(Version française disponible ici)
The Trudeau governmentâs latest budget contained a number of splashy items, ranging from housing policy to national defence. In the midst of a national housing crisis and with mounting geopolitical threats, itâs no surprise that these policy areas are getting attention.
Another issue that the government sought to address in the budget is Canadaâs lagging productivity. Itâs perhaps less well understood, but one that will determine Canadaâs ability to fund solutions to our most pressing national challenges. Dusting off the industrial policy playbook may be part of the solution.
Canadaâs productivity challenges arenât new, and arenât news. Economic commentators have been raising flags about them for years. A recent speech by Carolyn Rogers, senior deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, injected some urgency into the discussion.
âYouâve seen those signs that say, âIn emergency, break glass.â Well, itâs time to break the glass,â she said.
In other words, productivity is no longer just a problem. Itâs an emergency.
But why should ordinary Canadians fixate on productivity? Next to the increased cost of living â particularly the cost of shelter â productivity can seem like an abstract concept. Why spend money trying to make firms more efficient when many households are having trouble paying the bills? Itâs an important question that elected officials need to answer.
But productivity isnât a mere statistical artifact. Nor is it something that just pads the corporate bottom line. It determines how much Canadians can produce, and therefore how much weâre able to enjoy.
Investments in productivity â ranging from big ticket items like cutting-edge machinery to improve manufacturing output, to marginal tweaks like better software to improve agricultural output â mean weâre able to produce more goods and services per hour worked. Put simply, it means we get more output for the same amount of effort. Increased productivity means an increased standard of living, and a greater ability to finance important social programs.
Letâs use housing as an example. Several analysts have estimated that Canada is short over three million housing units. That is a daunting number. To meet that goal, we need more output. Unless weâre going to make a massive push to get young people into the building trades or completely reorient our immigration policy to focus on construction workers, we need to build more housing units per worker. In other words, we need more productivity.
Increasing productivity isnât easy. If it was, weâd have already done it. Â Itâs easy enough to tell firms that they ought to invest more in equipment or software. But they need to have the right incentives and the right tools at their disposal.
One potential tool to hit the accelerator is industrial policy. Itâs a broad concept that means different things to different people. The idea that there is a role for the state to nudge private companies in a particular direction is often thought of as antithetical to a market-oriented economy. In reality, weâve always done some form of industrial policy. This ranges from past large-scale interventions to build out Albertaâs oilsands to tax credits for research and development.
Thereâs plenty in the budget that broadly falls under the industrial policy umbrella aimed at bolstering clean technology, artificial intelligence, Indigenous reconciliation and other key priorities.
A cynic could argue that the federal government is merely throwing money at stakeholder groups. Indeed, some skepticism is warranted. After all, if thereâs money to be made on something, why doesnât the private sector just step up?
The trouble is the incentives often donât line up. Letâs take another example: supply chains. Global supply chains normally work like magic. Our highly globalized economy provides us with an array of goods and services previous generations could only have dreamed of.
However, COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have shown that we canât take that stability for granted. Geopolitics, natural disasters and infectious diseases, among other things, can disrupt supply chains. That is inconvenient when weâre talking about trinkets from Amazon. Itâs a disaster when weâre talking about life-saving vaccines. We need to ensure that we donât put all our eggs in one basket. No one wants to have to hoard toilet paper again.
This is where industrial policy can come in. Sometimes there are broader public interests that individual firms donât have the right incentives to address. Thereâs no shortage of examples. Reshoring or shortening supply chains is expensive and can put companies at a competitive disadvantage; firms might face cost barriers to adopting cleaner technologies; they might not see the monetary value in reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples; and they might not have the ability to undertake heavy upfront costs for research and development on the technologies of the future. This is where governments might have a role to play.
Canada wouldnât be the first major country to experiment with industrial policy. Countries ranging from China to Germany are pursuing aggressive industrial policy strategies. Even the United States has embraced industrial policy, perhaps best embodied by the American governmentâs Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act. This have led to an explosion of construction activity.
This new activity isnât just building widgets for the sake of creating jobs. It means that a share of the most advanced semiconductors on earth will now be built on American soil, helping to reduce the worldâs dependence on semiconductors produced in Taiwan. Given geopolitical threats in Asia and lingering worries about supply-chain predictability, having these vital inputs built in North America is an unalloyed good. Thereâs a reason why even conservatives like U.S. Senator Marco Rubio want to double down on industrial policy.
That isnât to say that industrial policy is completely uncontroversial, let alone perfect. Itâs not hard to find failed examples of industrial policy initiatives. Governments engaging in industrial policy need a sound strategy, good data and rigorous evaluation. They also need to know when to cut their losses. These are all easier said than done.
Quebec needs solutions to its long-term financial challenges
The sheer size of recent industrial policy initiatives, such as multibillion-dollar electric-vehicle battery manufacturing facilities or tax credits for clean-energy investments, should focus our collective minds on getting value for money. While industrial policy may be necessary to maintain or expand a presence in certain heavy industries that are being generously funded by other countries, the costs can be enormous. We canât simply cut blank cheques. We need to get these investments right more often than not.
Efforts to boost productivity in the medium to long term come at the expense of short-term priorities. Bluntly put, if weâre going to spend a dollar on factory construction rather than health care, we need to make sure thereâs a plausible and attractive payback. One of the key objectives of boosting productivity is enhancing our ability to generate the tax revenue needed to pay for services like health care, after all.
While industrial policy might be a promising avenue to boost productivity, we shouldnât step into it lightly. We need credible, evidence-based policies linked to a coherent strategy rather than ad hoc decisions. We also need strong governance, policy design that attracts private capital rather than replaces it, and effective and timely implementation. Itâs good that the government is thinking about productivity, but itâs not a matter of flipping a switch. We need to get the details right.
Getting these details right is what motivates the IRPPâs Building New Foundations for Economic Growth research program. We will continue to produce and share research aimed at bolstering Canadaâs productivity long after the budget ink is dry.
(English version available here)
Le plus rĂ©cent budget du gouvernement Trudeau renferme un certain nombre de mesures qui ont fait jaser, allant dâune politique du logement Ă la dĂ©fense nationale. Dans un contexte de crise pancanadienne du logement et de menaces gĂ©opolitiques croissantes, il nâest pas surprenant que ces domaines politiques retiennent lâattention.
Dans le budget, le gouvernement sâest aussi penchĂ© sur le retard de productivitĂ© du Canada. Cet enjeu est peut-ĂȘtre moins bien compris, mais il est dĂ©terminant dans la capacitĂ© du pays Ă financer des solutions Ă nos dĂ©fis nationaux les plus pressants. Le dĂ©poussiĂ©rage de notre politique industrielle peut faire partie de la solution.
Les retards de productivitĂ© du Canada ne sont pas nouveaux. Les commentateurs Ă©conomiques en parlent depuis des annĂ©es. Dans un rĂ©cent discours, Carolyn Rogers, premiĂšre sous-gouverneure de la Banque du Canada, a toutefois soulignĂ© lâurgence dâagir.
«âIl y a pĂ©ril en la demeure. Il faut agirâ», a-t-elle dĂ©clarĂ©.
En dâautres mots, la productivitĂ© nâest plus quâun simple problĂšme. Câest une urgence nationale.
Ă cĂŽtĂ© de lâaugmentation du coĂ»t de la vie â en particulier du coĂ»t du logement â la productivitĂ© peut sembler un concept abstrait. Pourquoi dĂ©penser de lâargent pour rendre les entreprises plus efficaces alors que de nombreux mĂ©nages ont du mal Ă payer leurs facturesâ? Câest une question importante Ă laquelle les Ă©lus doivent rĂ©pondre.
La productivitĂ© nâest pas une simple technicalitĂ© statistique. Ce nâest pas non plus quelque chose qui ne fait que gonfler les rĂ©sultats financiers des entreprises. Elle dĂ©termine la quantitĂ© de produits que les Canadiens peuvent produire et, par consĂ©quent, la quantitĂ© de biens dont nous pouvons profiter.
Les investissements dans la productivitĂ©, quâil sâagisse dâimmobilisations importantes, comme des machines de pointe pour amĂ©liorer la production manufacturiĂšre, ou dâajustements marginaux, comme de meilleurs logiciels pour amĂ©liorer la production agricole, signifient que nous sommes en mesure de produire plus de biens et de services par heure travaillĂ©e. En dâautres termes, cela signifie que nous obtenons plus de rĂ©sultats pour la mĂȘme quantitĂ© dâefforts. Lâaugmentation de la productivitĂ© se traduit par une amĂ©lioration du niveau de vie et une plus grande capacitĂ© Ă financer dâimportants programmes sociaux.
Prenons lâexemple du logement. Plusieurs analystes ont estimĂ© quâil manquait plus de trois millions de logements au Canada. Câest un chiffre impressionnant. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous devons en augmenter la production. Ă moins que nous investissions massivement pour attirer les jeunes vers les mĂ©tiers du bĂątiment ou que nous ne rĂ©orientions complĂštement notre politique dâimmigration pour nous concentrer sur les travailleurs de la construction, nous devons bĂątir plus de logements par travailleur. Dit autrement, nous avons besoin dâune plus grande productivitĂ©.
Augmenter la productivitĂ© nâest pas une mince tĂąche. Si câĂ©tait le cas, ce serait dĂ©jĂ fait. Il est assez facile de dire aux entreprises quâelles doivent investir davantage dans des Ă©quipements ou des logiciels. Mais elles doivent dâabord disposer des bonnes incitations et des bons outils.
La politique industrielle est lâun des outils potentiels permettant dâappuyer sur lâaccĂ©lĂ©rateur.
LâidĂ©e que lâĂtat a un rĂŽle Ă jouer pour orienter les entreprises privĂ©es dans une direction donnĂ©e est souvent considĂ©rĂ©e comme contraire Ă une Ă©conomie de marchĂ©. En rĂ©alitĂ©, nous avons toujours pratiquĂ© une certaine forme de politique industrielle. Cela va des interventions passĂ©es Ă grande Ă©chelle pour dĂ©velopper les sables bitumineux de lâAlberta aux crĂ©dits dâimpĂŽt pour la recherche et le dĂ©veloppement.
Le budget contient de nombreux Ă©lĂ©ments relevant de la politique industrielle et visant Ă soutenir les technologies propres, lâintelligence artificielle, la rĂ©conciliation avec les peuples autochtones, en plus dâautres prioritĂ©s essentielles.
Une personne cynique pourrait affirmer que le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral se contente de jeter de lâargent Ă des parties prenantes. En effet, un certain scepticisme est justifiĂ©. AprĂšs tout, sâil y a de lâargent Ă gagner quelque part, pourquoi le secteur privĂ© nây intervient-il pasâ?
Le problĂšme, câest que les incitations sont variables. Prenons un autre exemple : les chaĂźnes dâapprovisionnement. Normalement, les chaĂźnes dâapprovisionnement mondiales fonctionnent rondement. Notre Ă©conomie hautement mondialisĂ©e nous offre un Ă©ventail de biens et de services dont les gĂ©nĂ©rations prĂ©cĂ©dentes nâauraient pu que rĂȘver.
Cependant, la pandĂ©mie de COVID-19 et lâinvasion de lâUkraine par la Russie ont montrĂ© que nous ne pouvons pas considĂ©rer cette stabilitĂ© comme acquise. Le contexte gĂ©opolitique, les catastrophes naturelles et les maladies infectieuses, entre autres, peuvent perturber les chaĂźnes dâapprovisionnement. Ăa nâest pas un rĂ©el problĂšme lorsquâon achĂšte des babioles sur Amazon. Mais câest un dĂ©sastre sâil sâagit dâobtenir des vaccins qui pourraient sauver une vie. Nous ne devons pas mettre tous nos Ćufs dans le mĂȘme panier. Personne ne veut revivre une pĂ©nurie de papier hygiĂ©nique.
Câest lĂ que la politique industrielle peut ĂȘtre utile. Parfois, il existe des intĂ©rĂȘts publics plus larges pour lesquels les entreprises individuelles nâont pas les bonnes incitations. Les exemples ne manquent pas. La dĂ©localisation ou le raccourcissement des chaĂźnes dâapprovisionnement peut ĂȘtre coĂ»teux et dĂ©savantager les entreprises sur le plan de la concurrenceâ; les entreprises peuvent ĂȘtre confrontĂ©es Ă des obstacles liĂ©s aux coĂ»ts pour adopter des technologies plus propresâ; elles peuvent ne pas voir la valeur monĂ©taire de la rĂ©conciliation avec les peuples autochtones, et elles peuvent ne pas avoir la capacitĂ© dâengager des coĂ»ts initiaux Ă©levĂ©s pour la recherche et le dĂ©veloppement sur les technologies de lâavenir. Câest lĂ que les gouvernements pourraient avoir un rĂŽle Ă jouer.
Le Canada ne serait pas le premier grand pays Ă doubler la mise sur la politique industrielle. Des pays comme la Chine et lâAllemagne poursuivent des stratĂ©gies agressives en matiĂšre de politique industrielle. MĂȘme les Ătats-Unis ont adoptĂ© une politique industrielle, dont la meilleure illustration est peut-ĂȘtre leur Inflation Reduction Act et la CHIPS and Science Act. Ces mesures ont entraĂźnĂ© une explosion des projets de construction.
Il ne sâagira pas simplement de construire des gadgets pour crĂ©er des emplois. Ăa signifie quâune partie des semi-conducteurs les plus avancĂ©s au monde sera dĂ©sormais fabriquĂ©e sur le sol amĂ©ricain, ce qui rĂ©duira la dĂ©pendance du monde Ă lâĂ©gard de ceux produits Ă TaĂŻwan. Compte tenu des menaces gĂ©opolitiques en Asie et des inquiĂ©tudes persistantes quant Ă la prĂ©visibilitĂ© de la chaĂźne dâapprovisionnement, la construction de ces intrants vitaux en AmĂ©rique du Nord est une bonne chose. Ce nâest pas pour rien que mĂȘme des conservateurs comme le sĂ©nateur amĂ©ricain Marco Rubio veulent redoubler dâefforts en matiĂšre de politique industrielle.
Cela ne veut pas dire que la politique industrielle fait lâunanimitĂ©, et encore moins quâelle est parfaite. Il nâest pas difficile de trouver des exemples dâinitiatives de politique industrielle qui ont Ă©chouĂ©. Les gouvernements qui sâengagent dans une politique industrielle ont besoin dâune stratĂ©gie solide, de donnĂ©es fiables et dâune Ă©valuation rigoureuse. Ils doivent Ă©galement savoir quand rĂ©duire leurs pertes. Tout cela est plus facile Ă dire quâĂ faire.
Le Québec a besoin de solutions à ses défis financiers à long terme
Ottawa sauve la mise en haussant lâimpĂŽt sur le gain en capital
Si la politique industrielle peut sâavĂ©rer nĂ©cessaire pour maintenir ou dĂ©velopper une prĂ©sence dans certaines industries lourdes gĂ©nĂ©reusement financĂ©es par dâautres pays, les coĂ»ts peuvent ĂȘtre Ă©normes. Lâampleur des rĂ©centes initiatives de politique industrielle, telles que les usines de batteries pour vĂ©hicules Ă©lectriques ou les crĂ©dits dâimpĂŽt pour les investissements dans les Ă©nergies propres, qui se chiffrent Ă plusieurs milliards de dollars, devrait nous inciter Ă optimiser nos ressources. Nous ne pouvons pas nous contenter de signer des chĂšques en blanc. Le plus souvent, nous devons faire en sorte que ces investissements soient judicieux.
Les efforts visant Ă stimuler la productivitĂ© Ă moyen et long terme se font au dĂ©triment des prioritĂ©s Ă court terme. Essentiellement, si nous dĂ©pensons un dollar pour la construction dâune usine plutĂŽt que pour les soins de santĂ©, nous devons nous assurer que la rentabilitĂ© de lâinvestissement est rĂ©aliste et attrayante. AprĂšs tout, lâun des principaux objectifs de lâaugmentation de la productivitĂ© est dâamĂ©liorer notre capacitĂ© Ă gĂ©nĂ©rer les recettes fiscales nĂ©cessaires pour payer des services tels que les soins de santĂ©.
Si la politique industrielle peut ĂȘtre une voie prometteuse pour stimuler la productivitĂ©, nous ne devons pas nous y engager Ă la lĂ©gĂšre. Nous avons besoin de politiques crĂ©dibles, fondĂ©es sur des donnĂ©es probantes et liĂ©es Ă une stratĂ©gie cohĂ©rente, plutĂŽt que de dĂ©cisions ad hoc. Nous avons Ă©galement besoin dâune gouvernance solide, dâune conception des politiques qui attire les capitaux privĂ©s au lieu de les remplacer, et dâune mise en Ćuvre efficace et rapide. Il est bon que le gouvernement rĂ©flĂ©chisse Ă la productivitĂ©, mais il ne sâagit pas dâappuyer sur un bouton. Il faut rĂ©flĂ©chir aux moindres dĂ©tails.
Câest la recherche de ces dĂ©tails qui motive le programme de recherche Refonder la croissance Ă©conomique sur de nouvelles bases de lâIRPP. Nous continuerons Ă produire et Ă partager des recherches visant Ă renforcer la productivitĂ© du Canada bien aprĂšs que lâencre du budget soit sĂšche.
(Version française disponible ici)
The changing face of Canada and Quebec is leading to a transformation of the labour market. A growing proportion of the population comes from immigrant backgrounds and this trend will accelerate in the coming decades. Statistics Canada forecasts that immigrants and their Canadian-born children will make up nearly half the Canadian population by 2041, accounting for a significant share of the workforce.
While the vast majority of recently arrived immigrants belong to visible minorities, more and more people born here are from diverse backgrounds as well. StatsCan predicts that visible minorities could represent between 38 and 43 per cent of the total Canadian population by 2041.
Data from the 2021 census indicate that close to one in four young Québécois under the age of 25 is from a visible minority, a reality the labour market must now address.
Though the concept of an immigrant is clear, that of a visible minority is less so. Not all members of visible minorities are immigrants and not all immigrants are members of visible minorities, though for some years now the vast majority of recent immigrants (73 per cent in Quebec, 85 per cent in the rest of Canada) are members of a visible minority.
The term âvisible minoritiesâ refers to âpersons, other than Aboriginal people, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.â In Canada, Latino Americans, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Filipinos, South Asians, Southeast Asians, Western Asians as well as Blacks and Arabs are considered members of a visible minority. Hence, all individuals who emigrate from a Latin American country are deemed a visible minority, even those with white skin. In 2021 in Quebec, visible-minority members were mainly from three groups: Blacks (31 per cent), Arabs (21 per cent) and Latino Americans (13 per cent).
Employment is an important indicator of integration. Many studies have looked into the circumstances of immigrants in the labour market, but the employment integration of people from diverse backgrounds, particularly of Canadian-born young people, is a much less documented phenomenon.
A study by CIRANO fills this gap using publicly available data from StatsCanâs Labour Force Survey and the 2021 census.
The findings are clear: belonging to a visible minority reduces the likelihood of finding employment. Visible-minority individuals born in Canada are the ones with the lowest employment rates, both among those in the 15-64 age group and those aged 15 to 24, as shown in Table 1. The results are qualitatively the same across Canada, with generally lower employment rates than in Quebec.
But more telling are the disparities once adjustments are made, namely the gaps that persist even when one cancels out the role of personal characteristics, other than belonging to a visible minority or having immigrant status, such as age, level of education, gender, attendance at an educational institution, province (for all of Canada), metropolitan area, and marital status. All gaps are statistically significant to 1%.
In Quebec, immigrants who are not members of a visible minority have employment rates that are lower by five percentage points than those of the reference group, all other factors being equal. This difference is even more pronounced for visible-minority immigrants, with employment rates lower by 9.4 percentage points.
Among young people between the ages of 15 and 24, the adjusted gaps are greater than for the overall 15-to-64 age group, even when controlling for differences in several personal characteristics, including school attendance. Thus, even if they were born in Canada, have a good command of French or English, and even if educated here, visible-minority youth appear to struggle to find a place in the labour market.
We also examined the disparities in annual salary, both actually observed and adjusted, meaning the gaps that persist even after cancelling out the effect of several other factors that determine annual salary other than visible-minority or immigrant status.
As shown in Table 2, the adjusted disparities are very different from the observed disparities, reflecting the fact that the four groups do not share the same characteristics.
In the case of native-born individuals belonging to a visible minority, the gap with the reference group decreases from 26.9 per cent (observed) to nine per cent (adjusted). The 26.9 per cent gap means that, initially, native-borns belonging to a visible minority have characteristics unfavourable to them in terms of compensation compared to native-borns who are not part of a visible minority. The nine per cent gap after adjustment is problematic and signals integration difficulties for visible minorities, even if born in Canada.
As for visible-minority immigrants, the salary gaps compared to the reference group widen after adjustment, reaching nearly 24 per cent both in Canada and in Quebec.
The case of immigrants who are not part of a visible minority is unique because of the shift from a positive observed gap to a negative adjusted gap. At first glance, they are better paid than native-borns who are not part of a visible minority. However, after adjustment â and thus with equal characteristics â non-visible-minority immigrants earned on average 15.8 per cent less than native-borns not part of a visible minority.
These findings warrant further analysis to determine if these individualsâ experiences stem from discrimination or other non-observable factors that should be brought to light.
More and more newcomers to the job market will be members of a visible minority. The case of young Canadian-born visible minorities merits special attention, with the goal of preventing their socioeconomic exclusion and the potential consequences for social cohesion.
In a context where Quebec and the rest of Canada rely on immigration to address the labour shortage, logic would dictate that we first realize the full potential of those already present. The integration into the workforce of Canadian-born individuals from ethnocultural minority groups, particularly the young, must be among the priorities of policymakers so as to avoid a situation where integration difficulties are passed on from one generation to the next. Failing this, a growing share of the population risks being marginalized.
Governments, the business community and all relevant stakeholders must work together on this in order to permanently eliminate the barriers hindering the economic integration of these young individuals and preventing them from fully contributing to the progress of society.
Les repas de famille tendus lors de la pandĂ©mie, le «âConvoi de la libertĂ©â» en 2022 et, plus rĂ©cemment, les affrontements sur la question de lâidentitĂ© de genre tĂ©moignent de la polarisation sociale et de la propagation de la dĂ©sinformation. Ces phĂ©nomĂšnes fragilisent la cohĂ©sion sociale, exacerbent les divisions et les prĂ©jugĂ©s et affaiblissent la dĂ©mocratie.
Câest pourquoi lâappel Ă plus dâĂ©ducation Ă la citoyennetĂ© est devenu un refrain familier dans lâespoir de rĂ©gler ou de prĂ©venir ces crises sociales. Cette idĂ©e repose sur le principe que des citoyens informĂ©s, engagĂ©s et responsables sont essentiels pour maintenir une sociĂ©tĂ© dĂ©mocratique fonctionnelle et rĂ©siliente.
Toutefois, bien que cette demande puisse sembler raisonnable, ne devrions-nous pas dâabord analyser la qualitĂ© actuelle des services offerts avant dâen rĂ©clamer davantageâ? Câest prĂ©cisĂ©ment lâobjet du rapport LâĂducation civique mise au second plan, qui brosse un portrait de la perception des enseignants canadiens sur le sujet. Pour y parvenir, 1922 professionnels de lâĂ©ducation Ă travers tout le pays ont Ă©tĂ© sondĂ©s. Des groupes de discussion et des entretiens individuels ont permis dâapprofondir certains Ă©lĂ©ments de lâenquĂȘte.
Le constat est clair : lâĂ©ducation civique est gravement dĂ©valorisĂ©e au Canada, ce qui compromet son efficacitĂ©. Partant de cet Ă©tat de fait, il importe dâoutiller les enseignants dans leur lourde tĂąche de prĂ©parer les jeunes Ă devenir des citoyens engagĂ©s et bien informĂ©s.
LâĂ©ducation Ă la citoyennetĂ© comprend lâĂ©tude formelle des processus politiques, du rĂŽle des gouvernements ainsi que des droits et responsabilitĂ©s des citoyens. Toutefois, Ă un niveau plus fondamental, elle concerne la communautĂ© et la maniĂšre dont nous nous identifions aux autres et interagissons avec eux.
Ce qui fait toute la diffĂ©rence est lâapproche pĂ©dagogique de lâenseignant.
Une bonne éducation civique privilégie une participation active des élÚves plutÎt que la simple transmission des connaissances, des faits et des dates.
Les meilleures pratiques mettent lâaccent sur des mĂ©thodes pĂ©dagogiques qui placent les Ă©lĂšves en situation dâobservation et dâexpĂ©rimentation, par exemple des discussions constructives sur des enjeux politiques, des simulations de processus politiques ou des projets dâaction civique.
Mais pour y parvenir, les enseignants ont besoin de beaucoup de temps, de formation et de ressources afin de mettre en Ćuvre les meilleures pratiques.
Sur papier, les programmes scolaires prĂ©sentent la citoyennetĂ© active comme lâun des plus importants objectifs de lâĂ©ducation, mais sur le terrain, câest une tout autre chose.
PrĂšs des deux tiers des enseignants ont dĂ©clarĂ© dans le cadre de lâĂ©tude que ce volet nâest pas une prioritĂ© dans leur Ă©cole. Ce manque de valorisation au sein du systĂšme scolaire compromet son efficacitĂ©, notamment parce que les enseignants ne disposent pas de formation adĂ©quate et de suffisamment de temps ou de ressources pour lâenseigner.
LâĂ©tude rĂ©vĂšle des lacunes dans la formation des enseignants en matiĂšre dâĂ©ducation Ă la citoyennetĂ©Â : 25 % des rĂ©pondants ont suivi une formation en enseignement Ă cet effet, ce qui nâest pas le cas pour presque deux fois plus dâentre eux (48 %). Il nâest donc pas surprenant que plusieurs enseignants nâaient pas suffisamment confiance en leur capacitĂ© Ă enseigner la politique, ressentent une certaine pression ou se sentent dĂ©munis face au manque de lignes directrices de la part du systĂšme scolaire, qui inclut les Ă©coles, les centres de services scolaires, les commissions scolaires, les districts ou les ministĂšres de lâĂducation. Ce manque dâencadrement et dâintĂ©gration du programme peut dâailleurs donner lâimpression que lâĂ©ducation civique est une compĂ©tence facultative, tant aux yeux des enseignants que des Ă©lĂšves.
Pourtant, la majoritĂ© des programmes dâĂ©tudes canadiens dĂ©crivent des attentes Ă©levĂ©es en la matiĂšre. Par exemple, les programmes dâĂ©tudes des provinces de lâAtlantique affirment que «âles sciences humaines, plus que tout autre domaine du programme, sont essentielles au dĂ©veloppement de la citoyennetĂ©â», car elles «âincarnent les grands principes de la dĂ©mocratieâ». Toutefois, la plupart de ces programmes nâoffrent pas de conseils ou des consignes prĂ©cis sur la maniĂšre dâatteindre ces objectifs dâapprentissage.
Si certains enseignants profitent de cette flexibilitĂ© pour mettre en Ćuvre des projets dâĂ©ducation civique authentiques, ce nâest pas le cas pour tous. La plupart dâentre eux ont plutĂŽt indiquĂ© avoir besoin de stratĂ©gies pĂ©dagogiques et didactiques concrĂštes afin dâatteindre les objectifs dâapprentissage prescrits.
Actuellement, ces activitĂ©s prennent plus souvent quâautrement la forme de discussions sur les Ă©vĂ©nements dâactualitĂ© et des enjeux politiques. Or, des stratĂ©gies pĂ©dagogiques dâapprentissage actif ou par lâexpĂ©rience se sont avĂ©rĂ©es beaucoup plus efficaces, par exemple des discussions constructives bien encadrĂ©es, des simulations authentiques dâĂ©lection ou des projets dâaction civique qui permettent aux Ă©lĂšves de rĂ©investir leurs apprentissages dans leur communautĂ©.
Pour aider les jeunes Ă devenir des citoyens engagĂ©s, informĂ©s et actifs dans leurs communautĂ©s, lâĂ©ducation civique doit devenir une prioritĂ©, tant pour les enseignants que les autoritĂ©s scolaires.
Il faut dâabord investir dans la formation des enseignants Ă tous les niveaux, aussi bien des actuels que des futurs professeurs. Ils doivent ĂȘtre en mesure de dĂ©velopper leurs propres connaissances et compĂ©tences civiques, en plus de maĂźtriser les stratĂ©gies pĂ©dagogiques fondĂ©es sur des donnĂ©es probantes. La formation est lâun des principaux moyens pour apprendre les meilleures pratiques en la matiĂšre, qui permettront aux Ă©lĂšves dâavoir des discussions constructives et de participer Ă des projets expĂ©rientiels et authentiques.
De plus, les enseignants doivent avoir accĂšs Ă des stratĂ©gies pĂ©dagogiques concrĂštes et des exemples tangibles sur la maniĂšre dâintĂ©grer la matiĂšre dans leur classe, quelle que soit la matiĂšre enseignĂ©e. Cela peut se traduire par des ressources pĂ©dagogiques clĂ© en main qui les aident Ă bien prĂ©parer leurs Ă©lĂšves Ă voter lors dâune simulation Ă©lectorale, des guides ou encore des plans de leçons qui leur permettent de bien encadrer les discussions politiques en classe.
Enfin, il faut investir dans une infrastructure pour soutenir la crĂ©ation dâune communautĂ© de partage entre les enseignants, qui pourraient alors se partager les recherches Ă©mergentes en Ă©ducation civique, les meilleures pratiques et des ressources. MalgrĂ© leur volontĂ©, peu de professionnels de lâĂ©ducation ont le temps ou les moyens de se tenir au fait des recherches actuelles en la matiĂšre. Il faut souvent payer pour accĂ©der aux articles scientifiques, et y dĂ©dier un certain nombre dâheures pour les synthĂ©tiser ou sâen servir pour mettre en pratique de nouvelles approches pĂ©dagogiques. Nous avons donc besoin dâune infrastructure capable de rassembler les recherches Ă©mergentes et dâaider les pĂ©dagogues Ă lier ces recherches Ă leur pratique, de maniĂšre concrĂšte et rĂ©alisable.
Homelessness in Canada is an insidious, growing problem that directly and indirectly affects millions of people. At least 235,000 people experience it every year, according to Statistics Canada.
Based on estimates from the Homeless Hub, a research library, this costs Canada anywhere from $5.45 billion to $30.74 billion per year, including direct costs, such as shelters and services, as well as indirect costs (which economists refer to as externalities), such as increased use of health services, policing and the criminal justice system.
Two overlapping factors are helping to fuel this epidemic, which can appear like an unsolvable riddle.
First, we have a significant housing supply shortfall. In September 2023, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. (CMHC) estimated Canada needs to build 5.8 million housing units by 2030 to restore housing affordability. Thatâs 3.5 million units more than the current pace.
Second, we have a significant shortage of skilled labour, especially in the construction industry. In Ontario alone, there is a forecast deficit of 23,200 construction workers by 2027.
Many other complex factors also contribute to the homelessness epidemic, making it a compound problem that involves a dozen federal departments and Crown corporations.
But, by design, those government departments operate in silos. This disincentivizes collaboration and leads to a narrow scope of work.
These are issues, however, that necessitate a much broader and more co-ordinated response. Such an overarching shift in approach would better direct resources and ultimately help more people.
Government departments often focus on a single policy area with interdepartmental co-ordination inconsistent and at times non-existent. This siloed approach can have significant ramifications.
A recent example was the federal governmentâs decision to cap international student visas to decrease pressure on the rental housing market. This decision was made in the absence of adequate co-ordination between the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, and the CMHC.
Had immigration and housing policies been considered in tandem, it is possible that capping student visa permits may never have been necessary.
This example serves as a teachable moment about the importance of shifting to an un-siloed approach to policy management and programs defined by shared governance and funding.
The best, fastest way to meaningfully help low-income Canadians
Two recent examples from Australia show the success of a co-ordinated approach to major policy challenges involving multiple departments.
First, a federal initiative there called ârewiring the nationâ aims to transform Australiaâs electricity grid. This initiative saw multiple federal agencies collaborate toward the creation and delivery of a fund worth the equivalent of about $17.7 billion Cdn with the equivalent of an additional $6.9 billion Cdn delivered in partnership with the state government of New South Wales for other projects.
Second, New South Wales created its digital restart fund for cross-departmental transformation projects. This fund is worth the equivalent of $1.9 billion Cdn and has led to a whole-of-government approach in areas including workforce capacity-building, shared digital assets and the modernization of outdated systems.
In Canada, there is one example beyond the halls of government that is demonstrating success using a de-siloed approach to help grow the construction workforce, boost housing supply and reduce homelessness.
Launched in 2020, Blue Doorâs Construct provides a rapid pathway to secure a stable career in the skilled trades for vulnerable individuals stuck in a cycle of poverty and homelessness.
Blue Door partners with organizations such as LiUNA Local 506 Training Centre, Humber College, Durham College, The Home Depot Canada Foundation, the YMCA, the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, ACCES Employment and Ontario Works to provide a robust employment training program and wraparound support to participants.
Finding innovative solutions to reduce the cost of substance use on health care
In three years, close to 500 participants have graduated from the program while completing hundreds of high-quality and competitively priced construction jobs in the York, Peel and Durham regions of Ontario. Eighty-two per cent of Constructâs graduates have found employment or a pathway to higher education within six weeks.
Construct also saves money, offering a pathway to self-sufficiency for a one-time cost of $21,000 per participant. By contrast, Homeless Hub estimates that in 2012 (the most recent year for which figures are available), the average monthly cost of a sheltering someone while homeless ranged from $1,932 for a shelter bed to $10,900 for a hospital bed. That is $23,184 to $130,800 per year.
Construct demonstrates that multiple policy problems can be addressed using a concerted approach and can have a positive impact on peopleâs lives. Governments should take a cue from this experience to address these and other issues at a national scale.
The country desperately needs a Team Canada approach to drastically increase housing supply, with the federal government shifting toward shared governance and funding programs that transcend departmental boundaries.
There would be significant benefit from the creation of an interdepartmental funding program jointly overseen by Infrastructure Canada, and Employment and Social Development Canada to support social enterprises such as Construct. Effectively tackling these complex challenges requires not just know-how but a co-operative approach in place of our current siloed system.
This could be achieved by establishing committees or working groups across departments, fostering collaboration among departments with shared goals and adopting shared-funding mechanisms.
Governments can facilitate this transition by revisiting historical governance policies and frameworks that impede cross-sector financing, thereby enabling more comprehensive solutions to challenges using a whole-of-government approach.
This article is part of a series called How does Canada fix the housing crisis?
Le QuĂ©bec est le seul endroit en AmĂ©rique du Nord oĂč les nouveaux pĂšres ont droit, sous rĂ©serve de quelques conditions, Ă un congĂ© de paternitĂ© payĂ© leur Ă©tant exclusivement rĂ©servĂ©. Si les prestations de paternitĂ© sont fort populaires, les plus rĂ©centes donnĂ©es du Conseil de gestion de lâassurance parentale (CGAP) montrent quâune proportion croissante de pĂšres utilisent aussi les prestations parentales partageables au terme de leur congĂ© exclusif.
Ce changement dans les comportements des nouveaux pÚres pourrait avoir des effets bénéfiques sur les inégalités de genre.
LâarrivĂ©e dâun enfant est un moment charniĂšre dans lâĂ©dification de ces inĂ©galitĂ©s. Alors que la transition Ă la paternitĂ© est souvent accompagnĂ©e dâun renforcement de la position des hommes sur le marchĂ© du travail, celle des femmes est parallĂšlement fragilisĂ©e en raison des nouvelles responsabilitĂ©s de soins, dont elles assument disproportionnellement la charge. Une meilleure implication des pĂšres dans les congĂ©s parentaux aiderait Ă changer cette rĂ©alitĂ©.
Il existe en vertu du RĂ©gime quĂ©bĂ©cois dâassurance parentale (RQAP) trois principaux types de prestations pour une naissance : des prestations de maternitĂ© exclusives Ă la mĂšre biologique, des prestations parentales partageables entre les parents, et des prestations exclusives pour le pĂšre ou le second parent. Dâautres prestations exclusives peuvent Ă©galement sâajouter dans certaines situations particuliĂšres, par exemple lors de naissances multiples oĂč dans le cas oĂč un parent est le seul mentionnĂ© Ă lâacte de naissance.
La durée et la hauteur de ces prestations varient selon le type de régime choisi par les parents. Le régime de base offre une durée plus longue, tandis que le régime particulier est un peu plus généreux quant au montant versé pour les parents qui planifient un congé plus court, comme le montre le tableau 1.
Ailleurs au pays, les nouveaux parents ont Ă©galement accĂšs Ă des prestations exclusives pour la mĂšre biologique et des prestations partageables. Depuis 2019, les familles qui choisissent le rĂ©gime court bĂ©nĂ©ficient de 40 semaines de prestations pouvant ĂȘtre partagĂ©es. Toutefois, chaque parent ne peut prendre plus de 35 semaines. Ainsi, on comprend que des prestations dâune durĂ©e de cinq semaines sont Ă©galement offertes au deuxiĂšme parent.
Les prestations quĂ©bĂ©coises rĂ©servĂ©es aux pĂšres sont Ă©galement mieux payĂ©es, couvrant de 70 Ă 75 % du salaire jusquâĂ un maximum assurable de 94â000 $ (voir le tableau 1, ci-dessus). En comparaison, ailleurs au pays, les prestations partageables entre les parents remboursent un maximum de 55 % du salaire dans le rĂ©gime court, et de 33 % dans le rĂ©gime long. Le revenu maximal assurable est aussi sensiblement moins Ă©levĂ©, Ă un peu plus de 63â000 $ par an.
Les pÚres québécois utilisent massivement les prestations de paternité. Au Québec, plus des trois quarts (76,6 %) des pÚres ont demandé des prestations en 2021, comparativement à seulement trois pÚres sur 10 (29,9 %) ailleurs au pays.
Plus dâargent pour plus de nouveaux parents
Les changements apportĂ©s au RĂ©gime quĂ©bĂ©cois dâassurance parentale
Myopie et limites de la politique familiale québécoise
Un des objectifs clĂ©s de la refonte de 2020 de la Loi sur lâassurance parentale Ă©tait de favoriser une plus grande utilisation des prestations par les pĂšres, au-delĂ de leur congĂ© exclusif. Ă cette fin, le RQAP propose dĂ©sormais un nouvel incitatif au partage en «ârĂ©compensantâ» les couples dont les deux parents prennent des prestations parentales par lâajout de semaines additionnelles de prestations.
En vertu du rĂ©gime long, pour les couples oĂč chacun des parents utilise huit semaines de prestations partageables, quatre semaines sont ajoutĂ©es Ă la durĂ©e totale des prestations du RQAP. Les nouveaux parents qui prennent chacun six semaines de prestations partageables en vertu du rĂ©gime plus court se voient ajouter trois semaines Ă leur congĂ© payĂ©.
Lâinitiative portĂ©e par le CGAP, qui gĂšre et oriente le RQAP, porte ses fruits.
Parmi les couples oĂč les deux parents Ă©taient admissibles aux prestations du RQAP, le deuxiĂšme parent prenait au moins une semaine de prestation dans plus du tiers (35 %) des cas en 2021, alors que ce nâĂ©tait le cas que pour 20 % des couples en 2006, et 27 % en 2020.
De façon plus ciblĂ©e, la proportion de couples utilisant au moins 6 semaines de prestations â le minimum requis pour obtenir des semaines additionnelles de congĂ© â a presque triplĂ© Ă la suite de lâajout de semaines de «ârĂ©compenseâ», passant Ă 22 % en 2021, aprĂšs avoir oscillĂ© entre 6 et 8 % pendant les quinze annĂ©es prĂ©cĂ©dentes.
En dâautres mots, dans 22 % des couples oĂč les deux parents reçoivent des prestations, le deuxiĂšme conjoint utilise au moins 6 semaines de prestations parentales partageables, en plus du congĂ© de paternitĂ©
Un partage des prestations chez une proportion croissante de couples est Ă©videmment une excellente nouvelle. Lâenthousiasme avec lequel les couples se prĂ©valent de cette mesure suscite lâintĂ©rĂȘt.
Lâutilisation des prestations parentales chez les hommes est dĂ©terminĂ©e par des facteurs organisationnels, politiques et culturels. Des recherches comparatives ont nĂ©anmoins montrĂ© quâoffrir aux pĂšres des prestations bien rĂ©munĂ©rĂ©es non transfĂ©rables Ă la mĂšre encourage leur utilisation.
Cependant, la recherche a aussi montrĂ© que lâĂ©galitĂ© des genres est favorisĂ©e par lâoctroi de prestations sur une base individuelle, avec une portion partageable limitĂ©e, comme câest par exemple le cas en Islande et en SuĂšde. Au QuĂ©bec, lâaccĂšs aux prestations «âbonusâ» est conditionnel Ă la qualification des deux conjoints.
Câest bien lĂ ce qui est Ă©tonnant dans le succĂšs de lâinitiative. En vertu du rĂ©gime plus long, choisi par huit familles sur dix bĂ©nĂ©ficiaires du RQAP, les semaines de prestations additionnelles ne sont payĂ©es quâĂ 55 % du salaire⊠Or, la recherche montre quâun taux de remplacement du salaire dâau moins 80 % est nĂ©cessaire pour promouvoir lâĂ©galitĂ© des genres dans la prise de congĂ©s. De plus, lâaccĂšs au bonus est tributaire de lâutilisation par les deux parents des prestations parentales, contrairement aux autres types de prestations.
Il est aussi possible que la pĂ©nurie de places en services de garde â plus de 30â000 enfants sont en attente dâune place â incite au partage des prestations. Les couples ne trouvant pas de place pour leur enfant dĂ©cideraient alors de maximiser leur congĂ©. Câest ce qui expliquerait entre autres lâadhĂ©sion des pĂšres, en dĂ©pit du taux de remplacement du revenu plutĂŽt faible dans le rĂ©gime long.
La mise en place dâune nouvelle mesure est souvent accompagnĂ©e dâun effet dâentrĂ©e, directement liĂ© au changement dans lâarchitecture de la politique. Les effets Ă long terme de lâincitatif au bonus restent Ă ĂȘtre documentĂ©s. La hausse de la participation des pĂšres au RQAP Ă la suite de lâinstauration des prestations de paternitĂ© a ralenti aprĂšs une dizaine dâannĂ©es. On ne verra sans doute la pleine mesure de lâincitatif au partage que dans plusieurs annĂ©es.
Dâici lĂ , on ne peut exclure que les effets positifs de lâincitatif au partage soient aussi liĂ©s Ă dâautres modifications apportĂ©es au RQAP, comme la possibilitĂ© accrue de gagner des revenus de travail sur une base individuelle tout en Ă©tant prestataire, ou encore celle dâĂ©taler sur 18 mois la prise de congĂ©s.
A guaranteed basic income (GBI) has been discussed for more than half a century in Canada, but a well-researched proposal that takes into consideration both economic and political realities has never been put forward. Therefore, it has never been possible to develop viable alternatives to the status quo targeted approach to poverty reduction â an approach that is sometimes viewed as keeping people in poverty.
Until now.
The November 2023 publication of the report A Proposal For A Guaranteed Basic Income Benefit For Prince Edward Island addresses this omission at a crucial moment â when steps toward the goals of Canadaâs Poverty Reduction Act (2019) are faltering.
This report breaks new ground both in the work done to address poverty and in the process of applying academic economic expertise to policy development. Along with supplementary materials, it is now available for public review and discussion.
The report proposes a guaranteed basic income benefit for P.E.I. residents aged 18 to 64. It would be a collaborative federal-provincial program delivered through the income tax system and jointly financed by both governments.
This maximum annual benefit would be 85 per cent of the official poverty line, which is slightly more than $19,000 for a single adult and $27,000 for a family of two adults in P.E.I.
The proposed benefit for working-age adults would complete Canadaâs social safety net, which already includes a guaranteed basic income for seniors â through old age security and the guaranteed income supplement â and for children â through the Canada child benefit.
The proposal would virtually eradicate poverty among working-age adults and their children. The lives of families in poverty would also radically improve with better food security, health, education, housing and community involvement.
Pressures on the health-care system would lessen and social cohesion would be enhanced. Intergenerational transmission of poverty would be reduced, leading to higher productivity and economic prosperity over time.
In November 2020, the special committee on poverty in P.E.I. recommended implementation of a federal-provincial guaranteed basic income program in the province, and the legislature unanimously approved the idea.
In response, Coalition Canada, a pan-Canadian organization supporting guaranteed basic income, led a working group of economists, public servants, politicians and advocates who spent two years studying the issue and preparing this report.
The result of this innovative process is a proposal that is politically feasible, affordable and socially acceptable.
In fact, the political representatives in our group ensured that the work reflected, as one of them put it, âthe realm of the possible.â
2023 IRPP book | Basic Income and A Just Society: Policy Choices for Canadaâs Safety Net
Podcast | Basic Income and a Just Society: An Interview between Jennifer Ditchburn and Kim Pate
Podcast | Basic Income and a Just Society: Policy Choices for Canadaâs Social Safety Net
For example, there could be no changes to federal tax legislation to implement or finance the benefit. Economists modelled issues of cost, labour market (dis)incentives, financing and more.
One issue sometimes raised is that a guaranteed basic income delivered through the income tax system cannot address changes in family circumstances between tax filing dates.
Therefore, the team proposed an innovative partnership between federal and provincial systems in which the province remains the initial point of contact, providing necessary financial support and ensuring that recipients file taxes so that they can transition to the guaranteed basic income when their tax returns are next filed.
Significant changes in circumstances within the year would also be addressed by the province, allowing recipients to rely on predictable support.
The report has been presented to the government and opposition parties in P.E.I.
Recently, in response to Barb Ramsay, P.E.I. minister of social development and seniors, Jenna Sudds, the federal minister of families, children and social development, proposed creating a working group of departmental officials to share tax, survey and administrative data and information in support of P.E.I.âs work on assessing the feasibility of the proposal.
Concerns have been raised about the cost of basic-income proposals.
Confirming recent research, our modelling indicates that a substantial portion of a guaranteed basic income for Islanders aged 18-64 would be delivered to young adults (18-29).
Currently, social support in the federal system is delivered using a family model for estimating net income, which counts adult children living with their parents as distinct families. Our P.E.I. team suggested an innovative way to move forward â using the census definition, which includes adult children living with their parents to all be part of one family.
Using this model, the proposal reduces the annual cost by about $120 million or almost 40 per cent, to $188 million from $310 million, relative to a guaranteed basic income using the typical narrower definition of a family, thus allowing better targeting of benefits toward low-income families.
These costs are gross costs. When accounting for factors such as reduced spending on income assistance, the annual net cost would be in the $100-million range â about one per cent of GDP or seven per cent of government revenues in P.E.I.
This, in turn, means it is possible for the P.E.I. government to modestly increase its income and sale taxes to finance up to 50 per cent of the proposal cost while simultaneously raising the after-tax income of most Islanders. Indeed, only the top 20 per cent of income earners in the province would experience a modest reduction in their after-tax income under our proposal.
With respect to short-term labour market disincentives â a longstanding issue in the discussion of the implementation of a basic income â modelling done by the P.E.I. team indicated that using the census family definition to deliver the benefit would also limit the impact on labour markets, compared to proposals using the current family definition.
Indeed, the reduction in hours worked would be minimal â about 1.6 per cent, which translates to a reduction of only about 30 minutes less in a 35-hour work week. This is in line with work done to assess the impact of a basic income on work disincentives by the parliamentary budget officer and the British Columbia panel on basic income.
We are not proposing a permanent program or a pilot but rather a five-to-seven-year province-wide demonstration project that could become permanent in partnership with the federal government.
That would allow time to assess its full interaction with existing provincial and federal benefits. The effectiveness and efficiency of administering the guaranteed basic income via the tax system together with the provincial delivery system could also be assessed along with social and economic outcomes.
This would be a unique learning experience for the entire country and could put Canada at the forefront of the social policy of the 21st century.
Because the proposal is for a full-province demonstration project, it would be necessary to find control groups in a region or regions of the country with population and other characteristics that closely match P.E.I.
Two possible areas for this are southeast New Brunswick (Albert, Westmoreland and Kent counties) and parts of Nova Scotia (Colchester, Cumberland, Pictou and Antigonish).
In creating a model for policy development that brings together key stakeholders to ensure both its economic and political viability, the report has resulted in a proposed model that indicates how to design a federal-provincial basic income demonstration project that is financially as well as politically feasible and socially responsible.
In doing that, it does in fact meet the objective of reflecting âthe realm of the possible.â
The authors of the report are Robin Boadway, Miles Corak, Kendal David, Herb Emery, Evelyn Forget, Chloe Halpenny, Kourtney Koebel, BenoĂźt Robidoux, Wayne Simpson and Harvey Stevens. Barbara Boraks was a project lead.
(Version française disponible ici)
In her economic update last autumn, federal Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland set three main objectives for the 2024 budget.
The first was to keep the announced deficit in 2023-2024 at or below the 2023 budget forecast of $40.1 billion.
The second was to lower the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2024-2025 compared with the fall economic statement (42.7 per cent), and to keep it on a downward trajectory thereafter.
The third was to continue the decline in the deficit-to-GDP ratio in 2024-2025, and then to keep it below 1 per cent of GDP in 2026-2027 and beyond.
In her recent budget, the minister respects each of these objectives: the deficit for 2023-2024 is $40 billion; the projected debt-to-GDP ratio for 2024-2025 is 41.9 per cent; and the deficit-to-GDP ratio falls by 0.1 per cent in 2024-2025, to 0.9 per cent in 2026-2027, and declines further thereafter.
However, the fact that the budget targets are being met masks increased interventionism, leading to $57.9 billion in new initiatives between 2023-2024 and 2028-2029. Although the minister has identified additional sources of revenue (to which we will return shortly), the fact remains that the cumulative deficits over the entire period will increase by $10.3 billion.
The conclusion is that this budget is far from restrictive. Between 2023-2024 and 2024-2025, federal revenues will rise by 7.0 per cent, program spending by 6.7 per cent, and interest on the debt by almost 15 per cent.
Interest payments on the debt have risen significantly. After a low of $20.4 billion in 2020-2021, they are estimated to reach $54.1 billion in 2024-2025 and $64.3 billion in 2028-2029. It means that for the current year, Ottawa must now devote the equivalent of all the revenue from the GST to pay interest on the debt.
The finance minister will be seeking additional revenue mainly by reducing the preferential treatment given to capital gains. The impact of this change alone on corporations, trusts and individuals will exceed $19 billion over 5 years.
Since the Liberals came to power in 2015, many had expected such a tightening, not least because the marginal tax rate on a capital gain was lower than the highest marginal tax rate on eligible dividends. This encouraged tax planning aimed at converting dividends into capital gains. Some of these have proved to be uncertain, creating uncertainty when challenged by the Canada Revenue Agency.
Historically, capital gains have always received preferential treatment. Such treatment is often presented as recognition of the effect of inflation on long-term capital gains, or as a way of rewarding risk-taking. The federal government explicitly recognised this when it introduced the Canadian entrepreneursâ incentive in the last budget (which will be explained later).
Prior to 1972, capital gains were not taxed in Canada. It was the Benson budget of 1971 that reformed the definition of income to include up to 50 per cent of capital gains. In practice, this meant that half of the capital gain was added to income and taxed at the applicable rate. The other half of the capital gain remained exempt from tax, representing an advantage of 50 per cent.
This proposal followed on from the Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter commission), which recommended, however, that it be included in its entirety under the principle of “a buck is a buck is a buck”, which essentially means that although income can be earned in a variety of ways, it is ultimately income, and therefore all income should be taxed in the same way.
For more than fifty years, the advantage has varied between 25 per cent and 50 per cent, as shown in table 1.
As an indication, when the capital gains inclusion rate was increased effective January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1990, the announcement was made in June 1987 (when the tax reform was announced), giving taxpayers time to adjust. Conversely, when the capital gains inclusion rate was reduced in 2000, the announcements took effect the same day.
The 2024 budget reduces the preferential treatment given to capital gains to 33.33 per cent. In other words, two-thirds of the capital gain (66.67 per cent) will now be added to taxable income. For corporations, this change affects all capital gains, but for individuals, it only affects the portion exceeding $250,000 of annual capital gains. This $250,000 exemption is determined after taking into account capital losses. The new treatment applies from 25 June 2024, giving taxpayers time to organise their affairs before the measure comes into force.
For their part, the provinces have always had the same partial inclusion rate for capital gains as that applied by the federal government. Quebec has decided to follow suit, representing potential additional tax revenue of $3 billion over five years.
Many people are concerned about how the change will affect gains on the sale of property such as rental property or a second home. Taxpayers can continue to claim the exemption for the principal residence, which means that the gain remains entirely tax-free. Furthermore, in the case of couples where the secondary residence is 50 per cent owned by a spouse, each of them is entitled to the $250,000 exemption threshold. The capital gain on the secondary residence must therefore exceed $500,000 before the recent changes have a negative effect on a couple.
Apart from certain transfers of property between spouses that have no tax consequences at the time of death, the deceased is taxed on the capital gain accumulated at the time of death. Once again, the $250,000 exemption threshold applies, and only the excess is subject to the 66.67 per cent inclusion rate.
To avoid criticism of the effect that the increase in the capital gains inclusion rate could have on entrepreneurship, the minister of finance is increasing the lifetime capital gains exemption by 25 per cent to compensate for the increase in the inclusion rate. The new lifetime limit will reach $1.25 million as of June 25, 2024, and will be indexed to inflation as of 2026.
In addition, from Jan. 1, 2025, a new Canadian entrepreneur incentive will be introduced for entrepreneur-founders. This involves a reduction in the tax rate on capital gains when shares are sold. On the qualifying gain â amounts above the $1.25 million covered by the lifetime capital gains exemption â the inclusion rate is half of the current rate (i.e. 33.33 per cent instead of 66.67 per cent). The lifetime limit will be phased in by increments of $200,000 per year, up to a maximum of $2 million on January 1, 2034.
The more advantageous treatment will therefore eventually apply to a capital gain of $3.25 million arising from the sale of shares in a company, a significant improvement for those who qualify.
At current tax rates in Quebec, the difference between top marginal rates is almost 27 percentage points compared with ordinary income such as a salary (26.7 per cent versus 53.3 per cent), or just over 13 percentage points compared with dividends (26.7 per cent versus 40.0 per cent). Reducing the advantage associated with capital gains from 50 per cent to 33.33 per cent will reduce the gap and ensure greater symmetry in the tax treatment of dividends and capital gains. As a result, the marginal rates would be more uniform (35.5 per cent for capital gains versus 40.0 per cent for eligible dividends). The results are similar in Ontario.
Aside from assessing what this major change will bring in terms of taxation, we must consider the context of the current and future budget imbalances in Ottawa and the provinces. Both must at least consider ways to raise revenue. Ottawaâs move is also a benefit to the provinces, which are all likely to stay in lockstep on capital gains. To name one example, Chrystia Freelandâs budget has helped Quebec Finance Minister Eric Girard’s plan to return to a balanced budget.
Lors de sa mise Ă jour Ă©conomique de lâautomne dernier, la ministre fĂ©dĂ©rale des Finances, Chrystia Freeland, sâĂ©tait fixĂ© trois principaux objectifs en vue du budget 2024.
Le premier était de maintenir le déficit annoncé en 2023-2024 à un niveau égal ou inférieur à la prévision du Budget de 2023, soit 40,1 milliards $.
Le second Ă©tait dâabaisser le ratio de la dette au PIB en 2024-2025 par rapport Ă lâĂnoncĂ© Ă©conomique de lâautomne (42,7 %), et de le maintenir ensuite sur une trajectoire descendante.
Le troisiÚme était de continuer la baisse du ratio du déficit sur le PIB en 2024-2025, puis de le maintenir sous 1 % du PIB en 2026-2027 et aprÚs.
Dans son rĂ©cent budget, la ministre respecte chacun de ces objectifs : le dĂ©ficit pour 2023-2024 est de 40 milliards $â; le ratio prĂ©vu de la dette sur le PIB pour 2024-2025 est de 41,9 %â; et le ratio du dĂ©ficit sur le PIB baisse de 0,1 % en 2024-2025, pour descendre Ă 0,9 % en 2026-2027, et diminuera encore ensuite.
Le respect des cibles budgĂ©taires cache cependant un interventionnisme accru, conduisant Ă 57,9 milliards $ de nouvelles initiatives entre 2023-2024 et 2028-2029. Bien que la ministre ait identifiĂ© des sources de revenus additionnels (nous y reviendrons sous peu), il nâen demeure pas moins que les dĂ©ficits cumulĂ©s sur lâensemble de la pĂ©riode augmentent de 10,3 milliards $.
On peut en conclure que ce budget est loin dâĂȘtre restrictif. Entre 2023-2024 et 2024-2025, les revenus fĂ©dĂ©raux augmenteront de 7,0 %, les dĂ©penses de programmes de 6,7 %, et les intĂ©rĂȘts sur la dette de prĂšs de 15 %.
Les paiements dâintĂ©rĂȘts sur la dette connaissent une hausse significative. AprĂšs un creux de 20,4 milliards $ en 2020-2021, ils sont estimĂ©s Ă 54,1 milliards $ pour lâannĂ©e 2024-2025 et ils seront de 64,3 milliards $ en 2028-2029. Ă titre illustratif, pour lâannĂ©e en cours, Ottawa doit dĂ©sormais consacrer lâĂ©quivalent de lâentiĂšretĂ© des recettes de la TPS au financement des intĂ©rĂȘts sur la dette.
La ministre des Finances va chercher des recettes additionnelles essentiellement en rĂ©duisant le traitement prĂ©fĂ©rentiel accordĂ© sur les gains en capital. Ă lui seul, lâimpact de ce changement pour les sociĂ©tĂ©s, les fiducies et les particuliers dĂ©passera les 19 milliards $ sur 5 ans.
Depuis que les libĂ©raux ont pris le pouvoir en 2015, plusieurs sâattendaient Ă un tel resserrement, notamment parce que le taux marginal dâimposition sur un gain en capital Ă©tait infĂ©rieur au taux marginal dâimposition le plus Ă©levĂ© sur les dividendes dĂ©terminĂ©s. Cela a encouragĂ© des planifications fiscales visant Ă convertir des dividendes en gain en capital. Certaines dâentre elles se sont avĂ©rĂ©es incertaines, ce qui a pour effet de crĂ©er de lâincertitude lorsque lâAgence du Revenu du Canada les conteste.
Historiquement, le gain en capital a toujours bĂ©nĂ©ficiĂ© dâun traitement prĂ©fĂ©rentiel. Un tel traitement est souvent prĂ©sentĂ© comme une reconnaissance de lâeffet de lâinflation dans les plus-values Ă long terme, ou encore comme une maniĂšre de rĂ©compenser la prise de risque. Le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral lâa dâailleurs explicitement reconnu en introduisant dans le dernier budget lâIncitatif aux entrepreneurs canadiens (qui sera expliquĂ© plus loin).
Avant 1972, le gain en capital nâĂ©tait pas imposĂ© au Canada. Câest le budget Benson (1971) qui a rĂ©formĂ© la dĂ©finition du revenu pour y inclure partiellement le gain en capital, Ă hauteur de 50 %. ConcrĂštement, cela signifiait que la moitiĂ© du gain en capital Ă©tait ajoutĂ©e au revenu et imposĂ©e selon le taux applicable. Lâautre portion du gain en capital demeurait soustraite Ă lâimpĂŽt, ce qui reprĂ©sentait un avantage de 50 %.
Cette proposition faisait suite Ă la Commission royale dâenquĂȘte sur la fiscalitĂ© (commission Carter) qui recommandait toutefois de lâinclure en totalitĂ© sous le principe de «âa buck is a buck is a buckâ» (un dollar est un dollar est un dollar), ce qui signifie essentiellement que mĂȘme si le revenu peut ĂȘtre gagnĂ© de diverses façons, il sâagit en fin de compte dâun revenu, et donc que tous les revenus devraient ĂȘtre imposĂ©s de la mĂȘme maniĂšre.
Depuis plus dâune cinquantaine dâannĂ©es, lâavantage a variĂ© entre 25 % et 50 %, comme lâillustre le tableau 1.
Ă titre indicatif, lors de la hausse du taux dâinclusion du gain en capital ayant pris effet au 1er janvier 1988 et au 1er janvier 1990, lâannonce avait Ă©tĂ© faite en juin 1987 (lors de lâannonce de la rĂ©forme fiscale), laissant le temps aux contribuables de sâajuster. Ă lâinverse, lors de la rĂ©duction du taux dâinclusion du gain en capital en 2000, les annonces prenaient effet le jour mĂȘme.
Le budget 2024 vient rĂ©duire le traitement prĂ©fĂ©rentiel accordĂ© au gain en capital Ă 33,33 %. Autrement dit, les deux tiers du gain en capital (66,67 %) seront dorĂ©navant ajoutĂ©s aux revenus imposables. Pour les sociĂ©tĂ©s, ce changement affecte lâensemble des gains en capital, mais pour les particuliers, il ne concerne que la portion excĂ©dant 250â000 $ de gain en capital annuel. Cette exemption de 250â000 $ est dĂ©terminĂ©e aprĂšs prise en compte des pertes en capital. Le nouveau traitement sâapplique Ă compter du 25 juin 2024, ce qui laisse le temps aux contribuables dâorganiser leur affaire avant que la mesure nâentre en vigueur.
De leur cĂŽtĂ©, les provinces ont toujours eu le mĂȘme taux dâinclusion partielle des gains en capital que celui appliquĂ© par le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral. Le QuĂ©bec a dâailleurs dĂ©cidĂ© dâemboĂźter le pas, ce qui reprĂ©sente des recettes fiscales additionnelles potentielles de 3 milliards $ sur cinq ans.
Plusieurs se sentent interpellĂ©s par la façon dont le changement va affecter le gain Ă la suite de la vente de biens immobiliers (immeuble locatif, rĂ©sidence secondaire). Il faut rappeler que les contribuables peuvent continuer de rĂ©clamer lâexemption pour la rĂ©sidence principale, ce qui fait en sorte que le gain demeure entiĂšrement libre dâimpĂŽt. En outre, dans le cas des couples dont, par exemple, la rĂ©sidence secondaire est dĂ©tenue Ă 50 % par les conjoints, chacun dâentre eux a droit au seuil dâexemption de 250â000 $. Il faut donc que le gain en capital sur la rĂ©sidence secondaire soit supĂ©rieur Ă 500 000 $ avant que les rĂ©centes modifications aient un effet nĂ©gatif.
Outre certains transferts de biens entre conjoints sans consĂ©quence fiscale au moment du dĂ©cĂšs, le dĂ©funt est imposĂ© sur le gain en capital accumulĂ© au moment de la mort. Encore une fois, le seuil dâexemption de 250 000 $ sâapplique, et seul lâexcĂ©dent est visĂ© par le taux dâinclusion Ă 66,67 %.
Pour Ă©viter les critiques quant Ă lâeffet que pourrait avoir la hausse du taux dâinclusion du gain en capital sur lâentrepreneuriat, la ministre des Finances majore de 25 % lâexonĂ©ration cumulative des gains en capital pour compenser la hausse du taux dâinclusion. Le nouveau plafond Ă vie atteindra 1,25 million $ dĂšs le 25 juin 2024, et il sera indexĂ© Ă lâinflation dĂšs 2026.
De plus, Ă compter du 1er janvier 2025, un nouvel Incitatif aux entrepreneurs canadiens est mis en place pour les entrepreneurs-fondateurs. Il sâagit dâune rĂ©duction du taux dâimposition sur les gains en capital au moment de la disposition dâactions. Sur le gain admissible â soit au-delĂ de 1,25 million $ couvert par lâexonĂ©ration cumulative du gain en capital â, le taux dâinclusion est rĂ©duit de moitiĂ© en comparaison au taux en vigueur (donc 33,33 % au lieu de 66,67 %). Le plafond cumulatif sera mis en Ćuvre progressivement par tranche de 200â000 $ par annĂ©e, jusquâĂ un maximum de 2 millions $ au 1er janvier 2034.
Le traitement plus avantageux sâappliquera donc Ă©ventuellement un gain en capital de 3,25 millions $ dĂ©coulant de la vente des actions dâune entreprise, une amĂ©lioration apprĂ©ciable pour ceux qui se qualifient.
Aux taux dâimposition actuels au QuĂ©bec, la diffĂ©rence entre les taux marginaux supĂ©rieurs est de prĂšs de 27 points par rapport Ă un revenu ordinaire comme un salaire (26,7 % contre 53,3 %), ou dâun peu plus de 13 points de pourcentage par rapport aux dividendes (26,7 % contre 40,0 %). La rĂ©duction de lâavantage associĂ© au gain en capital de 50 % à 33,33 % rĂ©duira lâĂ©cart et permettra dâassurer une meilleure symĂ©trie dans le traitement fiscal des dividendes et du gain en capital. Ainsi, les taux marginaux seraient davantage uniformes (35,5 % pour le gain en capital contre 40,0 % pour les dividendes dĂ©terminĂ©s). Les rĂ©sultats sont similaires en Ontario.
Au-delĂ de lâĂ©valuation de ce que rapportera ce changement important Ă la fiscalitĂ©, il faut reconnaĂźtre que dans le contexte du dĂ©sĂ©quilibre budgĂ©taire actuel et Ă venir Ă Ottawa et dans les provinces, la dĂ©cision dâaller chercher de nouveaux revenus ne pouvait ĂȘtre exclue. Dâune certaine façon, au QuĂ©bec, le plan de retour Ă lâĂ©quilibre budgĂ©taire du ministre Girard a reçu un coup de pouce dâOttawaâ!
In the 2022 budget, tabled on April 7 of that year, six weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Trudeau government announced it would undertake a âswiftâ defence policy review.
On April 8 of this year â 732 days later â the government published the results of that review under the title Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canadaâs Defence. A new definition of swift was thus born.
Much has been already written about Our North, Strong and Free. Its sensible emphasis on threats to, and investments in, Canadaâs Arctic and Northern defence has been noted.
The government pledged to increase defence funding to 1.76 per cent of gross domestic product by 2029-30 from an abysmal 1.33 per cent today. While this keeps Canada well below the NATO target of two per cent â a level to which Ottawa has agreed twice in the past 10 years â it is still more than many expected.
It could, however, also be read as a firm commitment not to meet our commitments.
The undertaking to conduct and publish four-year reviews of both national security and defence policy has been applauded, while the shopping list of new equipment that the Canadian Armed Forces will buy has been discussed.
What is no less important, however, are the public administration innovations one can find within the pages of Our North, Strong and Free. Three chief ones come to mind.
The first we can call the âin and out play.â The new policy commits an additional $8.1 billion to the defence budget (on an accrual basis) over the next five fiscal years.
This fiscal year and next â the last two fiscal years in the life of the current Trudeau government â Department of National Defence funding will be increased by about $600 million and $1.1 billion, respectively.
However, also over these two fiscal years, between $800-$900 million will be taken out of the defence budget annually through a government-wide expenditure-reduction initiative aimed at cutting spending on âprofessional servicesâ and travel.
Meaning that during the remaining mandate of this government, what comes in the front door courtesy of Our North, Strong and Free, mostly goes out the back door.
The second novelty we can label the âFantasy Island move.â Our North, Strong and Free commits Ottawa to some $73 billion in defence funding increases over the next 20 years.
Normally a significant departmental funding boost would be phased in over five years (i.e., the fiscal framework time horizon, not to mention the lifetime of government), rather than a period equal to going from toddler to university graduate. Some have called this âback-end loading.â A less charitable take would consider it to be in the realm of fantasy.
The parliamentary budget officer forecasts a federal deficit of more than $46 billion and a federal debt ratio in excess of 42 per cent of GDP in this fiscal year (up from slightly more than 30 per cent five years ago).
Those numbers, both of which are rising, suggest a very strong likelihood that in the not-too-distant future (i.e., well within the 20-year framework) some government is going to have to get serious about deficit- and debt-reduction.
When that happens, it is a certainty that the defence budget will take a hit as it has in every expenditure-reduction exercise over the past 35 years by the Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin and Harper governments (Progressive Conservative, Liberal and Conservative alike).
As noted, the Trudeau government is already following in these footsteps, increasing the defence budget on the one hand, even as it cuts it on the other hand as the minister of finance and the president of the Treasury Board try to bring some fiscal probity to Ottawa.
Cutting defence spending in times of austerity has proven to be one of the few areas of bipartisan consensus over the past generation, owing chiefly to the fact the Department of National Defence is the second largest source of non-statutory spending for the federal government.
In other words, this is about math as much or more as it is about politics.
The third innovation in Our North, Strong and Free is what we might label the âunfunded shopping spree.â The policy statement makes it clear that the Canadian Armed Forces will acquire various types of equipment over time, meaning those projects are funded within the financial resources provided.
This is the kind of thing defence policy statements normally contain. Then comes the novelty. There are about a dozen instances where the document states that the Armed Forces will âexploreâ buying various other kit, meaning those projects are not funded.
Itâs anyoneâs guess why the authors of Our North, Strong and Free thought that highlighting the exploration of hypothetical purchases was necessary.
Anyone with even passing knowledge of the military knows it is always exploring the acquisition of new equipment of various kinds. It is part of its job after all to look to replace constantly aging kit and to keep abreast of technological change.
Unfortunately for the forces, many of those explorations over the years have foundered on the rocks of fiscal and political reality.
All of which reveals a central, though unstated, theme in this policy statement.
Our North, Strong and Free is above all else an expression of a government that fails to see national defence as a high priority even after two years of war in Ukraine, but which is under increasing pressure from NATO and allies to significantly boost defence funding in the context of a relatively tight fiscal box of its own making.
Perched on the shores of the Athabasca River in northern Alberta are a staggering 1.4 trillion litres of toxic industrial waste, stored in open pits known as tailings ponds created through oil production.
For decades, it has been public knowledge that this toxic waste is leaking into the surrounding environment. Yet the federal government has still not investigated the true dangers posed by these substances.
This could change immediately. With tools at its disposal under federal laws, it is time for Ottawa to take responsibility and protect communities and the environment from further contamination.
This is why First Nations, MĂ©tis and environmental groups joined forces in March to submit a formal request to the federal government to assess the harms caused by naphthenic acids, a major toxic component in oilsands tailings ponds. The goal is to compel the government to take further action to address oilsands water pollution. It has 90 days to respond.
The federal government has the constitutional responsibility to protect people across the country from toxic pollution. It exercises this power under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), a cornerstone environmental law upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The federal government also has other important responsibilities for protecting the environment in the oilsands region. For example, it has constitutional power over fisheries and has enacted the Fisheries Act with the purpose of âprotect[ing] fish and fish habitat, including by preventing pollution.â
The oilsands are also on territory subject to Treaty 8, of which the Crown is a signatory, which affirms the rights of First Nations to practise their traditional ways of life.
Unfortunately, however, successive federal governments have not taken their environmental responsibilities in the oilsands seriously, instead exacerbating the problem by approving more mines and tailings ponds.
In 2014, MPs from the then-Liberal opposition on the Commons environment committee published a scathing report in which they denounced the âabdication of federal leadership in an area (âŠ) that is rightfully Ottawaâs under the Constitutionâs division of powers.â
They accused the Conservative government of the day of âprotecting the oil sands industryâ by failing to assess the toxicity of one of its most harmful components found in the tailings ponds â the naphthenic acids.
Over the years, the response from successive governments in Ottawa has often been that while it has some responsibility, it lacks the tools to effectively regulate tailings pollution.
However, in June 2023, as part of the important effort to modernize CEPA, Parliament added a new mechanism allowing any individual or organization to ask the federal government to assess, and then address, the toxicity of specific harmful substances. Thatâs the basis of our joint request in March for a federal review of the situation.
Studies prove that naphthenic acids are harmful to fish and amphibians. While human health studies are incomplete, naphthenic acids are recognized as potential endocrine disruptors.
More than 6,000 tonnes of naphthenic acids are added to tailing ponds every year, increasing the risk that more of these substances will end up in the environment through leaks, spills or other incidents. For example, naphthenic acids were found in nearby freshwater following last yearâs high-profile leak from Imperial Oilâs Kearl oilsands mine.
Yet, the federal Health and Environment ministries have so far declined to conduct a risk assessment. Unlike well-known pollutants such as mercury and certain hydrocarbons, there are no official national guidelines for dealing with naphthenic acids.
The lack of a federal risk assessment has become an excuse for Ottawa to turn a blind eye to the potential harms caused by naphthenic acids, including on Indigenous communities.
The formal joint request â submitted by Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation, Keepers of the Water, and Environmental Defence, represented by Ecojustice lawyers â asks the federal government to use its powers under CEPA to conduct a formal assessment of the risks posed by oilsands naphthenic acids to the environment and human health.
If the federal government agrees, and if its assessment concludes that these substances pose a risk to human health or the environment, Ottawa will be required to adopt appropriate risk management measures.
This means the federal government could consider options such as regulations on production and conditions for the release of naphthenic acids, requiring companies to set aside funds for cleanup and demanding that the companies have environmental emergency plans to respond to incidents.
Such tools are essential for protecting the nearby environment and people who live there, including Indigenous nations, from unacceptable levels of pollution.
The Athabasca oilsands region is a pollution hotspot and one of the gravest examples of environmental injustice in Canada.
Because this request was filed under the modernized CEPA, the federal government is required to consider the specific circumstances of âvulnerable populationsâ and âvulnerable environments,â as well as the principle of environmental justice when assessing the harms posed by substances and selecting risk management measures.
This gives our request more weight because pollution from the oilsands has been principally felt by Indigenous communities that are exposed to many pollutants through the air, water and the food they consume.
Action on oilsands pollution has been a long time coming. It wasnât until 2020 that oilsands companies were required to report under the national pollutant release inventory how much naphthenic acids they produce and where they are disposing of it.
This happened only after environmental groups successfully advocated for reform. However, reporting alone is insufficient if it does not lead to action.
The ministers of Environment and Health have until June 11 to respond to our formal request and decide whether to conduct a risk assessment for oilsands naphthenic acids.
The federal government must uphold its responsibility to address toxic tailings and take action to protect people and ecosystems. For far too long, companies have been allowed to produce dangerous waste without proper investigation of the risks.
(English version available here)
Les Canadiens les plus démunis ont besoin de soutien supplémentaire, et rapidement.
Ce nâest pas nouveau. Les prestations provinciales dâaide sociale, qui servent Ă se procurer de la nourriture et dâautres produits de premiĂšre nĂ©cessitĂ©, sont infĂ©rieures au seuil de pauvretĂ© officiel du Canada depuis au moins 2013. Mais la situation sâest considĂ©rablement aggravĂ©e en raison de la poussĂ©e inflationniste qui a suivi la pandĂ©mie.
En Ontario, oĂč le seuil de pauvretĂ© officiel Ă©tait de 27â631 $ en 2022, un adulte cĂ©libataire en Ăąge de travailler recevait 10â253 $ en aide sociale. Câest en Alberta, en Nouvelle-Ăcosse et au Nouveau-Brunswick que lâaide sociale est la moins gĂ©nĂ©reuse.
La recherche montre que des transferts monĂ©taires ciblĂ©s peuvent rĂ©duire la pauvretĂ© et lâinsĂ©curitĂ© alimentaire, en plus dâaider Ă combler les besoins de base. Les gouvernements ont fait des progrĂšs considĂ©rables dans la rĂ©duction des taux de pauvretĂ© chez les personnes ĂągĂ©es et les enfants grĂące Ă des programmes tels que la Pension de la sĂ©curitĂ© de vieillesse, le SupplĂ©ment de revenu garanti et lâAllocation canadienne pour enfants.
Mais certains groupes passent à travers les mailles du filet. Les taux de faibles revenus restent élevés chez les personnes monoparentales et chez les adultes célibataires en ùge de travailler et sans enfant.
Mes propres travaux indiquent que le moyen le plus rapide et le plus efficace de rĂ©duire de maniĂšre significative les taux de faibles revenus est dâaugmenter le crĂ©dit de TPS/TVH pour les adultes en Ăąge de travailler et leurs enfants â ou, au QuĂ©bec, le crĂ©dit pour la TPS et la TVQ.
Cela permettrait Ă©galement de lutter contre lâinsĂ©curitĂ© alimentaire croissante. En 2022, 18 % des Canadiens nâavaient pas un accĂšs stable Ă une alimentation suffisante, contre 16 % en 2021 et 17 % en 2019. Plus de 40 % de ces familles Ă©taient dirigĂ©es par des mĂšres cĂ©libataires, tandis que plus dâun tiers des familles noires et autochtones souffraient dâinsĂ©curitĂ© alimentaire.
La frĂ©quentation des banques alimentaires est Ă©galement en hausse. Banques alimentaires Canada a enregistrĂ© prĂšs de deux millions de visites dans lâensemble du pays en mars 2023, le dernier mois pour lequel des donnĂ©es sont disponibles. Il sâagit dâune hausse de 32 % par rapport Ă la mĂȘme pĂ©riode en 2022, et de plus de 78 % par rapport Ă 2019. Les adultes cĂ©libataires en Ăąge de travailler reprĂ©sentaient 44 % des utilisateurs, lâun des plus grands sous-ensembles de visiteurs.
Ces tendances sont inquiĂ©tantes. Pour faire baisser les prix des produits alimentaires, le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral a annoncĂ© des mesures visant Ă stimuler la concurrence entre les grandes chaĂźnes dâĂ©picerie, mais il est peu probable que ces efforts aient Ă eux seuls un impact significatif.
De plus, les causes de lâinsĂ©curitĂ© alimentaire ne se limitent pas aux prix des aliments. La forte hausse du coĂ»t du logement, des taux dâintĂ©rĂȘt, de lâessence et des transports pĂšse Ă©galement sur le budget des familles. Bien des mĂ©nages doivent choisir entre manger ou payer le loyer. Câest souvent la nourriture qui Ă©cope.
La recherche indique Ă©galement quâune aide au revenu est le meilleur moyen de rĂ©duire lâinsĂ©curitĂ© alimentaire. Le Conseil dâaction sur lâabordabilitĂ©, un groupe non partisan dâexperts politiques et de responsables communautaires, mâa demandĂ© de rechercher et dâĂ©valuer la maniĂšre la plus efficace et la plus rentable dâaugmenter lâaide fĂ©dĂ©rale pour les mĂ©nages Ă faibles revenus.
Jâai examinĂ© les rĂ©formes possibles des programmes de transfert de fonds existants, notamment le CrĂ©dit pour la taxe sur les produits et services/taxe de vente harmonisĂ©e, lâAllocation canadienne pour enfants et lâAllocation canadienne pour travailleurs, puisque ces rĂ©formes peuvent ĂȘtre mises en Ćuvre plus rapidement quâune nouvelle prestation.
Jâen ai conclu que le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral devrait Ă©largir le crĂ©dit TPS/TVH existant pour les adultes en Ăąge de travailler et leurs enfants.
Ce crĂ©dit est une prestation gĂ©nĂ©rale accessible Ă tous les types de familles, y compris les adultes cĂ©libataires en Ăąge de travailler et les familles monoparentales, et qui arrive bien Ă cibler les mĂ©nages Ă faibles revenus. LâAllocation canadienne pour enfants ne sâadresse quâaux familles avec enfants et lâAllocation canadienne pour les travailleurs ne sâadresse quâaux personnes ayant un faible revenu dâemploi.
Toutefois, le crĂ©dit existant pour la TPS/TVH est modeste. Il prĂ©voit une prestation de base de 325 $ par an par adulte et de 171 $ par an, par enfant. Les adultes cĂ©libataires bĂ©nĂ©ficient de leur cĂŽtĂ© dâun montant annuel supplĂ©mentaire de 171 $, qui sâapplique progressivement aux revenus supĂ©rieurs Ă 10â544 $.
Dans lâensemble, les adultes cĂ©libataires reçoivent donc un maximum de 496 $ par an et les couples sans enfant un maximum de 650 $ par an.  Les couples avec un enfant reçoivent un maximum de 821 $ par an, comme les parents cĂ©libataires ayant un enfant, qui sont considĂ©rĂ©s comme un couple avec un enfant aux fins du calcul.
Je recommande au gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral de privilĂ©gier lâune des deux options suivantes : accorder un crĂ©dit mensuel de 100 $ par adulte en Ăąge de travailler, rĂ©parti uniformĂ©ment entre les mĂ©nages Ă revenus faibles et moyens, ou de 150 $ par mois aux personnes en situation de grande pauvretĂ©. Les deux options toucheraient environ 10 millions de mĂ©nages et ajouteraient entre 10 et 11 milliards $ Ă ce quâOttawa dĂ©pense pour ces prestations.
Je ne recommande pas dâĂ©tendre le complĂ©ment aux personnes ĂągĂ©es de 65 ans et plus, car elles sont moins susceptibles dâavoir un faible revenu ou de souffrir dâinsĂ©curitĂ© alimentaire. Toutefois, elles continueraient Ă recevoir le mĂȘme montant quâaujourdâhui.
Je recommande Ă©galement que le crĂ©dit de taxes Ă©largi soit versĂ© mensuellement et non plus trimestriellement, comme câest le cas actuellement. Cela permettrait de rĂ©partir les paiements de maniĂšre uniforme tout au long de lâannĂ©e et assurerait aux bĂ©nĂ©ficiaires une plus grande stabilitĂ© dans la couverture des dĂ©penses quotidiennes.
Quelle que soit la mĂ©thode de transfert de fonds retenue, certaines personnes qui auraient droit Ă la prestation proposĂ©e ne la recevraient pas. En effet, les aides au revenu sont distribuĂ©es par lâAgence du revenu du Canada et ne sont donc versĂ©es quâaux personnes qui remplissent une dĂ©claration de revenus. Or, jusquâĂ 12 % des Canadiens ne remplissent pas de dĂ©claration.
Il sâagit le plus souvent de personnes vivant dans la pauvretĂ©, par exemple des Autochtones (en particulier les mĂšres), des sans-abri et des bĂ©nĂ©ficiaires de lâaide sociale â ceux-lĂ mĂȘmes qui ont le plus besoin dâaide.
Dans le budget 2023, le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral annonçait la prochaine mise Ă lâessai dâun service automatique de dĂ©claration de revenus pour les Canadiens dont le revenu est faible ou fixe et qui ne remplissent pas de dĂ©claration. Ottawa a depuis Ă©largi un systĂšme moins ambitieux de dĂ©claration de revenus par tĂ©lĂ©phone, mais nâa pas mis en Ćuvre le service automatique. Il devrait le faire dĂšs que possible.
Sur la base de mon analyse, le Conseil dâaction sur lâaccessibilitĂ© a recommandĂ©, dans un rapport publiĂ© en dĂ©cembre 2023, que le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral restructure et Ă©largisse le crĂ©dit pour la TPS/TVH et le renomme «âAllocation pour lâĂ©picerie et les besoins de baseâ».
La prestation proposĂ©e sâappuierait sur le remboursement unique des frais dâĂ©picerie mis en place par le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral en 2023. Lâoption choisie par le Conseil donnerait 150 $ par mois par adulte (1800 $ par an) et 50 $ par enfant (600 $ par an) aux mĂ©nages aux revenus les plus faibles.
Il est peu probable que ce complĂ©ment contribue Ă lâinflation, car toute aide au revenu supplĂ©mentaire que les familles Ă faible revenu reçoivent est susceptible dâĂȘtre consacrĂ©e Ă lâachat de nourriture et dâautres produits de premiĂšre nĂ©cessitĂ©, et non Ă des articles de luxe.
NĂ©anmoins, les mĂ©nages les plus modestes ne devraient pas avoir Ă supporter le fardeau de la lutte contre lâinflation. Chacun devrait pouvoir se nourrir et payer son loyer.
Le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral a rĂ©cemment annoncĂ© quâil dĂ©penserait 1 milliard $ sur cinq ans pour lancer un programme national dâalimentation scolaire, qui devrait permettre de fournir des repas Ă 400â000 enfants chaque annĂ©e Ă partir de 2024-25. Ce programme est un pas dans la bonne direction, mais dâautres mesures sont nĂ©cessaires.
Pour rĂ©duire de maniĂšre significative les taux de faibles revenus et lâinsĂ©curitĂ© alimentaire croissante, le Canada a besoin dâun programme de transferts de fonds ciblĂ©s plus gĂ©nĂ©reux. LâĂ©largissement du crĂ©dit pour la TPS/TVH est le moyen le plus rapide et le plus efficace dây parvenir.
The continuing growth and remarkably diverse composition of the Canada we all know today is thanks to one main factor: historically high levels of immigration.
A well-established multiculturalism policy, positive public attitudes toward immigration and the lack of meaningful success of anti-immigration politics have contributed to Canadaâs continued openness to newcomers.
Springboarding off these realities, the pro-immigration lobby group Century Initiative is advocating for increased immigration levels to reach a total population of 100 million by 2100. That would double current projections for population growth.
However, there have been clear signals â especially over the last year â that attitudes are shifting. Following years of high intake of temporary and permanent residents, perceptions that Canada is accepting too many immigrants have mushroomed.
This should be of grave concern for our collective future. Why? Because Canada is in a global competition for talent.
This is especially true in key areas where specialized skills and expertise are indispensable to Canadaâs economy. A growing number of countries are also seeking to attract these immigrants to bolster their economies. Canada cannot afford to let slip its attractiveness to highly skilled migrants.
Shifting attitudes are being shaped by several factors, including concerns around housing availability and affordability, high inflation and high interest rates since the pandemic.
Record-breaking numbers of international students â more than one million in 2023 â have been linked to the housing crisis afflicting many communities, leading the federal government to introduce a cap on visa applications for 2024 and 2025 â a decision which will require the provinces with the most students to reduce their numbers.
While overall support for immigration remains high, these recent developments have created an opening for challenges to not only the number of temporary residents, but also to the federal governmentâs ambitious target of bringing in half a million new landed immigrants per year by 2025.
Inaction by the federal government to address these growing concerns could spell trouble.
Canada is in a global competition for talent â a fact widely accepted by governments, business groups, academic associations, pro-immigration movements, and organizations promoting entrepreneurship. Each of these groups, , in their own way, supports government efforts to assertively attract and retain highly skilled individuals from around the world.
The most basic argument points to demographic trends indicating the continued need for immigration to maintain population growth, meet labour-market needs and maintain a viable balance between the working and non-working population.
A more specific argument about the race (or âwarâ) for talent concerns the potential contribution of very high-achieving individuals among the skilled, globally mobile population â top scientists, engineers, artists, entrepreneurs and innovators.
Migration regimes focusing on the âbest and the brightestâ have grown in popularity, emphasizing highly specialized or extraordinary skills and expertise.
The United States, long a destination of choice for highly skilled professions, has benefitted substantially from the contributions of foreign talent in the higher echelons of scientific and entrepreneurial achievement. Demand continues to outstrip the supply of American H1-B visas, which are granted to highly educated professionals, particularly in STEM fields.
Germany, which has the second-highest number of immigrants in the world after the U.S., has recently introduced its Skilled Immigration Act to help specialized professionals become temporary or permanent residents.
In the U.K., the number of visas in categories of global talent, innovator founders and start-ups has grown dramatically since the pandemic, along with an increased intake of skilled professionals.
Canada has been lauded for its ability to admit skilled immigrants, but its targeted initiatives aiming at recruiting highly specialized talent from around the world have been unimpressive.
The start-up visa program was introduced as a pilot initiative in 2013 to replace the federal entrepreneur program in place since the 1970s, which had come to be regarded as ineffective. The visa program aims to attract innovative entrepreneurs who can create jobs and compete on a global scale.
While the program was renewed after its initial five-year pilot period, it is still not meeting those goals.
Moreover, the start-up visa program has also experienced operational difficulties. With a large backlog in applications reported in recent years and a processing time of 37 months, the program is out of touch with the realities of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
One blatant sign of the programâs shortcomings is the fact fewer entrepreneurs are being admitted today than under the previous program.
Meanwhile, the Canada Research Chairs Program was established in 2000 to attract and retain âsome of the worldâs most accomplished and promising minds to foster and reinforce academic research excellence.â
Despite lofty rhetoric and some measure of the prestige it still carries in academic circles, the programâs results remain far from the original vision: 86 per cent of appointments over the past decade have been internal.
Universities mostly nominate their own faculty members as chairs without having to mount a case that they are being recruited by other institutions (let alone universities in competitor countries).
In addition, the value of the financial award made to universities to support the salaries and research of the chairholders has not been readjusted, meaning its real value has declined by 53 per cent. As a result, the program has evolved to become less of a strategic tool to attract the worldâs brightest minds and more of a glorified federal subsidy.
These two programs are failures both in design and implementation. More worryingly, they also denote a certain lack of seriousness of purpose.
While espousing ambitious goals in line with the demands of the knowledge-intensive sectors of entrepreneurship and academic science, they lack the means to deliver. While periodic program evaluations may raise shortcomings, they ultimately are used to showcase them as successful.
In these cases, bureaucratic self-preservation is sitting in for genuine ambition to keep Canada competitive globally.
The  urgent debate on immigration needs to place greater emphasis on the tools meant to make Canada a prime destination for global talent.
More rigorous program reviews tied to a fundamental commitment to learning and adapting can help overcome the bureaucratic inertia that allows ineffective initiatives to continue.
Now more than ever, it is essential that Canada strive to attract the most innovative and capable scientific and entrepreneurial minds on the planet.
Experimenting with policy approaches may at times produce disappointing or underwhelming results. But that is less important than trying and learning from putting new ideas into practice so Canada doesnât fall even further behind in a global race that will shape the future of the country.
One legacy of the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada is the ongoing shift in work arrangements and location. Work-from-home (WFH), once considered a temporary emergency solution to the initial lockdowns in 2020, has taken root, reshaping how individuals work in many sectors.
In a previous Policy Options article, we explored this trend using data from a survey called Shaping the Future of Work in Canada conducted in 2022 by EKOS Research Associates. At the time, over 40 per cent of respondents were still working from home or had done so until recently. Many such workers reported very positive work experiences, with satisfaction well above that of those working from traditional work locations.
To see how these trends have further evolved, the Future of Work Consortium conducted a second survey in April and May 2023, drawing on 2,642 employed and self-employed Canadians aged 18 and over.
Several key trends stand out.
First, work-from-home and hybrid arrangements have become a viable option in Canada. Over 40 per cent of workers carried out some amount of paid work from home in the six months prior to our 2023 survey. In pre-pandemic times, this is work that typically would have been done in their employerâs workplace.
That said, there is considerable variation in WFH arrangements. Roughly 16.5 per cent of respondents work entirely at home. Another 23 per cent do the majority of their work from home, and 20 per cent work from home only a bit. At the far end of the spectrum, 40 per cent do not work from home at all (Figure 1).
Second, there are substantial differences in who has access to home-based work. Those who spend most of their work time at home are predominantly full-time employees (68.4 per cent). Just over one in five (21.5 per cent) is self-employed, 5.7 per cent are part-time employees, and 4.4 per cent are seasonal, term, or contract workers.
Highly educated knowledge workers are also more likely to work from home. Over two-thirds (67.1 per cent) of respondents who exclusively work from home have undergraduate or postgraduate degrees compared with under half (47.3 per cent) of respondents who report no home-based work.
Gender slightly influences opportunities to work from home. Over a quarter of men (27.3 per cent) and women (27.8 per cent) work 80 per cent or more of their time at home. But men are also slightly more likely than women to work 100 per cent at home (17.5 per cent men, 15 per cent women) and to do no remote work at all (41.9 per cent men, 38.2 per cent women)
Self-identified visible minorities are generally well-represented among home-based workers. Nearly 29 per cent work at home 80 per cent to 100 per cent of the time compared with about 27 per cent of non-visible minority workers. About one-third of visible minorities report doing no work at home (34.2 per cent) but this is less than other workers (42.3 per cent).
Employer size also shapes remote work, with WFH being more common in smaller organizations. Specifically, of those working at home 100 per cent of the time, 43 per cent of are employed by organizations with under 50 employees in Canada. Only 24 per cent of home-based workers are employed by large organizations with over 1,000 employees in Canada.
Union members are less likely than non-members to report working primarily from home. For example, 7.9 per cent of union members work entirely at home compared to 15 per cent of professional-association members and 22.9 per cent of survey respondents who belonged to neither of these types of organizations.
Third, WFH continues to be linked with very positive assessments of job satisfaction and well-being. This mirrors findings from our 2022 survey, though exceptions to this trend are beginning to emerge.
As figure 2 shows, roughly two-thirds of respondents felt that WFH had a positive impact on their job satisfaction, productivity and mental health. A majority also reported a positive impact on their commitment to their employer and work safety.
That said, we also see some negative impacts on team building and socializing among co-workers.
Interestingly, the more time respondents report working from home, the greater the reported positive impact. For instance, 74.6 per cent of those working fully at home reported positive impacts in job satisfaction compared with just 53.6 per cent of those working 20 per cent of the time at home. A similar trend can be seen for the impact on productivity.
Working primarily from home is also linked to positive assessments on an array of detailed job quality and satisfaction measures, especially among respondents entirely home-based. For this group, such outcomes include: being treated respectfully by co-workers, having opportunities for creativity, having independence at work, trusting their immediate supervisor and senior management, having the ability to balance work and family and the authority to make decisions. They also include having access to a retirement plan, a good income, and input into their employerâs post-pandemic work plans.
We also asked respondents who supervise others whether they felt working from home had positively or negatively impacted their supervisees.
Of that group, over half had supervisees who worked at home some of the time. Overall, the majority of supervisors reported very positive impacts on their employeesâ morale, productivity, and commitment to the organization, as figure 3 shows. However, mixed results are seen on the ability to collaborate. Over one-third of respondents reported a negative impact on collaboration among those they supervise.
We asked respondents how satisfied they were with their lives as a whole on a scale of 1 to 10. Those who rated their life satisfaction between 8 and 10 were more likely to be working from home some of the time. About 48 per cent of those working from home at least 60 per cent of the time reported life satisfaction in the 8 to 10 range compared with 42 per cent of respondents who do not work from home. Itâs a small but noteworthy difference.
Surprisingly, work from home does not appear to affect physical and mental health. The amount of time worked from home led to no statistically significant differences in respondentsâ ratings of their physical and mental health using the categories of excellent/very good, good, or fair/poor.
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Finally, given debates over how employers are handling arrangements, we asked about evolving practices. Overall, the vast majority (69 per cent) of respondents had not been consulted about any return-to-work process. Another 11 per cent reported being fully consulted, and 20 per cent somewhat consulted.
In terms of planning, just under half (47 per cent) agreed to a great extent that the return-to-work process had been well-planned. However, nearly one-quarter (23 per cent) did not feel it was well-planned.
The survey also asked: âRecognizing that it may not be practical in your industry, approximately how much of the time would you prefer to work from home?â Only 59 per cent who work exclusively at their employerâs worksite would like to continue that way. In contrast, 81 per cent of those who work from home all of the time want to continue doing so.
To summarize, there are obvious signs that work-from-home is emerging as one of Canadiansâ more enduring responses to the disruptions of the pandemic. Workers who can work from home report overall better quality of work life. This has introduced a whole new dimension to job-quality variations. To a large extent, workers who went into the pandemic with a higher socioeconomic status came out ahead.
There have been few public-policy responses to these emerging work trends. A big question is to what extent governments can influence working-from-home patterns in ways that provide more equitable access and benefits.
Note about the survey:
The Shaping the Future of Work in Canada Follow Up Survey was conducted using EKOS Research Associatesâ hybrid online/telephone research panel Probit. It offers extensive coverage of the Canadian population (i.e., Internet, phone, cell phone) and equal probability sampling. All respondents were recruited by telephone using random digit dialing and were confirmed by interviewers.
Unlike with online panels where people can opt in themselves, Probit supports margin-of-error estimates. The field dates for the survey were April 25 and May 5, 2023. A random sample of 2,642 individuals who were engaged in the workforce responded. This included employees and the self-employed. The margin of error associated with the total sample is +/- 1.3 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.
All data has been statistically weighted by age, gender and region based on the proportions of employed people from the 2016 census to ensure the sampleâs composition reflected that of the actual population of Canada.Â
The research methodology and questionnaire were approved by research ethics boards at the University of Alberta and Toronto Metropolitan University. Further details of the survey and questions can be obtained from karen.hughes@ualberta.ca.
The project is funded by the Future Skills Centre and conducted by the multidisciplinary Future of Work research consortium. Members include Graham Lowe, Merv Gilbert, Karen D. Hughes (University of Alberta), Frank Graves (EKOS Research Associates), Jim Stanford (Centre for Future Work) and Pamela Sugiman (Toronto Metropolitan University).
We thank Galiba Zahid at the University of Alberta for providing excellent research assistance on this article.
(English version available here)
Les soins primaires ne rĂ©pondent pas aux besoins de plusieurs Canadiennes et Canadiens en matiĂšre dâuniversalitĂ©, dâintĂ©gralitĂ© et dâaccessibilitĂ©, et ce, malgrĂ© lâinscription de ces principes fondamentaux dans la Loi canadienne sur la santĂ©.
Le Canada dispose actuellement dâun ensemble hĂ©tĂ©roclite de centres de soins de premiĂšre ligne indĂ©pendants, qui mĂšnent leurs activitĂ©s sans attentes claires en matiĂšre de rendement et de reddition de comptes. Câest notamment en raison de la structure de ce systĂšme, plutĂŽt que de circonstances imprĂ©vues, que tant de travailleurs de la santĂ© sont Ă©puisĂ©s et que 6,5 millions de Canadiens sont privĂ©s dâun accĂšs simple et rĂ©gulier aux soins.
à quelques exceptions prÚs, les soins primaires complets et centrés sur la personne ne sont ni accessibles ni efficaces pour les patients ayant des besoins complexes. Or, ce dysfonctionnement semble étonnamment toléré par des travailleurs épuisés et un public désabusé.
Une stratĂ©gie modĂ©rĂ©e et progressive â comprenant des projets pilotes Ă court terme, un recrutement international accru et de nouvelles Ă©coles de mĂ©decine â est inefficace, Ă©thiquement douteuse ou tout simplement irrĂ©aliste. Elle nâentraĂźnera pas les changements nĂ©cessaires.
Le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral a une occasion unique et opportune de corriger le tir avec son budget de 2024. Il faut investir dans la formation aux soins primaires dispensĂ©s par des Ă©quipes et dans lâĂ©laboration dâindicateurs de rendement et de normes rĂ©gissant la reddition de comptes. En outre, Ottawa devrait se concentrer sur les technologies du 21e siĂšcle et montrer lâexemple dans un domaine complexe oĂč les compĂ©tences sont partagĂ©es avec les provinces et les territoires.
MalgrĂ© lâinertie qui caractĂ©rise la «ârĂ©formeâ» des soins de premiĂšre ligne au Canada, il existe un large consensus sur les mesures devant ĂȘtre prises : une rĂ©organisation Ă grande Ă©chelle du systĂšme de santĂ© et une rĂ©elle responsabilisation de chaque instance. Ces mesures doivent ĂȘtre soutenues par un financement substantiel, ciblĂ© et suffisant pour marquer un vĂ©ritable changement.
Les rapports se succĂšdent pour demander la mise en place dâun systĂšme de soins primaires qui dĂ©passe ses racines artisanales, afin dâoffrir Ă chaque Canadien un accĂšs opportun et continu Ă des Ă©quipes de santĂ© qui mettent Ă profit lâensemble des compĂ©tences de leurs spĂ©cialistes.
Dans un monde idĂ©al oĂč le fĂ©dĂ©ralisme serait davantage axĂ© sur la collaboration, Ottawa et ses partenaires nĂ©gocieraient des augmentations significatives de la proportion des transferts fĂ©dĂ©raux vers les soins de premiĂšre ligne. Lâhistoire laisse plutĂŽt entrevoir quâun tel rĂ©sultat est peu probable.
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Une autre solution serait dâamorcer un changement transformationnel.
Il faudrait dâabord adapter et arrimer les soins primaires Ă leur finalitĂ©. La population actuelle est en moyenne 20 ans plus ĂągĂ©e que lors de lâimplantation de lâassurance-maladie.
Des millions de Canadiens ont des besoins multiples et complexes, en particulier les personnes ùgées fragiles, les personnes souffrant de maladies chroniques, les groupes socioéconomiques et culturels marginalisés et les personnes souffrant de problÚmes de santé mentale ou de dépendance. Aucun médecin de famille ou personnel infirmier praticien ne peut gérer seul des cas aussi complexes.
Pour rĂ©ussir, il faut un village, câest-Ă -dire des Ă©quipes interdisciplinaires de soins primaires. Les soins de premiĂšre ligne complets doivent inclure la santĂ© mentale, la rĂ©adaptation, la pharmacie et la diĂ©tĂ©tique, mais aussi couvrir un Ă©ventail de diagnostics et des partenariats avec dâautres organismes communautaires. Il faut aussi se doter dâune infrastructure adĂ©quate : des bĂątiments conçus pour accueillir des Ă©quipes et un excellent systĂšme dâinformation sur la santĂ©.
Le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral devrait ĂȘtre la source de «âcapital de risqueâ» pour les soins de santĂ©.
Les investissements intelligents libĂšrent et exploitent le potentiel de leadership organisationnel et clinique, facilitent les conversations difficiles et soutiennent une combinaison dâinnovations descendantes et ascendantes.
Ă cette fin, le budget de 2024 doit adopter des mesures pour soutenir lâinnovation Ă grande Ă©chelle dans notre systĂšme de santĂ©. Cela se traduit notamment par lâoctroi de davantage de fonds aux provinces et aux territoires, dont les plans sont les plus ambitieux en matiĂšre de modĂšles de soins primaires fondamentalement nouveaux, conçus pour servir ceux qui en ont le plus besoin.
Voici quatre mesures précises que le gouvernement fédéral devrait intégrer dans son budget :
1. Investir dans de nouvelles approches de la formation aux soins primaires. Les soins interdisciplinaires dispensĂ©s par des Ă©quipes ne seront jamais pleinement rĂ©alisĂ©s si les prestataires continuent dâĂȘtre formĂ©s individuellement. Au lieu dâĂ©coles de mĂ©decine, de sciences infirmiĂšres et de physiothĂ©rapie, il devrait y avoir des Ă©coles de soins primaires oĂč les Ă©tudiantes et les Ă©tudiants apprennent les bases de la santĂ©, de la maladie, de la santĂ© de la population et des dĂ©terminants sociaux de la santĂ©.
Les Ă©tudiantes et les Ă©tudiants devraient Ă©galement apprendre dĂšs le premier jour Ă travailler en Ă©quipe ainsi quâĂ organiser et dĂ©ployer les ressources et les talents de lâĂ©quipe dans lâintĂ©rĂȘt de leurs patients (et de leur propre durabilitĂ©).
Les Ă©coles de soins primaires ne devraient pas ĂȘtre des points dâentrĂ©e vers une spĂ©cialisation au sein dâĂ©tablissements. Elles devraient ĂȘtre les centres de formation dâun secteur des soins primaires en pleine expansion et beaucoup plus compĂ©tent, tout en assurant la majeure partie de lâĂ©ducation permanente.
2. Investir dans le dĂ©veloppement dâindicateurs de rendement, dans des stratĂ©gies dâoptimisation du personnel et dans des politiques visant une vĂ©ritable reddition de comptes sur la qualitĂ©, lâefficacitĂ© et les rĂ©sultats des soins primaires.
Ces mesures devraient ĂȘtre conçues et adoptĂ©es conjointement par les gouvernements, les prestataires, les Ă©quipes de recherche et le public. Les donnĂ©es qui permettront dâĂ©valuer le rendement du systĂšme et son amĂ©lioration devraient ĂȘtre gĂ©nĂ©rĂ©es en temps rĂ©el et ĂȘtre facilement accessibles Ă toutes les parties impliquĂ©es.
Par lâintermĂ©diaire de ses organisations de santĂ© pancanadiennes, le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral pourrait Ă©galement bonifier ses rapports publics sur le rendement en guise dâĂ©lĂ©ment clĂ© de lâamĂ©lioration continue de la qualitĂ© des services. Cela permettrait de renforcer la reddition de comptes et de mieux informer le public. Des initiatives concomitantes de recherche et dâĂ©valuation solides et intĂ©grĂ©es permettraient dâuniversaliser et dâĂ©tendre les approches les plus solides.
3. Soutenir lâadoption de processus et de technologies du 21esiĂšcle afin de rendre les soins primaires plus accessibles, pratiques et efficaces. DĂ©jĂ , de nombreuses personnes prĂ©fĂšrent les rendez-vous en ligne, souhaitent accĂ©der Ă leur dossier mĂ©dical Ă©lectronique et veulent naviguer sur des sites Web de haute qualitĂ©, alimentĂ©s des donnĂ©es probantes, qui soutiennent lâautogestion et les aident Ă prendre des dĂ©cisions.
ConsidĂ©rer les patients comme des partenaires pourrait devenir la nouvelle norme. Bien entendu, ces transformations comportent des incertitudes, des risques et des consĂ©quences imprĂ©vues auxquels les prestataires et le public devront sâadapter.
4. Le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral devrait montrer lâexemple en dĂ©veloppant les soins primaires les plus innovants.
La responsabilitĂ© du gouvernement en matiĂšre de services de santĂ© pour les Autochtones est lâoccasion idĂ©ale de maximiser son impact. Il existe un besoin particulier de soins dispensĂ©s par des Ă©quipes autochtones et dirigĂ©es par des Autochtones, qui intĂšgrent et reconnaissent les rĂŽles essentiels des anciens, des herboristes, des sage-femmes autochtones et dâautres personnes au sein dâĂ©quipes interdisciplinaires innovantes.
Les centres mĂ©dicaux, dentaires et de physiothĂ©rapie des Forces armĂ©es canadiennes au Canada et Ă lâĂ©tranger pourraient soutenir la diffusion des innovations en matiĂšre de services de soins primaires en adoptant et en prĂ©sentant des pratiques de pointe fondĂ©es sur le travail dâĂ©quipe.
Bien entendu, le fĂ©dĂ©ralisme fait en sorte quâOttawa ne peut pas dicter de solutions aux provinces et aux territoires ni imposer unilatĂ©ralement des conditions strictes Ă ses transferts de fonds. Ce systĂšme politique peut nĂ©anmoins soutenir le travail nĂ©cessaire pour amorcer un changement significatif.
Par rapport aux autres pays riches de lâOCDE, le Canada investit beaucoup trop peu dans les soins primaires.
Il est temps de voir plus grand que les fonds fĂ©dĂ©raux de transition pour les soins primaires dâil y a vingt ans. Ces fonds Ă©taient allouĂ©s Ă des microprojets qui nâĂ©taient pas assez importants pour ĂȘtre universalisĂ©s et adaptĂ©s, et qui nâĂ©taient dotĂ©s dâaucun ensemble cohĂ©rent de principes et de responsabilitĂ©s favorisant la transformation du systĂšme.
La population canadienne doit Ă©galement se mobiliser, hausser ses attentes et ses exigences et ĂȘtre ouverte Ă lâinnovation, en reconnaissant que les soins primaires ne se limitent pas Ă lâaccĂšs Ă un mĂ©decin de famille. Il ne faut pas lancer de fleurs aux gouvernements lorsquâils investissent des fonds qui ne contribuent quâĂ maintenir le statu quo.
Aucune patience ne doit ĂȘtre accordĂ©e aux gouvernements qui veulent simplement plus de fonds fĂ©dĂ©raux sans rendre compte des amĂ©liorations qui en dĂ©couleraient. AprĂšs tout, il sâagit de lâargent des contribuables et câest Ă eux que tous les niveaux de gouvernement doivent faire rapport.
Il faut exiger que les deux niveaux de gouvernement sâentendent, car la santĂ© et les soins de santĂ© sont lâaffaire de tous. La clĂ© de la mobilisation est de montrer que la transformation nâest pas une utopie, mais quâelle est Ă la fois nĂ©cessaire et rĂ©alisable grĂące Ă une stratĂ©gie solide, des investissements prudents et une conception efficace.
Il est temps de se mobiliser, dâamorcer des conversations difficiles, de prendre des risques innovants et de mettre en place le systĂšme que la population canadienne mĂ©rite.
The federal government recently introduced its long-promised Online Harms Act, Bill C-63.
Reaction so far has largely focused on the provisions to keep children safe online, on the extent to which the bill does or does not overreach in its definition of hate speech, as Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre thinks, and whether it encroaches on freedom of expression, as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association has warned.
These are worthwhile discussions as the bill moves through the Commons, but it is critical to focus public attention on a central aspect of this legislation â the proposed duty for digital platforms to keep and share data. Retaining this section is of paramount importance because it offers the greatest potential to reshape our digital public sphere for the better.
A key metric of the success of this bill will be how well it protects and enables research into online harms because this has the potential to empower both the public and the government to adapt and respond to rapidly changing digital technologies in a way that supports a resilient and strong democratic culture.
Disappointingly, this essential aspect of the bill is being overlooked in most media coverage and in public discussions.
This part of the bill is crucial because researchers have long been kneecapped in their efforts to analyze how social media platform policies affect the well-being of the public and the health of our democracy.
Platform owners collect an abundance of data that is readily shared with marketers and advertisers for profit, but they heavily restrict and curtail access to researchers who work in the public interest.
Recent restrictions in API (application programming interface) access on X (formerly Twitter), Reddit and TikTok have increased the challenge for researchers.
More than 100 studies about X Corp. have been cancelled, suspended or significantly altered since the new restrictions were implemented, a survey conducted by the Coalition for Independent Technology Research found.
The big online platforms are also increasingly taking legal action against small non-profit organizations that have compellingly demonstrated harm perpetuated by these companies.
X recently filed a lawsuit against the Center for Countering Digital Hate, a non-profit committed to stopping the spread of online hate and disinformation via research, education and advocacy.
It has also taken legal action against Media Matters, a non-profit research organization that published a report exposing how X places advertisements for major brands next to pro-Nazi content.
Yet litigation is just one part of an arsenal of concerning new tactics being used to restrict research and suppress efforts to hold Big Tech corporations such as X, Meta (which owns Facebook and Instagram), and Alphabet (Google) accountable when they amplify harmful content or distort our social norms.
Digital violence is becoming more pervasive around the world. Social media platforms facilitate the spread of abusive content that has offline consequences, including widespread polarization, alienation and physical violence.
Algorithms that recommend content to users on social media accelerate the distribution of this material, allowing it to reach new audiences and normalize harmful discourse.
There is evidence that under X Corp.âs new ownership, hateful content is not only being under-moderated but has increased, including targeted hate such as antisemitism, Islamophobia and anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric.
This is a Canadian problem as well as a global one. High levels of online abuse have been quantified in Canadian federal, Ontario and municipal elections through the Samara Centre for Democracyâs SAMbot project.
Pre-pandemic, more than 40 per cent of Canadians didnât feel safe sharing their political views online. Since then, online (and offline) hate has increased dramatically, according to the B.C. Office of the Human Rights Commissioner.
A 2021 Canadian Race Relations Foundation poll found that 93 per cent of Canadians believe online hate speech and racism are a problem. Seventy-nine per cent want online hate speech and racism treated by lawmakers with the same seriousness as in-person hate crimes.Â
Increasing transparency is one of the most recommended, evidence-based strategies to address digital violence, and there are encouraging efforts underway internationally to increase these requirements.
Under its Digital Services Act, the European Commission is drafting regulations that would require the large tech platforms to provide data access for research purposes in the EU.
In the U.S., the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, which would require platforms to make some data publicly available, among other research supports, has been reintroduced in the Senate.
With Bill C-63, Canada has the opportunity to position itself as a global leader in digital democracy research. The proposed bill creates a new Digital Safety Commission of Canada with the power to accredit certain people or groups and provide them access to relevant data from digital platforms if their work is intended for educational or advocacy purposes.
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We await clearer directives about how accessible this data will be, how inclusive the data access system will be for all types of researchers, how transparent this accreditation process will be and how much resistance researchers will face from federal organizations in accessing this data.
The full benefit of this crucial aspect of the bill will be realized only if research projects, large or small, led by civil society researchers, have equitable access to data.
If we can achieve broad and diverse research accreditation, Canada will have the opportunity to drive research that informs digital-policy legislation internationally â to transform our online spaces for the better, with democratic values in mind.
We see much of the content of this proposed legislation as a positive first step in effectively regulating digital platforms to act in the interests of democratic expression. But no single piece of legislation can address every social harm facilitated by digital spaces.
That is why ensuring Canadian researchers can quickly and equitably access comprehensive data from major digital platforms is so vital. Quality Canadian research should directly inform future legislative efforts.
Canadaâs digital-rights strategy needs to continue to progress regardless of the status of C-63.
We need empirical evidence on how digital technologies are affecting our social fabric so policymakers can draft effective digital policy. That all starts with requiring tech companies to be more transparent as well as permitting broad data access for civil-society researchers.
To begin fostering a healthier digital media landscape in Canada, our best defence is transparency, research and public accountability.
(English version available here)
La plupart des Canadiens nâinteragissent avec lâagriculture quâĂ lâĂ©picerie, oĂč ils sâinquiĂštent souvent de la hausse des prix des denrĂ©es. Compte tenu de leurs autres prĂ©occupations quotidiennes et de la distance qui sĂ©pare leur lieu de rĂ©sidence, leur milieu de travail et leur supermarchĂ© de la plupart des fermes, il nâest guĂšre Ă©tonnant que de nombreuses personnes ne soient pas conscientes de lâimportance du rĂŽle du secteur agricole.
Pourtant, lâagriculture est un actif stratĂ©gique de plus en plus important pour le Canada et le temps est venu de la placer au cĆur de ses projets futurs.
Le budget fĂ©dĂ©ral dâavril est lâoccasion dâadopter une vision plus stratĂ©gique et ambitieuse de lâagriculture et de lâalimentation, avec des investissements axĂ©s sur la croissance et la prospĂ©ritĂ© durable du secteur, en plus dâune sĂ©rie dâautres mesures.
Cependant, lâagriculture et lâalimentation ont une dynamique unique qui en fait un secteur plus riche en dĂ©fis que beaucoup dâautres. En fait, il est souvent inappropriĂ© de les considĂ©rer comme un «âsecteurâ». Il sâagit plutĂŽt dâun ensemble de chaĂźnes produisant des biens de consommation trĂšs diffĂ©rents, destinĂ©s Ă des marchĂ©s nationaux et internationaux trĂšs variĂ©s.
Par exemple, les vaches et les cochons reprĂ©sentent tous deux des sources de protĂ©ines animales, mais la production de bĆuf et de porc nĂ©cessite des approches trĂšs diffĂ©rentes. Ces produits se retrouvent Ă©galement sur des marchĂ©s diffĂ©rents. En 2022, 43 % de la viande bovine canadienne a Ă©tĂ© exportĂ©e, contre prĂšs de 70 % pour la viande de porc.
Aussi, un agriculteur de lâouest du pays peut cultiver du canola, du blĂ© et des lĂ©gumineuses en rotation, mais le canola peut finir comme carburant diesel renouvelable, le blĂ© moulu en farine au Canada et dans le monde entier, et les lĂ©gumineuses sont exportĂ©es vers lâInde, oĂč les cultures de la Saskatchewan sâinscrivent dans une relation gĂ©opolitique difficile.
Les secteurs soumis Ă la gestion de lâoffre se concentrent sur le marchĂ© intĂ©rieur, cherchant Ă tirer parti de la croissance rapide de la population canadienne. Il y a ensuite les diffĂ©rences avec les cultures plus petites, mais importantes, telles que les pommes de terre, les lĂ©gumes de serre, etc.
PlutĂŽt que dâĂȘtre dirigĂ©e par un petit groupe de grandes entreprises, comme câest le cas pour les industries automobile, miniĂšre et forestiĂšre, lâagriculture repose entre les mains de 200â000 agriculteurs canadiens tous diffĂ©rents les uns des autres.
Cette diversitĂ© au sein de lâindustrie agroalimentaire complique lâĂ©laboration de stratĂ©gies sectorielles, comme on en voit pour les minĂ©raux critiques, les vĂ©hicules Ă©lectriques et les Ă©nergies renouvelables.
La complexitĂ© de ce dĂ©fi ne signifie toutefois pas quâil ne faut pas s’y attaquer.
Le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral travaille sur une stratĂ©gie en matiĂšre dâagriculture durable. Toutefois, il peine Ă lier sa vision aux intĂ©rĂȘts Ă©conomiques, gĂ©opolitiques et stratĂ©giques plus larges du Canada.
Or, ce lien est pourtant au cĆur de la StratĂ©gie canadienne sur les minĂ©raux critiques, qui considĂšre ces derniers comme «âlâoccasion dâune gĂ©nĂ©rationâ» pour les travailleurs, lâĂ©conomie et lâavenir carboneutre du Canada.
Lâaugmentation de la demande mondiale, la crise alimentaire provoquĂ©e par «âles conflits, les chocs Ă©conomiques, les extrĂȘmes climatiques et la flambĂ©e des prix des engraisâ», de mĂȘme que la position du Canada en tant que fournisseur de cultures et de produits animaux Ă faible teneur en carbone ne sont que quelques-unes des raisons pour lesquelles lâagriculture et lâalimentation peuvent et doivent alimenter les opportunitĂ©s pour les gĂ©nĂ©rations futures au Canada.
Le budget fĂ©dĂ©ral de 2022 a consolidĂ© lâengagement du Canada Ă lâĂ©gard de lâexploitation, sur plusieurs gĂ©nĂ©rations, des minĂ©raux critiques avec un investissement de 3,8 milliards $ dans les infrastructures, la recherche et les donnĂ©es, ainsi quâun crĂ©dit dâimpĂŽt pour encourager lâexploration miniĂšre.
Le budget de mardi pourrait inclure des avancĂ©es similaires pour lâagroalimentaire.
Celles-ci pourraient sâappuyer sur des propositions telles que lâinitiative sur les chaĂźnes de valeur de lâagriculture durable, le dĂ©veloppement dâinnovations en matiĂšre dâagrotechnologie ou la poursuite de lâaugmentation des exportations agroalimentaires vers lâIndo-Pacifique.
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Ottawa a dĂ©jĂ fait quelques pas dans cette direction, mais continue de rater lâoccasion dâadopter une approche stratĂ©gique plus ambitieuse. Le budget de cette annĂ©e peut corriger cette situation en associant la durabilitĂ© Ă la croissance et Ă la prospĂ©ritĂ© tout en positionnant le secteur comme un atout gĂ©opolitique.
Le budget de cette annĂ©e pourrait garnir la boĂźte Ă outils politique de lâindustrie, comme celui de 2023 a adoptĂ© des crĂ©dits dâimpĂŽt pour stimuler la croissance de lâĂ©conomie propre. Le budget de cette annĂ©e pourrait faire de mĂȘme pour encourager les investissements dans lâagriculture et lâalimentation.
Le budget 2023 a prĂ©sentĂ© le plan du Canada pour une Ă©conomie propre sous la forme dâun triangle simple dont la base est la tarification de la pollution, progressant vers des programmes ciblĂ©s au sommet.
Une stratĂ©gie agricole dans le budget dâavril pourrait Ă©tablir des prioritĂ©s, notamment en matiĂšre de protĂ©ines animales et vĂ©gĂ©tales, de croissance durable, de productivitĂ©, de R&D, dâinfrastructures et de commerce.
PlutĂŽt quâune base de tarification de la pollution, le triangle pourrait se baser sur un meilleur accĂšs aux marchĂ©s nationaux et internationaux en mettant en Ćuvre un code de conduite pour les Ă©piciers et en investissant dans les infrastructuresâ; un cadre rĂ©glementaire qui favorise lâinnovation et la croissanceâ; des crĂ©dits dâimpĂŽt pour encourager lâinvestissement et la durabilitĂ©â; un financement stratĂ©gique pour combler le dĂ©ficit de capitauxâ; et une pointe au sommet de programmes ciblĂ©s pour stimuler la R&D et dĂ©velopper les chaĂźnes de valeur.
Lâun des plus grands avantages dâune stratĂ©gie axĂ©e sur lâagriculture et la croissance alimentaire est peut-ĂȘtre le moins tangible.
Le fossĂ© entre le Canada rural et le Canada urbain «âse creuseâ», Ă©crit lâauteur Donald Savoie dans le Globe and Mail.
De plus en plus de voix rĂ©clament une politique Ă©laborĂ©e avec une lunette rurale. La dĂ©cision dâexempter les combustibles de chauffage domestique de la taxe carbone est un exemple de «âla façon dont les petites communautĂ©s et leurs habitants sont souvent nĂ©gligĂ©s dans la conversation nationaleâ», selon Derek Nighbor, prĂ©sident et directeur gĂ©nĂ©ral de lâAssociation des produits forestiers du Canada.
La dĂ©cision dâexonĂ©rer de la taxe carbone lâhuile de chauffage dans le Canada atlantique, mais pas le propane et le gaz naturel utilisĂ©s pour le sĂ©chage des cĂ©rĂ©ales et le chauffage des granges, a perpĂ©tuĂ© la perception dâun fossĂ© entre les zones rurales et les zones urbaines.
Le budget fĂ©dĂ©ral de ce mois dâavril est lâoccasion de combler ce fossĂ© et de donner au Canada rural la place qui lui revient dans lâĂ©laboration de politiques nationales. Il sâagirait du mĂȘme coup dâun bienfait pour lâĂ©conomie, pour la durabilitĂ© et pour lâavenir du pays.
Low-income Canadians are struggling and urgently need more support.
This is not news. Provincial welfare benefits, which provide money to buy food and other necessities, have been below Canadaâs official poverty line since at least 2013. But the situation has become considerably worse because of the post-pandemic surge in inflation.
In Ontario, where the official poverty line was $27,631 in 2022, a single working-age adult received $10,253 in welfare income. Welfare incomes were the lowest in Alberta, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
Research shows that targeted cash transfers can reduce poverty rates and food insecurity as well as improve access to basic needs. Governments have made considerable headway in bringing down poverty rates among seniors and children because of programs such as old age security, the guaranteed income supplement and the Canada child benefit.
But some groups are slipping through the cracks. Low-income rates remain high among single parents and single working-age adults without children.
My research indicates the fastest and most efficient way of making a meaningful dent in low-income rates is increasing the GST/HST credit for working-age adults and their children.
That would also help with growing food insecurity. In 2022, 18 per cent of Canadians lacked stable access to sufficient food, up from 16 per cent in 2021 and 17 per cent in 2019. More than 40 per cent of these families were led by single mothers while more than one-third of Black and Indigenous families were food-insecure.
Visits to food banks have also been on the rise. Food Banks Canada recorded almost two million visits across the country in March 2023, the latest month for which data is available. Thatâs up 32 per cent from the same time in 2022 and more than 78 per cent from 2019. Single working-age adults accounted for 44 per cent of users, one of the largest subsets of visitors.
These are troubling trends. To bring down grocery prices, the federal government has announced measures to spur competition among Canadaâs major grocery retailers, but these efforts on their own are unlikely to have a substantial impact.
Whatâs more, the causes of food insecurity extend beyond grocery prices. The steep rise in housing costs, interest rates, gas and transportation are also squeezing family budgets. Many households are forced to choose between putting food on the table and paying the rent. Food is often what gets cut.
Research shows that income support is the best way to reduce food insecurity. The Affordability Action Council, a non-partisan group of policy experts and community leaders, asked me to research and assess the most effective and cost-efficient way to increase federal income support for low-income households.
I examined possible reforms to existing cash-transfer programs including the goods and services tax/harmonized sales tax credit, the Canada child benefit and the Canada workers benefit because these reforms can be implemented faster than designing a new benefit.
I concluded that the federal government should expand the existing GST/HST credit for working-age adults and their children.
The GST/HST credit is a broadly based benefit that reaches all family types, including working-age single adults and single-parent families, and is well-targeted to low-income households. The Canada child benefit goes only to families with children and the Canada workers benefit goes only to those with low levels of employment income.
However, the existing GST/HST credit is modest. It provides a base benefit of $325 a year per adult and $171 a year per child. Single adults receive an additional $171 a year phased-in for income over $10,544.
Overall, single adults receive a maximum of $496 a year and couples with no children receive a maximum of $650 a year. Single parents with one child, whose benefit is calculated as if they are a couple with one child, and couples with one child both receive a maximum of $821 a year.
I recommend that the federal government adopt one of two options: provide a credit of either $100 a month per working-age adult, spread evenly over low- and middle-income households, or $150 a month to those in deep poverty. Both options would reach about 10 million households and add between $10 billion and $11 billion to what the government spends on the benefit.
I donât recommend extending the top-up to people who are 65 years old and older because they are less likely to be low-income or to experience food insecurity. However, they would continue to receive the same amount as now.
I also recommend that the expanded credit be distributed monthly rather than quarterly as now. That would spread the payments evenly throughout the year and give recipients more stability to cover day-to-day expenses.
Regardless of the cash-transfer method chosen, some people who would be eligible to receive the proposed benefit wouldnât get it. This is because income supports are delivered by the Canada Revenue Agency and therefore go only to people who file tax returns. Up to 12 per cent of Canadians donât file a return.
Non-filers are more likely to be people living in poverty, Indigenous Peoples (especially mothers), people experiencing homelessness and social assistance recipients â the very people who require the most support.
In the 2023 budget, the federal government announced that it would pilot an automatic tax-filing service for low-income and fixed-income Canadians who donât file a return. The government has since expanded a more modest phone tax-filing system but has not implemented the automatic service. It should move ahead with the promised reform as soon as possible.
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Based on my analysis, the Affordability Action Council recommended in a report released in December 2023 that the federal government restructure and expand the GST/HST credit and rename it the grocery and essentials benefit.
The proposed benefit would build on the federal governmentâs one-time grocery rebate implemented in 2023. The option selected by the council would give $150 a month per adult ($1,800 a year) and $50 per child ($600 a year) to the lowest-income households.
The top-up is unlikely to contribute to inflation because any additional income support that low-income families receive is likely to go to purchasing food and other necessities rather than luxury items.
Even so, the lowest-income households shouldnât be expected to bear the burden of fighting inflation. Everyone deserves to have the means to put food on the table and to pay the rent.
The federal government recently announced that it will spend $1 billion over five years to launch a national school food program, which is expected to deliver meals to an additional 400,000 children a year starting in 2024-25. The program is a step in the right direction, but more action is needed.
To make a meaningful dent in low-income rates and rising rates of food insecurity, Canada needs a more generous targeted cash-transfer program. Expanding the GST/HST credit is the fastest and most efficient way of doing that.