Andrew Cohen’s book claims that Canada has abandoned its spir- ited internationalism with a less broad vision, a much-weakened military, a less generous attitude as an aid donor and is less effective in its diplomacy. He notes that some of the realities of spend- ing on defence, aid and diplomacy don’t square with the mythical images of Canada as a peacekeeper, major aid donor, trader and diplomat. He asks ”œCan we expect to sit at the global table by virtue of our economic power with- out pursuing a foreign policy worthy of our history, geography and diversity?”

Many of Cohen’s criticisms are correct, including the many which he echoes from discontented members, past or present, of the military and for- eign service. But his basic criticism that Canada has lost its place in the world doesn’t stand up to serious scrutiny, nor does the allegation that everything that has taken place has been done in a deep slumber.

Cohen also makes a major mistake in assuming that the problems he identifies can be corrected simply by the addition of new financial resources in all three sectors. Faced with a choice between a declining health care system and more expenditure on aid, military and the foreign service, what would most Canadians chose? He fails to show how a beefed-up military will have much of a role to play in the fight against the new threat of international terrorism, where Canada’s best contri- bution might be to help keep terrorists from reaching our shores or from entering the United States via Canada, a task which is totally outside the purview of the Canadian military.

Cohen looks back to the Golden Age of Canadian diplomacy through the prism of three of its strongest fig- ures: Lester Pearson (known mainly because of his time as foreign minister, when he won the Nobel Prize and then as prime minister, when his main achievements were domestic), Hume Wrong and Norman Robertson (virtu- ally unknown outside the public serv- ice), whom he idolizes for the idealism they embraced, the diplomacy they practiced and the standards they set. Cohen gives no credit to Pearson’s political bosses throughout this period, primarily Louis St-Laurent, first as his minister and then as his prime minis- ter, as having been involved in any way in any of the successes.

The G7/G8 summit process, which started out in 1975 as an effort to deal with international economic co-opera- tion in the light of the oil crisis, has become a year-round exercise involv- ing the prime minister and his minis- ters of finance and foreign affairs, and sometimes other ministers, and their officials to look at major political and economic issues. These are much more than photo opportunities in idyllic set- tings and involve Canadian diplomats on a daily basis.

Cohen acknowledges the impor- tant role which trade played in the careers of Wrong and Robertson, but then suggests that the fusion of the Department of External Affairs and the ”œtrade” parts of the former Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (and not just the Trade Commissioner Service as claimed by Cohen), was a mistake and has result- ed in an overemphasis in Canada’s for- eign policy on trade versus more traditional diplomatic pursuits. I think Cohen is dead wrong here and he has sided with some ”œtraditional purists,” who do not see trade and economic interests as part of Canada’s diplo- macy, when in fact they always have been, even during the so-called Golden Age.

The idea that our aid program is not part of foreign policy is equally wrong-headed as are Cohen’s pleas to untie Canadian aid to the detriment of Canadian business and farmers, but to also introduce a new type of condition- ality by linking aid to human rights performance. The idea that Canada should concentrate its aid program in the 15 least developed countries that practice good governance is an oxy- moron on several counts. Cohen right- ly emphasizes the disgraceful decline in the level of our aid program as a per- centage of GNP, which has taken us almost to the bottom of the OECD countries as a percentage of GNP, though not in actual dollar terms.

Cohen does admit that Canada and the world have both changed since the Golden Age, when Canada played an abnormally pre- eminent role. He also admits that the Waspish male-only Canada that Pearson, Wrong and Robertson epitomized has long since disappeared into a multi- cultural/multilingual society where communities in Canada with roots in almost every country on the planet are able to exercise political influence on Canadian foreign policy, some with more effect than others.

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Cohen’s book focuses almost exclusively on relations with Washington (always the top priority) and London (a faded power and one which has trouble deciding between its Atlantic and European vocations), to the detriment of all other relation- ships. Times have changed and many new actors have emerged.

Cohen briefly alludes to the national unity crisis which Canada faced from 1967 on, but doesn’t fully develop the extent to which this impacted on Canadian aid, foreign pol- icy and diplomatic practice in the 35- year period since then. National unity issues took up tremendous foreign pol- icy and aid resources and by and large can be called a success. Francophone summits in which the premiers of Quebec and New Brunswick can participate alongside the prime minister of Canada are a reality today.

Cohen unfairly accuses Jean ChrĂ©tien of being the most parochial PM since the first part of Mackenzie King’s term of office. Despite having presided over the decline in our military spending after the hiccup of increased spending by Mulroney, and continuing the decline in our aid budget, started under Mulroney, ChrĂ©tien has continued to play an active role on the world stage in the various international organizations of which Canada is a member: Canada easily won its bid for another term on the UN Security Council; ChrĂ©tien kept troops in Bosnia and participated in the Kosovo War without a UN Security Council mandate; and he pushed forward two of the most innovative diplomatic initiatives taken anywhere (the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Land Mines and the International Criminal Court). ChrĂ©tien’s success at deficit reduction was the envy of the G-8 and it gave him enhanced credibility to speak on economic issues at those summits and elsewhere. He supported the FTAA and APEC initiatives and proposed an FTA between NAFTA and the EU. His environmental policies were weaker than Mulroney’s and his eventual sup- port for Kyoto was more a means of dif- ferentiating himself from President Bush than a real commitment to emissions reductions, where the Americans may yet beat us to the punch.

In the ChrĂ©tien years the British became so weary of Canadian activism that they called Canadiandemarches ”œABC initiatives” (”œAnother Bloody Canadian initiative”) and the French were impressed at Canada’s successes in the landmine and crimi- nal court debates. ChrĂ©tien failed to get US participation in either of these agreements and failed to get US agree- ment to his initiative to stop the mas- sacres in the Great Lakes region of Africa. It was US opposition and not, as claimed by Cohen, the lack of long- range military transport, which killed this initiative.

Cohen is right to point out some shortfalls in our military, aid and diplo- matic practices. However, he is just plain wrong and overly romantic to say that the overall picture represents a serious decline in our diplomatic influence from the Golden Age, when even he admits everything was not as golden as some old fogies like to think.

All in all Cohen’s book is worth a read, it identifies some areas where more political direc- tion, policies, and more financial resources are needed for Canada to be able to play a more effective role in the world. However, Cohen overestimates the extent of our relative decline in the world and rather than worrying too much about that, he should perhaps have concentrated more on policy options about what we could do to be more effective in promoting and protecting our vital interests. Where he does venture forth ”” in suggesting a new Third Option and diversification from our economic dependence on the US ”” he turns his back on 40 years of history and dreams of a world and options which don’t exist.

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