Prior to 1998, Jack Granatstein was well known to many Canadians as an academic historian with particular interests in the Canadian military and 20th century politics and politicians. With Who Killed Canadian History?, his audience expanded to Canadians more general- ly. Who Killed the Canadian Military? is again aimed directly at the general public, but will no doubt have scores of professionals scribbling furiously in denial or support of the various issues on the table. Neither the general pub- lic nor the professional scribblers will be disappointed. Granatstein has iden- tified and exposed the different dimensions along which the Canadian Forces have evolved historically and which have led to the current decima- tion of Canada’s military contribution to international operations.

Although the book is divided into seven chapters, there are really two parts and a conclusion. The first three chap- ters nominally take to task Pearson, Diefenbaker and Paul Hellyer but really establish a chronology and analysis of the evolving environment of defence decision-making in terms of national interests. Peacekeeping in the Suez and Cyprus can be viewed as in the national interest since they bridged differences between important Canadian allies. Granatstein has argued that UN peace- keeping has had little favourable effect on world order in the long run. ”œCana- dians cannot pin their hopes for a better world on a flawed, crippled world body.” This is neither provocative nor argumentative in the Granatstein con- text; this is a simply a somber but accu- rate synopsis of the UN with respect to peacekeeping.

Diefenbaker’s hesitancy to react during the Cuban missile crisis was not in the national interest since it shook the trust that is the very heart of NATO. Such anti-Americanism continues, but unreflective anti-Americanism in the name of Canadian national sovereignty may not be in the national interest.

”œIt is long past time,” Granatstein writes, ”œfor Canadians to begin to act in their true national interest. Above all, that means cooperating closely with our neighbours in the defence of North America. In real terms, Canada has no choice here, though it can exer- cise its independent judgment when the United States goes to war abroad.”

Hellyer’s unification of the armed forces serves only as an introduction to a neverending series of changes that have affected the structure of the Canadian forces: the management sys- tem, relations between senior military leadership and political leadership, and the constant adaptation of all forces personnel to general changes in Canadian society through the applica- tion of Charter rights and bilingualism.

The second section of the book is about political leadership and defence under Trudeau, Mulroney and Chrétien. In this section the emphasis is on the shift to peacekeeping as the core of Canadian defence and security policy. Equally, it emphasizes an increase in anti-Americanism at the highest political levels with the Trudeau and Chrétien administrations and deep structural changes that were the backdrop for political decisions that shifted resources from NATO and Cold War activities to peacekeeping with associated budget decreases. Granatstein highlights the tentative approach to defence budgets and poli- cy in the Mulroney era and finally the almost complete loss of strategic direc- tion and fiscal commitment with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. With further decreases in DND budgets in the 1995 fiscal tightening, Granatstein accurate- ly records that ”œAt the end of 2003 the Canadian forces’ personnel were exhausted, their equipment rusted out, their coffers all but empty.” It would be very difficult to overturn this ver- dict. The principle actors in each chap- ter, unwittingly or not, in small steps or large, killed the Canadian military.

The final chapter really hits the mark.

Canadians do not appear to com- prehend that a military exists to fight wars and, ultimately, to protect the national interests. Instead they somehow came to think of the Canadian Forces as the embodiment of their values, as peacekeeping social workers at home and abroad.

”œWho killed the Canadian mili- tary? We all did.”

Granatstein then outlines a list of expenditures required to ensure that Canada can assume some degree of ter- ritorial defence and support for interna- tional alliances including UN activities. The list is consistent with a number of studies produced by the academic com- munity and pro-defence study insti- tutes and may sound quite extravagant to those unfamiliar with defence issues. However, Granatstein is clearly less wedded to details and budgets than he is to the requirement to act now.

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The great appeal of Granatstein’s writing is its easy uncluttered flow. Who killed the Canadian military? The complex and changing political and social context should complicate any analysis ”” except this one. Each chapter tells a complex story simply. Nonetheless, the direct linkages between national interests and nation- al defence decisions are exposed, and understanding these is a necessary pre- requisite to thinking about what national defence ought to be.

There are some omissions from the stories that might have been con- sidered. In particular, Trudeau’s ”œmalign neglect” could well have been described as explicit and desired. The ”œthird way” was an explicit approach applied broadly to national policy. Canada was to increase its exchanges with Western Europe and decrease reliance on Britain and the US in social, political and economic matters. As a result, Canada instituted the Foreign Investment Review Agency, increased attention on la Francophonie and multiculturalism, and shifted resources from NATO to the UN. Both FIRA and the shift to the UN showed the exercise of nation- al sovereignty, but they each hurt national interests by reducing the trust and stability of ongoing central security relationships. Some reduc- tion in Canadian defence spending on Cold War deterrence might be understandable since Canada’s real contribution to deterrence was more political support than military sup- port. However, Canada’s support to NATO reached a critical level in the 1970s and international pressure resulted in the purchase of Leopard tanks from Germany. Later, in 1983 Trudeau launched his ”œpeace initiative” to punc- tuate the role that Canada could play in international affairs, but further wors- ened the atmosphere between Canada and its allies. Defence policies and postures were not an accident. While Granatstein is an expert on these issues, he has cho- sen to be less expansive and, wisely, less contentious.

Granatstein highlights the diffi- culties with the operation of the civilian-military management system, coping with deep social changes, and to the cyclical posting system of the Forces. Similar changes affected all federal departments. The ”œPublic Service 2000” study commenced in 1989 was rendered irrelevant with the budget and personnel cuts of 1995- 96. Then came departmental budget plans, plans to accommodate 30 per- cent or 10 percent cuts. A recruitment and retention crisis was identified by the clerk of the Privy Council in the 1997 report to the prime minister. Plans for the universal classification system were later the hot manage- ment issue until fading away. Finally in 2003 Bill C-25, the Public Service Modernization Act, was passed with as yet unknown implications except for more change.

The management and informa- tion problems that arose in the Canadian forces should come as no surprise to Canadians who have seen equivalent problems in Human Resources Canada and ”œadscam.” Granatstein’s goal is not to lay blame but to expose real problems that require immediate attention. Again, Granatstein has chosen to be less expansive and less contentious.

There are bound to be several points of disagreement on the proposals for augmenting the Canadian forces. Increasing the defence budget to 2.5 percent of GDP will be a major bone of contention, as will an increase in personnel to 85,000 from 60,000. What airlift and sealift capabilities are required? Does Canada need a shipbuilding capacity for naval vessels? What should be the response of the Canadian forces to terrorism relative to other national security issues? The alignment of defence policy with foreign and national security policies receives lit- tle attention. One thing is certain: whoever takes up these questions must be as clear as Granatstein is on national interests and objectives. In addition to the defence of Canada, domestic order, disaster assistance, and international efforts including UN activities, Canada, Granatstein writes,

has to act so that no threat to the United States will ever be facilitated by Canadian weak- ness. We must also ensure that the Americans do not believe that we are getting a free ride on their heavily laden backs. Neutrality is never an option for Canada because the Americans cannot permit it.

Granatstein is clear on what is required and why. He is also clear on the timing ”” now. The existing list of urgent capital requirements is more than enough to get started.

This short insightful book may well revive active interest by the Canadian public in the Canadian military. Granatstein makes it clear that he is the chair of a pro-defence lobby group in the introduction, but this book is not a policy rant. No one is pilloried; no views are slighted. This is an authorita- tive essay on a serious issue posing as a relaxed and enjoyable discussion of more or less familiar events. We Canadians have lessons to be learned. The Canadian forces are not currently capable of protecting our national interests. As Granatstein suggests, it is in our national interest to re-establish the trust of our major ally. We can solve the problem and we must start now.

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