Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol does not preclude Canadians from developing a Made-in-Canada action plan on climate change; it compels us to do so. Kyoto provides an internationally-agreed framework for meeting targets on greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions; it does not dictate how countries are to meet these objectives. In fact, through a series of market-based and other broad mechanisms, the accord augments, not diminishes, the flex- ibility with which individual countries can meet their cli- mate change commitments. In short, Kyoto sets the condi- tions for action on climate change; it does not dictate how a nation must meet its international commitments.

After a decade of international negotiations and nation- al consultations on climate change, the first draft of a fed- eral action plan was presented to a meeting of energy and environment ministers on October 28. Further formal dis- cussions on the accord took place in late November””a mat- ter of weeks, if not days, before Parliament is expected to vote on whether Canada should be legally bound to Kyoto by ratifying it.

There is no doubt that Canada’s ”œratification readiness” would be greatly enhanced by a comprehensive national implementation plan to ensure we can meet our Kyoto com- mitments. However, the foot-dragging of the past decade has made it clear that no such plan will materialize until rat- ification is assured. For better or worse, implementation is now contingent upon ratification””not, as some prominent political and business leaders would have it, the other way around. By protracting the debate on ratification, we are running out the clock on implementation. The longer Canada postpones ratification, the more difficult it will become to implement Kyoto, if not impossible. Failure to meet our global climate change commitments may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Ottawa’s continued mixed messages on Kyoto have confounded our international counterparts: while the EU was assured that we were on board, the US was convinced we would follow their lead and reject the accord. Domestically, the policy vacuum left by Ottawa has encouraged special interest groups and provinces such as Alberta and Quebec to present their own alternatives to Kyoto.

In 1992, under the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, Canada was one of the first industrialized countries to both sign and ratify the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, one of two treaties to emerge from the Rio Earth Summit. As such, Canada was one of the origi- nal champions of the principles underlying the Kyoto Protocol (named after the Japanese city in which it was adopted in 1997), which is a sub- agreement to the 1992 climate convention. The accord calls for industrialized countries to reduce their GHG emissions by 6 percent below 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. But Kyoto represents only the first, but nonetheless critical,step to meeting our climate change commitments.

These entail a total reduction of 50- 75 percent in greenhouse gases globally in this century alone. The most recent round of climate negotiations in New Delhi sought to bring emerging economies and major greenhouse-gasemitting countries in the developing world, such as such as Brazil, China and India, on board the regime. In the decade since the Rio Earth Summit, Canada is widely seen to have gone from environmental leader to laggard, both at home and abroad. So, at last month’s World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, the prime minister’s pledge that Parliament would ratify the Kyoto Protocol by year’s end came as a surprise to the UN community, to Canadians and, apparently, to his own Cabinet. Nonetheless, Mr. Chrétien’s was a critical announcement at a critical time. Kyoto now stands poised to become legally binding on all countries which have ratified it. To be operational, the accord requires ratification by a minimum of 55 countries responsible for at least 55 percent of the globe’s GHG emissions. Although Kyoto has long surpassed the first criterion for entry into force, the second has remained elusive, especially in light of the Bush administration’s refusal to ratify the agreement. While the US contributes roughly 25 percent to total GHG emissions, Canada produces a mere 2 percent. But person-for-person, it is Canadians””not Americans””who are the biggest energy consumers in the world. Our country should compensate for its vast size and extreme climate not with more GHG emissions, but with greater innovation and investment in efficient sources of energy.

Current opponents of Kyoto claim that Canada can’t afford to ratify, and thus implement, the accord because it would damage Canada’s economic competitiveness. However, it is the policy uncertainty created by the govern- ment’s continued hesitation regarding ratifica- tion that is most costly for corporate decision- making. Canadian corporations have a legitimate concern about the negative effects of uncertainty to their competitiveness and ability to attract investment. Ratification of the accord and effec- tive negotiation of details of the implementation plan with key industrial sectors as well as the provinces and territories is the best way to deal with such uncertainty.

Moreover, according to the Alberta-based Pembina Institute for Appropriate Technology, Canada’s competitiveness is likely to benefit, not suffer, from a decision by Parliament to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Their report finds that by taking a lead on environmental policy, governments position firms to be more efficient and competi- tive. In a survey of corporations in several key sectors (such oil and gas, electricity, chemicals, transportation and manufacturing) with major operations in Canada, those firms which took early action to improve efficiency and effect emission-reduction strategies in anticipation of Kyoto ratification, also increased their competi- tiveness. For example, from 1990 to 2000, Dupont reduced its GHG emissions by 60 percent while production increased by 10 percent and shareholder return quadrupled. Between 1995 and 2001, Interface (a flooring products firm) reduced GHG emissions (per unit of production) by 64 percent in its Canadian operations while the company’s waste reduction program pro- duced savings of over $185 million worldwide. Canadian policy now needs to recognize and credit this progress, and set clear and realistic tar- gets for further improvements.

Also prominent in the rhetoric of Kyoto crit- ics is the notion that Canada cannot afford to implement the agreement because our largest trading partner has rejected it, and therefore so must we. This argument confuses lack of leader- ship by the Bush administration on climate change with lack of action by American states, cities, companies and citizens. Indeed, state and municipal governments in the US have taken far more significant action to reduce GHG emissions than their Canadian counterparts. If these trends continue, the US may well reduce its GHG emis- sions in line with Kyoto targets despite not hav- ing formally ratified the accord. And although it is unlikely to do so under the Bush administra- tion’s watch, the US may well ratify under a future administration. With American ratifica- tion would come a stronger push for enforcement mechanisms, and thus trade measures. So, Canada has a choice: we can pay now or pay more later.

Although the US appears to be making progress on climate change outside the Kyoto framework, Canada’s track record remains very weak. In the absence of legally binding targets, Canada has invoked the voluntary Rio pledge to stabilize its GHG emissions at the 1990 level by 2000. Instead, despite a slew of federal and provincial plans purporting to address climate change, Canada’s emissions levels have grown by 20 percent in the last decade. Given our ever- growing emissions levels, the federal government estimates that Canada will need to reduce its cur- rent levels by 25 percent in order to meet its Kyoto target by 2010.

Ratifying Kyoto will not only allow Canada to contribute to the global effort to curb climate change, it will have the practical effect of nar- rowing””not widening””the gap with the US. Moreover, ratification would not preclude us from strengthening this global commitment with national or indeed regional (NAFTA-based) ones, so long as these enhance rather than erase our Kyoto targets.

Contrary to popular belief, Canada’s commit- ment to ratify the Kyoto Protocol did not come with the prime minister’s pledge at the Johannesburg Summit. The Liberal government initially signalled its intent to ratify Kyoto when it signed the accord in 1997. Why then, in the five years since first signing the accord, has Ottawa failed to produce a viable national action plan to implement the agreement? This failure is not, as some would have it, due to lack of consultations or technical know-how: Canada has some of world’s best people in both the pri- vate and public sectors working on climate change issues. The failure to craft a clear, com- prehensive and timely implementation program is due purely to a lack of political will.

Current complaints regarding the federal government’s failure to fully consult with the provinces, key sectors and stakeholders are disin- genuous in light of the real record: Kyoto has arguably been more extensively consulted upon than any other treaty signed by Canada. Imagine, if you will, the federal government consulting Canadians this much on whether it should adhere to international institutions””such as NAFTA or the WTO””which meet the approval of powerful sectors of the Canadian economy. The objection here is not to consultations per se, but to their selective use for purely opportunistic or PR purposes. As decisions once enacted by elect- ed representatives in national legislatures are increasingly made by non-elected officials at international summits, it is critical that citizens and parliamentarians become more informed and involved at all levels and stages of the policy- making process. But tackling the ”œdemocratic deficit” in international decision-making should not be a discriminatory undertaking, nor should it be used as a delaying tactic regarding matters on which the government would rather avoid taking decisive action. Which brings us back to Kyoto.

Ottawa’s mistake lies not in its failure to con- sult but, rather, in its failure to consult the right people on the right question: until now, selective discussions with elites and experts have been framed by ”œwhether to ratify” Kyoto; instead, the Chrétien government should have been consult- ing Canadians directly on ”œhow to implement” the accord from the start. This is what Ottawa is now doing in late 2002””but only after years of procrastination and vacillation.

Despite the initial praise it inspired in inter- national and environmental circles, the commitment made by Mr. Chrétien in Johannesburg is still not clear-cut. Canada’s posi- tion now appears to be contingent upon two additional and improbable conditions:

• Nationally, ratification seems to depend upon the environmental and economic equiva- lent of a ”œClarity Act on Kyoto”””a level of detail rarely required by other international agreements Canada has signed.

• On the international scene, the condi- tion for ratifying Kyoto appears to be credits for clean energy exports””a scheme which has so far failed to secure any substantive support during previous rounds of international negotiations.

This equivocation seriously undermines the Government of Canada’s credibility on this criti- cal issue, both at home and abroad. Far from re- establishing the country’s credentials as an envi- ronmental champion, the confusion following the prime minister’s remarks in Johannesburg may ultimately serve to alienate important stake- holders on all sides of this issue:

SIGN UP

The inner workings of government

Keep track of who’s doing what to get federal policy made. In The Functionary.

Read it now.

SUBSCRIBE

The Functionary

Our newsletter about the public service. Nominated for a Digital Publishing Award.

• The international community, especially the EU, would likely block any additional amend- ments to Kyoto, particularly those proposed by a country widely seen to have already watered down the accord. In this light, the position””held by several prominent political and business lead- ers””that Canada should not ratify Kyoto because it is too feeble proves perverse: If Kyoto does not do enough to curb climate change, it is in part because countries such as Canada have consis- tently negotiated additional concessions which have served to weaken its effect. Having success- fully softened the accord, Canada’s walking away from it now would be viewed by the internation- al community as an act of bad faith, if not betray- al. This is the American approach to internation- al treaties, not the Canadian one. Concretely, rejection of Kyoto would also mean that Canada would have little if any influence in the future rounds of global climate negotiations, which are expected to bring key developing countries into the fold. Thus, from an international perspective, non-ratification is a non-starter: it would damage Canada’s reputation and its leverage in future international negotiations on critical issues beyond climate change.

• Environmentalists who strongly support Kyoto view the Johannesburg announcement as a last-ditch, legacy-driven effort to reverse the country’s decade-long slide from environmental leader to laggard. Some perceive the Jean-come-lately support for the accord as an act of ”œecolog- ical opportunism” stemming from the prime minister’s preoccupation with his legacy rather than from a real concern for the environment.

• Business will resent the added burden of having to now scramble to meet Kyoto targets within a much tighter timeframe. Had Canada not only signed but also ratified the protocol fol- lowing its 1997 adoption, energy producers and consumers would have had more time to transi- tion to a cleaner, less carbon-dependent econo- my. The policy confusion created by the govern- ment’s protracted hesitation regarding Kyoto has also proven problematic for corporate decision- making, which thrives in conditions of certainty. It is time to bring clarity to this issue and get on with business of implementation. This is what the corporate world does so well””it sets clear rules and works to meet them.

• Some provinces have decried the federal government’s ”œbreech of public trust” in changing the focus of this fall’s cross-Canada discussions on Kyoto from ratification to implementation. There is no doubt that the federal government has cir- cumvented a public consultation process that it had itself laid out. But this process was ill-con- ceived and over-extended from the start. Consent of the provinces is not required for ratification of international agreements; this authority rests strictly with the federal government. However, given the provinces’ shared jurisdiction over natural resources, the federal government does have a responsibility to consult its provincial counter- parts on how it arrives at implementing these treaties and must work to involve the provinces in areas of implementation under their jurisdiction. Indeed, without securing the full cooperation of the provinces, a number of key instruments may be unavailable for implementation.

Therefore, if one views ratification as a mat- ter of foreign policy (to be exercised by the feder- al government for the common good) and imple- mentation as a matter of domestic environmen- tal and economic policy (to be jointly agreed by the federal and provincial governments), the revised focus of the current deliberations””from consultations on whether to ratify to real negoti- ations on how to implement””is not only more acceptable, it is preferable (again, notwithstand- ing the delay).

Once Parliament ratifies Kyoto, the treaty becomes domestic law and Canada has six to ten more years to reach its targets. The coun- try does not””as Prime Minister Chrétien has stated””have another ten years to work out the plan. 2008-2012 is the deadline for achieving the plan, not developing it. This reality check leads some to want to abandon Kyoto altogether. It leads others to the opposite conclusion: Canada must expedite ratification as a matter of utmost priority and then consult the stakeholders on how””not whether””to achieve them. It’s a matter of commitment.

Perhaps Canada should follow the example of Norway and other parties to Kyoto. After assembling a team of high-profile, popular indi- viduals to both champion Kyoto with domestic audiences and coordinate its implementation, Norway produced a solid national action plan in a matter of six weeks.

This Liberal government has already proven it can muster the massive political will and resources to successfully tackle seemingly intractable problems. The fiscal deficit provides a compelling case in point: the rationale presented was short-term pain for long-term gain; it would be irresponsible to leave such a burden on future generations. The same logic applies, if not more so, to the ecological debt.

Among a broad range of worthy ecological issues and initiatives, Kyoto has become the lit- mus test on the environment. Any government, sector or individual seen to be stalling on Kyoto will be seen to be stalling on the environment. Kyoto will help determine whether Canada’s citi- zens and leaders are up to the challenge of bring- ing our country into the carbon-constrained real- ity of the 21st century. It will also provide very substantial opportunities to make a transition to a more efficient and competitive economy.

For all its imperfections (the inevitable result of the trade-offs inherent in international negotiations), Kyoto represents the only global game in town for addressing climate change. The result of ten years of tough negotiations, the accord reflects careful compromises made by some 170 states with divergent interests at vastly different stages of their economic development. Domestic disagreements within Canada about how to address climate change only serve to rein- force Kyoto’s value as an international agree- ment. Indeed, the Protocol embodies innovative principles””such as ”œintergenerational equity” and ”œcommon but differentiated responsibili- ty”””which may prove instructive for Canada as it seeks to establish a fair and equitable regime without unduly burdening particular provinces, sectors or stakeholders.

The near-universal support enjoyed by the protocol has led countries that remain outside the regime to be dubbed ”œenvironmental rogue states.” Just as there is little doubt the US””even going it alone””would prevail militarily against Iraq, a Made-in-the-USA alternative to Kyoto would undoubtedly help curb climate change. But international relations and the rule of law are about means””not just ends. These unilateral actions represent inadequate responses to what are collective-action problems. At least the US is fairly consistent””if not misguided””in its go-it- alone approach to foreign affairs. Will Canada be consistent in its foreign policy and apply its gen- eral preference for multilateralism to the problem of climate change?

The question Canada faces is not whether to adopt Kyoto or develop a made-in-Canada solution; this is a false choice since adopting the former implies the latter. At issue is whether Canada will adopt a unilateral or international approach to the global problem of climate change.

Let it be stated emphatically that there is no moral equivalence between the potential deployment of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein and the dangers posed by climate change. While the former would represent a delib- erate evil act of a single madman, the latter reflects the seemingly benign actions of countless produc- ers and consumers largely in the industrialized world. However, there is a clear double standard in international affairs: the burden of proof for taking collective action against an environmental threat appears to far exceed that required for responding to a military one.

Within the hierarchy of international relations, ”œhard” security and trade matters have traditionally trumped ”œsoft” social and environmental ones. The reality, however, is that ecological degradation is a growing source of conflict in the world and thus represents a real threat to collective security. Pervasive climate change has been described as sec- ond only to nuclear war in terms of its catastrophic effects globally. In this sense, climate change is far more than a matter of environmental policy; it is increasingly a matter of national security.

The evidence underlying global climate change is objective, far-reaching and compelling. Indeed, few issues on the global agenda have galvanized such widespread consensus within political and sci- entific communities. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change””representing 1,500 of the world’s leading atmospheric scientists, economists and technologists””have repeatedly concluded that: (1) the current scope, scale and pace of climate change are unprecedented, and (2) human activity ””mainly through the production of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide””is increasingly influ- ential in this regard. Canadian scientists from across the country have been active in their areas of expertise in the work of this international panel. Even sceptical nations find the science convincing. Thirteen national academies of science””including the American counterpart whose members were hand-picked by President George W. Bush him- self””concur with these findings.

Still, international affairs are not susceptible to courtroom proofs beyond reasonable doubt. It is pre- cisely for this reason that a ”œPrecautionary Principle” underlies many environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. While the US and, to some extent, Canada have sought to expel direct reference to this principle in international treaties, its intent is straightforward: where there is a threat of serious or irreversible harm, lack of scientific certainty should not preclude action. Otherwise, positive proof would come too late. The principle essentially asserts that it is better to err on the side of action that turns out to be unnecessary than to expose ourselves to preventable devastation through inaction.