According to Robert Kagan, Americans and Europeans have travelled divergent roads since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the European Union. Europe, Kagan argues, has emerged into a political paradise much like the stable, civilized world order of perpetual peace envisioned by Immanuel Kant. America, in contrast, with its massive defense budget, capac- ity to launch military operations around the world, and willingness to engage in unilateral actions against ”œrogue states,” remains inside a violent, anarchic Hobbesian world. If the Cold War was an era when ”œthe West” held together, integrated in part by a com- mon ideological opponent and military threat, the post-Cold War era witnessed a profound rift in the ”œtransatlantic alliance” between the United States and Europe. Kagan writes that ”œon major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”
The opening words of Kagan’s work capture the core message of his book. Europe, he insists, seeks to inhabit the paradisiacal realm of a cos- mopolitan, liberal-democratic order governed by treaties, deliberative bod- ies, and international law. The US, in contrast, the only hyperpower capable of waging war in almost any setting and on numerous fronts simultaneous- ly, plays the sheriff outside paradise in the unruly Wild West of rogue states unwilling to submit to international law and peaceful mechanisms of dis- pute resolution.
According to Kagan, the First and Second World Wars decimated the mil- itary and economic strength of the major European powers. France, Germany and Great Britain had their imperialist ambitions severely cur- tailed; Britain, in particular, would lose its status as empire. Following the Second World War, the US and the Soviet Union emerged as the domi- nant superpowers. The transatlantic alliance was formed as the US and the countries of Western Europe formed an integrated block ”” ”œthe West” ”” allied against the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the need for unity in the West diminished. In Europe, countries celebrated the ”œpeace dividend” marking the end of the Soviet Union by reducing military budgets and emphasizing social pro- grams and international aid. The countries of Europe sought to move beyond the clash of nations to a peace- ful social order built upon internation- al laws, shared dispute resolution mechanisms and common institu- tions. The US, in contrast, though it would lower its level of military spend- ing, continued to maintain a powerful military capable of operating in regions around the globe.
Kagan argues that EU members and the United States have different psychologies and different material resources. EU countries, he insists, have little interest in military action; ideologically, they prefer to resolve conflicts through laws, treaties, and extended exercises in diplomacy. The US, in contrast, has a large and power- ful military and a political leadership willing to see that military used, even without UN sanction. Furthermore, as the self-appointed global ”œsheriff” will- ing to engage in combat around the world, the United States serves as a focal point for opposition. The psychologies of Europe and America are marked by different perceptions of threats. While Kagan recognizes varia- tions in the psychologies and material capacities of different European coun- tries and acknowledges the existence of voices of dissent from dominant positions in both the EU the US, he insists upon a profound difference in the willingness of Americans and Europeans to use military power to achieve particular objectives.
As a work of descriptive analysis, there is much to commend in Kagan’s analysis. He accurately and sensibly describes differences in American and European efforts to respond to countries whose actions fall outside the boundaries of international law. Political leaders and citizens in many countries ”” and not just nations within Europe ”” have little interest in maintaining large defence budgets with sizeable standing armies. Many countries lost their appetite for war- making following the deaths of mil- lions in the trenches of the first World War and the sustained period of blood- letting during the second World War. The establishment of the EU has helped move Europe away from the bloody, violent world of Hobbes toward the more peaceful, civil world envisioned by Kant.
Though brief and prone to generalization, Kagan’s work successfully cap- tures the different roads down which the US and the European Union have trav- elled since the end of the Cold War. As a work of normative analysis, however, Of Paradise and Power falls notably short.
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Kagan insists that countries lack- ing in war-making capacities inevitably seek peaceful means of resolving disputes. They turn to diplo- matic negotiation, provide incentives, or use international aid as means of defusing potential conflicts. In con- trast, the United States, with the capacity to launch prolonged military engagements on multiple fronts, is much more willing to use military intervention as a means of achieving national objectives. Regrettably ”” and crucially ”” Kagan offers no practical insight into when the use of military power is warranted. He suggests that Europeans and civilians of other nations suffer from a form of naiveté when they presume to live in a Kantian paradise of international laws with small armies and modest budgets for the military. For Kagan, just outside the borders of the civil, cosmopolitan social order lies the Hobbesian, violent world of the lawless ”œjungle.”
The chief shortcoming with this analysis is that it refuses to take seriously the possibility that diplomatic and economic alternatives to military engagement might be both more ethically justifiable and ultimately more effective than the exercise of mili- tary power. For example, while it is pos- sible to view the dispute over the justifiability of the invasion of Iraq as a conflict between ”œKantian” and ”œHobbe- sian” inspired views of the world, it is also possible to view the debate over mil- itary action as a legitimate dispute over both the nature of Iraq as a threat and the justified use of military power. True, it is possible to follow the logic of Kagan’s argument that weak countries tend to underestimate threats. However, another way of analyzing the situation is to argue that many countries were not persuaded that existing intelligence lent support to the claim that Iraq was a legit- imate, immediate threat to other nations. Furthermore, many countries insisted that all diplomatic and nonvio- lent methods be used short of military intervention before they would consider providing support for a UN Security Council resolution permitting the inva- sion of Iraq.
Though Kagan provides a clear analysis of who has power and how that power was acquired over the last several hundred years, he offers little insight into how military power ought to be exercised. The disinclination to use military power as a force for ”œregime change” is not just a sign of weakness or a sign of an excessively idealistic conception of human nature. It can also reflect the judicious, pru- dent use of power in response to avail- able evidence, the likelihood of particular threats, and the anticipation of particular outcomes. The willing- ness to consider alternatives to war might also reflect a better appreciation for the destruction wrought by mili- tary conflict. Of Paradise and Power would be much more persuasive and significant if Kagan had offered a con- sidered account of when the exercise of US military power is justified.
Paradise is a place that neither Europeans nor Americans occupy. Even in an uncertain, ”œHobbesian” world, there are powerful reasons for limiting the exercise of military power to very carefully defined circum- stances where the available evidence leads to the conclusion that no other alternative ought to be pursued. Given Kagan’s focus on the significance of power, he offers surprisingly little insight into how such power should be wielded.
