{"id":268988,"date":"2020-12-08T16:55:19","date_gmt":"2020-12-08T21:55:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/issues\/are-fiscal-stabilization-reforms-a-slap-in-the-face-or-a-modernization\/"},"modified":"2025-10-07T23:19:42","modified_gmt":"2025-10-08T03:19:42","slug":"are-fiscal-stabilization-reforms-a-slap-in-the-face-or-a-modernization","status":"publish","type":"issues","link":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2020\/12\/are-fiscal-stabilization-reforms-a-slap-in-the-face-or-a-modernization\/","title":{"rendered":"Are fiscal stabilization reforms a slap in the face or a modernization?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"dropcap-big\">With all the attention paid to rising COVID-19 cases, expansions to various federal emergency support programs, ongoing political machinations south of the border, and Canada\u2019s $382-billion projected deficit, you\u2019d be forgiven for missing changes to Canada\u2019s fiscal stabilization program announced in the recent <a href=\"https:\/\/www.budget.gc.ca\/fes-eea\/2020\/home-accueil-en.html\">federal fiscal update<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>But Alberta\u2019s premier, Jason Kenney, sure noticed. It\u2019s a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/nationalpost.com\/news\/politics\/kenney-calls-fiscal-stabilization-changes-a-slap-in-the-face-amid-anxiety-confusion-over-transfer-program\">slap in the face<\/a><u>,<\/u>\u201d he said in response to the announced changes.<\/p>\n<p>Alberta Finance Minister Travis Toews was less overdramatic but agreed the reforms \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/edmontonjournal.com\/news\/politics\/fiscal-stabilization-changes-mean-more-money-for-alberta-but-not-nearly-as-much-as-it-asked-for\">fall well short<\/a> of the proposal <a href=\"https:\/\/www.canadaspremiers.ca\/canadas-premiers-reiterate-priorities\/\">endorsed by premiers<\/a> from every province and territory at (the) Council of the Federation.\u201d Even former Alberta premier and current opposition leader Rachel Notley <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbc.ca\/news\/canada\/edmonton\/alberta-politicians-unhappy-with-changes-to-federal-fiscal-stabilization-program-1.5824498\">was unimpressed<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The federal government, meanwhile, calls its reforms \u201cmodernizing\u201d and says they \u201cprovide a more effective backstop to provinces that face an extraordinary drop in revenues.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>At a time when provinces across the country are under intense fiscal strain and looking for as much support as they can get, it\u2019s worth cutting through the political spin to unpack what was announced and what the reforms to fiscal stabilization might mean. In my view, they are a modest but meaningful change to an increasingly important transfer program.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What Is fiscal stabilization and how was it changed?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Federal support for provincial finances is nothing new. It\u2019s at the core of Canadian federalism. And since the original terms of Confederation, federal transfers have provided \u201cfloors\u201d of some form or another for provincial revenues.<\/p>\n<p>But since 1967, a broad form of provincial revenue insurance has existed in what\u2019s called the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.canlii.org\/en\/ca\/laws\/stat\/rsc-1985-c-f-8\/latest\/rsc-1985-c-f-8.html#PART_II_Fiscal_Stabilization_Payments_to_Provinces_120881\">Fiscal Stabilization Program<\/a>. I won\u2019t go into full details, but interested readers can explore the full history, functioning, and reform options for the program in <a href=\"https:\/\/irpp.org\/research-studies\/an-overdue-review-of-canadas-fiscal-stabilization-program\/\">this recent IRPP paper<\/a>. I\u2019ll only briefly summarize the program here.<\/p>\n<p>Originally, it provided payments to any province whose revenues declined by more than five per cent from one year to the next \u2014 for reasons other than provincial tax changes, of course. It was meant to help cushion the blow to provinces experiencing a large economic shock, such as a severe recession. Essentially, the federal government would absorb the full cost of the shock beyond the first five per cent drop, which would be borne by the province.<\/p>\n<p>Today, it functions a little differently but its core components are straightforward. A province receives a payment if:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Total revenues decline by more than five per cent <em><u>and<\/u><\/em> if either:\n<ol>\n<li>Non-resource revenues decline by more than five per cent or<\/li>\n<li>Resource revenues decline by more than 50 per cent.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>(Technically, this way of describing the program only works <em>after <\/em>certain minor reforms announced in the fiscal update. But even the previous program worked <em>almost<\/em> like this. If you\u2019re brave, you can visually compare the old and the new formula <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/trevortombe\/status\/1335388133324558336?s=20\">here<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/trevortombe\/status\/1335658470834491392\">here<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<p>But, importantly, regardless of how much provincial revenues decline, stabilization payments are capped by a ceiling. And the most important reform to the program announced in the fiscal update was to ease this cap.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Easing the cap on stabilization payments<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Since 1987, stabilization payments have been constrained by a $60-per-person limit. Alberta, for example, has roughly 4.3 million people, so any stabilization payments it receives could not exceed roughly $250 million.<\/p>\n<p>This is very limiting. So the government opted for a simple change: index the cap to Canada\u2019s rate of nominal GDP growth per person. The immediate effect is to nearly triple the cap to $170 per person today, which will also gradually rise over time.<\/p>\n<p>This matters. Since provincial own-source revenues have been (somewhat) stable as a share of overall economic activity over time, indexing the cap to GDP makes sense. And it fully reverses the severe deterioration in the real value of the stabilization program, as I illustrate here (figure 1).<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s the first meaningful change to the program since 1995, and the first meaningful expansion in nearly a half century. And it will benefit many provinces almost immediately.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Stabilization payments to Canada\u2019s provinces due to COVID-19<\/strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/cwf.ca\/research\/publications\/what-now-the-need-to-review-canadas-fiscal-stabilization-program-for-provinces-after-covid-19\/\">My estimates<\/a> as well as some <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotiabank.com\/ca\/en\/about\/economics\/economics-publications\/post.other-publications.fiscal-policy.fiscal-pulse.provincial-budget-analyses-and-updates.provincial.provincial-fiscal-deficit-roundup--thrown-off-balance--october-8--2020-.html\">private-sector forecasts<\/a> suggest that five or six provinces may qualify for stabilization payments in 2020. And if each hits the cap (which is not an unlikely scenario) then Ottawa is on track to pay out roughly $6 billion total to the governments of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Quebec, and Newfoundland and Labrador. This is more than double all previous payments to all provinces under the program throughout its entire history and more than $4 billion above what an unreformed program would have paid.<\/p>\n<p>It is therefore a meaningful reform.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, other than the $20-billion <a href=\"https:\/\/www.canada.ca\/en\/intergovernmental-affairs\/services\/safe-restart-agreement.html\">Safe Restart Agreement<\/a>, it\u2019s the largest single increase in federal transfers to provincial governments this year.<\/p>\n<p>If my estimates are anywhere close to reasonable, the new cap will also buffer a large share of the overall revenue decline experienced by most of these provinces.<\/p>\n<p>Alberta is a notable exception.<\/p>\n<p>That province\u2019s tax, liquor, and gaming revenues <a href=\"https:\/\/www.alberta.ca\/budget-documents.aspx\">may fall<\/a> by $3.2 billion this year (though some of this is due to corporate tax cuts, which wouldn\u2019t count) and resource revenues may fall by $4.3 billion. Under the reformed stabilization program, it\u2019s set to receive $750 million to help offset these losses. This is far less than the roughly $3 billion that Alberta would like to see under an uncapped program \u2014 and explains why the premier isn\u2019t happy. Alberta was also hoping for <em>retroactive<\/em> changes to the program to boost its prior payments in 2015\/16 and 2016\/17. That won\u2019t happen.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, the federal government has supported and will likely continue to support provinces through ad-hoc transfers this year and next. The unique nature and scale of COVID-19 shouldn\u2019t necessarily be used to critique the reforms to stabilization. Instead, let\u2019s consider what \u201cnormal\u201d shocks are for provinces and whether the increased cap is meaningful.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Is the new cap too small, too large or just right?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>If historical experience is any guide, a limit of $170 per capita in payments will matter only rarely. It represents approximately 2.5 per cent of provincial revenues covered by the stabilization program, so for non-resource revenues it matters only if annual declines exceed 7.5 per cent. This is a large decline.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s tough to estimate precisely, since the relevant data for stabilization payments is calculated only if a province makes an application. But I attempt to approximate relevant changes in provincial tax bases using historical equalization data. Since 1981, I find a greater than 7.5-per-cent decline in adjusted non-resource revenues has only occurred three times: Alberta after the 1986 oil price crash, Alberta during the financial crisis, and Alberta after the 2015\/16 oil price crash. I illustrate this here (figure 2).<\/p>\n<p>Of course, the program remains of only limited support to provinces overall \u2014 since a drop of more than five per cent in non-resource revenues is a rare event, so provinces understandably want a lower threshold.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Should other reforms be explored? <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>At their September 2020 meeting, Canada\u2019s premiers and territorial leaders <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newswire.ca\/news-releases\/canada-s-premiers-outline-priorities-896570169.html\">called for<\/a> the five-per-cent threshold to be lowered to three per cent and for the 50-per-cent threshold for resource revenues to be lowered to 40 per cent. They also want the cap eliminated completely, not merely eased. This would increase the scale of the program significantly, with both more frequent and larger payments.<\/p>\n<p>The challenge for the federal government is to provide support to provinces without encouraging risky behaviour. Alberta is a great example of this. Its revenue is volatile largely by choice \u2014 the province opts to rely on risky resource revenues and steadfastly refuses to consider more stable sources of revenue, such as broad-based consumption taxes. To have the consequences of this decision shifted to Canadians elsewhere dampens the province\u2019s incentive to adopt fiscal reforms to improve its own budget.<\/p>\n<p>There are ways around this concern, as I explore in detail <a href=\"https:\/\/irpp.org\/research-studies\/an-overdue-review-of-canadas-fiscal-stabilization-program\/\">in the IRPP report<\/a>. But any additional expansion to the federal stabilization program should be done only with a deeper rethink of its overall structure.<\/p>\n<p>So rather than being a slap in Alberta\u2019s face, the changes to stabilization \u2014 however modest \u2014 are a meaningful reform to an important program.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"image-caption\">Photo: Shutterstock.com, by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.shutterstock.com\/g\/Gajus\">Gajus<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>With all the attention paid to rising COVID-19 cases, expansions to various federal emergency support programs, ongoing political machinations south of the border, and Canada\u2019s $382-billion projected deficit, you\u2019d be forgiven for missing changes to Canada\u2019s fiscal stabilization program announced in the recent federal fiscal update. But Alberta\u2019s premier, Jason Kenney, sure noticed. It\u2019s a [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":278582,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"content-type":"","ep_exclude_from_search":false,"apple_news_api_created_at":"2025-10-08T03:19:45Z","apple_news_api_id":"82f16e0a-de22-4fad-9cf6-737eaa93930e","apple_news_api_modified_at":"2025-10-08T03:19:45Z","apple_news_api_revision":"AAAAAAAAAAD\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/w==","apple_news_api_share_url":"https:\/\/apple.news\/AgvFuCt4iT62c9nN-qpOTDg","apple_news_cover_media_provider":"image","apple_news_coverimage":0,"apple_news_coverimage_caption":"","apple_news_cover_video_id":0,"apple_news_cover_video_url":"","apple_news_cover_embedwebvideo_url":"","apple_news_is_hidden":"","apple_news_is_paid":"","apple_news_is_preview":"","apple_news_is_sponsored":"","apple_news_maturity_rating":"","apple_news_metadata":"\"\"","apple_news_pullquote":"","apple_news_pullquote_position":"","apple_news_slug":"","apple_news_sections":[],"apple_news_suppress_video_url":false,"apple_news_use_image_component":false},"categories":[9362,9358,9372],"tags":[8470],"article-status":[],"irpp-category":[4247,4245,4295],"section":[],"irpp-tag":[],"class_list":["post-268988","issues","type-issues","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economie","category-politique","category-recent-stories-fr","tag-covid-19","irpp-category-covid","irpp-category-economie","irpp-category-politique"],"acf":[],"apple_news_notices":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v25.8 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Are fiscal stabilization reforms a slap in the face or a modernization?<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2020\/12\/are-fiscal-stabilization-reforms-a-slap-in-the-face-or-a-modernization\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Are fiscal stabilization reforms a slap in the face or a modernization?\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"With all the attention paid to rising COVID-19 cases, expansions to various federal emergency support programs, ongoing political machinations south of the border, and Canada\u2019s $382-billion projected deficit, you\u2019d be forgiven for missing changes to Canada\u2019s fiscal stabilization program announced in the recent federal fiscal update. 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