
Amazing. Well, Michael, thank you so much for being on this podcast. It’s always, always a pleasure to talk to you and I’m so grateful for your time.
Michael Orsini 36:41
Thank you. I really, really appreciate the time, Deborah.
Debra Thompson 36:44
Thanks so much for tuning in to inequality the new series from the IRPP policy options podcasts, we explore many of the facets of inequality in Canada, through in depth conversations with experts from across the country. This show has been a labor of love with research assistance by Juliane Vandal, production assistance by Nessi Altaras and Ricardo Montrose, and audio by Jackie Gallant. If you like what you heard, and you want to know more about the work being done by the Institute for Research on Public Policy, head over to irpp.org. And if you really, really like what you heard, leave us a review on whatever platform you’ve been listening on. Or share your feedback with us on Twitter using the handles @IRPP or at @debthompsonphd. I’ll be back next week for another episode of In/Equality. I’m Deb Thompson, and this is not my day job. But thanks again for listening.
On April 19, 2021, Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland presented the first federal budget in two years. Among the many new and updated policies, one stood out especially â the promise of affordable universal childcare for all Canadians.
Universal child care had been promised in the past and never come to fruition, not for lack of political will or public support, but rather because it is such a difficult policy to enact. One place in Canada, however, already has universal, affordable child care: Quebec.
The federal government plans on taking this model of child care and replicating it in every province and territory. But this system is not perfect, and the government needs to be careful not to make the same mistakes that Quebec has made while creating this policy.
This week we are joined by Sophie Mathieu and Gordon Cleveland to speak about the Quebec model of child care, and how this policy will be enacted across the country.
Sophie Mathieu is a postdoctoral researcher at UniversitĂ© TĂLUQ, with a focus on family policy in Quebec. She holds a PhD in sociology.
Gordon Cleveland is emeritus associate professor of economics at the University of Toronto Scarborough, and a member of the Expert Panel on Early Learning and Child Care Data and Research. He is also president of Cleveland Consulting: Early Childhood Education and Care Inc.
Where should media outlets draw the line between revenue generation and content quality? Between truth and ethics? CBC Newsâ Lauren OâNeil stopped by the podcast to weigh in on these issues and more on this weekâs episode. We looked at the Gawker bankruptcy, the ethics and business of new media and Canadaâs evolving media landscape.
Download for free. New episodes every second Tuesday.
See Lauren OâNeilâs CBC News article âWhy Gawker matters: Bankruptcy auction could make or break the ‘voice of a generation’â
Photo:Â Steve Nesius / The Canadian Press
This week, we spoke with James Fergusson, director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, about the changing international security landscape and how it affects Canada. We look at the lessons from Canadaâs involvement in Afghanistan, our  relationship with NATO, and whether Canada is equipped to deal with the threats it faces.
Download for free. New episodes every second Tuesday.
Click here to learn more about James Fergusson and Francis Furtadoâs recent book Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada.
Photo: Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND / Crown Copyright
E-commerce is revolutionizing the way we trade by giving businesses unprecedented access to new markets. Tools such as eBay have become the great equalizer of international trade: empowering small businesses in a globalized trade environment traditionally dominated by large firms. With so much to gain from these emerging trade patterns, Canadian trade policy canât afford to be stuck in the past.
In a new IRPP study, authors Hanne Melin and Usman Ahmed argue that Canadian trade policies are creating obstacles for small businesses engaging in cross-border online trade. Using data from eBay between 2008 and 2013, they found that e-commerce businesses export at a much higher rate, reach more countries, and grow faster than do their offline counterparts. We caught up with Hanne to learn how the government can foster the growth of technology-enabled small businesses.
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Hanne Melin and Usman Ahmedâs IRPP study âTechnology-Enabled Small Business Trade in Canada: New Evidence from eBay Marketplacesâ irpp.org/research-studies/aots6-ahmed-melin/
The latest chapter in the IRPPâs trade volume describes the emerging phenomenon of technology-enabled (âonlineâ) trade. In this chapter, authors Usman Ahmed and Hanne Melin (eBay Inc.) analyze a unique dataset of Canadian firms using eBay in 2008-13. The experiences of these businesses demonstrate that technology-enabled trade is broader and more inclusive than traditional trade. These firms are much more likely to export, they reach more countries, and in these markets, there are more new entrants (particularly smaller firms), and sales are less concentrated among the top firms. Existing policies, however, are creating obstacles to these cross-border transactions, such as the low threshold for exemption from customs duties, and customs risk assessment procedures that are ill-suited to small traders.
So, how does technology-enabled trade differ from traditional trade?
Traditional trade is dominated by large multinational companies. They make big, regular shipments of a standard range of products using commercial trucks, ships and cargo containers along well-established trade corridors.
Technology-enabled trade, on the other hand, features more small businesses and newcomers. They ship smaller-valued, niche or customized products using the postal system on an irregular basis to idiosyncratic locations. Consumers often find these firms, rather than the other way around.
Better information flows, enhanced connectivity and growing trust in online transactions have helped spur this new type of trade. The Internet has obviously been a key driving force. Online marketplaces and search engines allow businesses of all sizes to connect and trade directly with one another and with consumers around the world. Customer satisfaction ratings and reliable payment systems engender trust between traders. And efficient global logistics providers can deliver products directly to consumers, quickly and cheaply, while also helping them track their purchases digitally. These developments have rapidly lowered the costs of communicating, searching for and reaching new markets and, as a result, are effectively shrinking the impact of distance on trade.
Here are some key findings from this chapter:
Finding 1: Technology-enabled firms are much more likely to export than traditional âofflineâ traders.
Virtually all of the Canadian firms with annual sales of at least $10,000 on eBay were selling outside the country. By contrast, overall only about 10 percent of Canadian small businesses exported; the share is even lower for US firms.
Among Canadian eBay firms, export growth was particularly pronounced to emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific, South America and Africa â a welcome development as diversifying Canadaâs export mix is a government objective.
Finding 2: Technology-enabled firms export to far more countries than traditional âofflineâ traders.
Even when traditional small businesses in Canada are able to reach beyond the US market, they serve only one or two more countries on average. In contrast, Canadian exporters on eBay reached an average of 19 different markets.
Digging deeper into the numbers, even the smallest 10 percent of eBay traders reached an average of 11 markets, while the largest 10 percent sold to 38 markets on average (and one Canadian business sold to 133 different countries!)
Finding 3: Technology-enabled markets have more entrants and less concentrated outcomes.
International trade is generally dominated by a small number of very large, well-established firms. For instance, in 2014 among traditional traders, the top 10 Canadian exporters by value accounted for one-quarter of countryâs goods exports (yet they made up only 0.02 percent of the over 41,200 exporters). Alternatively, technology-enabled trade has more newcomers and they capture more market share. By way of comparison, the largest 3.3 percent of exporters by value captured 82 percent of the market for traditional traders versus only 36 percent for eBay sellers in Canada.
Policy recommendations
Technology-enabled small businesses face unique challenges that must be better integrated into trade discussions in order to realize the full potential of these new trends. This chapter makes a broad set of policy recommendations, but here Iâll describe just three:
Recommendation 1: Raise Canadaâs import exemption threshold
Antiquated customs regimes represent a big obstacle to this emerging trade. International transactions can be subject to import duties, but countries waive these taxes on shipments below a certain value, called the low-value threshold (the LVT, or âde minimisâ customs level). With the United States recently raising its threshold to $800 US, Canadaâs choice of only $20 CAD is increasingly out of step and should be increased. Indeed, a recent C.D. Howe paper estimates that raising Canadaâs LVT would benefit our consumers and businesses (particularly smaller firms) and would have a limited impact on government revenues.
Recommendation 2: Update customs risk assessments
Technology-enabled trade is often undertaken by small firms with little exporting experience, irregularly dispatching smaller shipments to several destinations. Customs risk assessments (which are used to determine which goods require additional screening at border crossings) should be updated to reflect these new trading realities and not necessarily presume that such activity is higher risk. Valuable information not readily available for traditional trade could help inform our customs procedures â such as the feedback scores and ratings generated by these online transactions.
Recommendation 3: Integrate small businesses into trusted trader programs
âTrusted traderâ programs allow the private sector to share in the security responsibilities of customs, in exchange for trade facilitation benefits, such as faster processing of their goods by customs officials due to a lower rate of physical inspections.
The benefits of trusted trader programs are strongest when countries conclude mutual recognition agreements â where being a trusted trader in one country allows a firm to be recognized by other parties to the agreement, with mutually recognized and reciprocal benefits. Canada could take the lead in pushing for a global system of mutual recognition, working with the OECD, the World Customs Organization and the World Trade Organization.
The potential of technology to democratize trade
More inclusive global trade that features more small traders has the potential to deliver economic, social and political benefits. From an economic perspective, we know that exporting can improve a firmâs performance. From a social perspective, smaller businesses that traditionally have not reaped the full benefits of globalization might be brought into the global system, creating a more inclusive marketplace. Consumers around the world also stand to gain through lower prices and increased selection. Lastly, from a political perspective, some voices argue that international trade can harm local businesses, while only benefiting a small number of firms and elites. Encouraging the rise of âmicro-multinationalsâ might help counter some of this criticism and build broader support for trade-enhancing policies.
I encourage you to read the full chapter here. It argues that with some policy changes and more focus on these emerging trade issues, thereâs significant potential for small business traders to leverage technology and expand their global reach.
Photo:Â mervas/Shutterstock.com
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Much has been written about the roles members of Parliament play, but surprisingly little is publicly known or discussed about Canadaâs parliamentary staffers. The pejorative label âthe boys in short pantsâ has recently been used to describe some staffers; others have been called  âruthless, cutthroat psychopathsâ and â25-year-old jihadis.â (Those latter two quotes were from left-leaning party leaders!) These labels are undeserved and not a true portrait of political staffers. It comes from a misunderstanding and lack of public knowledge of the role of staffers. While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to being a staffer, itâs worth trying to help the public better understand the public servants who work in some of Canadaâs most important offices.
Generally speaking, there are four types of staffers: those in an MPâs constituency office, ministerial staffers, Senate staffers and staffers in an MPâs Ottawa office. Much has already been written about the work done by constituency staffers thanks to Peter MacLeodâs two-year research study on the topic. Likewise, Ian Brodie has written about the job descriptions of ministerial staffers, clarifying their role in navigating the bureaucracy and advising and serving their ministers. The roles of these two types of staffers are relatively well known, so this article will expand on the work of an MPâs Ottawa staffers. An MP commonly employs six to eight staffers for the Ottawa and constituency offices.
Staffers are some of Canadaâs most important, influential, committed and hard-working public servants. Jenni Byrne, a senior adviser and election organizer for former prime minister Stephen Harper, was described as âthe (other) woman behind Harper,â and Gerry Butts, a senior adviser and long-time friend to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has been called âPrime Minister Buttsâ for the gatekeeping role he plays within the Prime Ministerâs Office. To cite an American example, Bob Haldeman, chief of staff to President Richard Nixon, was described as the de facto prime minister of that government: running the machinery and organizing cabinet before the presidentâs involvement and approval. While a Canadian prime ministerâs chief of staff will never be as powerful as this example, the two positions, although in different jurisdictions and despite different models of governance, demonstrate staffersâ close proximity to and influence on the most senior government offices.
Staffers are some of Canadaâs most important, influential, committed and hard-working public servants.
Many parallels can be drawn between two relationships: the one between officers and noncommissioned members (NCMs) in the military and the one between MPs and staffers. In the military, officers set broad policy objectives and define the ideal end goal. It is largely the NCMs who implement the procedures and policies that will achieve their commandersâ objectives. Parliament is strikingly similar: MPs will define a broad stance on an issue or a policy they wish to advance (âWe need to lower taxes for familiesâ or âWe need to get more people into the skilled tradesâ). Staffers are the ones who research the issue, liaise with stakeholders, mobilize support and package everything together to make the strongest possible case for that policy stance. If their party is in government, it is largely staffers (working with a departmentâs public servants) who write and implement the policies so that the MPâs or ministerâs objectives are achieved. Staffers are Parliamentâs foot soldiers, who do the groundwork to achieve their MPsâ objectives.
Sometimes staffers pursue elected office, either to emulate or to change something they saw during their time as staffers. Just a few examples are Harper (an assistant to Progressive Conservative MP Jim Hawkes and later Reform MP Deborah Grey); Conservative MP Pierre Poilievre (an assistant to then Conservative MP Stockwell Day); Conservative MP John Williamson (director of communications to Harper as prime minister); and Liberal MPP John Fraser (assistant to Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty). While a majority of staffers might not go so far as to pursue elected office, those who do make it clear that staffers share many of the same motivations, hardships and desire for public service as members of Parliament.
Parliamentary staffers may become involved and hired into a political office through numerous avenues. They are almost always members of the political party for which they work. Considering the highly sensitive nature of the work they perform, it would be difficult to trust someone who is not on the same team. The House of Commons recognizes a stafferâs position as one that ârequires [the] utmost trust, particularly because of the politically sensitive and partisan environment in which their duties are carried out.â There are a few rare exceptions to this, such as staffers who work in the constituency office because they are close with the constituency, regardless of which party the MP represents.
Initial exposure to a political office may come through an internship organized by the party or through a parliamentary program, through volunteering with an electoral district association or through knowing someone already working for a member of Parliament. Many staffers volunteer on Parliament Hill before being hired into a paid position.
MPs are given wide discretion to manage their offices as they see fit. House of Commons Procedure and Practice notes that MPs basically have absolute authority to hire, train, fire, promote and demote their staffers. They also have complete control over staffersâ work hours, duties and salaries. Parliamentary staffers are unique public servants, serving the Government of Canada and paying into the public servantsâ pension plan, but receiving no job protection and being excluded from other benefits available to other public servants. (The staff connected to the NDP caucus, however, are members of a union and receive certain protections.)
Once staffers have been hired, they need to be trained, but training can be particularly difficult for two reasons. First, the exceptionally quick news cycle and the demand for quick responses to issues leave little time to take stock and âlearnâ the right way to deal with an issue. Embarrassing mistakes and political problems are often solved by cutting the responsible staffer loose. Andrew MacDougall, a former director of communications to Harper, referred to this as âthe dark cloud of knowing that your next mistake could end up being your last.â Second, there is large turnover of staffers leaving for other MPsâ offices, a job in the public service, a job in the private sector or a return to school. For this reason, there is usually little time (perhaps a few days) for new hires to learn the job and get up to speed on its requirements. It is largely a âthrown into the deep endâ situation.
The exceptionally quick news cycle and the demand for quick responses to issues leave little time to take stock and learn the right way to deal with an issue.
Staffers are known for working gruelling hours. While they technically sign contracts indicating a 37.5-hour workweek (eight hours, five days a week, with 30 minutes for lunch), it would be exceptionally difficult to fulfill the jobâs requirements in so few hours. When the House of Commons is sitting, it is common to work from 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., although those hours are easily extended. During non-sitting weeks (âbreak weeksâ or constituency weeks, when the MPs are in their ridings) it is much more common to work a standard eight-hour day, or less to make up for the overtime during sitting weeks.
The long hours are largely a necessity of running the government. Issues and crises happen at all hours of the day and night, and the 24/7 news cycle requires that MPs be available to respond to questions or comments very quickly. Question Period happens from 2:15 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. every sitting day (11:15 a.m. to noon on Fridays), which defines a stafferâs work schedule. Before, staffers are busy monitoring the media, doing research and consulting stakeholders. After, staffers are monitoring the impacts and determining how to further respond. It is easy to appreciate how quickly a stafferâs 10-hour day can be extended. MacDougall had it even worse: an average day in his life usually started at 5:30 a.m. and ended at 11:00 p.m., normally six days a week, for weeks on end without a break. There are many more like him, whether on the government or the opposition side.
For this exceptional work, parliamentary staffers are modestly compensated. Staffers are paid from the Membersâ Office Budget (MOB), which varies depending on the population of an MPâs constituency and its geographic location. Parliament capped the 2015 annual maximum salary of a staffer at $82,800. This is the maximum for an MPâs senior staffer (the chief of staff); other full-time parliamentary staff probably receive somewhere between $30,000 and $60,000.
Those are the working conditions, but what does a parliamentary staffer do? Think of it this way: whenever you see an MP doing something, there are several staffers behind that action. Staffers work on the MPâs social media presence and respond to questions and comments. They prepare the MP for media appearances. They liaise with dozens of stakeholders, public servants, departmental officials, ministerial staff and senior government or opposition staff. Staffers monitor the media. They do research and policy analysis relevant to the MPâs interests and portfolio. Staffers write press releases, editorials and website content. They get the MP reimbursed for travel expenses and help make travel arrangements. They âstaffâ him or her at events, which is to say they act as a personal assistant: carrying wallets, purses, business cards, water and hand sanitizer; taking photos; getting the names and contact information of people the MP wants to follow up with; and doing anything else the MP might need. Whatever you see an MP doing, a staffer helped him or her do it.
The attributes and work of parliamentary staffers as described here are almost certainly at odds with how much of the Canadian public would describe them. But if even party leaders do not understand the role of political staffers, the Canadian public can hardly be expected to have a better grasp of their work. Â The dialogue around the lives of members of Parliament before, during and after politics is still growing, and with that there needs to be a better understanding of who staffers are, what they do, what motivates them and how they operate in their positions. I hope to begin to change that, and I encourage other staffers to share their experiences so that this dialogue grows. Eventually, we will have a better understanding and therefore a better respect for some of Canadaâs hardest-working public servants.
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The dark side of branding must be reined in. New rules are needed to contain nefarious behaviour and curtail the most despicable acts. In Democratizing the Constitution: Reforming Responsible Government, Peter Aucoin, Mark Jarvis, and Lori Turnbull argue that proposals for democratic reform in Canada must establish clear objectives, place formal constraints on prime ministerial power, provide mechanisms for the House of Commons to enforce the reform, and entrench the power of MPs in both majority and minority governments. Within this framework, they present some specific suggestions for reforming the Canadian Constitution, the executive, the legislature, and political parties. Their ideas are concerned with curtailing the power of the political centre of government, such as increasing the threshold for dissolving the legislature by requiring the support of two-thirds of MPs. Further suggestions for reform are found in Tragedy in the Commons: Former Members of Parliament Speak Out about Canadaâs Failing Democracy, authored by the co-founders of Samara, a Toronto-based non-profit organization that seeks to improve Canadian democracy. Their recommendations surround the professionalization of what amounts to schoolyard behaviour. Written questions provided in advance of Question Period, orientation sessions and job descriptions for MPs, increased transparency of political party business, and an improved role for MPs as brand ambassadors are just some of the ideas mentioned based on their interviews with former MPs. Inevitably, they concede that a cultural shift is required to set the stage for significant change. Both works are a good basis for initiating dialogue on what would amount to a seismic shift in Canadian political life.
The first attempts at curtailing the worst aspects of political branding must balance audacity with plausibility and look beyond partisanship and personalities. Above all, what must be limited is the publicity stateâs contribution to the fusion of party and government brands. The conflation of state and party symbols, and the use of public resources for political communications purposes, run counter to the democratic principle of detachment of party business from public administration. In comparison, little can be done to prevent brand evisceration or reclamation, part of the normal ebb and flow of changing administrations. A number of possibilities to curtail statecraft rebranding and other forms of public sector branding are identified in the following pages. They follow the advice of Aucoin, Jarvis, and Turnbull to identify the objective of the proposed reform and a mechanism to give power to the peopleâs elected representatives to enforce it.
Increasing professionalism: More ethical public sector communications
Have Parliament regularly update the government of Canadaâs communications policy. The governmentâs communications policy should be regularly reviewed by Parliament to reflect changing circumstances and evolving communications technologies. A number of issues raised in this book should inspire a further update, planned by the Trudeau Liberals. The government should not use advertorials. Government communications, including the promotion of public policies or programs for which parliamentary or intergovernmental approval is pending, should not proceed until a motion is passed by the House of Commons pertaining to the specific item to be publicized. Visuals of members of cabinet should not appear on government homepages, with some exceptions, such as pm.gc.ca. The government of Canada and its institutions should not be referred to by anything other than their formal names in communications products. Government buildings should not be named after former party leaders. Journalists should expect a response within a certain time period; however, it should be specified that faster responses are possible when questions are submitted with considerable notice and during normal business hours. The communications policy should be subject to scheduled reviews and approval by a multiparty committee of parliamentarians. An officer of Parliament should monitor implementation of the policy.
Create a political communications code of ethics. A voluntary code of practice about political marketing should act as a moral compass for political actors who have different interpretations of the boundaries of freedom of speech. Industry codes of behaviour, such as the Canadian Code of Advertising Standards and the Canadian Marketing Association Code of Ethics, are insufficient since they all but exempt politics. A political communications code of ethics would form the basis of stimulating dialogue on what is acceptable behaviour. It would spell out the privacy safeguards associated with database marketing, what sort of negativity is beyond the pale, when it is fair game for politicians to critique those who stand in their way, to what extent they should have access to media footage of opponents, when a controversial remark warrants sanction irrespective of the brand ambassadorâs position, and so on. Such a code would apply public pressure on political parties and interest groups to sign on. A code of practice would raise the bar while tempering the outcries of idealists, putting us on the path to more civil discourse. It would be the basis of a normative assessment of the actions of American-style political action committees, an emerging force in Canada. The nonpartisan code should be developed by a broad consortium of practitioners and specialists who would work toward securing the endorsement of all major political parties. It would be periodically updated to reflect changing norms. Over time, Parliament would ideally come to recognize the code and participate in scheduled reviews of it.
Eliminate financial support for debranding. Highlighting problems with an opponentâs candidacy, platform, and claims is one thing; denigrating leaders on a personal level is quite another. Excessive negativity and debranding are harmful to civic discourse and public engagement in a democratic system of government. Canadians should not unknowingly subsidize the worst forms of debranding. Political fundraisers ought to be legally required to obtain donor consent for a donation earmarked for advertising that is foremost negative. Such donations should be subject to a less generous tax refund scheme. Post-election financial returns should itemize advertising spending associated with personal attacks, which should qualify for a lower rate of refund to the party or candidate. This would result in political parties maintaining two separate war chests and being choosier about negativity. Parliamentarians who distribute debranding materials with harsh personal slights paid for through their office budget allotments should be required to repay the amounts as well as receive a temporary suspension from the privilege. The adjudication of what constitutes unacceptable forms of debranding should be the responsibility of a non-partisan review board that reports to Parliament.
Depoliticizing government communications: Inhibiting the fusion of party and government brands
Prevent political parties from using the official colours of the government of Canada. The convergence of party, prime ministerial, and government brands is perhaps the most significant concern raised in this book. Brand fusion intensifies centralization, undermining confidence and trust in political and public institutions. The brand markers of the government must be state-like and above repute so that integrity is preserved regardless of which political party or prime minister is in power and irrespective of public opinion about personalities.
The provision in Ontarioâs Government Advertising Act that government advertising is partisan if it âincludes, to a significant degree, a colour associated with the governing partyâ is a starting point in that it recognizes that colour schemes are loaded with political meaning. Regardless of which party is in power, all government of Canada visual communications should always be based on a red-and-white colour palette. This is practical only if the official colours and symbols of the government cannot be co-opted by any political party. To avoid perceptions of partisanship, the government of Canada and its institutions must have a monopoly on using the official colours of the government, the Canadian flag, and the red maple leaf symbol. No political party in the federal arena should use a red-and white colour scheme in its marketing communications. Whenever a maple leaf is used in visual communications by political organizations, that icon should be any colour other than red.
The Elections Act should be amended to prohibit tax-deductible status and financial payments from the government to any political party whose logo, advertising, website, signage, or other visual communication uses mostly red and white. Funds should be withheld if any political party uses a red maple leaf. To help established political parties â particularly the Liberal Party of Canada â with the transition to new marketing collateral, a generous one-time financial payment should be extended to help defray costs incurred from market research, graphic design, and production of new materials. To the extent possible, these amendments should be approached in a non-partisan manner when they are debated in Parliament. Such provisions must be designed to withstand a Charter of Rights and Freedoms court challenge.
Require that the official red and white colours of the government of Canada be used in its communications. If steps are taken to depoliticize the use of red and white, then, for good measure, the communications policy of the government of Canada should be amended to prohibit government from using other colours, in particular the main colour(s) associated with the government party. Those colours are identified in the logo filed with Elections Canada and campaign materials in the preceding election. Materials sent from parliamentariansâ offices, such as ten percenter flyers, householders, and calendars, should not be permitted to use colours normally associated with a political party. These amendments should be part and parcel of a parliamentary debate about the role of colour use in brand fusion.
Issue annual reports about government spending on photo-ops. The federal government issues annual reports on advertising and public opinion research. To capture a fuller understanding of government communications spending on publicity, and as a measure of accountability, regular financial reports should be prepared concerning media pseudo-events. This includes proactive disclosure of costs such as signage, room rental, audiovisual equipment, travel, photography, and other extraordinary non-fixed expenses for special communications events such as photo-ops, speeches, or videos. In lieu of a customized measurement vehicle such as the Advertising Campaign Evaluation Tool, the financial outlay for pseudo-events should be balanced with an estimate of the financial value of the earned media. The reports should be presented by the minister of public works to Parliament each fiscal year.
Create a checklist to assess government advertising. There is a need to reduce the politicization of government advertising as well as unwarranted claims of partisanship, both of which erode trust in government institutions. There is no obvious solution to limiting the ability of cabinet to commandeer public resources for partisan-like communications. As long as the political government can originate advertising on policy priorities of its choosing, little can reasonably be done to turn a sales-oriented approach into a product-oriented one. The partisan nature of the creative content of the ads is also in the eye of the beholder, making the vetting process a potentially subjective rather than an objective exercise. As with EAP [Economic Action Plan] advertising, short of being able to spot a party logo, little explicit evidence of partisanship can be policed, and the WOG [whole of government] approach to advertising is not necessarily a problem. In the short term, a non-partisan group such as Samara should research, create, and maintain a user-friendly and publicly accessible government advertising checklist. The checklist would enable anyone to readily assess whether a government ad is excessively political or partisan. It would expand on the basic framework of the Ontario Government Advertising Act. If this checklist were adopted by Parliament, it would perform a public accountability function and inject some objectivity into claims of partisan communication. It would pressure government to exercise greater caution while freeing it from opponentsâ constant alarmism. This would be a step toward adopting a more robust review process of advertising than has been proposed by the Trudeau government.
Turning lapdogs into watchdogs: Empowering public guardians
Create media guidelines. News coverage of Canadian politics involves too much politainment and precious little public policy analysis. There is brinksmanship between political parties and the media on all manner of topics. More broadly there is excessive celebritization, pseudo-scandal, and the treatment of politics as a sporting event. The media has its reasons, and not all journalists fall into this trap. In a democratic society, the freedom of the press is sacrosanct â and yet without intervention into media logic (discussed in Chapter 3) the quality of democracy in the branding age is suspect.
One mechanism to encourage good coverage is the creation of media guidelines by academics identifying what the political media ought to voluntarily prioritize. Guidelines might promote the ideal that the media should strive to deliver information about government and political parties without applying a slant and without the trappings of market journalism. Editorializing and politainment ought to be confined to forums such as panel shows and opinion pieces so they can be differentiated from news reporting. Journalists and news editors should be encouraged to see past personality politics and to periodically explain to their audiences how the Canadian system of government works. These sorts of ideals would require a collaborative effort between interest groups committed to good governance and media organizations in conjunction with service standards in the governmentâs communications policy. Media guidelines passed as a non-binding motion by academic organizations could build on the CBCâs journalistic mission and the Canadian Association of Journalistsâ ethics guidelines. This sort of rethinking is necessary to combat the message control of public sector branding by making it less likely for government officials to be fearful of media agendas.
Empower and legitimize the Senate. There is no getting away from the forces of branding that require message symmetry among members of the executive and legislative branches. Ideas to increase the power and independence of members of the House of Commons are problematic given the communications pressures on ministers and members of Parliament to act as mouthpieces for their political parties. It remains to be seen whether the Reform Act or reforms promised by the Trudeau Liberals (see this bookâs Preface) will have chops. A more ambitious way to limit the power of the prime minister and cabinet is to change the Senate itself so that it acts as a legitimate counterbalance to the brand discipline of the House of Commons. The theory that responsible government places power in the hands of the peopleâs representatives in the lower house is antiquated in a world where communications technology enables and pressures conformity. Whereas only the attentive public concerns itself with the procedural nuances of the House of Commons, the average Canadian can instinctively recognize the undemocratic nature of the Senate. A democratized Senate would provide a second forum for representative government. The public demand for that outdated institution to hold the political executive and permanent government to account grows with the diffusion of communications technology.
Senate reform is such a long-standing issue in Canadian politics that in the 1960s the topic was written off as âmerely a plaything of parties.â In recent years, the outrageous spending by a number of senators, in particular Mike Duffy, has galvanized public opinion that something must be done. However, the possibility of reform is slim as long as there is division over the most viable way to modernize Parliament. Academic discussion on restructuring the Senate has fallen out of favour as scholars and democracy advocates focus on the House of Commons and the electoral system. The ivory tower punditry seems to have little effect on political parties and MPs, with the important exception of Chongâs bill. It is the Senate that a sizable majority of Canadians want to see changed, but there is no consensus on how to proceed. Prime Minister Harper went through extended periods without making Senate appointments, and he required that new appointees support his efforts to limit their terms and require election. The Conservative administration referred the constitutional nuances to the Supreme Court of Canada, which ruled in 2014 that support from both federal chambers and seven provinces representing half of the Canadian population (known as the 7/50 amendment formula) is required for the federal government to implement senator elections and/or term limits. The New Democratic Partyâs long-standing position is that the Senate should be abolished, a sentiment periodically advocated by some premiers, including Brad Wall of the Saskatchewan Party. This is implausible because the SCC ruled that abolishing the Senate requires the unanimous consent of both federal chambers and all provincial legislatures; moreover, doing so would only concentrate more power in the hands of the prime minister and courtiers. For his part, in 2014 Trudeau dramatically expelled all senators from the Liberal Partyâs caucus to create a symbolic division between members of the two chambers. As prime minister, he plans to depoliticize the appointment process. There is thus widespread agreement that something must be done about the Senate and disagreement about what must be done. Trudeau is unwilling to reopen constitutional debate, so it will be up to others to take a united stand on reform to turn the political plaything into a meaningful mechanism to limit brand power.
Suffice it to say that the brandâs clutch means that, in addition to the old chestnuts of creating an equal, elected, and effective Senate, there must be institutional measures to loosen the communications control of party elites. The Senate tends to be populated by some of the governing partyâs most active brand ambassadors. They are not sufficiently accountable, and members constitute an exclusive club of individuals with connections to the current or recent prime minister(s). The Senate must elevate the importance of regional/local priorities over those of a senatorâs party or its leader. Its members must somehow be elected on a staggered electoral cycle not always twinned with general elections of MPs, and perhaps not be permitted to campaign as affiliates of a political party. Only through such change will senators gain public legitimacy to act as a check on the House of Commons and constrain prime ministerial power. To ensure responsible government, reforms would need to prohibit senators from jointly being members of the executive branch and a political partyâs caucus. Parliamentary reformers such as Peter Russell, who argues that the House of Commons must take on the role that the Senate was originally intended to perform, must establish consensus. Whatever the pathway, observers of Canadian parliamentary government should take a page from the public sector branding playbook and speak with a united voice to repeat a simple, consistent message of what must be done about the upper chamber. Divergence must become convergence on the matter of parliamentary reform if anything is to happen.
Excerpted with permission from Brand Command: Canadian Politics and Democracy in the Age of Message Control, by Alex Marland (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2016). For an interview with Alex Marland, see the PO Podcast.
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In an era where access to political figures is unprecedented (and a scandal is just a tweet away), for those in politics controlling the political brand has become major priority. Narratives come from the top and make their way down, driving the need for message consistency throughout the process. In his new book Brand Command: Canadian Politics and Democracy in the Age of Message Control, Alex Marland argues that the consequences of this shift go beyond the substance of political communications â they’re changing democratic participation itself. We caught up with Alex to talk about the âalarming developmentsâ he sees in Canadian democracy.
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To find out more about Alex Marland’s new book Brand Command, visit https://bit.ly/1TwaJAM
To read an excerpt from Brand Command, visit https://bit.ly/29DHf4i
Photo: Sean Kilpatrick / The Canadian Press
Imagine the following scenario: a PhD candidate, before writing his dissertation, sits down with his PhD examiner. She says to him, âas long as you structure your argument in this particular way, and use this specific evidence, I will pass your dissertation. Donât worry â Iâll be with you every step of the way, in case you have any problems or questions. After all, itâs in the interest of both of us â and society more widely â that your thesis is approved as quickly and painlessly as possible.â
This is the new model of pharmaceutical regulation.
Traditionally, regulatory theory focused on the need for regulatory independence. This literature emphasized the relationship between the regulatory agencies and the state, and generally argued that a regulatory body could not perform its functions effectively if it did not retain sufficient independence. But a different kind of regulatory relationship has emerged, especially within the pharmaceutical sector, and there has been very little critical discussion of this shift.
This new kind of relationship sees regulatory bodies not just as adjudicative bodies (this drug will be licensed; that one wonât) but also as assistors and enablers. Increasingly, pharmaceutical regulators such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), and Health Canada are being tasked by their political masters with assisting those applying for licensing approval. In the most recent articulation of this expectation, the European Union has developed a model called âAdaptive Pathways.â Under this pilot, the EMA not only sits in judgment of companiesâ applications for drug approval, but it is also being asked to assist these companies in navigating the bureaucratic process of application, in designing the protocol for testing the drugs, and even in identifying which kinds of drugs should be developed.
This new kind of relationship sees regulatory bodies not just as adjudicative bodies, but also as assistors and enablers.
The reasons for this shift in function are clear. Biomedical and pharmaceutical markets are the most profitable in the world, eclipsing that of the banking, automotive, energy, and media sectors. Worldwide, the market for pharmaceuticals is worth US$1057.2 billion, and is still expanding, especially in developing states.
Within this market, the biggest expansion is for niche or âorphanâ drugs that target very specific conditions. These drugs comprised over 40% of all FDA approvals for new drugs in 2014. These drugs are more controversial than traditional ones, as there are too few subjects to perform standard clinical trials. Testing of safety and effectiveness is increasingly carried out after approval has been given, even though there is evidence that the willingness to follow through on these studies wanes once these drugs hit the market. As traditional testing methods become increasingly unsuitable for these lucrative classes of drugs, governments have charged their regulatory agencies with figuring out ways to assist biomedical and other pharmaceutical companies bring these products to market.
Health Canada serves in an advisory capacity to the very industry it is expected to regulate.
A report by Industry Canada noted that âFederal and provincial policy and regulations can enhance or detract from the business climate for the Canadian pharmaceutical industry,â and suggested that â[a]n increase in government policy supporting R&D may further strengthen Canadaâs expertise in niche areas within biologics and oncology.â As in other states, the concept of âstate supportâ in Canada has gone from the utilization of tax incentives, subsidies, and market access arrangements to the requirement that Health Canada serve in an advisory capacity to the very industry it is expected to regulate.
In 2002, Canadaâs Auditor General released a report on public sector accountability. In it, the Auditor General noted the increase in âpartnering arrangementsâ between public, private, and private not-for-profit bodies. This may be a characteristic of twenty-first century governance. âIf the roles and responsibilities of each are not clear, however,â added the Auditor General, âshared accountability can become accountability diffused.â
It is reasonable to provide a clear set of expectations and protocol requirements for industries that must acquire regulatory approval before they can market their products. It is also unsurprising that states would want to support private sector innovation in ucrative markets with a high degree of export potential. But we should ask what precisely the model of public accountability is that underlies this new kind of function placed on regulatory agencies. And we should ask whether there are any checks and balances, such as requirements for public transparency, which would ensure effective accountability in this new regulatory regime.
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The Trudeau government took office last fall announcing it would reverse Canadaâs lagging productivity and competitiveness by investing in social innovation. But it has broken new ground by stating that for its social innovation strategy to succeed, it will require greater collaboration across all ministries as well as between government, industry and research institutions. And it is calling for social innovation across all government departments.
While there is no single definition of social innovation, key organizations and networks such as the RĂ©seau quĂ©becois dâinnovation sociale in Quebec, the Stanford Center for Social Innovation in the United States, and the Young Foundation in the United Kingdom all agree that social innovation is about process. It is about new ways to meet todayâs complex social, economic and environmental challenges within organizations, institutions or enterprises in all sectors. Quebec is well positioned to build on its leadership in spearheading initiatives that are transforming the lives of people and communities throughout the province. This is especially true for the social economy in Quebec.
The social economy includes all cooperatives and not-for-profit organizations and enterprises engaged in commercial activity. There are more than 7,000 social economy enterprises throughout the Quebec economy, in diverse sectors that include health and social services, housing, manufacturing, culture, food, tourism, and in the ânew economy.â They employ approximately 150,000 people and represent about 8 percent of the provinceâs gross domestic product (GDP). These enterprises integrate a commitment to greater equity, stable and quality jobs, and sustainable development into their business model. Social economy enterprises produce goods and services in old and new sectors of activity, from daycares to web design; from manufacturing to information and communications technology; from homecare to recycling.
For La Guilde des dĂ©veloppeurs de jeux indĂ©pendants du QuĂ©bec, a cooperative of âinteractive technology developers,â cooperation and co-creation underlie the digital or so-called fourth industrial revolution. La Guilde has adopted a democratic, cooperative business model. The same holds for Projet Sol, a not-for-profit consortium that provides restaurant services to the Planetarium and Biodome. It uses local produce and trains half of its employees so they can be reintegrated into the labour market. Few people are aware that la Tohu, Montrealâs internationally renowned not-for-profit circus theatre, provides job training and creative opportunities for vulnerable youth in the neighbourhood of St. Michel. A recent study reveals that the vast majority of these young people find permanent employment and/or continue their education. Even students are driving the social economy, through initiatives such as the PUSH Fund, recently launched by the Concordia Student Union to finance new affordable cooperative housing for students.
The social economy is also characterized by innovative partnerships designed to mobilize and share knowledge. The Champ des possibles is the symbolic name given to the former industrial district hemmed in by the CP tracks in Mile End. It is now home to Temps libre, a cooperative that is revitalizing the community through innovative ventures such as the first co-working space for the growing number of self-employed parents in the neighbourhood. It has also launched an initiative called Espaces temps, where collaborators from Concordia University are working on experiential learning projects that span the sciences and the arts and promote civic engagement.
These cooperatives and not-for-profit enterprises in the social economy are represented by the Chantier de lâĂ©conomie sociale, an umbrella of networks across Quebec offering customized labour market, business development, research and financial tools, and providing an integrated, coherent âsystem of social innovationâ that is dedicated to meeting todayâs social, economic and environmental needs in novel ways. It is the architect of a dynamic and organic ecosystem built on collaboration with organizations, movements, academic institutions and government to improve the lives of people and communities across the province. Social innovation is at the heart of the success of the social economy. The new mandate for all ministries in the federal government to incorporate social innovation into their mandate should result in greater support for the social economy in Quebec and across Canada. This means taking seriously the commitment by the federal government to promote social innovation and collaborate in the design of new strategies for the well-being of all Canadians.
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The fragile state of Afghanistan remains one of the greatest development challenges of our time. While the joint work of the Afghan government and the international community brought a few benefits for the country, many have not been sustainable. My visits to Kabul and consultations with Afghans at various levels confirm that a large number of serious challenges remain unaddressed, and they require the priority attention of analysts, policy-makers and bureaucrats. Highlighting dubious and anecdotal success stories and painting an overly positive picture of the state of affairs do not necessarily benefit Afghanistan.
Sally Armstrongâs largely optimistic article in Macleanâs earlier this year is a case in point. A certain degree of optimism is absolutely critical if efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the region are to continue. However, ignoring past and current failures and turning our heads away from critical problems in the areas of security, governance and rule of law, economic growth and social development will result in the countryâs descent into a few more decades of chaos, conflict and violence.
The claim made in Armstrongâs coverage â that Afghans are better off today than ever before â is illusory and historically untrue. Afghanistanâs history stretches far beyond the past 40 years of conflict. During the past 40 years, life conditions of people might have been poorer than today. But Afghans saw better days in the decades preceding these conflict years. Astonishingly, some Afghans speak of better conditions even under the Soviet regime. The Washington Post reports an interview with a 27-year-old Afghan realtor who lost his business and would welcome back the Taliban regime, when there was less crime and less corruption and thus business thrived.
Security of Afghans was also better in the years immediately following the war of 2001, before the start of the Taliban resurgence. The Taliban control more of Afghanistan today than at any point since 2001. The year 2015 has been Afghanistanâs most violent since the war of 2001, with civilian casualties during the year reaching record proportions. So many Afghans are trying to leave the country to escape insecurity and economic woes. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that Afghans are the second-largest group of asylum seekers, after Syrians.
The busy and traffic-blocked streets of Kabul are not necessarily indicators of improved security and better life, as concluded in the Macleanâs article. Security threats are top concerns for most Afghans, though the city lives vibrantly from day to day. The instability has generated a survival instinct and resilience in the population. There is also a noticeable increase in the number of children and women in burqas begging in the streets of Kabul. The unemployment rate has climbed above 50 percent.
Armstrongâs assessment that the current Afghan government cannot necessarily be blamed for such an economic downturn is correct. Disproportionately large amounts of foreign aid sent to the country have created an inflated economy dependent on external sources rather than on goods and services produced in the country. Ninety-five percent of the development budget and 60 to 70 percent of the operational budget of Afghanistan are externally financed. Foreign troops and the money flowing into the country from jobs and contracts connected to the US military once accounted for 40 percent of the countryâs GDP. However, the mass withdrawal of the troops was planned years ago, with the full awareness of the Afghan government. It is inexcusable that the international community and the Afghan government failed to foresee and plan for the economic and security shock to follow.
Worsening security is feeding the economic crisis, according to Bill Byrd, who was country manager and economic adviser at the World Bank in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2006 and is now with the United States Institute of Peace. A growing Taliban insurgency is a reality not to be ignored. Euphoria after the quick victory in the war of 2001 had gripped the international community, and a certain complacency took hold. A look at the map of Taliban areas of control and influence (issued and regularly updated by the Institute for the Study of War and published in the Long War Journal), should help to dispel the myth of the Taliban thriving on propaganda alone. Taliban advances are being made despite stepped-up airstrikes by American warplanes and involvement by American Special Operations ground forces.
Meanwhile, the international communityâs training and advisory missions have not produced desirable results. Deficiencies of the Afghan forces persist, according to researchers at the Brookings Institution. Clear indicators of the Taliban insurgency posing serious challenges to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) have emerged, bringing into question the Afghan forcesâ capacity to assume responsibility for the countryâs security. The new American commander for Afghanistan, John Nicholson, also admits that Afghan forces are not making enough progress.
With the Taliban refusing to cooperate, peace appears elusive. There is a risk that the quadrilateral meetings (of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the US) on reconciliation will turn away the Taliban and thus harm reconciliation efforts.
Armstrong gives credit to the Afghan governmentâs commitments to eradicate corruption, undertake judicial reforms and protect womenâs rights. The gaps between intent, commitments and implementation are wide, however. Corruption continues unabated, with a lack of appropriate accountability structures. There have been a few bright spots: the appointment of a new chief justice and judges in several provinces, the attempt to appoint a female judge to the Supreme Court, appointment of four female ministers and two female provincial governors. But these are symbolic gains, considering widespread human rights abuses, the fact that 87 percent of women experience family violence (as documented by Danielle Moylan, a freelance journalist based in Kabul) and the horrendous mob killing of a woman named Farkhunda in broad daylight in Kabul. Her killersâ sentences were reduced on International Womenâs Day.
Training of the police by the international community is a failure. The Afghan police force is inadequately trained to secure civilian lives. It is understandable that the police need to be extra vigilant under fragile security conditions. But such vigilance will be more effective and efficient if conducted with firm but polite and respectful words and actions. During my recent visits to Kabul this year, I witnessed police officers screaming, shouting and yelling at innocent civilians, pointing Kalashnikovs at them. A uniformed police officer yelled at me in front of the office of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. Such behaviour would not produce the desired result of better security or law and order nor help establish the governmentâs authority and legitimacy. In fact, the police behaviour is turning people away from a government that people perceive (perhaps wrongly) as complicit in violation of citizensâ right to be treated with respect in their own country. Legitimacy building (earning the support and loyalty of the people and respect for governmentâs authority) is central to any fragile stateâs stabilization agenda. Legitimacy building through protecting physical and economic security might be time-consuming. But for building a better image of the government (an essential ingredient for legitimacy building) in the immediate future, having the civilian police be civil to and respectful of fellow citizens should be a mandatory requirement.
Since the Bonn conference of 2001, the international community and the Afghan government have relentlessly travelled from one conference to the other, with both parties making promises and commitments while most commitments have been ignored. Resolutions, jointly adopted by the Afghan government and the international community in international conferences, have listed the Afghan governmentâs commitments to undertake reform measures and the international communityâs resource commitments in support of Afghanistanâs reform agenda, to secure Afghanistanâs future and stabilize the country. Identification and unambiguous acceptance of unattained commitments, as we skated from one conference to the other, would have helped resolve problems. But the most striking omission has been the inability of the international community to monitor its own and the Afghan governmentâs progress with indicators, acknowledge failures to attain benchmarks and integrate lessons learned in determining the future course. Instead, we virtually sleepwalked for a decade and a half, dreaming of reaching the finish line with eyes closed, sometimes tripping on morasses of complex policies, strategies and programs and yet continuing our journey while ignoring devastation left by the roadside.
While the international community can be blamed for a lack of vigilance and accountability around its aid operations in Afghanistan, the Afghan government has a responsibility for fixing the situation, with the international community serving in a support role. Canadaâs dynamic ambassador, Deborah Lyons, is correct in her statement that Canadaâs representation on the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board provides the opportunity to take leadership in strengthening joint international and Afghan efforts to increase the effectiveness of international support. However, it is ultimately Afghans who must take a resolute stand in reform efforts for economic growth, job creation, fostering rule of law and human rights, improving public finance management and taking anticorruption measures to ensure delivery of the most essential services to the public. It is no less critical for Afghanistan to reach out for peace and nurture a political process toward peace and cross-border economic cooperation. It is equally urgent for the ANSF to establish control of security and lead on the security front.
Photo:Â Tracing Tea / Shutterstock.com
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Le dernier rapport du commissaire aux langues officielles nous confirme un Ă©lĂ©ment essentiel : les francophones doivent continuer Ă veiller au respect de leurs droits linguistiques, de la dualitĂ© linguistique et de la prestation des services gouvernementaux fĂ©dĂ©raux en français. Cette vigilance comprend au dĂ©part lâobligation de dĂ©poser des plaintes et de soumettre aux tribunaux tout conflit et tout manquement aux dispositions lĂ©gislatives.
Comme les francophones sont en situation minoritaire au Canada, rester vigilants, câest aussi ne pas laisser sâeffriter tous les progrĂšs faits et les combats menĂ©s pour assurer la dualitĂ© linguistique au Canada et la prestation des services gouvernementaux dans les deux langues officielles. Les francophones ont le devoir dâassurer un leadership au quotidien afin de protĂ©ger les acquis, et ils doivent trouver de nouvelles approches pour faire respecter la dualitĂ© linguistique. TrĂšs souvent, cette tĂąche revient aux associations et regroupements communautaires reprĂ©sentant les minoritĂ©s de langue officielle, car eux seuls possĂšdent les structures et les moyens de faire bouger les choses.
Un des problĂšmes auxquels les francophones font face est lâĂ©puisement des « bagarreurs linguistiques ». Ces « fatigants » se trouvent dans plusieurs rĂ©gions du Canada, toujours les mĂȘmes, au point que nous notons un essoufflement, un retrait devant les manquements Ă la dualitĂ© linguistique canadienne ou leur acceptation. Le danger Ă long terme est la perte dâune vision du Canada et lâacceptation dâun pays divisĂ© en des rĂ©gions qui respectent la dualitĂ© linguistique canadienne et dâautres qui sont uniquement anglophones ou francophones.
VoilĂ pourquoi Ă long terme, le gouvernement du Canda ne peut tolĂ©rer que lâon offre des services gouvernementaux fĂ©dĂ©raux infĂ©rieurs Ă ceux qui ont Ă©tĂ© planifiĂ©s ou qui sont Ă©tablis, car tout le pays en paiera le prix. Manquer au devoir de la dualitĂ© linguistique, câest revenir en arriĂšre dans lâhistoire canadienne, Ă la frustration du citoyen qui nâest pas desservi dans la langue de son choix et Ă la perte de confiance devant les instances gouvernementales.
Pour renforcer la dualitĂ© linguistique, il faut modifier la Loi sur les langues officielles et accorder au commissaire aux langues officielles des pouvoirs administratifs lui permettant dâobliger les administrateurs et les dirigeants politiques Ă respecter les droits linguistiques Ă©tablis au niveau fĂ©dĂ©ral. Plusieurs sây opposeront par crainte de perdre des pouvoirs ou dâĂȘtre soumis Ă une « police linguistique ». Mais si nous voulons ĂȘtre vraiment consĂ©quents avec les orientations canadiennes en matiĂšre de dualitĂ© linguistique et de respect des minoritĂ©s de langue officielle, il est nĂ©cessaire dâagir immĂ©diatement auprĂšs des instances gouvernementales qui ne mettent pas en Ćuvre les principes de lâĂ©galitĂ© des deux langues officielles du Canada.
Le rapport publiĂ© en juin par le ComitĂ© permanent des langues officielles des Communes sur la situation du Bureau de la traduction confirme la nĂ©cessitĂ© de donner Ă une autoritĂ© centrale le pouvoir dâassurer lâapplication de la Loi sur les langues officielles. Cette tĂąche pourrait ĂȘtre confiĂ©e au dĂ©part au Commissariat aux langues officielles.
Modifier le programme de contestation judiciaire afin de permettre de poursuivre le gouvernement du Canada lorsquâil ne respecte pas ses obligations quant Ă la promotion et au dĂ©veloppement des communautĂ©s de langue officielle est une excellente mesure en soi. Toutefois, le fardeau sera toujours sur les Ă©paules des minoritĂ©s de langue officielle et, plus particuliĂšrement, les francophones, car la trĂšs grande majoritĂ© des fonctionnaires fĂ©dĂ©raux communiquent aisĂ©ment en anglais. Cette revendication des droits demande beaucoup dâĂ©nergie et de volontĂ©, au point que certains renoncent Ă faire reconnaĂźtre leurs droits.
Depuis des années, les rapports du commissaire aux langues officielles nous indiquent les progrÚs réalisés tout autant que les délais et les manquements en matiÚre de dualité linguistique canadienne. Si nous voulons réaliser notre vision du Canada, la meilleure approche est bien plus souvent administrative que juridique.
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One of the enduring lessons of my time working on citizenship and multiculturalism issues under former minister Jason Kenney was just how much I and many other public servants were blinded by internal values, ideologies and biases and were thus not able to respond appropriately to the various values, ideologies and biases of the minister and his staff.
Recognizing these biases, and more importantly, overcoming them, was a somewhat painful process, as I detailed in my book Policy Arrogance or Innocent Bias: Resetting Citizenship and Multiculturalism. As a result, I always try to ensure that my readings include a range of perspectives, particularly those that challenge my beliefs and values.
This commentary on Candice Malcolmâs book should be understood in that context.
Malcolm, who was a political staffer in Jason Kenneyâs office, provides good insights into the thinking, values, ideologies and biases within the ministerâs office. Her view of the âreal character of our nation,â which she describes as âan independent but community-oriented, hard-working but fun-loving, prudent yet jovial, responsible, religious, family-oriented nation with big hearts and open minds,â reflects the anti-elite orientation of the Harper government.
But, written as it was so soon after the election, Malcolmâs book reads more as a rant than a thoughtful critique of the changes the Liberal government has made to citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism. To borrow one of Elizabeth KĂŒbler-Rossâs five stages of grief, she remains in the denial stage.
The language she uses is highly partisan: âfoolhardy Syrian refugee policy,â âelite intellectual circles,â Trudeau âisnât interestedâŠignoresâŠwhitewashes,â âmouldy leftist myths,â âblundering politicians and partisan lackeys,â âarrogantly throwing the doors open,â ârewards his friends and government agencies,â âpandering to a small minority in ethnic communities,â âsilent majority of right-thinking Canadiansâ and âmanipulating the system and playing partisan games.â
While her examples and anecdotes are relevant, all too often she does not substantiate them with quantitative analysis.
But beyond the language and rhetoric, what about her substantive arguments?
My fear is that the Liberal government may go too far in the other direction, only addressing the weaknesses of Discover Canada by adding âprogressive values,â rather than building on its strengths to prepare a more bipartisan citizenship guide. The themes the Liberals have selected for the Canada 150 celebration â diversity and inclusion, reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, youth, and the environment â somewhat justify my fear. As to her defence of the Conservative governmentâs language and approach surrounding âbarbaric cultural practices,â in my view, more neutral and inclusive language would situate these practices within the broader historical context of the struggle for gender equality without weakening the fundamental illegality of honour crimes.
Malcolm correctly notes the general importance of integration and settlement services, and to the Conservativesâ credit, they tripled the funding for integration and settlement services between 2006 2012 to $966 million (but reduced it to $599 million in 2014-15 after program review and other cuts). So while she is right to question whether there is adequate funding for existing settlement services and Syrian refugeesâ needs (as many settlement agencies have), her critique would be more credible if she included an examination of the previous governmentâs policy and funding choices, and acknowledged the additional funding provided by the current government for Syrian refugees. Moreover, her overall fears regarding poor integration prospects for Syrian refugees do not take into consideration the relative success of our education system (which is recognized in many OECD studies) in integrating the children of immigrants and the subsequently high percentage of them who are university educated. Her assertion that âSecond generation immigrants are choosing to reject western culture and values and instead embrace a radical religion that their own parents likely rejectedâ is not qualified. While there is an increase in religiosity among younger new Canadians â as seen in more common wearing of religious symbols such as the hijab, turban and other âheadgearâ â this is mainly in the context of participating in Canadian society, not removing themselves from it. A recent Environics Institute survey of Canadian Muslims indicates high levels of attachment to Canada.
A number of her critiques are valid, but they are undermined by incomplete and misleading assertions. While it is legitimate to criticize the Liberalsâ reversal of language- and knowledge-testing for 54-65 year olds, reverting to Paul Martinâs policy, she fails to note that this only affects 8 percent of applicants for this testing (according to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada). She wisely does not challenge the removal of the language and knowledge-testing requirement for 14-17 year olds (they attend school and acquire the necessary language and knowledge). She does not acknowledge that the Liberal government kept the Conservative policy of not allowing interpreters in the knowledge interviews, despite pressure within their caucus to abandon the policy.
While one can argue whether or not the change in the residency requirement to three years out of five (from four out of six) was wise from an integration perspective, the Liberal government change did not change the fundamental â and more important â principle of residency, that is, physical presence in Canada. In the past, residency court definitions had ranged from physical presence to having a Canadian legal address, which led to some new citizens spending minimal time in Canada.
Her critique of the relative shift in immigration policy away from the Economic Class immigrants is valid, as is her critique of the overall increase in levels. But again, she overstates the impact of the shift, as 54 percent will be in the Economic Class compared with 65 percent before. Moreover, since her book was published, better data  from Statistics Canada on the various immigration classesâ incomes is available, and it shows, not surprisingly, that the children of immigrants from the Economic Class fare the best ($46,000, similar to Canadian-born) and those of Family Class immigrants fare the worst ($39,000), but, surprisingly, those of refugees â government and privately-sponsored â do almost as well as those of Economic Class immigrants ($41,000 and $44,000, respectively) in 2011.
She correctly notes the complete failure of the Investor Immigrant Program, which the Conservatives cancelled, but then conflates this with Provincial Nominee Programs in general. The latter show good economic integration results in most provinces except Quebec, in terms of employment and earnings or accessing EI and social assistance.
Her valid concern that support for immigration is at risk is demonstrated by the 2015 Ipsos survey  (which she cites), but also by Ekos (March 2015) and IRCCâs most recent tracking survey (October 2014).
However, it is striking that she is silent on the role language and discourse â whether on the part of government leaders or the media â can play in influencing public opinion. Did some of the Conservative governmentâs language â âbogus refugees,â âcitizens of convenienceâ â and the increasing use of identity politics against Canadian Muslims, not play a part in influencing public opinion?
This silence and lack of awareness is evident in her assertions that the Liberals are âpanderingâ for votes and that the changes they made were âdeliberately engineered for partisan gain.â Did not the Conservatives also âpanderâ for votes in their historical-recognition initiatives for Chinese, Ukrainian, Italian, Indo- and Jewish Canadians? Or were these initiatives just responding to citizen concerns? Was some of the anti-Muslim language not âpanderingâ to the Conservative base and used for party fundraising purposes, or was it a legitimate political response to a public concern? And was the push to address and provide additional funding to resolve the citizenship-application backlog, with over 500,000 new citizens in 2014 and 2015, not also partially driven by politics?
As other reviewers have noted, there is a need for a strong conservative perspective in citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism policies to inform debates, discussion and policy choices. Otherwise, governments risk not considering the impact of their preferred approach. But this conservative perspective should be rigorous and evidence-based, enriched by anecdotes, and not merely a polemic. The same of course applies to liberals.
While it may be cathartic for her and other Conservative party members and supporters to criticize the Liberal governmentâs changes in this manner, it does not help the Conservative Party in its reflections on the lessons of the 2015 election. Even though Jason Kenny spent most of his weekends in ridings with large populations of new Canadians, the Liberals were victorious in 30 of the 33 ridings where visible minorities are the majority. Furthermore, her book does little to advance our understanding and knowledge of the challenges in ensuring the ongoing success of the Canadian model of the immigrant-to-citizen process.
Photo: arindambanerjee / Shutterstock.com
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While Donald Trump keeps reciting his mantra about the Mexican border, every week brings news about the construction of a new border wall.
In the past year, Austria, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary, Kenya, and Tunisia have stated their intention to build walls or barriers along their borders, while Bulgaria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will renovate or improve existing barriers. Hungary is in the process of reinforcing the subpar one it built less than a year ago.
Although in the aftermath of the Cold War only a dozen walls remained standing, since then almost 70 walls have been or are in the process of being built along 40,000 km of borders. Three-quarters of these have been erected within the last two decades.
Fences topped with barbed wire or razor blades, concrete walls with deep foundations to (unsuccessfully) prevent tunnel-building, infrared cameras and plain barbed wire fences wrapped around concrete pillars â these are now the ways governments typically secure their borders, hoping they will be a quick and visible response to international threats, whether real or perceived.
Today, only a minority of these walls demarcate a de facto boundary, and instead of resolving conflicts, they tend to bring them to deadlock (for example, in Cyprus; between North and South Korea; between India and Pakistan). Mostly they are statesâ unilateral initiatives in response to a national security issue. They are employed to fight terrorism (Turkey-Syria, Thailand-Malaysia, Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan), illegal immigration (United States-Mexico, Bulgaria-Turkey, Greece-Turkey), or smuggling (Iran-Pakistan) â even all three simultaneously (India-Bangladesh). But they end up inciting even more border violence.
Far from fixing the problems for which they were erected, walls lead people to find ways to circumvent them: tunnels to transport fighters, drugs, and migrants (on April 21, 2016, American border guards discovered an 800-metre tunnel long the border in San Diego); ramps to cross barriers; submarines where coastal waters enable border-crossing; and using compressed air guns to shoot goods over to the other side.
Walls are also counterproductive, as illegal migrants â afraid to face the ordeal of crossing the border again â tend to stay instead of occasionally returning to their home countries, as they might otherwise have done. For people who really want to get into a walled territory, border barriers are an additional obstacle, but they do not dissuade them from crossing it. Rather than stopping it walls shift the flow of migrants to more dangerous areas, such as deserts, seas and conflict zones.
Walls also encourage criminal groups to take over the border-crossing process using extortion and violence. Thus, migrants become objects in an ever more lucrative market, and the dangers of the border increase.
And now, instead of consisting mostly men trying to make money to send their families left behind as in the past, today the migrants frequently include women (who sometimes take contraceptives before they leave, as rape is an integral part of the migratory process) and, increasingly, unaccompanied children. Europol has recorded 10,000 missing minors.
So, faced with migrants and criminals at their borders, countries embark on an accelerating spiral of ever tighter security, adding more border guards to the barriers, technology and surveillance â the value of the border-security market is estimated at US$16 billion just for 2015 â while the problems the walls are meant to address persist.
Walls are nothing but short-term response to the challenges posed by globalization, such as economic inequality and even the effects of climate change. Until we start to acknowledge the despair of the people affected by the building of walls, change will be slow to come.
To find out more about this topic, see the proceedings of a conference held June 2-3, 2016, in Montreal. The photo shows a large steel fence protecting the border between Mexico and the United States of America â a common place for illegal migrants and drug smugglers to cross. Photo by Shutterstock.
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Oh, the irony.
A Brexit vote that was meant to repatriate democratic accountability back to British shores has instead thrown the very question of accountability up in the air. A clear majority of the British people backed leaving the European Union but no one, least of all the political leaders of the Brexit movement, has any idea what that means in practice or how they will achieve it.
The resulting uncertainty is harming the well-being of Britons. The markets are down, and the pound is plumbing depths it hasnât seen in over a generation. Billions of dollars are being wiped off peopleâs pensions. Who from the Brexit camp can or will speak to calm frayed nerves?
The answer, it appears, is no one. The only peep from leading Brexiteers since Friday morningâs seismic shock was Boris Johnsonâs regular column in Mondayâs Daily Telegraph, which had the feel of an ostrich seeking to plug its head back into European sands.
The vacuum at the top of British politics is now complete. Prime Minister David Cameron has resigned, and Opposition Leader Jeremy Corbyn is under siege from his own Labour Party following a tsunami of resignations from his shadow cabinet. Britain is facing the most complicated act of governance in its modern history â extracting itself from the European Union â and no one has a plan.
No matter who takes control, itâs hard to see how the current composition of the House of Commons can produce a government lined up with the will of the people on the question of the hour.
As a whole, the British Parliament is massively majority pro-âremain.â Conservative MPs, it bears reminding us, are also majority pro-remain, although they are likely to soon be led by a Brexiteer. The parliamentary Labour Party, too, is pro-remain, as is Corbyn, albeit with fingers crossed behind his back. That reticence is precisely why Labour MPs are so cross with Corbyn and his office and several are resigning. This, however, puts them massively offside with the majority of Labourâs membership, who are simultaneously pro-Corbyn and pro-âleave.â
So far, so complicated.
The only pro-remain party to represent an unquestionably pro-remain constituency in Westminster is the Scottish National Party, whose raison dâĂȘtre, of course, is to break up the United Kingdom, something Brexit has now kicked into higher gear. The Liberal Democrats are also unequivocal on Europe, but their rump â a mere eight MPs â no longer generates movement in Parliament.
Meanwhile, the only pro-leave leader who represents a resolutely pro-leave constituency is Nigel Farage of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and he doesnât have a seat in Parliament. Indeed, the only UKIP MP who does have a say in Westminster, Douglas Carswell, hates Farageâs guts.
Nor is Farage certain to be offered a place in the Brexit negotiation team. Although the official leave campaign ended up aping his odious anti-immigration arguments in the final weeks of the campaign, the man himself remains persona non grata in the respectable salons of pro-leave opinion.
Returning to the question: Who, then, speaks for the 52 percent who backed breaking up with the European Union? And what do they want?
If you believe the winning Vote Leave campaign (which didnât include Farage), it won because people wanted to âtake back controlâ from an overbearing EU bureaucracy. Its vision is resolutely pro-trade and pro-economic-freedom. The Farage camp, however, claims it was a desire to crack down on immigration that won the day. These arenât mutually exclusive interpretations, but the emphasis is clearly being placed on two very different ideas of âcontrol.â
A lot of the blame for poor economic outcomes in pro-leave regions falls on the kind of pro-market, pro-trade policies that Vote Leave now wants to pursue with even greater vigour. Globalization is the enemy here, and a newly independent Britain would have to be even more competitive and globalized to keep investment flowing. What would the Farage crowd â which includes populist conservative and ex-Labour working-class support â say to this kind of a program?
We might be about to find out.
The more Westminster descends into farce, the more it becomes clear that whatever governing formation emerges will need a mandate to extract Britain from Europe. Just how effectively the split Conservative and Labour parties could campaign in the resulting election is an open question. So, too, is the level of support a motivated UKIP could claim. The result could be even more political instability.
In the meantime, the markets and Britainâs allies will be left with no clear signals to plan the new world order and might go on to plan it without British input, a result that couldnât be less accountable or more out of control.
Photo: Pixelbliss / Shutterstock.com
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In the wake of the Brexit referendum, this weekâs episode tackles a Canadian issue that might soon trigger a referendum of its own: electoral reform.
Harvard Universityâs Pippa Norris is one of the worldâs leading experts on electoral systems. She is currently the director of the Electoral Integrity Project. This $6 million-dollar initiative involves thousands of researchers who are examining why elections around the world work and why they fail. Norris and the project team have also been able to make observations about the link between specific types of voting systems and the degree of integrity associated with them. For example, proportional representation systems tend to be linked to higher levels of electoral integrity.
Norris recently delivered the Cadario Lecture at the University of Torontoâs School of Public Policy and Governance, after which she shared her views on Canadaâs electoral reform debate in a live on-stage interview with Jennifer Ditchburn, Policy Options editor-in-chief.
Download for free. New episodes every second Tuesday.
The Policy Options Special Feature on electoral reform https://bit.ly/29gvNXE
Photo:Â Sean Kilpatrick / The Canadian Press
Au QuĂ©bec, comme dans les autres provinces, un seul organisme paie tous les soins offerts dans le systĂšme public. Tous les services mĂ©dicaux, de tous les mĂ©decins, pour tous les patients, depuis plus de 40 ans. Cela constitue une base de donnĂ©es dâune incroyable richesse pour comprendre comment la maniĂšre de payer les soins influence les pratiques cliniques, et ultimement les soins reçus par la population. Câest une mine dâor potentielle pour les ordres professionnels, les chercheurs ou les journalistes. Mais contrairement Ă ce qui se fait en Ontario ou au Manitoba, par exemple, lâexploitation du potentiel dâinformation que constituent ces donnĂ©es pour mieux comprendre, dĂ©cider et intervenir est presque impossible en pratique au QuĂ©bec.
Les difficultĂ©s sont de plusieurs ordres. Dâune part, les procĂ©dures de traitement des demandes dâaccĂšs aux donnĂ©es sont kafkaĂŻennes. Ces procĂ©dures visent, en thĂ©orie, Ă protĂ©ger la confidentialitĂ© et la vie privĂ©e, objectif que tout le monde soutiendra. Mais dans la rĂ©alitĂ©, la bureaucratie quâelles impliquent est souvent incohĂ©rente, les dĂ©lais sont interminables, les dĂ©cisions sont parfois trĂšs arbitraires et, au final, il est discutable que lâobjectif de protection de la vie privĂ©e soit effectivement bien servi.
Par ailleurs, des organismes comme la RĂ©gie de lâassurance maladie du QuĂ©bec (RAMQ) nâont mĂȘme pas comme mandat de rendre les donnĂ©es utilisables pour la recherche ou la pratique. La RAMQ peut ainsi dĂ©cider ce quâelle accepte de communiquer ou pas, indĂ©pendamment de toute question sur la protection de la confidentialitĂ©. Il nâexiste mĂȘme pas de donnĂ©es sur les donnĂ©es disponibles. Il est ainsi souvent impossible de savoir si une donnĂ©e existe. Ultimement, toute extraction est facturĂ©e au demandeur, ce qui rend les donnĂ©es inaccessibles pour beaucoup dâorganismes et de mĂ©dias.
Officieusement, les anecdotes abondent, pointant vers dâautres causes : culture du secret et mĂ©connaissance de la recherche, inconfort du politique face Ă des donnĂ©es qui pourraient surgir dans les dĂ©bats publics et potentiellement dĂ©ranger leur agenda. Quand on pense que la RAMQ met deux ans Ă rendre publics de simples tableaux de synthĂšse sur les dĂ©penses, on peut effectivement se demander sâil nâexiste pas dâautres causes que les lourdeurs bureaucratiques et les contraintes inhĂ©rentes Ă la protection de la confidentialitĂ©.
Sur le fond, et quelles quâen soient les causes, cette impossibilitĂ© Ă utiliser les donnĂ©es pour analyser la performance du systĂšme de santĂ© est dĂ©sespĂ©rante pour un chercheur. Sans donnĂ©es dĂ©taillĂ©es, il est impossible de faire des modĂ©lisations sophistiquĂ©es, de tester des hypothĂšses en contrĂŽlant pour des facteurs confondants, et ainsi de rĂ©pondre Ă des questions socialement et scientifiquement importantes.
Le Commissaire Ă la santĂ© et au bien-ĂȘtre a lancĂ© Ă l’hiver 2016 un exercice pour rĂ©flĂ©chir aux services de santĂ© qui devraient ĂȘtre assurĂ©s et Ă ceux qui ne devraient pas lâĂȘtre. Mais, comment dĂ©battre de ces questions sans savoir combien coĂ»tent les services en question ? Combien de services sont offerts ? Par qui et Ă qui ? Aucun des paramĂštres de base du dĂ©bat nâest sur la table et aucun ne pourra lâĂȘtre sans que les rĂšgles du jeu en matiĂšre dâaccĂšs aux donnĂ©es ne changent. De mĂȘme, la vĂ©rificatrice gĂ©nĂ©rale du QuĂ©bec a mis en lumiĂšre un imprĂ©vu de 400 millions de dollars dans la rĂ©munĂ©ration des mĂ©decins. Ce nâest pas une petite somme. Pourquoi un tel imprĂ©vu ? Pour payer quels services ? Ă quels patients ? MystĂšre, personne nâaura le droit de rĂ©pondre Ă ces questions.
Il suffit dâune courte visite sur le site de lâInstitut canadien dâinformation sur la santĂ© (ICIS) pour constater que le QuĂ©bec est le cancre du Canada dans lâanalyse et la publication dâindicateurs sur les dĂ©penses de santĂ©, lâaccĂšs aux soins et la performance du systĂšme. Dans un contexte dâaustĂ©ritĂ© oĂč, soi-disant, chaque dĂ©pense est scrutĂ©e Ă la loupe, il est incomprĂ©hensible dâentraver lâanalyse des donnĂ©es par des scientifiques ou des tierces parties. Comme le soutenait RĂ©mi Quirion, le scientifique en chef du QuĂ©bec, dans son mĂ©moire dĂ©posĂ© dans le cadre de la consultation menĂ©e en vue dâune rĂ©forme de la Loi dâaccĂšs Ă lâinformation, « il est temps de repenser la maniĂšre dont les donnĂ©es administratives peuvent ĂȘtre exploitĂ©es pour contribuer Ă une sociĂ©tĂ© ouverte, Ă un gouvernement transparent et au fonctionnement dĂ©mocratique ». Si le gouvernement Harper sâest illustrĂ© en muselant les scientifiques fĂ©dĂ©raux, empĂȘcher les chercheurs dâavoir accĂšs aux donnĂ©es est une façon tout aussi efficace de les condamner au silence.
Il existe un biais que les anglophones appellent « streetlight effect » et qui est illustrĂ© par lâanecdote de la personne qui cherche ses clĂ©s perdues sous la lumiĂšre du lampadaire plutĂŽt que dans le coin sombre oĂč elles sont tombĂ©es. EmpĂȘcher lâaccĂšs aux donnĂ©es administratives en santĂ© va produire les mĂȘmes comportements Ă lâĂ©chelle dâune sociĂ©tĂ©. Les chercheurs et les journalistes ne pourront pas analyser ou discuter de phĂ©nomĂšnes pourtant fondamentaux parce que ces phĂ©nomĂšnes sont maintenus dans le noir. Quand le QuĂ©bec sortira-t-il enfin de cette noirceur ?
Souhaitez-vous rĂ©agir Ă cet article ? Joignez-vous aux dĂ©bats dâOptions politiques et soumettez-nous votre texte en suivant ces directives. | Do you have something to say about the article you just read? Be part of the Policy Options discussion, and send in your own submission. Here is a link on how to do it.