{"id":265757,"date":"2017-12-04T11:30:09","date_gmt":"2017-12-04T16:30:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/issues\/apec-summit-canadas-reputation-asia\/"},"modified":"2025-10-07T21:53:44","modified_gmt":"2025-10-08T01:53:44","slug":"apec-summit-canadas-reputation-asia","status":"publish","type":"issues","link":"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2017\/12\/apec-summit-canadas-reputation-asia\/","title":{"rendered":"The APEC summit and Canada\u2019s reputation in Asia"},"content":{"rendered":"

The news trickling\u00a0out of\u00a0the APEC Summit in\u00a0Vietnam\u00a0on\u00a0November 10\u00a0was confusing.\u00a0Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership\u00a0moving ahead<\/a>,\u00a0did\u00a0Prime Minister Justin Trudeau\u00a0sabotage<\/a>\u00a0efforts to revive\u00a0it,\u00a0or was it being \u201cre-revived\u201d after all?\u00a0Only now\u00a0is\u00a0the smoke lifting,\u00a0as\u00a0the extent of the damage to Canada\u2019s trading reputation in Asia\u00a0and\u00a0the\u00a0potential losses to western Canada\u2019s export-based economy\u00a0are\u00a0revealed.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

As the remaining\u00a0Trans-Pacific Partnership 11\u00a0countries (TPP11)\u00a0prepare to\u00a0move on,\u00a0without\u00a0not just\u00a0the US\u00a0but, according to rumblings\u00a0coming\u00a0out of Asia, possibly\u00a0also\u00a0Canada, the costs\u00a0of\u00a0the Trudeau government\u2019s shenanigans on the world stage are\u00a0becoming clear.\u00a0The first\u00a0cost\u00a0is\u00a0losing out on the immediate economic gains from a\u00a0rapid\u00a0<\/i>coming\u00a0into\u00a0effect of a revised Trans-Pacific Partnership\u00a0agreement without the US.\u00a0The second\u00a0is\u00a0the reputational damage\u00a0caused by\u00a0Trudeau\u2019s decision to play coy on the deal,\u00a0stand up his fellow heads of state,\u00a0and\u00a0torpedo Canada\u2019s best and only chance to catch up in the Asian trade race. And\u00a0all for\u00a0what? To protect a few narrow domestic interests from a trade agreement\u00a0\u2014\u00a0the\u00a0TPP \u2014\u00a0that\u00a0in fact\u00a0offers better terms for\u00a0the\u00a0dairy and auto\u00a0sectors\u00a0than what\u2019s currently on the table in NAFTA?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Here\u00a0are five take-aways that tally the disaster Trudeau left behind in Asia,\u00a0and what\u00a0they\u00a0mean\u00a0for Canadians.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Canada lost big time<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

First, the dollars-and-cents facts of the deal.\u00a0Economic modelling<\/a>\u00a0done for\u00a0the Canada West Foundation\u00a0makes it\u00a0clear that\u00a0Canada\u00a0would do\u00a0better under\u00a0TPP11\u00a0than under an agreement that includes the Americans.\u00a0This\u00a0modelling\u00a0merely\u00a0quantifies\u00a0what is\u00a0common sense. Gaining tariff and other advantages over the Americans in Japan, Vietnam and other markets\u00a0will lead to trade diversion,\u00a0as Asian importers switch to cheaper Canadian goods,\u00a0and US exporters\u00a0possibly\u00a0move production to Canada to take advantage of\u00a0TPP11\u00a0benefits\u00a0(we have\u00a0seen\u00a0this\u00a0in the past<\/a>,\u00a0but this time\u00a0it would be\u00a0accelerated).\u00a0Persistent commentary\u00a0that\u00a0TPP11\u00a0was not a good deal<\/a>\u00a0is demonstrably false.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It\u00a0would\u00a0entail\u00a0some losses\u00a0for\u00a0Canada;\u00a0every trade negotiation involves some give\u00a0and\u00a0take\u00a0(only in Donald Trump\u2019s world are trade agreements winner-take-all).\u00a0The\u00a0modelling clearly shows that\u00a0the\u00a0losses to Canada would have been minimal and\u00a0the\u00a0gains substantial.\u00a0Potential losses on intellectual property and investor-state dispute mechanisms are hypothetical and would not materialize immediately,\u00a0meaning\u00a0that\u00a0Canada\u00a0would\u00a0have time to adjust.\u00a0On balance,\u00a0based on\u00a0quantifiable measures,\u00a0the agreement\u00a0would be\u00a0a clear win.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There is also the opportunity cost.\u00a0Canada has nothing\u00a0presently\u00a0underway or\u00a0in the near\u00a0term\u00a0(within this decade)\u00a0to replace the TPP11. If\u00a0it\u00a0fails,\u00a0the losses will be with us for a long time.\u00a0The longer we delay,\u00a0the more we lose\u00a0by not realizing the gains that the agreement\u00a0would\u00a0offer. And it is unclear from\u00a0Trudeau\u2019s actions in Vietnam if\u00a0he\u00a0will ever\u00a0be pleased by the\u00a0outcome\u00a0of\u00a0the negotiations,\u00a0or\u00a0whether he\u2019ll\u00a0simply wear out\u00a0the other signatories\u2019\u00a0patience.\u00a0Several governments have privately said that they intend to move\u00a0ahead\u00a0early in 2018,\u00a0with or without Canada,\u00a0because, after having made numerous concessions, they cannot figure out what Canada wants.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Canada cannot get a better deal<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

From the outset of the TPP\u00a0negotiations\u00a0Canada scored big,\u00a0because\u00a0we\u00a0joined\u00a0a group\u00a0of nations that were\u00a0willing to make concessions to gain the \u201cprize\u201d of\u00a0access to\u00a0the US market.\u00a0Canada\u00a0also stood to benefit from\u00a0the advantages that\u00a0would\u00a0flow from a new trade bloc with one set of rules for 12 economies.\u00a0This is significant,\u00a0and\u00a0it\u00a0now\u00a0stands as\u00a0a major competitive advantage over the US, which is seeking to advance a series of disjointed bilateral agreements\u00a0requiring\u00a0separate paperwork for each country.\u00a0Under TPP11,\u00a0Canadian exporters would have one set of paperwork for 10 economies,\u00a0from which they could use inputs from any economy to sell to the others, something not available to US firms under the Trump administration\u2019s approach.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But the more immediate benefit for Canada is that the\u00a0concessions\u00a0that Asian countries\u00a0ceded\u00a0to gain access to the US market\u00a0were largely left in place\u00a0after the\u00a0Americans\u00a0dropped out,\u00a0which gives\u00a0Canada the\u00a0best of both worlds.\u00a0We\u00a0got\u00a0better access to Asian markets than\u00a0we\u00a0could ever hope to negotiate on\u00a0our\u00a0own (would any country make the same concessions to gain access\u00a0only\u00a0to Canada?).\u00a0And,\u00a0now\u00a0the US\u00a0has\u00a0pulled\u00a0out,\u00a0Canada\u00a0would\u00a0not have to worry about competitors gaining better access to the\u00a0American\u00a0market.\u00a0The possibility of replicating this outcome under any bilateral scenario is inconceivable.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Under\u00a0the\u00a0Trudeau\u00a0government\u2019s\u00a0\u201cprogressive\u201d\u00a0trade agenda,\u00a0it is hard to\u00a0see\u00a0Canada\u00a0getting a better deal than\u00a0what was achieved\u00a0under the TPP.\u00a0In addition to the\u00a0leverage\u00a0for\u00a0countries\u00a0to make\u00a0concessions to get\u00a0larger gains,\u00a0there was\u00a0the\u00a0negotiating power of having countries like Australia, Chile, New Zealand,\u00a0and the\u00a0US (under\u00a0Barack\u00a0Obama\u2019s\u00a0administration)\u00a0also pushing for\u00a0those\u00a0progressive trade elements.\u00a0The Obama administration is not coming back,\u00a0and\u00a0if Canada goes the bilateral route,\u00a0there will be\u00a0no\u00a0one\u00a0sitting at the table with\u00a0us\u00a0pushing\u00a0those\u00a0progressive trade\u00a0measures\u00a0in Asia.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Trying to\u00a0push for more progressive elements<\/a>\u00a0in the current agreement is\u00a0probably\u00a0a nonstarter,\u00a0given that countries are already annoyed that Canada,\u00a0along with Mexico, gets\u00a0the lion\u2019s share of benefits under\u00a0TPP11.\u00a0To add further demands\u00a0would be\u00a0the definition of \u201cpushing\u00a0one\u2019s\u00a0luck\u201d\u00a0and\u00a0would\u00a0not\u00a0be\u00a0a good idea. This is\u00a0especially\u00a0true\u00a0when the asks\u00a0seem\u00a0to be\u00a0designed\u00a0purely\u00a0for\u00a0domestic\u00a0optics\u00a0rather\u00a0than\u00a0for\u00a0substance. The\u00a0gender chapter in the recently updated Canada-Chile agreement\u00a0is a good example of this approach. There is nothing of substance in\u00a0it; it is\u00a0a disservice to Canada\u2019s trade agenda,\u00a0and\u00a0it is,\u00a0arguably,\u00a0a betrayal of\u00a0what would be a\u00a0true\u00a0gender equality agenda.\u00a0The\u00a0government\u2019s dismissiveness\u00a0toward\u00a0quantifiable economic returns and its focus on issues\u00a0that are\u00a0important\u00a0to\u00a0narrow domestic constituencies\u00a0are leading\u00a0observers to note<\/a>\u00a0that Canada\u2019s\u00a0trade strategy\u00a0may\u00a0be more\u00a0about how it appears back home\u00a0(and\u00a0catering to\u00a0narrow special interests\u00a0in the lead-up to\u00a0the next election)\u00a0than about advancing trade gains for the entire country.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There will be long-term damage to our efforts to open Asia<\/b>n markets<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Trudeau\u2019s undercutting\u00a0of\u00a0Japanese\u00a0Prime Minister Shinzo\u00a0Abe\u00a0and Canada\u2019s\u00a0trade\u00a0minister at the APEC summit will\u00a0harm\u00a0future\u00a0efforts to negotiate in Asia.\u00a0Even though\u00a0he\u00a0took measures to\u00a0limit embarrassing\u00a0Abe\u00a0by\u00a0scheduling\u00a0a\u00a0last-minute\u00a0sidebar\u00a0meeting<\/a>,\u00a0acting so late\u00a0was\u00a0problematic,\u00a0for two reasons.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

First,\u00a0Trudeau\u00a0let Japan go ahead with preparations when\u00a0he\u00a0could have\u00a0provided\u00a0a much earlier heads-up that there were problems,\u00a0instead of waiting until everyone else was\u00a0ready\u00a0to go ahead. Second,\u00a0his\u00a0reasons for not going ahead were vague\u00a0and could have been resolved\u00a0much earlier; now they have left the other TPP countries confused.\u00a0There was\u00a0consensus\u00a0to move ahead<\/a>\u00a0among the leading economies and Canada\u2019s allies.\u00a0Part of this consensus was Canada\u2019s\u00a0International\u00a0Trade Minister\u00a0Fran\u00e7ois-Philippe Champagne,\u00a0who was\u00a0undercut literally\u00a0at\u00a0the last minute by\u00a0Trudeau.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Beyond\u00a0embarrassing\u00a0Abe\u00a0by disrupting\u00a0his highly choreographed moment in the leadership spotlight,\u00a0Trudeau\u2019s actions have led some Asian nations to\u00a0question who speaks for Canada on trade issues,\u00a0and Australia\u00a0to question\u00a0how reliable a partner Canada\u00a0is\u00a0in Asia.\u00a0The anger in the region\u00a0is\u00a0understandable:\u00a0governments\u00a0spent\u00a0valuable\u00a0political capital and took electoral risks back home to push the agreement,\u00a0only to watch the Canadian\u00a0Prime Minister\u00a0waltz in and yank the rug out from under them\u00a0at the last minute.\u00a0Trudeau had close to nine months of\u00a0TPP11\u00a0negotiations to raise issues,\u00a0and\u00a0he had\u00a0plenty of time leading up to the\u00a0APEC\u00a0meeting to alert his allies and avoid embarrassing anyone. Waiting until after his trade minister had agreed to a deal\u00a0and every other leader was exposed\u00a0to announce his objections looks\u00a0like a political stunt; the type\u00a0of stunt\u00a0that Donald Trump would pull.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Chief among the reasons for the other countries to go ahead with the TPP, despite receiving\u00a0fewer\u00a0economic benefits\u00a0without the\u00a0US\u00a0in the pact, is\u00a0to contain Donald Trump and his winner-take-all trade strategy<\/a>. By withdrawing from the TPP, Trump was attempting to increase pressure on countries in Asia to negotiate one-on-one with his administration.\u00a0As they watch\u00a0the\u00a0soap opera\u00a0that has become the NAFTA negotiations,\u00a0the\u00a0Asian countries\u00a0are desperate to avoid winding up in Canada\u2019s\u00a0\u2500\u00a0or,\u00a0worse,\u00a0Mexico\u2019s\u00a0\u2500\u00a0seat across from\u00a0American\u00a0trade negotiators, nor do they want\u00a0to see other countries\u00a0in that position. This partially explains why other TPP countries are willing to let Canada and Mexico get away with getting a better deal in TPP11 while they get a worse deal (but\u00a0still\u00a0retain some\u00a0positive gains).\u00a0These countries have sacrificed on two fronts,\u00a0only to see\u00a0Trudeau, whose\u00a0nation\u00a0is getting the best deal,\u00a0throw them under the bus.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In this light, one can understand why former staunch allies\u00a0of Canada\u00a0are\u00a0now\u00a0saying\u00a0things\u00a0like \u201cTrudeau screwed us all.\u201d\u00a0The\u00a0epithet\u00a0\u201cJudas of Da\u00a0Nang\u201d\u00a0ascribed to Trudeau\u00a0may\u00a0last\u00a0for years to come\u00a0in Asia and western Canada, especially if\u00a0TPP11\u00a0eventually fails,\u00a0after being so close to success.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The\u00a0prime minister\u00a0appears to be\u00a0investing\u00a0his hopes of\u00a0\u201cgetting a better deal in Asia\u201d\u00a0in\u00a0the\u00a0opening of talks with the\u00a0Association of Southeast Asian Nations\u00a0(ASEAN). Yet\u00a0reportedly\u00a0part of the reason for\u00a0his\u00a0eleventh-hour\u00a0aversion to going ahead with the\u00a0Japanese-led\u00a0TPP11\u00a0summit was because\u00a0Malaysia and Vietnam wanted to water down labour and environmental\u00a0provisions.<\/a>\u00a0The two countries\u00a0are,\u00a0of course,\u00a0members of APEC,\u00a0and\u00a0can be\u00a0fairly\u00a0considered\u00a0representative of the bloc as a whole.\u00a0An APEC meeting would seem\u00a0not\u00a0to be\u00a0the best forum\u00a0to try and push a\u00a0\u201cprogressive\u201d\u00a0trade agenda, but it might appeal\u00a0to\u00a0a Liberal\u00a0government\u00a0seeking something it can brand as\u00a0a\u00a0\u201cnew\u201d\u00a0initiative,\u00a0as opposed to the TPP, which was\u00a0initiated,\u00a0under\u00a0duress,\u00a0by\u00a0the previous government.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Canada needs to push ahead on all fronts in Asia,\u00a0and the government is to be applauded for beginning what will be a long and drawn-out\u00a0process of negotiations.\u00a0But should the\u00a0TPP11\u00a0talks fail,\u00a0it is hard to envision any scenario under which an Abe-led Japanese government would resume bilateral negotiations with Canada,\u00a0and if he did not, it\u00a0would\u00a0deprive\u00a0Canada of the second-largest prize in Asia,\u00a0after China. This\u00a0reluctance\u00a0would be\u00a0good news for Australia, Mexico, Chile and other\u00a0nations that compete with Canada,\u00a0as well as\u00a0for\u00a0American exporters who\u00a0would\u00a0no longer have to worry about losing market share to Canada.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A failed\u00a0TPP11\u00a0would\u00a0also weaken Canada\u2019s hand in negotiating with China. Canada\u00a0currently has\u00a0only one trade agreement in Asia,\u00a0with Korea,\u00a0and if ASEAN\u00a0refuses to\u00a0entertain talk of a\u00a0\u201cprogressive\u201d\u00a0trade deal,\u00a0Canada\u00a0will be left\u00a0with no realistic prospect of any other negotiations\u00a0except\u00a0those\u00a0with\u00a0China, which will take close to a decade\u00a0to\u00a0bear fruit. The bottom line for Canada in Asia is that\u00a0we\u00a0need the region more than the region or any\u00a0Asian\u00a0country needs\u00a0us. China is well aware of this\u00a0imbalance.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There\u00a0<\/b>will\u00a0<\/b>be damage to NAFTA<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The idea that anything agreed to in the TPP imposes\u00a0conditions on Canada and Mexico in\u00a0the\u00a0NAFTA\u00a0negotiations<\/a>\u00a0is risible. If the Americans want something that was in the TPP included in NAFTA,\u00a0then they have to make an offer. Simply because Canada and Mexico agree to something in one trade deal does not mean that they have to make the same concessions, outside of tariffs, in another negotiation. If the Americans want TPP provisions on copyright or intellectual property in NAFTA,\u00a0they have to\u00a0offer something in exchange. When\u00a0the Americans\u00a0left the TPP,\u00a0they left those provisions behind.\u00a0And with the\u00a0US\u00a0not\u00a0part of the agreement,\u00a0any damage to Canada from these provisions\u00a0will\u00a0be lessened,\u00a0if not eliminated.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Had Canada\u00a0not equivocated in going\u00a0ahead with the\u00a0TPP11,\u00a0Canadian companies would have had access to the IP and copyright provisions that\u00a0US\u00a0companies wanted. This would have helped Japanese\u00a0negotiators drive\u00a0home to\u00a0US\u00a0interests the costs of walking away from win-win multilateral agreements. This message was severely undercut by Trudeau\u2019s actions. In fact, by almost scuttling the agreement,\u00a0Trudeau came within a hair\u2019s breadth of handing Donald Trump the single biggest trade and foreign policy win of his term so far.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On autos, there is also a strong and obvious case to be made that\u00a0rules of origin and content\u00a0under\u00a0TPP11\u00a0are far better\u00a0<\/a>than what the Trump administration has on offer in the NAFTA talks.\u00a0This sounds like a win\u00a0for Canada.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There will be long-term damage to west<\/b>ern Canada<\/b>\u2019s<\/b>\u00a0influence\u00a0<\/b>on\u00a0<\/b>trade policy<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Opposition to\u00a0TPP11, mostly from central Canada, was strong\u00a0and\u00a0well\u00a0organized.\u00a0There were very few\u00a0counter-arguments from western Canada and those sectors of the economy that would have benefited\u00a0most.\u00a0Agricultural export associations\u00a0were active in drafting letters and\u00a0lobbying the government, as was the\u00a0Canada West Foundation.\u00a0The\u00a0foundation\u00a0has\u00a0also spent significant\u00a0time, effort and resources\u00a0on\u00a0economic modelling, outreach to MPs and op-eds across\u00a0western Canada. But,\u00a0this outreach was ineffective in mobilizing the grassroots, compared with the efforts groups like Unifor, the dairy industry and academia opposing the deal. The status and importance of the TPP\u00a0were\u00a0not subjects\u00a0of\u00a0conversation at constituency barbecues\u00a0over the summer\u00a0out west.\u00a0Most western MPs\u00a0seem to have been\u00a0unaware that the TPP was still alive and\u00a0that\u00a0Canada was\u00a0still\u00a0participating in negotiations.\u00a0Worse, government MPs\u00a0were saying this summer<\/a>\u00a0that they were \u201ctold by Canadian government officials the global trade deal is basically dead now that the United States has pulled out.\u201d\u00a0This despite\u00a0evidence in local papers to the contrary<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The take-away from\u00a0Trudeau\u2019s actions at the APEC\u00a0Summit is clear:\u00a0there is no political cost to\u00a0the government in Ottawa in\u00a0taking money out of the pockets of westerners, farmers and commodity exporters. Of all the bad news that emerged from\u00a0Vietnam, this may be the worst.<\/p>\n

Photo:\u00a0Shutterstock, by\u202fWindVector.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Do you have something to say about the article you just read? Be part of the\u00a0<\/em>Policy Options\u00a0discussion, and send in your own submission.\u00a0Here is a\u00a0<\/em>link<\/em><\/a>\u00a0on how to do it.\u00a0<\/em>|\u00a0Souhaitez-vous r\u00e9agir \u00e0 cet article ?\u00a0<\/em>Joignez-vous aux d\u00e9bats d\u2019<\/em>Options politiques\u00a0et soumettez-nous votre texte en suivant ces\u00a0<\/em>directives<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The news trickling\u00a0out of\u00a0the APEC Summit in\u00a0Vietnam\u00a0on\u00a0November 10\u00a0was confusing.\u00a0Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership\u00a0moving ahead,\u00a0did\u00a0Prime Minister Justin Trudeau\u00a0sabotage\u00a0efforts to revive\u00a0it,\u00a0or was it being \u201cre-revived\u201d after all?\u00a0Only now\u00a0is\u00a0the smoke lifting,\u00a0as\u00a0the extent of the damage to Canada\u2019s trading reputation in Asia\u00a0and\u00a0the\u00a0potential losses to western Canada\u2019s export-based economy\u00a0are\u00a0revealed.\u00a0\u00a0 As the remaining\u00a0Trans-Pacific Partnership 11\u00a0countries (TPP11)\u00a0prepare to\u00a0move on,\u00a0without\u00a0not just\u00a0the US\u00a0but, according to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":255707,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"content-type":"","ep_exclude_from_search":false,"apple_news_api_created_at":"2025-08-30T06:41:13Z","apple_news_api_id":"a8d07122-cd0b-4b81-85c8-738e2db35034","apple_news_api_modified_at":"2025-08-30T06:41:13Z","apple_news_api_revision":"AAAAAAAAAAD\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/w==","apple_news_api_share_url":"https:\/\/apple.news\/AqNBxIs0LS4GFyHOOLbNQNA","apple_news_cover_media_provider":"image","apple_news_coverimage":0,"apple_news_coverimage_caption":"","apple_news_cover_video_id":0,"apple_news_cover_video_url":"","apple_news_cover_embedwebvideo_url":"","apple_news_is_hidden":"","apple_news_is_paid":"","apple_news_is_preview":"","apple_news_is_sponsored":"","apple_news_maturity_rating":"","apple_news_metadata":"\"\"","apple_news_pullquote":"","apple_news_pullquote_position":"","apple_news_slug":"","apple_news_sections":[],"apple_news_suppress_video_url":false,"apple_news_use_image_component":false},"categories":[9362,9360,9372],"tags":[],"article-status":[],"irpp-category":[4217,4245],"section":[],"irpp-tag":[],"class_list":["post-265757","issues","type-issues","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-economie","category-international","category-recent-stories-fr","irpp-category-affaires-internationales","irpp-category-economie"],"acf":[],"apple_news_notices":[],"yoast_head":"\nThe APEC summit and Canada\u2019s reputation in Asia<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/policyoptions.irpp.org\/fr\/2017\/12\/apec-summit-canadas-reputation-asia\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The APEC summit and Canada\u2019s reputation in Asia\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The news trickling\u00a0out of\u00a0the APEC Summit in\u00a0Vietnam\u00a0on\u00a0November 10\u00a0was confusing.\u00a0Was the Trans-Pacific Partnership\u00a0moving ahead,\u00a0did\u00a0Prime Minister Justin Trudeau\u00a0sabotage\u00a0efforts to revive\u00a0it,\u00a0or was it being \u201cre-revived\u201d after all?\u00a0Only now\u00a0is\u00a0the smoke lifting,\u00a0as\u00a0the extent of the damage to Canada\u2019s trading reputation in 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