{"id":293598,"date":"2016-04-20T19:58:28","date_gmt":"2016-04-20T23:58:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/"},"modified":"2025-08-28T15:27:10","modified_gmt":"2025-08-28T19:27:10","slug":"legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/","title":{"rendered":"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth"},"content":{"rendered":"

Michael Plaxton has\u00a0written an\u00a0insightful, informative piece<\/a>\u00a0on the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in\u00a0R. v. Safarzadeh\u2011Markhali<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0I have decided to write a crabby,\u00a0unfocused one, in the spirit of an old codger shouting at squirrels from his porch.\u00a0 I recommend Plaxton’s\u00a0post for its thoughtful commentary on the possible salutary effects of the Court’s recent\u00a0judgment.<\/p>\n

For my purpose here, I borrow from his description of the holding and logic:<\/p>\n

On April 15, the Supreme Court of Canada\u00a0struck down<\/a>\u00a0provisions of the\u00a0Truth in Sentencing Act<\/em>\u00a0that limited the ability of sentencing judges to award \u201cenhanced credit\u201d for pretrial time spent in jail. It did not do so on the basis that the provisions would lead to sentences that amount to cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter. Rather, the Court struck them down because they were \u201coverbroad.\u201d In light of the professed objectives that Parliament was pursuing when it enacted the legislation, it\u00a0needlessly<\/em>\u00a0restricted the liberty of some offenders.<\/p>\n

According to the reasoning used in the Court\u2019s judgment, then, Parliament remains free to bar sentencing judges from awarding enhanced credit. But it can only do so for the \u201cright\u201d reasons.<\/p>\n

Reasons matter. The idea that legislation can be unconstitutionally overbroad hangs on the premise that, if Parliament crafts a measure that puts the \u201clife, liberty, or security of the person\u201d at risk, it must do so for reasons that can be\u00a0logically<\/em>\u00a0justified. The fact that it would be theoretically possible for\u00a0someone<\/em>\u00a0to dream up a defensible rationale for the measure is not good enough; if\u00a0Parliament\u2019s\u00a0<\/em>rationale was inadequate, then the challenged provision will fall.<\/p>\n

The Court’s definition of the purpose\u00a0underlying the provision at issue in\u00a0Safarzadeh-Markhali<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>came almost entirely from the statements of a single \u2014 albeit relatively important \u2014 member of Parliament, the then minister of justice. As Plaxton points out, this analysis was largely dispositive of the case,\u00a0as the\u00a0Court found the law unconstitutional on the basis that it would capture more individuals than that (narrowly defined) purpose would suggest. (Notably, the minister did<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>in fact\u00a0 articulate broader purposes that would have made the Court’s holding more difficult to maintain, however the Court did not find these purposes to be the\u00a0real<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>purposes (see paras 37-41)).<\/p>\n

By proceeding in this manner, the Court was ostensibly not rejecting Parliament’s objectives as\u00a0unconstitutional in and of themselves,\u00a0 but\u00a0merely identifying a\u00a0flaw in the implementation of Parliament’s\u00a0own<\/em>\u00a0objectives, sort of like when my tech-support\u00a0guy informs me that smashing my head on the keyboard will not actually fix my computer.<\/p>\n

Judicial hostility to the use of legislative statements in the context of interpreting statutes\u00a0has long standing in our common law tradition.\u00a0To some extent, it stems from the fundamental\u00a0notion that\u00a0legislators do not bind us by their motivations, objectives or intentions, as such; they\u00a0bind us by\u00a0laws, which must be ascertainable to all, including those of us\u00a0not privy to the inner thought process of legislators.\u00a0Justice Antonin Scalia once put the point starkly (did he ever put a point otherwise?), arguing that\u00a0a “legal system that determines the meaning of laws on the basis of what was meant rather than what was said” would be “tyrannical”; legislators “may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact that bind us.” On the other hand, courts will, and always have,\u00a0purported to rely on the legislature’s purposes or intentions.\u00a0 For instance, the \u201cmodern principle\u201d of statutory interpretation describes the task this way:\u00a0\u201cthe words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament\u201d (see, e.g.,\u00a0Rizzo & Rizzo’s Shoes<\/em><\/a>\u00a0<\/em>at para 21, and every case since).\u00a0 However, this tends to be a sort of\u00a0fictional or constructed legislative\u00a0intention, rather than\u00a0any actual objectives of legislators (or a critical mass thereof), as Lord Reid\u00a0once explained:<\/p>\n

We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but\u00a0that is not quite accurate. We are seeking the meaning of the words which Parliament used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said.<\/p>\n

Historically, legislative statements have been considered a particularly unreliable basis for\u00a0identifying legislative purposes or intentions of this sort.\u00a0 Even leaving aside\u00a0any natural\u00a0propensity for politicians to\u00a0indulge in \u201cbulls**t,\u201d to use Plaxton’s technical terminology, there are many reasons to be skeptical of the use of legislative statements as indicative of a legislative intention.<\/p>\n

For instance, legislators may agree on a law, while having fundamentally different objectives or beliefs as to what the law will or should\u00a0achieve.\u00a0 Or they may say they are trying to achieve one purpose, when actually they are seeking to achieve another. Some legislators may have nothing at all in their head at all other than\u00a0\u201cI would like to be in cabinet some day, and therefore, yea.\u201d\u00a0 Their votes count all the same.<\/p>\n

The use of legislative history\u00a0can be\u00a0all the more\u00a0tenuous (or tendentious)\u00a0when\u00a0reliance is placed upon\u00a0statements of a single or small number of\u00a0parliamentarians. One can typically find support for most any legislative purpose or intention\u00a0by trawling the legislative record, which has led some to describe the use of such materials as \u201cthe equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends.\u201d (I should note in passing\u00a0that it is hard to accuse the Court\u00a0of this kind of \u201ccherry-picking\u201d in\u00a0Safarzadeh-Markhali<\/em>, or at least not in the most objectionable sense \u2014 they did not cite\u00a0just any<\/em>\u00a0parliamentarian, but\u00a0the statements of the\u00a0minister responsible for the legislation in question, and\u00a0to their credit, included statements that\u00a0tended to contradict the purpose at which they eventually arrived.)<\/p>\n

Indeed, so\u00a0hostile have common law\u00a0courts been to the potentially distracting and unavailing nature of legislative statements that, for a long time,\u00a0they were deemed inadmissible for the purposes of interpretation. These concerns are helpfully explained in a case called\u00a0BC Motor Vehicle Reference<\/em><\/a>:<\/p>\n

48. InReference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act<\/em>,\u00a0supra<\/em>, McIntyre J. wrote at p. 319;<\/p>\n

… I would say that the speeches and public declarations by prominent figures in the public and political life of Newfoundland on this question should not be received as evidence. They represent, no doubt, the considered views of the speakers at the time they were made, but cannot be said to be expressions of the intent of the Legislative Assembly.<\/p>\n

49. Professor J. E. Magnet has written in “The Presumption of Constitutionality” (1980), 18Osgoode Hall L.J.<\/em>\u00a087, at pp. 99\u2011100:<\/p>\n

In the administrative law cases, the issue of intent concerns the intent of a specific person. In the constitutional cases, the issue of intent concerns the legislature, an incorporeal body made up of hundreds of persons. It may be said that such a body, like a corporation, is a legal fiction and has no intention in the relevant sense. It would follow that legislative intent, in the constitutional setting, is a hollow concept.<\/p>\n

Largely in consideration of this argument, Canadian courts have developed the rule that, in scrutinizing legislative intent for the purpose of determining constitutional validity, statements by members of the legislature during passage of the challenged Act are irrelevant and inadmissible. Several explanations of the rule have been put forward. Strayer has argued that the rule is sound because legislative motive is irrelevant to constitutional validity: “The essential factual issue here is that of effect….” More convincingly, it has been argued that, considering the way in which the Canadian process of enactment differs from that of the United States, “Hansard gives no convincing proof of what the government intended….” Moreover, by allowing ambiguities in the statute to be resolved by statements in the legislature, ministers would be given power in effect to legislate indirectly by making such statements. “Cabinets already have powers enough without having this added unto them.<\/p>\n

50. If speeches and declarations by prominent figures are inherently unreliable\u00a0… and “speeches made in the legislature at the time of enactment of the measure are inadmissible as having little evidential weight” …, the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee, though admissible, and granted somewhat more weight than speeches should not be given too much weight. The inherent unreliability of such statements and speeches is not altered by the mere fact that they pertain to the\u00a0Charter<\/a>\u00a0rather than a statute.<\/p>\n

In that case, the Court found that it should not give much weight at all to the legislative statements of certain senior civil servants, \u201chowever distinguished,\u201d in the course of determining\u00a0the meaning of the disputed term.\u00a0 Doing so would \u201cbe assuming a fact which is nearly impossible of proof,\u00a0i.e.<\/em>, the intention of the legislative bodies which adopted the\u00a0Charter<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n

One could cite countless cases for similar statements, but I have of course\u00a0chosen\u00a0BC Motor Vehicles Reference<\/em>\u00a0advisedly. The \u201cdisputed term\u201d in that case was \u201cprinciples of fundamental justice,\u201d and the\u00a0Court found that these principles\u00a0go beyond\u00a0familiar natural justice concerns (i.e.,\u00a0procedural guarantees to a fair hearing, an impartial arbiter, and the like), to include\u00a0substantive<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>principles, for instance,\u00a0\u201coverbreadth,\u201d upon which the Court hung its hat in\u00a0Safarzadeh-Markhali<\/em>.<\/p>\n

As Peter Hogg has explained, the\u00a0very\u00a0question as to whether section 7 included substantive principles\u00a0had been the subject of considerable testimony leading up to the enactment of the\u00a0Charter<\/em>, and \u201cthe witnesses, who included those responsible for drafting s. 7, all agreed that fundamental justice was procedural only.\u201d\u00a0 As has been often narrated, the holding in\u00a0BC Motor Vehicle Reference<\/em>\u00a0is therefore directly contrary to all available evidence as to the purposes or intentions of the lawmakers, at least as revealed in legislative statements of the drafters.\u00a0 Indeed, these statements reveal that the phrase \u201cprinciples of fundamental justice\u201d was deliberately chosen\u00a0to avoid exactly that result<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>(see, e.g.,\u00a0this piece<\/a>\u00a0by Grant Huscroft, at pp. 15-16).<\/p>\n

So, if my math is right, the Court in\u00a0BC Motor Vehicle Reference<\/em> interpreted section 7 to contain what has turned out to be an enormously powerful substantive guarantee, contrary to the apparent intentions and purpose of the statements of its drafters,\u00a0which it\u00a0has most recently\u00a0found to have been violated on the basis of a legislative purpose as\u00a0evidenced primarily by\u00a0some of the words spoken by a single parliamentarian.<\/p>\n

I do not meant to make too much out of this seeming inconsistency, which may be more apparent than real.\u00a0\u00a0As\u00a0L\u00e9onid Sirota<\/a>\u00a0and I have recently explained in\u00a0the context of\u00a0discussing \u201coriginalist\u201d constitutional reasoning in Canada\u00a0(see\u00a0here<\/a>\u00a0at\u00a0pp. 35-39), legislative\u00a0purposes or intentions\u00a0can be based on a range of different sources, and it is not easy to draw any hard and fast rules, even within a specific context.\u00a0 Even if we could agree upon what those purposes or intentions are in any given case, we might disagree on how they should be used;\u00a0purposes or intentions can be\u00a0helpful in some\u00a0contexts and\u00a0rather unhelpful in others, and there is no consensus on which uses fall into which category.\u00a0 I have written about one dimension of this issue\u00a0here<\/a>, while Plaxton and Mathen\u00a0have looked at another in\u00a0this piece\u00a0<\/a>(which was cited by the Supreme Court\u00a0another recent and controversial decision, the\u00a0Supreme Court Act\u00a0Reference<\/em><\/a>.) Suffice to say that the use of legislative \u201cpurposes\u201d or \u201cintentions\u201d\u00a0in the course of an interpretive analysis is\u00a0not exactly\u00a0a science; it\u2019s\u00a0barely even an art.<\/p>\n

But\u00a0Safarzadeh-Markhali<\/em>\u00a0helpfully highlights a fact that has been forever\u00a0clear:\u00a0the way the Court ascertains legislative intentions or purposes\u00a0is of critical importance.\u00a0\u00a0Even if we limit ourselves to the interpretation of normal statutes, notions of legislative\u00a0purpose or intention\u00a0can be decisive in any range of cases, from ho-hum statutory interpretation cases, to administrative law decisions, to federalism cases (see especially the interesting discussion in cases like\u00a0Morgentaler (1993)<\/em><\/a>), to cases involving section 7, to the analysis under section 1,\u00a0where the Court seeks to determine whether a\u00a0Charter<\/em>\u00a0<\/em>violation is nevertheless demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.\u00a0 So it matters considerably how the Court goes about that task.<\/p>\n

The more the Court seeks to rely on the statements of certain legislators, and indeed, only certain statements of those certain legislators,\u00a0for these and other purposes, the more it will have to carefully grapple with the concerns it raised in the\u00a0BC Motor Vehicle Reference<\/em>.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

Do you have something to say about the article you just read? Be part of the <\/em>Policy Options discussion, and send in your own submission. Here is a link<\/a> on how to do it. |\u00a0<\/em>Souhaitez-vous r\u00e9agir \u00e0 cet article ? Joignez-vous aux d\u00e9bats d\u2019<\/em>Options politiques et soumettez-nous votre texte en suivant ces directives<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Michael Plaxton has\u00a0written an\u00a0insightful, informative piece\u00a0on the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in\u00a0R. v. Safarzadeh\u2011Markhali.\u00a0\u00a0I have decided to write a crabby,\u00a0unfocused one, in the spirit of an old codger shouting at squirrels from his porch.\u00a0 I recommend Plaxton’s\u00a0post for its thoughtful commentary on the possible salutary effects of the Court’s recent\u00a0judgment. For my purpose […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":913,"featured_media":293596,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"content-type":"","ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"article-status":[],"irpp-category":[],"section":[],"irpp-tag":[],"class_list":["post-293598","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nLegislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Michael Plaxton has\u00a0written an\u00a0insightful, informative piece\u00a0on the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in\u00a0R. v. Safarzadeh\u2011Markhali.\u00a0\u00a0I have decided to write a crabby,\u00a0unfocused one, in the spirit of an old codger shouting at squirrels from his porch.\u00a0 I recommend Plaxton’s\u00a0post for its thoughtful commentary on the possible salutary effects of the Court’s recent\u00a0judgment. For my purpose […]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Policy Options\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/IRPP.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2016-04-20T23:58:28+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-08-28T19:27:10+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional-1920x672.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1920\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"672\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"vkurzawa\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@irpp\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@irpp\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"vkurzawa\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"11 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/\",\"name\":\"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional.png\",\"datePublished\":\"2016-04-20T23:58:28+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-08-28T19:27:10+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/caa28d6bbc41d147877478e79aa84e6e\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional.png\",\"width\":2000,\"height\":700},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/\",\"name\":\"Policy Options\",\"description\":\"Institute for Research on Public Policy\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/caa28d6bbc41d147877478e79aa84e6e\",\"name\":\"vkurzawa\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/000fc191cb4be23411c2528f5429f16b0d72633aac55540779eff4743edb6867?s=96&d=https%3A%2F%2Fpolicyoptions.irpp.org%2Fwp-content%2Fthemes%2Fsimone-blog%2Fimages%2Fmysteryman.png&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/000fc191cb4be23411c2528f5429f16b0d72633aac55540779eff4743edb6867?s=96&d=https%3A%2F%2Fpolicyoptions.irpp.org%2Fwp-content%2Fthemes%2Fsimone-blog%2Fimages%2Fmysteryman.png&r=g\",\"caption\":\"vkurzawa\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/author\/vkurzawa\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/","og_locale":"fr_FR","og_type":"article","og_title":"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth","og_description":"Michael Plaxton has\u00a0written an\u00a0insightful, informative piece\u00a0on the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in\u00a0R. v. Safarzadeh\u2011Markhali.\u00a0\u00a0I have decided to write a crabby,\u00a0unfocused one, in the spirit of an old codger shouting at squirrels from his porch.\u00a0 I recommend Plaxton’s\u00a0post for its thoughtful commentary on the possible salutary effects of the Court’s recent\u00a0judgment. For my purpose […]","og_url":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/","og_site_name":"Policy Options","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/IRPP.org","article_published_time":"2016-04-20T23:58:28+00:00","article_modified_time":"2025-08-28T19:27:10+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1920,"height":672,"url":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional-1920x672.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"vkurzawa","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@irpp","twitter_site":"@irpp","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"vkurzawa","Est. reading time":"11 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/","url":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/","name":"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional.png","datePublished":"2016-04-20T23:58:28+00:00","dateModified":"2025-08-28T19:27:10+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/caa28d6bbc41d147877478e79aa84e6e"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"fr-FR","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/WordPress-Image-jail-cell-constitutional.png","width":2000,"height":700},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2016\/04\/legislative-history-statutory-purposes-constitutional-overbreadth\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Legislative history, statutory purposes, and constitutional overbreadth"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#website","url":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/","name":"Policy Options","description":"Institute for Research on Public Policy","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"fr-FR"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/caa28d6bbc41d147877478e79aa84e6e","name":"vkurzawa","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/000fc191cb4be23411c2528f5429f16b0d72633aac55540779eff4743edb6867?s=96&d=https%3A%2F%2Fpolicyoptions.irpp.org%2Fwp-content%2Fthemes%2Fsimone-blog%2Fimages%2Fmysteryman.png&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/000fc191cb4be23411c2528f5429f16b0d72633aac55540779eff4743edb6867?s=96&d=https%3A%2F%2Fpolicyoptions.irpp.org%2Fwp-content%2Fthemes%2Fsimone-blog%2Fimages%2Fmysteryman.png&r=g","caption":"vkurzawa"},"url":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/author\/vkurzawa\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/293598","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/913"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=293598"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/293598\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":295169,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/293598\/revisions\/295169"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/293596"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=293598"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=293598"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=293598"},{"taxonomy":"article-status","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/article-status?post=293598"},{"taxonomy":"irpp-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/irpp-category?post=293598"},{"taxonomy":"section","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/section?post=293598"},{"taxonomy":"irpp-tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/irpp-tag?post=293598"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}