Canada needs deepfake legislation yesterdayTEST

Increasingly sophisticated deepfakes technologies are forcing lawmakers around the world to try to tighten legal frameworks to safeguard privacy and security.

Recent deepfakes incidents – ranging from the release of sexually explicit images purporting to be of Taylor Swift to Chinese disinformation in the Taiwan presidential election – show the vast and complex nature of the deepfakes problem created by, or propelled by, artificial intelligence (AI).

The problem is getting worse as the technology needed to produce deepfakes becomes more available and easier to use.

Some governments are already moving on the issue. Sadly, Canada seems to be a step, or two, behind. Canada needs new legislation and other measures – yesterday – to protect its citizens and strengthen democratic resilience.

By contrast, the United Kingdom criminalized the sharing of deepfakes pornography as a part of its Online Safety Act last year, while the European Commission’s Digital Service Act also addressed non-consensual deepfakes porn.

In January, the No AI FRAUD Act was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in the hope of establishing a federal framework for action in the wake of Swift’s sexually explicit deepfakes.

In Canada, eight provinces have enacted legislation on the sharing of non-consensual intimate images – Nova Scotia, Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince Edward Island – but only half of them target edited images.

The Intimate Images Protection Act in British Columbia gives prosecutors the power to pursue actors responsible for disseminating non-consensual fake intimate images online. However, they do not address the person responsible for creating them, nor big tech platforms that helped spread it.

The ease with which technology can now create deepfakes also poses a grave threat in terms of malign foreign influence, especially defamation campaigns against political candidates, or democracy and human rights activists, especially women, racial and sexual minorities.

The cautionary tale of Taiwan

China’s attempt to interfere in Taiwan’s recent presidential and legislative elections is a textbook example.

Deepfake videos of Lai Ching-tethe successful Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate for president were disseminated online, falsely depicting him as supporting the coalition between the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), as well as synthesizing an audio of him purportedly criticizing his own party.

These Chinese deepfakes distorted his original statements in a bid to influence public opinion and undermine the democratic process.

China tried to undercut Lai because he favours preserving the current status quo regarding the political status of Taiwan, arguing that it is already independent, as well as strengthening relations with the United States and other liberal democracies.

Although the Chinese disinformation campaigns did not have a significant impact on the result, their attempts showed how deepfakes could have a greater potential impact on election outcomes elsewhere, especially if the vote there is close.

As the technology spreads, this problem is only likely to get worse and there are few ways for the targets of deepfakes to combat their impact.

Few can mobilize like Taylor Swift’s supporters

In the case of Swift, her fans used hashjacking and complaints to X, formerly Twitter, to prevent further abuse after the initial publication.

The problem is that few, if any, human rights or pro-democracy activists and politicians who are being targeted by deepfakes have such a large number of self-mobilizable fans or supporters to protect them in the face of defamation.

In addition, it’s increasingly, and surprisingly, easy to create realistic deepfakes.

In late January, a deepfake audio robocall of U.S. President Joe Biden urging Democratic voters to skip the primary election in New Hampshire was estimated to be placed between 5,000 to 25,000 times. The caller ID falsely appeared to be coming from Kathy Sullivan, a former state Democratic chairwoman who helped run a pro-Biden political group.

Paul Carpenter, who says he was hired to make the deepfake audio, says it “took less than 20 minutes and cost only $1.” He got paid $150 to make it.

The low cost, the ease to produce and the general lack of legal consequence serve as a great incentive for anyone who has the skills to do the same thing and who has a target in mind.

Therefore, the federal government must introduce legislation that increases transparency and criminalizes the use of artificial intelligence in disinformation, especially the sharing of harmful deepfakes.

Fake porn causes real harm to women

The time for a law on artificial intelligence has come

There are already precedents around the globe in terms of how laws and regulations could take shape. In addition to the U.S. No AI FRAUD Act, another option in establishing a federal framework against AI abuse is how the. U.S. Federal Communications Commission has made it illegal for robocallers to use AI voice clones.

Moreover, lawmakers should also look into possibilities for new legislation on, and voluntary disclosure requirements by, big tech companies and social media platforms.

For combating electoral interference, specific legislation that bans the use of deepfakes in influence operations would also be necessary. For instance, Taiwan’s Election and Recall Act added specific clauses aimed at preventing deepfake audio and video.

While Canadian legislation is needed sooner rather than later, it won’t be the entire solution. Instead, a whole-of-society approach is necessary.

Recently, I also proposed 10 concrete policy recommendations that Canada could learn from Taiwan’s decentralized network in strengthening its democratic resilience.

Canada is already far behind many other like-minded democracies. It is time for more policy and less rhetoric.

La force des identités partisanesTEST

Le « Super mardi » du 5 mars dernier a permis Ă  Donald Trump de pousser vers la sortie sa seule opposante Ă  l’investiture rĂ©publicaine, Nikki Haley. En se retirant de la course, celle-ci a laissĂ© le champ libre Ă  une nouvelle confrontation Biden-Trump en novembre prochain. Mais les jeux sont loin d’ĂȘtre faits : une partie des rĂ©publicains partage les doutes de Haley sur l’acceptabilitĂ© de Trump, et de nombreux dĂ©mocrates s’inquiĂštent de l’ñge de Biden.

Au lendemain du « Super mardi », le Washington Post prĂ©sentait de brĂšves entrevues avec des partisans de Haley pour illustrer la gamme des rĂ©actions face Ă  son retrait. Connie Schlundt, par exemple, de Eden Prairie au Minnesota, disait qu’elle Ă©tait rĂ©publicaine Ă  100 % et que son ralliement Ă  Trump ne faisait aucun doute. Cindy Siler de Smith Mountain Lake, en Virginie, se prĂ©parait plutĂŽt Ă  voter pour Biden, comme elle l’avait d’ailleurs fait en 2020. Plus Ă©tonnant Ă©tait le tĂ©moignage de Micki Stout, de Richmond en Virginie, qui jugeait Trump « irrationnel », « malhonnĂȘte » et « franchement inquiĂ©tant », mais s’estimait, sans l’expliquer, incapable de voter pour Biden. « Comme en 2016 et 2020, concluait-elle, je vais devoir voter pour Trump. »

Pour rendre compte de ces rĂ©actions variĂ©es, les politologues parlent depuis longtemps de l’importance des identitĂ©s partisanes, c’est-Ă -dire de l’attachement durable Ă  un parti auquel une personne peut s’identifier. Dans l’Étude Ă©lectorale canadienne, par exemple, on demande aux rĂ©pondants si, en politique fĂ©dĂ©rale, ils se considĂšrent habituellement comme Ă©tant libĂ©raux, conservateurs ou autre, et Ă  quel point ils ressentent fortement, ou non, cet attachement partisan.

Établies tĂŽt dans la vie et semblables Ă  nos appartenances Ă  divers groupes sociaux, les identitĂ©s partisanes rĂ©sistent aux changements de contexte et de prĂ©fĂ©rences sur des enjeux spĂ©cifiques et elles influencent fortement le vote. Elles donnent naturellement de la stabilitĂ© aux Ă©lections. On sait comment vont voter les rĂ©publicaines pures et dures comme Connie Schlundt, mĂȘme quand leur candidate prĂ©fĂ©rĂ©e est dĂ©faite. On se doute aussi de ce que fera Cindy Siler, qui a dĂ©jĂ  votĂ© pour Biden en 2020 et qui n’a manifestement pas la fibre rĂ©publicaine trĂšs prononcĂ©e.

Le cas de Micki Stout apparaĂźt plus intrigant. VoilĂ  une Ă©lectrice qui considĂšre Trump comme malhonnĂȘte et dangereux, mais qui vote tout de mĂȘme pour lui Ă©lection aprĂšs Ă©lection. On peut penser qu’elle est aussi une rĂ©publicaine invĂ©tĂ©rĂ©e, mais il y a peut-ĂȘtre d’autres facteurs qui expliquent sa dĂ©cision. Sans pouvoir cibler une seule raison, cette Ă©lectrice semble littĂ©ralement incapable d’envisager un vote pour le Parti dĂ©mocrate.

Pour rendre compte d’un tel blocage, certains politologues parlent depuis quelques annĂ©es d’un autre type d’identitĂ© partisane, qu’ils qualifient de nĂ©gative. Souvent mesurĂ©es par les rĂ©ponses Ă  une question demandant aux Ă©lecteurs de dĂ©signer les partis pour lesquels ils ne voteraient jamais, ces convictions complĂštent en quelque sorte les identitĂ©s positives. Mme Stout, par exemple, explique qu’elle ne pourrait jamais voter dĂ©mocrate, mĂȘme s’il en allait de la survie de la dĂ©mocratie amĂ©ricaine.

Deux mesures aux conséquences distinctes

Dans un livre qui vient de paraĂźtre, When Politics Becomes Personal: The Effect of Partisan Identity on Anti-Democratic Behavior, la politologue Ă  l’UniversitĂ© de GĂ©orgie, Alexa Bankert, montre comment les identitĂ©s partisanes nĂ©gatives ne sont pas simplement l’autre versant des identitĂ©s positives. On peut trĂšs bien, comme Cindy Siler, s’identifier comme rĂ©publicaine, mais appuyer Ă  l’occasion le parti opposĂ©. Comme on pourrait ĂȘtre trĂšs anti-rĂ©publicain sans pour autant s’identifier comme dĂ©mocrate.

Les identitĂ©s partisanes positives et nĂ©gatives n’auraient pas non plus les mĂȘmes consĂ©quences. Selon Bankert, les identitĂ©s positives sont bĂ©nĂ©fiques pour la dĂ©mocratie en encourageant la participation Ă©lectorale et l’engagement citoyen, alors que les identitĂ©s nĂ©gatives engendrent de l’animositĂ©, des conflits et mĂȘme de la violence. L’idĂ©al dans cette perspective serait que les Ă©lites politiques tiennent des discours rassembleurs afin de diminuer la propension des Ă©lecteurs Ă  entretenir des sentiments nĂ©gatifs envers leurs adversaires.

Les identitĂ©s partisanes nĂ©gatives, explique Bankert, stimulent le mĂ©pris, voire la haine de l’autre, et encouragent le ressentiment et l’hostilitĂ©. Pourtant, il n’y a rien de fonciĂšrement mauvais Ă  refuser fermement de soutenir un parti. Personnellement, il y a plein de partis pour lesquels je ne voterais jamais. Le Parti rĂ©publicain, le Likoud, les DĂ©mocrates de SuĂšde et le Parti conservateur du Canada figureraient certainement sur ma liste noire. En fait, j’aurais plus de facilitĂ© Ă  identifier mes choix nĂ©gatifs que mes options positives. Je ne crois pas, cependant, que ceci fait de moi un citoyen trempant dans le ressentiment et l’hostilitĂ©.

Pour comprendre comment Bankert arrive à de telles conclusions, il faut porter attention à la façon dont elle mesure les identités partisanes.

PlutĂŽt que de reprendre les questions mentionnĂ©es plus haut sur les partis qui sont habituellement les nĂŽtres ou pour lesquels on ne voterait jamais, Bankert mesure une palette d’émotions pour dĂ©velopper un indice de prĂ©sence ou d’absence d’affection envers un parti. Pour jauger les identitĂ©s nĂ©gatives, par exemple, elle demande aux rĂ©pondants s’ils sont d’accord pour dire que « si ce parti fait bien dans les sondages, ma journĂ©e est ruinĂ©e » ou encore que « si les gens critiquent ce parti, je me sens bien ».

C’est un peu fort de cafĂ©. Je ne voterais jamais pour les conservateurs, mais mon humeur du jour ne dĂ©pend pas de leur succĂšs dans les sondages ou de ce qu’en disent les autres. Avec de telles questions, l’autrice fait des affiliations partisanes une question trĂšs Ă©motive. Le rĂ©sultat est une mesure plus « affective » que « cognitive » qui accentue probablement le cĂŽtĂ© conflictuel des identitĂ©s partisanes nĂ©gatives.

Des attitudes raisonnables

Dans une Ă©tude que j’ai rĂ©alisĂ©e il y a quelques annĂ©es avec mon collĂšgue Mike Medeiros, nous montrions le caractĂšre somme toute raisonnable des identitĂ©s nĂ©gatives mesurĂ©es avec les questions classiques sur l’appui aux partis.

Dans ce portrait, les identitĂ©s nĂ©gatives reflĂ©taient moins des Ă©motions peu avouables que la force des identitĂ©s positives et des idĂ©ologies. Les plus susceptibles d’avoir une opinion nĂ©gative d’un parti Ă©taient ceux qui s’identifiaient plus fortement au parti adverse ainsi que ceux qui se situaient Ă  l’opposĂ© de ce parti sur l’échelle droite-gauche. Dit autrement, l’identitĂ© partisane Ă©tait moins une question d’affectivitĂ© que d’affinitĂ©, une maniĂšre pour chaque citoyen de maintenir une certaine cohĂ©rence dans ses choix.

L’ouvrage de Bankert contribue au renouvellement de la recherche sur les identitĂ©s partisanes positives et nĂ©gatives. Mais son approche plus affective que cognitive jette un regard trop sombre sur les identitĂ©s partisanes nĂ©gatives, qui ne sont, aprĂšs tout, rien de plus qu’une façon pour les Ă©lecteurs de se positionner dans un paysage politique offrant souvent des choix limitĂ©s.

Entre Trump et Biden, par exemple, les Ă©lecteurs se retrouvent avec des options moins que parfaites et doivent jauger le nĂ©gatif autant que le positif. C’est souvent le moins pire qui l’emporte.

Budget du QuĂ©bec : faut-il s’alarmer ou se calmer?TEST

La taille du dĂ©ficit annoncĂ© pour l’annĂ©e 2024-2025 surprend. Maintenant que la poussiĂšre retombe, doit-on s’en inquiĂ©ter ? S’agit-il rĂ©ellement d’un dĂ©ficit historique ? Surtout, que reprĂ©sente l’effort Ă  fournir pour retrouver l’équilibre ?  

Alors qu’il Ă©tait estimĂ© Ă  3 G$ l’an dernier, le dĂ©ficit est maintenant projetĂ© Ă  11 G$. Sans surprise, les revenus de l’État ont Ă©tĂ© revus Ă  la baisse avec la diminution des perspectives Ă©conomiques. Ils ont aussi Ă©tĂ© plombĂ©s par une chute des bĂ©nĂ©fices des entreprises du gouvernement (et les pressions sur les dĂ©penses dĂ©coulant des nouvelles ententes collectives. À cela s’ajoutent de nouvelles initiatives pour prĂšs de 2,2 G$.  

En regard du prĂ©cĂ©dent budget, les donnĂ©es du cadre financier montrent que prĂšs de 28 G$ de dĂ©ficits s’ajouteraient aux annĂ©es de 2023-2024 Ă  2028-2029. Les rĂ©sultats attendus, tels qu’illustrĂ©s dans le cadre financier, laissent entrevoir l’importance d’un dĂ©ficit structurel autour de 3 Ă  4 G$. 

Un dĂ©ficit record ? 

Il a Ă©tĂ© avancĂ© par plusieurs qu’un dĂ©ficit de 11 G$ Ă©tait un record, notamment supĂ©rieur Ă  celui observĂ© lors de la pandĂ©mie. Qu’en est-il exactement ? 

Le cadre financier indique un dĂ©ficit au sens de la Loi sur l’équilibre budgĂ©taire de 11 G$ pour l’annĂ©e 2024-2025, alors qu’en dollars absolus, le dĂ©ficit le plus important observĂ© Ă©tait de 10,8 G$ en 2020-2021 (annĂ©e pandĂ©mique).  

Cela dit, si on retranche la portion du dĂ©ficit causĂ©e par les modifications comptables et les versements au Fonds des gĂ©nĂ©rations, le dĂ©ficit liĂ© aux activitĂ©s est beaucoup plus important en 2024 (8,7 G$) que pendant la pandĂ©mie (4,4 G$). Rares sont ceux qui, avant la prĂ©sentation du budget, auraient pu s’imaginer que le ministre des Finances Eric Girard prĂ©senterait un dĂ©ficit d’activitĂ©s plus grand que celui prĂ©sentĂ© durant l’annĂ©e pandĂ©mique. Cela reste aussi vrai si on ne tient pas compte de la provision pour Ă©ventualitĂ©s de 1,5 G$. 

 

Évidemment, si on trace l’évolution du poids du dĂ©ficit en pourcentage du PIB, le portrait est quelque peu diffĂ©rent. Il est possible d’observer que le dĂ©ficit en 2024-2025 reprĂ©sente un poids de 1,9 %, le deuxiĂšme plus important depuis la mise en place de la Loi sur l’équilibre budgĂ©taire en 1996. Au terme de l’annĂ©e financiĂšre actuelle, on saura si la rĂ©serve pour Ă©ventualitĂ©s a Ă©tĂ© utilisĂ©e ; si QuĂ©bec n’y a pas touchĂ©, le ratio du dĂ©ficit serait plutĂŽt de 1,6 %. 

 

Un plan de retour Ă  l’équilibre repoussé 

Le ministre des Finances utilise le remplacement de la Loi sur l’équilibre budgĂ©taire votĂ©e en dĂ©cembre pour repousser au prochain budget le dĂ©pĂŽt de son plan de retour Ă  l’équilibre. Il indique, toutefois, un retour Ă  l’équilibre en 2029-2030.  

Pour bien saisir tout l’effort budgĂ©taire Ă  venir, prenons l’annĂ©e 2028-2029. Actuellement, le solde budgĂ©taire au sens de la loi indique un dĂ©ficit de 3,9 G$, mais Ă  l’intĂ©rieur du cadre financier, il est prĂ©cisĂ© que pour atteindre ce solde, le gouvernement devra rĂ©sorber 2 G$ dont l’origine demeure encore non identifiĂ©e. Cela signifie donc que le dĂ©ficit avant l’identification de l’écart Ă  rĂ©sorber est de 5,9 G$. 

Or, en vertu de la nouvelle loi sur l’équilibre budgĂ©taire, selon l’article 7, un dĂ©ficit budgĂ©taire constatĂ© supĂ©rieur aux versements au Fonds des gĂ©nĂ©rations – comme c’est le cas pour l’exercice 2022-2023 –, enclenche l’obligation de prĂ©senter un plan de retour Ă  l’équilibre budgĂ©taire d’une durĂ©e maximale de 5 ans au budget suivant (mars 2024) ou l’autre d’aprĂšs (mars 2025). Le ministre des Finances a optĂ© pour le prĂ©senter au budget de mars 2025. La loi prĂ©cise Ă©galement que lors de l’annĂ©e prĂ©cĂ©dant le retour Ă  l’équilibre, le dĂ©ficit ne devra pas dĂ©passer 25 % du dĂ©ficit constatĂ© ayant enclenchĂ© le dĂ©pĂŽt du plan.  

Le plan qui sera dĂ©posĂ© au printemps 2025 devra donc prĂ©voir un dĂ©ficit maximal de 1,5 G$ en 2028-2029. Cela implique qu’on devra trouver 4,4 G$, soit la somme de l’écart Ă  rĂ©sorber indiquĂ©e au cadre financier (2 G$) et de l’écart Ă  additionnel pour respecter la loi (2,4 G$).  

 

Impact sur la dette 

Évidemment, les dĂ©ficits additionnels projetĂ©s se rĂ©percuteront sur la dette, dont la valeur nette passera en 2028-2029 Ă  263,5 G$ dans le budget de cette annĂ©e par rapport Ă  233,5 G$ dans celui de l’an dernier. Le ministre des Finances indique qu’il s’assurera que les cibles d’endettement sont respectĂ©es lorsqu’il dĂ©posera son plan de retour Ă  l’équilibre. 

Actuellement, le ratio de la dette nette par rapport au PIB se situe au-dessus des nouvelles cibles d’endettement votĂ©es en dĂ©cembre dernier, soit 33 % pour 2032-2033 et 30 % en 2037-2038. Ces ratios respectent toutefois la Loi sur la rĂ©duction de la dette et instituant le Fonds des gĂ©nĂ©rations, car ils se situent Ă  l’intĂ©rieur de la fourchette (+/– 2,5 points de pourcentage). Dans le cas de la cible intermĂ©diaire de 2032-2033, le ratio prĂ©vu se situe Ă  la limite supĂ©rieure.  

Devant la dĂ©tĂ©rioration des soldes budgĂ©taires relativement aux derniĂšres perspectives budgĂ©taires et de ses effets sur le ratio de dette, deux agences de notation (DBRS et Moody’s) se sont montrĂ©es prĂ©occupĂ©es au lendemain du budget, sans pour autant annoncer une perspective nĂ©gative sur la cote de crĂ©dit du QuĂ©bec.  

Pour renouer avec l’équilibre budgĂ©taire, le ministre a dĂ©jĂ  rĂ©visĂ© certains crĂ©dits d’impĂŽt aux entreprises basĂ©s sur les salaires. Il souhaite une hausse du potentiel Ă©conomique qui contribuerait Ă  hausser les recettes de l’État sans hausser le fardeau fiscal des contribuables. Il prĂ©voit aussi une optimisation des entreprises du gouvernement et un examen des dĂ©penses budgĂ©taires et fiscales devant ĂȘtre intĂ©grĂ©s au plan de retour Ă  l’équilibre budgĂ©taire du printemps 2025, mais tout reste Ă  faire de ce cĂŽtĂ©.  

Il va de soi que si cette annĂ©e, le dĂ©ficit est imposant, le travail pour retrouver l’équilibre budgĂ©taire et l’identification des actions qui devront ĂȘtre prises le sera tout autant. Passer d’un dĂ©ficit structurel Ă  l’équilibre budgĂ©taire n’est jamais une tĂąche facile. Les prochaines annĂ©es le confirmeront. 

Regulators should remain independent as Canada moves away from fossil fuelsTEST

Two provincial energy regulators recently passed rulings that signal it is no longer business as usual when it comes to traditional energy infrastructure in Canada. 

The decisions considered whether new natural gas infrastructure will become underutilized before its costs are fully paid – known as stranded-asset risk. The shift represented by these decisions is sorely needed if Canada is to ensure the transition to a low-carbon economy is efficient, equitable and in line with its climate targets. 

That said, at least one of the rulings will almost certainly be overturned by legislation introduced by the Ontario government which politicizes energy regulation, claiming that it will increase housing costs. 

The rulings 

In British Columbia and Ontario, energy regulators were concerned that the transition away from fossil fuels would reduce demand for natural gas when they ruled on two applications for new gas infrastructure. Regulators act in the public interest while protecting the interests of consumers. 

The British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC) rejected a proposal for the construction of a new $327.4-million natural gas transmission pipeline to meet forecast increases in peak demand in the Okanagan region. 

The BCUC ruled the forecast by FortisBC Energy Inc. failed to adequately account for provincial and municipal plans for zero-carbon new buildings and provincial initiatives to support the adoption of heat pumps.  

Meanwhile, the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) was asked to rule on proposed 2024 rates for Enbridge Gas to recover the cost of delivery infrastructure to new residential developments. 

The OEB ruled those costs should be paid upfront by the developers rather than through connection and delivery fees over the 40-year lifespan of the infrastructure to avoid creating stranded assets that risked increasing costs for customers. 

Responses 

Both FortisBC and Enbridge Gas are moving to appeal the decisions. 

However, just one day after the OEB decision was released, the Ontario government vowed legislation to override the decision, arguing that it would “slow or halt the construction of new homes” and “could lead to tens of thousands of dollars added to the cost of new homes.” 

On Feb. 22, Bill 165, the Keeping Energy Costs Down Act, was introduced which threatens the independence of the OEB and politicizes an institutional process that has been and should remain non-partisan. 

Implications for housing affordability 

The Ontario government is wrong to suggest that making developers pay the cost of new gas infrastructure will hurt housing affordability. Enbridge estimates the average added cost per home would be $4,412, a mere 0.47 per cent of the average Ontario home price as of May 2023.  

Ultimately, developers can avoid the cost altogether by building all-electric communities.  

As pointed out by the OEB, obligating developers to cover the cost of installing gas delivery infrastructure is an incentive to choose the most cost-effective energy option. 

In some cases, this will mean building all-electric communities that use high-efficiency heat pumps for space and water heating. This in turn improves housing affordability by reducing the cost of operating the new homes.  

The two rulings aimed to protect ratepayers from the cost of new infrastructure that risks becoming stranded assets as our society decarbonizes. 

Without fairness and finance, the energy transition won’t be fast 

Foreign-owned oil companies in Canada hold key to climate change 

In the long term, these costs are far more likely to fall on low-income households because wealthier households can afford the upfront costs of purchasing electric home appliances such as heat pumps. 

 Those households will continue to benefit because heating with a heat pump is more cost-effective than with gas, in part due to rising carbon taxes, and because they may avoid paying monthly gas connection fees.  

As homes increasingly move away from gas, paying for that infrastructure will fall to a shrinking customer base.  

The energy transition will reduce gas use 

Both regulators determined that natural gas use will decline in response to the transition from fossil fuels to electricity. In addition, the federal government has committed to reducing Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions by 40 to 45 per cent by 2030 and to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050.  

Electric heat pumps are widely held to be the best option for decarbonizing buildings. Heat pumps are the most efficient heating system available, and most homes and businesses in Ontario and B.C. with a heat pump will save money by replacing gas heating systems.  

Moreover, unlike gas appliances, all-electric homes do not produce health-harming pollutants indoors that result in increased rates of asthma in children and are linked to other serious health problems, or vent pollutants outdoors.  

Policy implications  

What these recent rulings and the aftermath demonstrate is that good policy in the public interest is vulnerable to politicization.  

The OEB and BCUC should be applauded for recognizing the stranded-asset risks of new gas infrastructure as the energy transition unfolds. It is in the public interest to avoid such risks and to protect ratepayers from these unnecessary costs that are also bad for public health and threaten housing affordability.  

In turn, governments should respect the independence of energy regulators, recognizing that their decisions are based on careful analysis of complex systems after engagement with major stakeholders and industry experts.  

Housing affordability is a complex issue that is directly and indirectly impacted by energy regulator decisions and government policy. 

As society takes the necessary steps toward decarbonization, more work is needed to understand the impact on low-income and vulnerable Canadians so that policies and programs can be developed and applied equitably for a cleaner more affordable future for all.  

Where are the reviews of government action on COVID-19?TEST

(Version française disponible ici)

This winter, COVID-19 is circulating and contributing to the cocktail of respiratory diseases filling emergency rooms across Canada, but governments have shifted the bulk of their attention to dealing with the aftermath of the pandemic.

With the trauma and upheaval of the most disruptive pandemic restrictions behind us, the focus has turned to the affordability crisis and a health-care system about to crack.

But where are the lessons-learned reports from governments?

Academics and civil society have issued papers and reports reviewing the government’s performance, most notably, a series on Accountability for Canada’s COVID-19 Response by the BMJ, formerly the British Medical Journal.

The Centre of Excellence on the Canadian Federation at the IRPP has released its own report in partnership with the Institute on Governance on Resilient Institutions: Lessons Learned from Canada’s COVID-19 Response.

Reports like ours can set the groundwork, but they’re not a replacement for reports from governments themselves, which have largely been in short supply. We have neither the resources nor access required for the kind of lessons-learned study this country deserves.

But governments need to understand how they can co-ordinate to respond better to future crises.

Few internal reports have been made public by provinces

Why the lack of reports? It could be that governments simply haven’t gotten around to it yet. The federal government recently tasked a panel of experts with a report reviewing the federal approach to pandemic science advice and research coordination. It is set to be published in March.

Alberta released a report in November reviewing legislation impacting its response to COVID-19. But many other governments have not released plans to conduct any reviews at all.

As part of the Resilient Institutions research, we conducted a scan of publicly available reports on COVID-19 issued or commissioned by government.

We took a particular interest in those issued by ministries or departments given their internal perspective of what happened during the pandemic. We reached out to the provincial and territorial clerks to confirm whether reports have been published. We were surprised to find that six provinces haven’t made public any ministerial or departmental reports.

For one of the most devastating public policy crises of this century, half of the governments in this country have not published any sort of internal reflection (figure 1). It’s a very low bar, and yet, almost half of provinces and territories in the country have not met it.

Of the 61 reports we identified, 38 of the public COVID-19 reports were written by auditors general. Auditors general have an important role in government accountability but they’re limited in their mandate, which is to conduct performance and financial audits. They can’t, for example, question whether a decision should have been implemented. They can measure whether the program hit performance targets or stayed on budget, but not whether the government should have implemented the program in the first place.

External expert groups commissioned by governments were responsible for five reports. Expert groups can be helpful in providing an independent assessment of the government’s performance. Of course, the merits of this source of reports are dependent on the mandate and composition of these expert panels and what experience they have navigating the complexities of the public service.

But internal reports from governments themselves have advantages. Governments are best placed to understand the processes and structures that went into one of the most challenging policy responses in this century. No one has a better understanding of the government’s response to the pandemic than the governments themselves.

None of the 61 reports is a comparative, pan-Canadian pandemic lessons-learned study. Not one has been attempted or even announced. A pan-Canadian study is an inherently difficult task because of the input it needs from each order of government. That’s why such an initiative should be initiated by the federal government.

Co-ordination must improve

Better co-ordination is necessary to avoid causing harm, especially to underserved communities. Last June, we held the Resilient Institutions conference, where senior officials, academics, and civil society gathered to discuss lessons learned from the pandemic. During the conference, many of the 35 panelists talked about jurisdictional confusion and how treating responsibilities like a game of hot potato led to poor outcomes.

One of the most egregious examples was when provincial border closures prevented students in Listuguj Mi’gmaq First Nation from getting to school. The community is on the Quebec side of the border with New Brunswick, and their high school is on the N.B. side.

How the provinces compare in their COVID-19 responses

What was different about Ontario’s COVID-19 response

COVID-19 responses were always going to be inequitable

Another example was how some municipal governments were left with few resources or co-ordination. Kennedy Stewart, former mayor of Vancouver, lamented that he was only able to secure one brief person-to-person call with John Horgan, then-B.C. premier, throughout the entire pandemic.

Without a review to delve into understanding the necessary structures, processes, and relationships needed to prepare for cross-jurisdictional disasters, Canada is in a vulnerable position. Viruses and natural disasters don’t respect borders, so governments are all going to have to figure out how to work with each other.

Examine the federation’s robustness

Secondly, governments need to examine the Canadian federation’s robustness, and how flexible and responsive its responses can be. Our institutions largely worked well to implement the government’s COVID-19 strategy, but executive federalism, where the prime minister and premiers drive much of the institutional response, was the foundation of the government’s approach.

Governments need to figure out a way to work together that doesn’t depend on weekly first ministers’ meetings. This is not a sustainable strategy in the medium or long term. As a first step, they must identify the processes and structures that worked best in a far-reaching and vital process only they can launch.

This could be done with a thorough operational review of the committees and working groups that were a part of the federal, provincial, and territorial response to the pandemic. This could happen as part of a pan-Canadian pandemic lessons-learned study.

Avoiding a “snap-back” to old habits

The pandemic was the first big test this decade of a crisis that required cross-jurisdictional collaboration. Governments need to get a feel for what avenues of communication work. They need to capitalize on the information exchange that occurred and create opportunities for those relationships to continue after the pandemic.

One panellist during the Resilient Institutions conference remarked that after the pandemic started to subside, colleagues from other provinces stopped reaching out, and so did those in the panelist’s office. This is just one example of the “snap-back” governments should want to avoid. The federation is better off when governments talk to each other.

How federalism failed Canadian cities during COVID-19

Stress testing Canadian governance

Canadians were asked to accept far-reaching restrictions like border closures and curfews, often with little explanation and on short notice. They need assurances that the government acknowledges these costs and are working to ensure that these measures are proportionate and limited in the future. How the government handles itself after the pandemic sets the tone for future crises.

Learning how to learn from mistakes is something governments grapple with. The pandemic is a huge opportunity to do so. The Resilient Institutions report is a start, but it’s up to governments to build on the work in it.

OĂč sont les bilans de la rĂ©ponse gouvernementale Ă  la COVID-19 ?TEST

(English version available here)

La COVID-19 circule toujours bel et bien cet hiver et elle participe au cocktail de maladies respiratoires qui remplissent les salles d’urgence partout au pays. En dĂ©pit de ceci, les gouvernements ont tournĂ© leur attention vers la gestion des consĂ©quences postpandĂ©miques.

Maintenant que le traumatisme et les bouleversements liĂ©s aux restrictions sanitaires de la pandĂ©mie sont derriĂšre nous, les dĂ©cideurs consacrent dĂ©sormais l’essentiel de leur attention Ă  la crise de l’abordabilitĂ© et Ă  des rĂ©seaux de la santĂ© qui craquent de partout.

Mais oĂč sont leurs bilans sur les enseignements tirĂ©s de la pandĂ©mie ?

Des universitaires et des reprĂ©sentants de la sociĂ©tĂ© civile ont publiĂ© des Ă©tudes et des rapports sur la gestion gouvernementale de la pandĂ©mie, dont une sĂ©rie d’articles publiĂ©s par le BMJ (anciennement connu comme le British Medical Journal) sur l’obligation de rendre compte de la rĂ©ponse du Canada Ă  la COVID-19.

Le Centre d’excellence sur la fĂ©dĂ©ration canadienne de l’IRPP a publiĂ© son propre rapport, en partenariat avec l’Institut sur la gouvernance, intitulĂ© Institutions rĂ©silientes : Apprendre de la pandĂ©mie de COVID-19 au Canada.

Des rapports comme le nĂŽtre peuvent mettre la table Ă  la rĂ©flexion, mais ils ne remplacent pas ceux rĂ©alisĂ©s par les gouvernements eux-mĂȘmes et qui manquent encore grandement Ă  l’appel. Nous ne disposons ni des ressources ni des accĂšs nĂ©cessaires pour rĂ©aliser le type d’étude que notre pays mĂ©rite sur les leçons Ă  tirer de la crise sanitaire.

Nos gouvernements doivent comprendre comment ils peuvent se coordonner pour mieux répondre aux crises futures.

Peu de rapports internes ont été rendus publics

Pourquoi cette absence de rapports ? Peut-ĂȘtre parce que les gouvernements n’ont tout simplement pas encore pris le temps de les produire.

Le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral a rĂ©cemment chargĂ© un groupe d’experts de rĂ©diger un rapport qui devrait paraĂźtre en mars sur l’approche fĂ©dĂ©rale en matiĂšre de conseils scientifiques et de coordination de la recherche en cas de pandĂ©mie

En novembre, l’Alberta a publiĂ© un rapport sur l’examen de la lĂ©gislation ayant une incidence sur sa rĂ©ponse Ă  la COVID-19. Toutefois, de nombreux autres gouvernements n’ont pas encore annoncĂ© leur intention de procĂ©der Ă  un quelconque rĂ©examen.

Dans le cadre de nos travaux sur la résilience de nos institutions, nous avons analysé les rapports sur la COVID-19 publiés ou commandés par les gouvernements et accessibles au public.

Nous nous sommes particuliĂšrement intĂ©ressĂ©s aux rapports publiĂ©s par les ministĂšres, compte tenu de leur perspective interne sur ce qui s’est passĂ© pendant la pandĂ©mie. Nous avons contactĂ© les greffiers provinciaux et territoriaux pour vĂ©rifier si de tels rapports avaient Ă©tĂ© publiĂ©s. Nous avons Ă©tĂ© surpris de constater que six provinces n’ont publiĂ© aucun bilan.

MĂȘme s’il s’agit d’une des crises de politique publique les plus dĂ©vastatrices de ce siĂšcle, la moitiĂ© des gouvernements du pays n’ont publiĂ© aucune rĂ©flexion interne (voir figure 1). La barre est trĂšs basse, et pourtant, prĂšs de la moitiĂ© des provinces et des territoires du pays ne l’ont pas franchie.

Sur les 61 rapports que nous avons identifiĂ©s, 38 des rapports publics portant sur la COVID-19 ont Ă©tĂ© rĂ©digĂ©s par des vĂ©rificateurs gĂ©nĂ©raux. Ceux-ci jouent un rĂŽle important en matiĂšre de responsabilitĂ© gouvernementale, mais ils sont limitĂ©s dans leur mandat, qui consiste Ă  rĂ©aliser des audits de performance et financiers. Ils ne peuvent pas, par exemple, se demander si une dĂ©cision devait ĂȘtre prise. Ils peuvent Ă©valuer si un programme a atteint les objectifs de performance ou respectĂ© le budget, mais pas si un gouvernement devait ou non mettre un programme en Ɠuvre en premier lieu.

Cinq autres rapports ont Ă©tĂ© rĂ©digĂ©s par des groupes d’experts externes mandatĂ©s par les gouvernements. Les groupes d’experts peuvent ĂȘtre utiles en fournissant une Ă©valuation indĂ©pendante des performances gouvernementales. Bien entendu, les mĂ©rites de ce type de rapports dĂ©pendent du mandat, de la composition de ces groupes d’experts et de l’expĂ©rience qu’ils ont des complexitĂ©s du service public.

Les rapports internes des gouvernements prĂ©sentent aussi des avantages. Les gouvernements sont les mieux placĂ©s pour comprendre les processus et les structures qui ont permis de gĂ©rer l’un des casse-tĂȘte politiques les plus difficiles de ce siĂšcle. Personne ne comprend mieux la rĂ©ponse gouvernementale Ă  la pandĂ©mie que les gouvernements eux-mĂȘmes.

Malheureusement, aucun des 61 rapports recensĂ©s n’est une Ă©tude comparative pancanadienne des leçons tirĂ©es de la pandĂ©mie. Aucune n’a Ă©tĂ© tentĂ©e ni mĂȘme annoncĂ©e. Une Ă©tude pancanadienne est une tĂąche intrinsĂšquement difficile en raison de la contribution nĂ©cessaire de chaque ordre de gouvernement. VoilĂ  pourquoi une telle initiative devrait ĂȘtre initiĂ©e par le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral.

Une coordination qui doit ĂȘtre amĂ©liorĂ©e

Une meilleure coordination entre les différentes instances est nécessaire pour éviter de causer des dommages, en particulier aux communautés mal desservies.

En juin dernier, nous avons organisĂ© la confĂ©rence « Institutions rĂ©silientes » oĂč de hauts fonctionnaires, des universitaires et des reprĂ©sentants de la sociĂ©tĂ© civile se sont rĂ©unis pour discuter des enseignements tirĂ©s de la pandĂ©mie. Au cours de cette confĂ©rence, un grand nombre des 35 panĂ©listes ont parlĂ© de la confusion entourant les diffĂ©rentes compĂ©tences et du fait que certaines responsabilitĂ©s traitĂ©es comme des « patates chaudes » ont conduit Ă  de mauvais rĂ©sultats.

L’un des exemples les plus flagrants est la fermeture des frontiĂšres provinciales, qui a empĂȘchĂ© les Ă©lĂšves de la PremiĂšre Nation Mi’gmaq de Listuguj de se rendre Ă  l’école Ă©tant donnĂ© que la communautĂ© se trouve au QuĂ©bec, mais l’école secondaire au Nouveau-Brunswick.

La rĂ©ponse de l’Ontario Ă  la pandĂ©mie, vue de l’intĂ©rieur

Pandémies, Covid-19 et facteurs sociétaux

Gestion de la pandémie : les Québécois ont droit à une seconde opinion

La démocratie canadienne au temps de la COVID-19

Un autre exemple est celui des municipalitĂ©s qui se sont retrouvĂ©es avec peu de ressources ou de coordination. Kennedy Stewart, ancien maire de Vancouver, a dĂ©plorĂ© le fait qu’il n’ait pu obtenir qu’une seule brĂšve conversation au tĂ©lĂ©phone avec John Horgan, alors premier ministre de la Colombie-Britannique, pendant toute la durĂ©e de la pandĂ©mie.

Sans examen permettant de comprendre les structures, les processus et les relations nécessaires pour mieux se préparer à des catastrophes transnationales, le Canada se trouve dans une position vulnérable. Les virus et les catastrophes naturelles ne connaissent pas de frontiÚres : les gouvernements vont donc devoir trouver un moyen de travailler ensemble.

Valider la robustesse de la fédération

En outre, les gouvernements doivent examiner la soliditĂ© de la fĂ©dĂ©ration canadienne, ainsi que la souplesse et la rapiditĂ© de ses rĂ©ponses. Nos institutions ont en grande partie bien fonctionnĂ© pour mettre en Ɠuvre la stratĂ©gie gouvernementale face Ă  la COVID-19, mais le fĂ©dĂ©ralisme exĂ©cutif, dans lequel les premiers ministres fĂ©dĂ©ral et provinciaux dirigent une grande partie de la rĂ©ponse institutionnelle, a Ă©tĂ© le fondement de l’approche gouvernementale.

Les diffĂ©rents gouvernements doivent trouver un moyen de travailler ensemble sans dĂ©pendre des rĂ©unions hebdomadaires des premiers ministres, une stratĂ©gie qui n’est pas viable Ă  moyen ou Ă  long terme. Dans un premier temps, il importe d’identifier les processus et les structures qui ont le mieux fonctionnĂ©.

Pour ce faire, on pourrait procĂ©der Ă  un examen opĂ©rationnel approfondi des comitĂ©s et des groupes de travail qui ont participĂ© Ă  la rĂ©ponse fĂ©dĂ©rale, provinciale et territoriale Ă  la pandĂ©mie. Cela pourrait se faire dans le cadre d’une Ă©tude pancanadienne sur les enseignements tirĂ©s de la pandĂ©mie.

Éviter de renouer avec de vieilles habitudes

PremiĂšre grande crise de la dĂ©cennie, la pandĂ©mie a mis Ă  l’épreuve la collaboration entre les diffĂ©rentes instances politiques. Les gouvernements doivent se familiariser avec des moyens de communication qui fonctionnent. Ils doivent tirer parti de l’échange d’informations qui a eu lieu et crĂ©er des opportunitĂ©s pour que ces relations se poursuivent aprĂšs la pandĂ©mie.

Lors de notre confĂ©rence, un intervenant a fait remarquer qu’aprĂšs la fin de la pandĂ©mie, ses collĂšgues d’autres provinces ont cessĂ© de lui tendre la main, de mĂȘme que ceux de son bureau. Ce n’est lĂ  qu’un exemple du « retour en arriĂšre » que les gouvernements devraient Ă©viter. La fĂ©dĂ©ration se porte mieux lorsque les gouvernements se parlent.

Le fédéralisme a mal servi les villes pendant la pandémie

Le test de résistance de la gouvernance canadienne

On a demandĂ© aux Canadiens d’accepter des restrictions de grande envergure, comme la fermeture des frontiĂšres et les couvre-feux, souvent sans explication et avec un prĂ©avis trĂšs court. Ils doivent avoir l’assurance que les gouvernements reconnaissent ces coĂ»ts et qu’ils s’efforcent de faire en sorte que ces mesures soient proportionnĂ©es et limitĂ©es Ă  l’avenir. Le comportement des gouvernements aprĂšs la pandĂ©mie donnera le ton pour les crises futures.

Les gouvernements doivent apprendre Ă  tirer les leçons de leurs erreurs. La pandĂ©mie est une occasion unique de le faire. Le rapport Institutions rĂ©silientes est un dĂ©but, mais il appartient aux gouvernements de s’appuyer sur le travail qu’il contient pour entamer la dĂ©marche grandement nĂ©cessaire qui ne saurait Ă©maner que d’eux.

Policing women’s sexuality in the name of protectionTEST

S-210 is a private member’s bill introduced by Senator Julie Miville-DechĂȘne. Its central goal seems like a no-brainer: to keep young people from encountering media they are not equipped to see. It aims to achieve this goal by requiring people to use a third-party service to verify their age to access adult content online in Canada.

Part of the motivation for the bill is to end violence against women. The notion is that men who watch pornography from a young age can go on to inflict violence on women as those men get older. In short, violence against women is pornography’s fault, the reasoning goes. And to end that violence, we need to end access to pornography.

Where the bill goes wrong is in the definition of pornography, which starts with women’s breasts. In doing so, it could reinforce a stigma against women. After all, if women’s bodies on their own are pornographic, and pornography is the cause of violence against women, aren’t women actually to blame for the violence they encounter?

This sounds a lot like upholding a cycle of blaming women for their own abuse instead of making meaningful and inclusive social policy.

But regulation doesn’t have to be that way. The creation and promotion of media literacy programs aimed at viewers of sexually explicit content would go a long way toward raising awareness of unrealistic messaging and depictions in pornography. A push to expand the use of device-based parental-control options must also be part of the way forward.

Less information, more violence

The bill takes the definition of sexually explicit material from section 171.1(5) of the Criminal Code of Canada, which begins at exposed female breasts. In this line-drawing exercise of breasts-as-necessarily-pornographic, women’s experiences will be silenced online.

This reduces access to comprehensive health and safety information, including information for patients and survivors of breast cancer and victims of domestic and/or sexual abuse. All of this increases violence against women. What’s worse: the bill’s roots suggest that censoring women may be what it was designed to do.

Starting as S-203 in 2020, the bill found its base in anti-choice, anti-women’s sexuality and anti-2SLGBTQ+ rhetoric. The sponsoring senator quotes the American College of Pediatricians, an American hate group that is not the legitimate American Academy of Pediatrics but capitalizes on its similar name to spread misinformation. With this base, it’s not surprising that the worst of the myriad harms of S-210 will be borne by women, 2SLBTQ+ folks, and other marginalized communities.

Rape myths and sexism still cloud police responses to sexualized violence

The misogyny of the so-called “rough sex” defence

“Extreme intoxication” appeal decision is yet another blow to women

Proponents of the bill reason that people have to show identification to enter a strip club or buy liquor or cigarettes. They argue that age verification online is no different.

But we’re not talking about controlling access to a physical space or object. It’s access to ideas, to data. It’s ones and zeroes strung together and transmitted across wires that represent our online lives, which are inseparable from our physical ones. And to intercept specific ideas, you need to control access to all ideas.

S-210 would allow the government to target any platform that sexually explicit material can be found on. It was initially aimed only at major pornography websites – think Pornhub and the like. Discussions at committee then evolved to apply to any platform with 33 per cent or more of its content classified as adult. Now, the sponsoring senator and the Age Verification Providers Association that lobbied for this bill have reset their tone for the worse.

The bill’s near-unlimited scope now includes all social media, search engines, and even messaging services. Under 171.1(5) of the Criminal Code, the ideas being controlled here are sexually explicit ones contained in video, photo, written, and audio materials. If it were to proceed as drafted, content moderation on those platforms would need to go nuclear.

Anything that could be defined as sexually explicit material under the bill would need to be filtered out to avoid creating barriers to traffic flows. After all, the generator of profit for most of these ad-based, free-to-use services is their sheer number of visitors, which would be hampered if they are required to use age verification tools.

Women’s bodies are seen by both humans and AI alike to be more sexual than men’s. Because their breasts alone are enough to constitute pornographic content, more of women’s posts on the internet are likely to come down. Breast cancer survivors, women’s reproductive health companies, and sexual health education agencies have all had their content taken down for violating “community standards” when posting images or text about women’s health.

Bringing fairness to campus sexual violence complaint processes

Legal gaps persist for intimate partner sexual violence after key ruling

When information on safe abortion is unavailable due to content moderation, maternal mortality increases. When women can’t share information on their breast-cancer journeys, others won’t detect their own cancers earlier. Quite simply, strengthening content moderation against women’s bodies will cost lives.

But I am not saying we should do nothing. Quite the opposite. There could well be harm that flows from watching media that presents social or sexual situations that young people are unequipped to experience. We should do something, but something that actually works and does not implicate equality or privacy rights of all Canadians.

Educate the young and old

Australia recently rejected an age verification bill and recommended an approach very similar to what I will propose here: media literacy programs that focus on attacking the perceived realism of media that young people encounter. The higher the perceived realism of a piece of media, the more likely that person is to believe that it represents real-world truth.

This can be addressed in age-appropriate ways, including demystifying production sets and explaining how special effects are achieved. Educators and/or guardians can also discuss relationships modelled in all media and encourage young people to think critically about why they’re presented in a certain way.

Studies have shown that simple educational messaging that the content in adult films is not necessarily how everyone likes to have sex can decrease perceived realism and even correct rape-supportive beliefs. We just have to be able to talk about it.

Strategic education programs aimed at caregivers that demystify device-based content filters, also known as parental controls, are also incredibly useful. These filters ensure that only users who shouldn’t be encountering sexually explicit content aren’t encountering it.

For those who say that pornography truly is the problem, I hear you. As a teen, I hated the unrealistic body image that some porn communicated, and I saw it as cheating when my partners looked at it. I might have even applauded Bill S-210 if it had been tabled at the time.

But I’m not that anti-porn critic anymore.

I’ve come to realize how blanket criticism of porn and sex work creates opportunities to police all women’s bodies and sexualities – just like S-210 would do.

In my late teens, an ex-boyfriend shared intimate images of me online without my consent. I stepped back and looked critically at what was happening. Someone was trying to leverage my sexuality as a young woman to ruin my life.

Fake porn causes real harm to women

What’s at stake in supporting sex workers’ right to health

Preventing sexual violence on campus

This guy saw the hateful way we, and even I, treated people who work in sex work. He saw how society treats women who are not chaste. He found power in that parallel and used it. He knew that by “demoting” me to the ranks of an online sex worker, I could lose jobs, have my family reject me, lose friends, lose opportunities for education. Damage could be inflicted because of anti-women attitudes in society. That’s why that kind of sharing works.

This bill doubles down on those attitudes. Victims of sexual assault will have to fight even harder to establish that their assault was not their fault because this bill implies that sexual violence is the fault of pornography, not of the people who commit violence. And if women’s bodies are pornography, it’s pretty easy to continue the cycle of blaming the victim for her own abuse. That price is simply too high.

Rather than surveilling the salaciousness of any post related to women’s bodies, a two-pronged approach using device-based controls and media literacy must be adopted.

Les multinationales s’invitent dans les cliniques vĂ©tĂ©rinairesTEST

(English version available here)

Nos animaux de compagnie sont précieux. Naturellement, nous voulons en prendre soin en ayant recours à des soins vétérinaires de qualité. Ce souhait semble toutefois de plus en plus mis à mal par le coût des soins.

La hausse du coĂ»t des soins aux animaux a plusieurs causes. Une partie s’explique par le systĂšme professionnel qui encadre les vĂ©tĂ©rinaires.

La profession vĂ©tĂ©rinaire, est encadrĂ©e par plusieurs lois et rĂšglements dont le Code des professions, une loi datant dĂ©jĂ  de plus de cinquante ans. Elle a crĂ©Ă© le systĂšme professionnel quĂ©bĂ©cois et dĂ©fini le rĂŽle des ordres en se fondant largement sur le principe de l’autonomie des professions.

À l’exception de la surveillance de l’exercice illĂ©gal d’une profession, le pouvoir des ordres professionnels s’exerce exclusivement sur les membres, entre autres en les rendant responsables de prĂ©server leur autonomie et de respecter leur code de dĂ©ontologie.

Alors que les structures Ă  l’intĂ©rieur desquelles les vĂ©tĂ©rinaires travaillent sont de plus en plus lourdes et comprennent souvent plusieurs paliers, une question se pose : notre systĂšme professionnel protĂšge-t-il encore le public? On parle beaucoup de protection du public dans la mission des ordres professionnels, mais on devrait aussi attirer l’attention sur leur rĂŽle sociĂ©tal et sur l’arrimage entre l’offre de services des professionnels et les besoins du public — dans le cas de la mĂ©decine vĂ©tĂ©rinaire, les animaux (patients) et leurs propriĂ©taires (clients).

L’emprise des multinationales

Cet arrimage ne se fait pas Ă  forces Ă©gales quand l’offre de services est en grande partie dĂ©terminĂ©e par de grandes corporations, ce qui est trĂšs loin de ce qu’on appelle dans ma profession la relation vĂ©tĂ©rinaire-client-patient (RVCP). Plus les centres dĂ©cisionnels sont prĂšs du triangle de la RVCP, plus les soins sont adaptĂ©s au patient et Ă  sa famille.

En effet, des multinationales sont maintenant propriĂ©taires d’un pourcentage significatif (26 %) de cliniques vĂ©tĂ©rinaires : environ 40 % des mĂ©decins vĂ©tĂ©rinaires du QuĂ©bec y travailleraient. Nous semblons suivre la mouvance amĂ©ricaine avec quelques annĂ©es de retard.

Ce phĂ©nomĂšne n’est pas propre au secteur vĂ©tĂ©rinaire. RĂ©cemment, on rapportait que des cliniques mĂ©dicales du QuĂ©bec (pour humains, comme on dit dans le milieu) sont la propriĂ©tĂ© d’entreprises d’autres domaines, une rĂ©alitĂ© aussi rĂ©pandue dans d’autres professions s’exerçant en cabinet privĂ©.

En principe, selon les rĂšglements sur l’exercice en sociĂ©tĂ© (ou incorporation des professionnels), les cabinets des professionnels de la santĂ© devraient ĂȘtre exclusivement la propriĂ©tĂ© et sous le contrĂŽle de ces derniers. C’est aussi le cas pour les vĂ©tĂ©rinaires : le rĂšglement relatif aux mĂ©decins vĂ©tĂ©rinaires exige que toutes les actions avec droit de vote d’une sociĂ©tĂ© d’exercice de la mĂ©decine vĂ©tĂ©rinaire soient dĂ©tenues par des mĂ©decins vĂ©tĂ©rinaires. La motivation derriĂšre cette exigence est la prĂ©servation de l’autonomie professionnelle.

Ce principe est malheureusement mis Ă  mal parce que la rĂ©glementation est assez facilement contournable ou sujette Ă  interprĂ©tation, surtout lorsqu’on parle de structures administratives Ă  paliers multiples. Comme les multinationales qui possĂšdent des cliniques vĂ©tĂ©rinaires sont parfois aussi propriĂ©taires de marques de nourriture ou de laboratoires d’analyse, cela peut encourager l’intĂ©gration de tels services Ă  ceux offerts par la clinique.

Certains diront que les fonds provenant d’investisseurs non professionnels ont certains effets positifs sur les services, par exemple sur la disponibilitĂ© d’équipements spĂ©cialisĂ©s (scan, imagerie par rĂ©sonance magnĂ©tique, etc.). C’est probablement vrai, et cela bĂ©nĂ©ficie Ă  la minoritĂ© de cas qui nĂ©cessitent ce type de technologie, mais Ă  quel coĂ»t pour l’ensemble des clients ?

PrĂ©server l’indĂ©pendance des professionnels

Comme d’autres professionnels, des mĂ©decins vĂ©tĂ©rinaires exercent dans des OBNL (comme les refuges pour animaux), mĂȘme si cette possibilitĂ© n’est pas mentionnĂ©e de façon explicite dans les rĂšglements sur l’exercice en sociĂ©tĂ© des ordres concernĂ©s. En principe, cela ne semble pas contraire Ă  l’intĂ©rĂȘt public, mais cette possibilitĂ© devrait ĂȘtre Ă©noncĂ©e clairement dans la rĂ©glementation. On devrait aussi s’assurer que l’indĂ©pendance des professionnels y soit protĂ©gĂ©e. De mĂȘme, il serait avantageux d’établir des modalitĂ©s de formation de coopĂ©ratives de professionnels. (Il existe prĂ©sentement des coopĂ©ratives mĂ©dicales, mais ce sont des coopĂ©ratives d’usagers et non de professionnels).

On aura beau insister sur les obligations dĂ©ontologiques des professionnels et leur attribuer la responsabilitĂ© de prĂ©server leur autonomie, celle-ci est menacĂ©e par des contextes organisationnels. La disponibilitĂ© du personnel de soutien, du matĂ©riel de laboratoire et de mĂ©dicaments spĂ©cifiques, de mĂȘme que l’organisation du travail sont des pratiques de gestion qui affectent le type et la qualitĂ© des soins offerts. Certes, de nombreux mĂ©decins vĂ©tĂ©rinaires prĂ©fĂšrent leurs activitĂ©s mĂ©dicales Ă  la gestion. Alors, trouvons des modes de gouvernance qui respectent leur autonomie en matiĂšre de soins tout en confiant des responsabilitĂ©s de gestion Ă  des tiers.

La commission Charbonneau a Ă©tĂ© un important dĂ©clencheur de remise en question du systĂšme professionnel. Elle avait recommandĂ© que « les firmes de services professionnels liĂ©es au domaine de la construction soient assujetties au pouvoir d’encadrement des ordres professionnels dans leur secteur d’activitĂ©s ». On peut penser qu’à l’instar du domaine de la construction, la population aurait avantage Ă  ce que d’autres milieux professionnels soient assujettis Ă  un meilleur encadrement.

QuĂ©bec a entrepris une rĂ©forme du systĂšme professionnel, qui inclut une modernisation du Code des professions. Il sera essentiel de soutenir les professionnels dans la prĂ©servation de leur indĂ©pendance dans tous les types d’organisations (sociĂ©tĂ© par actions, sociĂ©tĂ© en nom collectif Ă  responsabilitĂ© limitĂ©e, OBNL, coopĂ©rative, etc.) et de fournir aux ordres professionnels des outils modernes pour encadrer leurs membres devant une rĂ©alitĂ© qu’ils contrĂŽlent de moins en moins.

En plus de se pencher sur les structures de gouvernance, il faudra aussi que les ordres se prononcent sur les modes de rĂ©munĂ©ration et que ceux-ci respectant les codes de dĂ©ontologie. MalgrĂ© la bonne volontĂ© individuelle, certains modes de facturation peuvent exercer une influence (mĂȘme inconsciente) sur le jugement professionnel, comme la rĂ©munĂ©ration Ă  la commission, qui se rĂ©pand chez les vĂ©tĂ©rinaires employĂ©s de multinationales. Les sections « IndĂ©pendance et dĂ©sintĂ©ressement » des codes de dĂ©ontologie des mĂ©decins vĂ©tĂ©rinaires, des dentistes et des optomĂ©tristes semblent pourtant s’y opposer.

La prĂ©servation de l’indĂ©pendance des mĂ©decins vĂ©tĂ©rinaires est un moyen important de protĂ©ger le public en ramenant les dĂ©cisions prĂšs du centre du triangle vĂ©tĂ©rinaire-client-patient. Agissons pendant qu’il est encore temps.

Multinationals are taking over veterinary clinicsTEST

(Version française disponible ici)

Our pets are precious. Naturally, we want to look after them with quality veterinary care. However, this desire seems to be increasingly undermined by the cost of care.

The rising cost of animal care has several causes. Part of it can be explained by the professional system that governs veterinarians.

The veterinary profession is governed by a number of laws and regulations, including the professional code, which dates back over fifty years. It created Quebec’s professional system and defined the role of the orders, largely based on the principle of professional independence.

Except for monitoring the illegal practice of a profession, the power of professional orders is exercised exclusively over their own members, among other things by requiring them to preserve their autonomy and to respect their code of ethics.

At a time when the organization of veterinarian work is becoming increasingly cumbersome, and often includes several tiers, the question arises: does our professional system still protect the public? There’s a lot of talk about protecting the public in the mission of professional orders, but attention should also be drawn to their societal role and to the link between the services offered by professionals and the needs of the public – in the case of veterinary medicine, the animals (patients) and their owners (clients).

The power of multinationals

This alignment does not take place on an equal footing when the supply of services is largely determined by large corporations, which is a far cry from what is known in my profession as the veterinary-client-patient relationship (VCPR). The closer the decision-making centers are to the VCPR triangle, the better the care is adapted to the patient and its family.

Indeed, multinationals now own a significant percentage (26 per cent) of veterinary clinics and about 40 per cent of Quebec’s veterinarians work in them. We seem to be following an American trend, albeit a few years behind.

This phenomenon is not unique to the veterinary sector. Quebec medical clinics (the ones for humans, as we say in the veterinary industry) are being purchased by companies in other fields, a reality just as widespread in other professions in private practice.

In principle, according to the regulations governing the practice (or incorporation) of professionals, practices of healthcare professionals should be exclusively owned and controlled by them. This is also the case for veterinary surgeons: regulations require that all voting shares in a veterinary surgeon’s corporation be held by veterinary surgeons. The motivation behind this requirement is to preserve professional autonomy.

Unfortunately, this principle is undermined by the fact that regulations is easy to work around and open to interpretation, especially when it comes to multi-level administrative structures. Given the multinationals that own veterinary clinics sometimes also own food brands or laboratories, this can encourage the integration of such services with those offered by the clinic.

Some will argue that funds from non-professional investors have certain positive effects on services, for example on the availability of specialized equipment (CT, MRI, etc.). This is probably true, and it benefits a minority of cases that require this type of technology, but at what overall cost to clients?

Preserving professional independence

Like other professionals, veterinarians practice in non-profits (such as animal shelters), even if it is not explicitly mentioned in the corporate practice regulations of the relevant orders. In principle, this does not appear to be contrary to the public interest, but this type of practice should be clearly treated in the regulations with protections for professional independence. Similarly, it would be advantageous to establish procedures for the formation of professional co-operatives. (Medical co-operatives currently exist, but they are user co-operatives, not professional ones.)

However much we may insist on the ethical obligations of professionals and assign them the responsibility of preserving their autonomy, it is threatened by organizational context. The availability of support staff, laboratory equipment and specific drugs, as well as the organization of work, are management practices that affect the type and quality of care offered. Of course, many veterinarians prefer medical activities to management. Let’s find ways of governing that respect their autonomy in care while entrusting management responsibilities to others.

The Charbonneau Commission in Quebec that examined corruption linked to the construction industry was a major trigger for questioning the professional system. It recommended that “professional service firms related to the construction industry be subject to the supervisory powers of the professional orders in their sector of activity.” Like the construction industry, the public would benefit from better supervision of other professional sectors.

Québec has undertaken a reform of the professional system, including a modernization of the professional code. It will be essential to support professionals in preserving their independence in all types of organizations (joint-stock companies, limited liability partnerships, non-profits, co-operatives, etc.), and to provide professional orders with modern tools to supervise their members in an environment where the orders have less and less control.

In addition to looking at governance structures, professional orders should take a stand on remuneration methods, making sure they comply with codes of ethics. Despite individual goodwill, certain billing methods can exert influence (even if unconscious) on professional judgment, such as commission-based remuneration, which is becoming widespread among veterinary surgeons employed by multinationals. However, the “independence and impartiality” sections of the codes of ethics for veterinary surgeons, dentists and optometrists seem to forbid this.

Preserving the independence of veterinary surgeons is an important way of protecting the public by bringing decision-making closer to the center of the veterinarian-client-patient triangle. The profession must act while there’s still time.

Addressing the funding gap for Indigenous entrepreneurs in CanadaTEST

Indigenous people were the first entrepreneurs to ply their trades on this land – as voyageurs, translators, trappers and traders.

Today, they create businesses at nine times the rate of non-Indigenous Canadians. Overall, the Indigenous economy in Canada is surging toward $100 billion per year.

However, despite these successes, Indigenous-led businesses often encounter a cliff when it comes to growth opportunities due to barriers to accessing capital.

Since I began working with Indigenous entrepreneurs more than a decade ago, one issue has consistently been raised by nearly every one of them: financing and funding.

My experience aligns with a study prepared by the Fraser Institute showing that even as the level of market capital available to Indigenous businesses in Canada grew between 2003 and 2013 to $5.9 billion from $2.8 billion, the gap in the amount of capital available to Indigenous businesses versus non-Indigenous businesses grew even faster.

It’s a challenge that is nothing new to Indigenous entrepreneurs who have been facing such opportunity deficits for generations. It’s also an iniquity that financial institutions in Canada need to help address.

Financial discrimination is enshrined in Canadian law

Every entrepreneur getting a business started needs capital. Without an operational track record, securing business bank loans can be difficult or even impossible in the first couple of years. For many entrepreneurs, tapping into personal savings or family wealth is the only option to cover high startup costs.

For Indigenous entrepreneurs, this reality disproportionately represents a barrier to developing their successful businesses.

Indigenous people in Canada earn 70 cents for every dollar our non-Indigenous counterparts earn and one in four experience poverty.

Meanwhile, the rate of homeownership, a significant indicator of generational wealth in Canada, is effectively zero in Indigenous communities (because it is mostly Crown land that cannot be pledged as collateral for loans for housing or businesses) while it’s about 70 per cent for non-Indigenous families.

The Indian Act historically governed our ancestors’ ability to partake in the economy. If they went off reserve, pursued higher education, joined the police force or the army or went to medical school, they lost their Indigenous status.

Options are severely restricted for any Indigenous entrepreneurs living on reserve hoping to secure startup financing, such as not being able to own the land they live on. Building wealth or demonstrating collateral that meets the requirements to secure a business loan can be essentially impossible without giving up Indigenous community or identity.

Add to this a residential school system that didn’t teach anything about finances, credit and savings.

Financing solutions

Yet, despite these barriers, the Indigenous economy is dynamic and productive and has momentum. Across every industry, Indigenous-led businesses are thriving.

I’m inspired by entrepreneurs such as fashion designer Justin Jacob Louis whose Section 35 streetwear brand has been featured in Vogue; ethical makeup brand Cheekbone Beauty which is carried in Sephora; and the Bouchier Company which has been an integral developer in Alberta’s Athabasca oil sands region for the past 25 years. These inspiring examples prove it can be done.

Every Indigenous entrepreneur should have access to the tools needed to reach those goals. To ensure this is the case, mechanisms need to be in place to provide financing options that are designed with a deep understanding of the challenges specific to Indigenous entrepreneurs. Traditional financial institutions need to move beyond the asset criteria they usually apply.

My organization, Futurpreneur, and our partners at BDC or Indigenous financial institutions funded by NACCA, do provide alternatives. This represents an important start, but it’s not enough to fill the tremendous funding gap.

Through the Indigenous entrepreneur startup program at Futurpreneur, eligibility requirements for startup credit don’t require collateral and focus on the strength of the business plan and accomplishments of the entrepreneur, as well as credit history. Indigenous entrepreneurs who are under 40 in their first year of business can qualify for loans whether they live on or off reserve.

Now, it’s time for other financial institutions to follow suit.

Lived experience and accessible criteria are key

Canadian financial institutions have a crucial role to play in making support available to Indigenous entrepreneurs. Two areas that need particular attention include lending programs that serve entrepreneurs aged 40 and over, and businesses that have been operational for more than one year.

Designing appropriate solutions requires financial institutions to develop a better understanding of the specific barriers Indigenous that entrepreneurs face. For example, banks need to assemble Indigenous-led teams with lived experience who can advocate for, and provide customized counsel to, Indigenous entrepreneurs.

Banks also need to innovate how they assess creditworthiness.

This is uncharted territory for many banks. Our approach at Futurpreneur serves as a blueprint, using a credit-scoring matrix that gives more weight to the strength of the business plan, versus simply looking at credit and credit history.

The outcome is that Indigenous entrepreneurs make up five per cent of the Futurpreneur portfolio (which is proportionate to the Indigenous population in Canada) while we successfully maintain low default rates.

To provide equitable opportunities to Indigenous entrepreneurs, Canadian financial institutions – including banks – should take several steps.

First, they need to hire Indigenous leaders who are empowered to design and run targeted funding programs. It’s impossible to successfully serve the needs of Indigenous communities without a true understanding of those needs that comes from lived experience.

Second, institutions need to innovate when it comes to credit qualifications to address the systemic barriers that perpetuate the Indigenous funding gap. My organization is demonstrating that an adapted credit matrix can deliver great results for both the lender and the borrower.

Finally, these initiatives will be most successful when there’s broader organizational buy-in. Indigenous people make up the fastest-growing demographic in Canada and an important clientele for Canada’s banks. The Indigenous leaders who will run these programs can offer vital expertise to help develop a better overall understanding of the socioeconomic inequalities that their Indigenous customers face.

There is a golden opportunity to better support Indigenous entrepreneurs in Canada so they – like non-Indigenous entrepreneurs – can flourish and grow in an equitable business environment that reflects our realities.

High and dry: The rising tide of flood risks and the insurance dilemmaTEST

Climate change is resulting in heavier rainfall and increased flooding in many parts of the world.

In Canada, roughly one in 10 households face the double whammy of living in areas at high risk of a deluge, while getting insured in these areas is nearly impossible. Insurance companies, deterred by the high cost of payouts for frequent and severe flooding, seldom offer flood coverage in these areas and, when they do, the premiums are sky-high.

Can the Canadian government protect homeowners who don’t have access to, or can’t afford, insurance from rising rates and rising waters?

The federal government announced in last year’s budget that it would create a low-cost flood insurance program. It would aim to ensure that families in high-risk areas could obtain insurance at affordable rates, thus offering a financial safety net in case of flooding.

As important as it is, flood insurance is not a stand-alone solution. A poorly designed program – divorced from a broader resilience strategy – could encourage further risky housing choices in flood-prone areas.

Why discuss a public national flood insurance program in Canada?

Public Safety Canada and a federally convened task force on flood insurance and relocation estimate that about 90 per cent of Canada’s $2.9-billion average annual flood damage is concentrated in the 10 per cent of homes that are most at risk.

The vast majority of these 1.5 million homes are not insured against flooding, generally because private insurance companies can’t offer affordable coverage without payouts exceeding premiums.

This means homeowners either pay out of pocket or they may receive disaster assistance from federal, provincial and territorial governments if the flooding is deemed severe enough.

Both of these outcomes are untenable as climate change drives an increasing frequency and severity of flooding. Homeowners may be financially ruined by having to bear the costs.

Disaster assistance is essentially free insurance paid by taxpayers. This creates what economists often call a “moral hazard” because there is no incentive for homeowners to reduce their risk.

It can also lead to continued building on floodplains because local governments and developers reap property taxes and profits, while assuming that others will bear the costs of repair or rebuilding.

Another consequence for homeowners is that mortgage lenders may increasingly decline to finance or refinance uninsurable homes in flood zones.

Well-designed, publicly supported national flood insurance could potentially address these problems. Governments could use some of the substantial funds they currently pay out for flood disaster assistance to subsidize affordable premiums in the short term. This would give high-risk households and their mortgage providers certainty about their coverage.

The risks of public flood insurance

Without careful design, however, a low-cost insurance program could continue to lead homeowners to underestimate the risk of, and overestimate their protection from, flooding.

Local governments, believing insurance would protect homeowners, could continue to permit the building of housing in high-risk areas and relax flood-proofing requirements. Both homeowners and governments could remain disinclined to invest in protecting the 1.5 million homes already under greatest threat.

A low-cost flood insurance program could also represent a major financial risk for the federal government.

A similar program in the United States has become a white elephant with diminishing uptake, premiums kept low for political expediency and revenue unable to cover ballooning payouts from more frequent and severe floods. At the end of 2022, the program owed the Treasury US$20.5 billion.

Last year’s federal budget indicated that Ottawa would backstop large payouts for extreme flooding, so smart insurance design, a broader national strategy to reduce flood risk and the political will to deliver on both are critical to make sure such payouts are rare — and that they don’t break the bank.

How to craft smart flood insurance

A low-cost flood insurance program should drive safer decisions about living in flood zones. Three design measures that should be considered include:

1. Specifying exclusions: The insurance program should cover only homes built before it comes into effect. This would set a cap on the pool of insured properties and send a clear message that new homes in high-risk flood zones would not be covered, discouraging interest in developing new housing in those areas.

2. Phasing in risk-based premiums: Premiums should be adjusted over time to reflect a home’s flood risk. This would increase current and prospective homeowners’ awareness and encourage them to reduce their risk. Initially, the program would be likely to offer subsidized premiums to make them affordable, but a planned transition toward fully risk-based premiums would be essential. Long-term support for low-income households would be critical, however, to ensure that risk-based pricing did not disproportionately hurt those least able to afford it.

3. Providing incentives for flood resilience measures: The program should offer reduced premiums for homeowners and communities that bring in measures to reduce flood risk. They could range from structural changes that physically protect properties to land-use practices that enhance natural water absorption and reduce runoff. Reducing premiums for mitigation efforts would lower immediate insurance costs and contribute to greater flood resilience across the country.

Such measures would go a long way to ensuring that low-cost flood insurance doesn’t unintentionally increase risk and cost.

Beyond insurance to comprehensive flood resilience

As the federal task force highlights, a national program alone will not make Canada resilient to increasing risk. Without complementary measures, it’s more likely to create incentives for inaction and bad decisions that could increase the country’s flood risk overall.

The committee points out that Canada also requires comprehensive strategies to address flood risk across the country, including:

1. Actions by all orders of governments to restrict development in floodplains, improve urban drainage systems, build flood-control measures such as dams and seawalls, and help people relocate.

2. Policies that require sellers and lenders to disclose flood risks during real estate transactions. Transparency allows buyers to make informed decisions. It also creates price signals in housing markets to better reflect flood risk.

3. Updates to government disaster financial assistance to complement, rather than conflict with, a flood insurance program. Continued expectations that the government will provide payouts after floods deter insurance uptake and mute signals that households and communities must proactively reduce flood risk.

The details matter

Insurance availability for high-risk areas is needed to ensure that Canadians aren’t left to face increasingly devastating flood losses on their own. The expected insurance program’s success and long-term viability hinge on intelligently designed measures woven into a comprehensive flood-mitigation strategy.

Done poorly, public flood insurance could lead to more damage. Done well, it could protect vulnerable Canadians in at-risk areas by offering immediate financial relief while creating incentives for developing countrywide long-term flood resilience in an overheating climate.

It’s time to restore pride in post-secondary institutions and immigrationTEST

(Version française disponible ici)

At one time, Canada could boast about its highly respected systems of immigration and higher education. You’d never know it from reading today’s headlines.

How did it come to this?

About a decade ago, the federal government made several changes to Canada’s immigration rules, effectively making it easier for international students to qualify for permanent residency, primarily by allowing them to stay and work after graduation. After three years, permanent residents can apply for Canadian citizenship.

These changes had several goals. Canada wanted to attract a larger share of international students and better compete with other top host countries including the U.S., the U.K. and Australia.

But the changes were also seen as a way to overcome one of the big problems with Canada’s points-based immigration system: Canada admits many highly trained workers who often have difficulty getting a job in their field because employers don’t recognize their foreign educational credentials and work experience.

International students were thought to be the golden ticket. Educated in Canada, they would have the language skills, the Canadian degrees and diplomas, as well as the domestic work experience that employers sought.

For universities and colleges, international students expanded their pool of high-calibre students and brought in additional revenue at a time when domestic enrolment was dropping because of demographic changes. Students from abroad pay much higher tuition fees than domestic students.

The number of international students in Canada studying at all levels reached more than one million at the end of 2023, up 29 per cent from 2022 and up more than 200 per cent from a decade earlier. More than half were in Ontario, with British Columbia as the second most popular destination at 20 per cent.

Enter public-private partnerships in Ontario

Many institutions benefited from the new rules, but some more so than others. In Ontario, public colleges, particularly those in northern regions and smaller cities, which were experiencing a more pronounced decline in domestic enrolments, found it difficult to attract international students.

To overcome this roadblock, they began striking agreements with private institutions located in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), the region that most international students prefer.

Under these contracts, a student is admitted to a public college, but the training is provided by private institutions, which are mainly located in the GTA, often in strip malls and office buildings.

The college retains a portion of the fees paid by international students and graduates get a credential from the college, which then qualifies them for a post-graduate work permit and eventually permanent residency. In 2021, 11 Ontario colleges had partnerships with private institutions.

A 2017 review of these partnerships in Ontario by David Trick, a former provincial assistant deputy minister of post-secondary education, concluded they posed risks to academic quality and the reputation of the entire college system. He recommended shutting them down.

The then-Liberal government imposed a moratorium on new partnerships, which was subsequently lifted after the election of a Progressive Conservative (PC) government in 2018.

In 2019, the PC government also cut post-secondary student tuition fees by 10 per cent and imposed a freeze on future tuition fee hikes, which remains in place today. The lost tuition revenue wasn’t replaced with higher operating grants.

A 2021 report by the auditor general of Ontario noted that during the four years prior to the pandemic, college tuition revenue from international students increased to $1.75 billion in 2019-20 from $696 million in 2016-17 and accounted for 68 per cent of all tuition fee revenues.

The report also sounded the alarm over the growing popularity of public-private partnerships, finding provincial oversight of these agreements was lacking and there was no strategy to mitigate the risk that such a high reliance on international student enrolment posed for the province’s colleges.

The increase in international students extended beyond Ontario colleges. Universities too hopped on the bandwagon. International students at Nova Scotia’s Cape Breton University account for two-thirds of total enrolment and are the driving force behind its overall enrolment growth in recent years.

A separate auditor general of Ontario report on the financial management of four Ontario universities — Algoma, Nipissing, Ontario Tech and Windsor — noted that the vast majority of students at these institutions were from India, including 85 per cent of students from abroad at Algoma and 60 per cent at Windsor.

Rapid influx causing growing concerns

Post-secondary institutions rightfully argue that these students bring many benefits to Canadian campuses beyond financial considerations, including diversity and cultural perspectives that provide valuable lessons for Canadian students. They also contribute to Canada’s highly skilled workforce and help offset labour shortages.

But the rapid influx has raised many concerns too. Incoming students have complained of long processing times for student visas and delays in getting their post-graduate work permits, as well as a shortage of affordable student housing, unethical practices among some student recruiters, and financial and mental health challenges. Some have been forced to turn to food banks.

Others have blamed the student influx for exacerbating Canada’s housing shortage and putting additional strain on our health-care services.

In response, Immigration Minister Marc Miller announced earlier this year that the federal government will set a cap on international student permits for two years. In 2024, the cap will be set at about 360,000 permits, down 35 per cent from 2023.

The permits will be allocated by province and territory, based on population. The provinces will then distribute the permits among institutions. The cap doesn’t apply to master’s and doctoral programs or the elementary and secondary sectors.

In addition, starting Sept. 1, international students who begin a program under a public-private partnership will no longer be eligible for a post-graduate work permit. This comes on top of previous announcements that raised the cost-of-living requirements for study permit applicants and other regulations.

Canada needs new immigrants, but must plan for the consequences

Ontario needs to better protect international students

There has always been much to celebrate about Canada’s post-secondary education system. We routinely come out near the top of OECD rankings for educational attainment.

Our institutions run the gamut from world-renowned research-intensive universities to small liberal arts institutions and to the wide network of colleges that are supposed to cater to community needs. Presumably, this is what attracted international students in the first place.

All this appears in jeopardy now. Forced to deal with a reduction in international study permits, many institutions are bound to be left struggling.

In Ontario, Laurentian University filed for creditor protection in 2021 and Queen’s University has publicly warned about its financial straits, blaming it on the reduction in tuition fees, high inflation and a decline in international student enrolment during the pandemic. Will governments step in or will we see more go the way of Laurentian?

International students should play an integral role in our immigration system, but they shouldn’t be used as a vehicle to keep post-secondary institutions financially afloat. Governments need to restore proper funding to universities and colleges.

A recent report by an Ontario expert panel recommended ending the province’s tuition freeze and increasing per-student funding, noting: “Many colleges and universities have passed the point where they could survive financially with only domestic students.”

The Ontario government announced recently a $1-billion funding boost over three years — far short of the $2.5-billion increase recommended by the expert panel.

The institutions need to do their part too. They have been unwilling to acknowledge the fact that a smaller number of domestic students means they need to scale back their operations.

It’s time to restore the pride we once had in our post-secondary institutions and our immigration system.

Renouons avec la fiertĂ© envers nos Ă©tablissements d’enseignement supĂ©rieur et l’immigrationTEST

(English version available here)

Il fut un temps oĂč le Canada s’enorgueillissait de ses systĂšmes d’immigration et d’enseignement supĂ©rieur trĂšs respectĂ©s. On ne s’en rendrait pas compte en lisant les gros titres d’aujourd’hui. 

Comment en est-on arrivĂ© là ? 

Il y a une dizaine d’annĂ©es, le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral a apportĂ© plusieurs modifications aux rĂšgles d’immigration du Canada, facilitant ainsi l’obtention de la rĂ©sidence permanente pour les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers, principalement en leur permettant de rester et de travailler aprĂšs l’obtention de leur diplĂŽme. Au bout de trois ans, les rĂ©sidents permanents pouvaient ensuite demander la citoyennetĂ© canadienne. 

Ces changements avaient plusieurs objectifs. Le Canada souhaitait attirer une plus grande proportion d’étudiants Ă©trangers et mieux rivaliser avec d’autres pays d’accueil prisĂ©s par ceux-ci, notamment les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et l’Australie. 

Mais ces changements ont Ă©galement Ă©tĂ© perçus comme un moyen de rĂ©soudre l’un des principaux problĂšmes du systĂšme canadien d’immigration fondĂ© sur des points : le Canada admet de nombreux travailleurs hautement qualifiĂ©s ayant souvent des difficultĂ©s Ă  trouver un emploi dans leur domaine parce que leurs diplĂŽmes Ă©trangers et leur expĂ©rience professionnelle ne sont pas reconnus par les employeurs. 

Les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers Ă©taient considĂ©rĂ©s comme une poule aux Ɠufs d’or. FormĂ©s au Canada, ils possĂ©daient les compĂ©tences linguistiques, les diplĂŽmes canadiens ainsi que l’expĂ©rience professionnelle nationale recherchĂ©e par les employeurs. 

Pour les universitĂ©s et les Ă©tablissements d’enseignement supĂ©rieur, les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers ont Ă©largi leur vivier d’étudiants de haut niveau et ont apportĂ© des revenus supplĂ©mentaires Ă  un moment oĂč les inscriptions nationales diminuaient en raison des changements dĂ©mographiques. Les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers paient des frais de scolaritĂ© beaucoup plus Ă©levĂ©s que les Ă©tudiants nationaux. 

Le nombre d’étudiants Ă©trangers au Canada, tous niveaux confondus, a atteint plus d’un million Ă  la fin de 2023, soit une hausse de 29 % par rapport Ă  2022 et de plus de 200 % par rapport Ă  la dĂ©cennie prĂ©cĂ©dente. Plus de la moitiĂ© d’entre eux se trouvaient en Ontario, la Colombie-Britannique Ă©tant la deuxiĂšme destination la plus populaire avec 20 % des inscriptions. 

Les partenariats public-privé en Ontario 

De nombreux Ă©tablissements ont bĂ©nĂ©ficiĂ© des nouvelles rĂšgles, mais certains plus que d’autres. En Ontario, les Ă©tablissements publics, en particulier ceux des rĂ©gions du Nord et des petites villes, qui connaissaient une baisse plus prononcĂ©e des inscriptions nationales, ont eu du mal Ă  attirer des Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers. 

Pour surmonter cet obstacle, ils ont commencé à conclure des accords avec des établissements privés situés dans la région du Grand Toronto, région préférée par la plupart des étudiants internationaux. 

Dans le cadre de ces ententes, l’étudiant est admis dans un Ă©tablissement public, mais la formation est dispensĂ©e par des Ă©tablissements privĂ©s, principalement situĂ©s dans la rĂ©gion du Grand Toronto, souvent dans des centres commerciaux et des immeubles de bureaux. 

L’institution publique conserve une partie des frais payĂ©s par les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers et les diplĂŽmĂ©s obtiennent un diplĂŽme qui leur permet d’obtenir un permis de travail postuniversitaire et, Ă©ventuellement, un permis de rĂ©sidence permanente. En 2021, 11 Ă©tablissements publics de l’Ontario avaient conclu des partenariats avec des Ă©tablissements privĂ©s. 

En 2017, David Trick, ancien sous-ministre adjoint de l’enseignement postsecondaire en Ontario, a examinĂ© ces partenariats et a conclu qu’ils prĂ©sentaient des risques pour la qualitĂ© de l’enseignement et la rĂ©putation de l’ensemble du rĂ©seau postsecondaire. Il a recommandĂ© d’y mettre un terme. 

Le gouvernement libĂ©ral de l’époque avait alors imposĂ© un moratoire sur les nouveaux partenariats. Il a Ă©tĂ© levĂ© aprĂšs l’élection d’un gouvernement progressiste-conservateur dans la province, en 2018. 

En 2019, celui-ci a Ă©galement rĂ©duit de 10 % les frais de scolaritĂ© postsecondaires et a imposĂ© un gel sur les hausses futures des frais de scolaritĂ© qui est toujours en vigueur aujourd’hui. La perte de revenus provenant des frais de scolaritĂ© n’a pas Ă©tĂ© remplacĂ©e par une augmentation des subventions de fonctionnement. 

Un rapport publiĂ© en 2021 par le vĂ©rificateur gĂ©nĂ©ral de l’Ontario indique qu’au cours des quatre annĂ©es prĂ©cĂ©dant la pandĂ©mie, les recettes provenant des frais de scolaritĂ© des Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers ont augmentĂ© pour atteindre 1,75 milliard $ en 2019-20, contre 696 millions $ en 2016-2017. Cette somme reprĂ©sentait 68 % de l’ensemble des recettes provenant des frais de scolaritĂ©. 

Le rapport a Ă©galement tirĂ© la sonnette d’alarme sur la popularitĂ© croissante des partenariats public-privĂ©, constatant que la surveillance provinciale de ces accords faisait dĂ©faut et qu’il n’existait pas de stratĂ©gie pour attĂ©nuer le risque que reprĂ©sentait une dĂ©pendance aussi forte Ă  l’égard des inscriptions d’étudiants Ă©trangers pour les Ă©tablissements d’enseignement postsecondaire de la province. 

L’augmentation du nombre d’étudiants Ă©trangers ne s’est pas limitĂ©e aux collĂšges de l’Ontario. Les universitĂ©s ont Ă©galement pris le train en marche. Les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers de l’UniversitĂ© du Cap-Breton, en Nouvelle-Écosse, reprĂ©sentent les deux tiers du nombre total d’inscriptions et sont le moteur de l’augmentation globale des inscriptions ces derniĂšres annĂ©es. 

Un rapport distinct du vĂ©rificateur gĂ©nĂ©ral de l’Ontario sur la gestion financiĂšre de quatre universitĂ©s ontariennes – Algoma, Nipissing, Ontario Tech et Windsor – a notĂ© que la grande majoritĂ© des Ă©tudiants de ces Ă©tablissements Ă©taient originaires de l’Inde, dont 85 % d’étudiants Ă©trangers Ă  Algoma et 60 % Ă  Windsor. 

L’afflux rapide de migrants suscite des inquiĂ©tudes croissantes 

Les Ă©tablissements d’enseignement supĂ©rieur font valoir Ă  juste titre que ces Ă©tudiants apportent de nombreux avantages aux campus canadiens au-delĂ  des considĂ©rations financiĂšres, notamment la diversitĂ© et les perspectives culturelles qui constituent des enseignements prĂ©cieux pour les Ă©tudiants canadiens. Ils contribuent Ă©galement Ă  la main-d’Ɠuvre hautement qualifiĂ©e du Canada et aident Ă  compenser la pĂ©nurie de main-d’Ɠuvre. 

Mais cet afflux rapide a Ă©galement suscitĂ© de nombreuses inquiĂ©tudes. Les nouveaux Ă©tudiants se sont plaints des longs dĂ©lais de traitement des demandes de visa et des retards dans l’obtention de leur permis de travail postuniversitaire, ainsi que de la pĂ©nurie de logements Ă©tudiants abordables, des pratiques contraires Ă  l’éthique de certains recruteurs d’étudiants et des problĂšmes financiers et de santĂ© mentale. Certains ont Ă©tĂ© contraints de se tourner vers les banques alimentaires. 

D’autres ont reprochĂ© Ă  l’afflux d’étudiants d’aggraver la pĂ©nurie de logements au Canada et d’accroĂźtre la pression sur nos services de santĂ©. 

En rĂ©ponse, le ministre de l’Immigration Marc Miller a annoncĂ© plus tĂŽt cette annĂ©e que le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral fixerait un plafond pour les permis d’études internationaux pendant deux ans. En 2024, le plafond sera fixĂ© Ă  environ 360 000 permis, soit une baisse de 35 % par rapport Ă  2023. 

Les autorisations seront attribuĂ©es par province et par territoire, en fonction de la population. Les provinces rĂ©partiront ensuite les permis entre les Ă©tablissements. Le plafond ne s’applique pas aux programmes de maĂźtrise et de doctorat ni aux Ă©tudes primaires et secondaires. 

En outre, Ă  partir du 1er septembre, les Ă©tudiants internationaux qui commencent un programme dans le cadre d’un partenariat public-privĂ© ne pourront plus bĂ©nĂ©ficier d’un permis de travail postuniversitaire. Cette mesure s’ajoute aux annonces prĂ©cĂ©dentes qui ont relevĂ© les exigences en matiĂšre de coĂ»t de la vie pour les demandeurs de permis d’études et d’autres rĂ©glementations. 

Le systĂšme d’enseignement postsecondaire canadien a toujours eu de nombreuses raisons de se rĂ©jouir. Nous arrivons rĂ©guliĂšrement en tĂȘte des classements de l’OCDE en matiĂšre de niveau d’éducation. 

Nos Ă©tablissements vont des universitĂ©s de recherche de renommĂ©e mondiale aux petites institutions d’arts libĂ©raux, en passant par le vaste rĂ©seau de collĂšges et cĂ©geps censĂ©s rĂ©pondre aux besoins de la communautĂ©. On peut supposer que c’est ce qui a attirĂ© les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers en premier lieu. 

Tout cela semble aujourd’hui menacĂ©. Contraints de faire face Ă  une rĂ©duction des permis d’études internationaux, de nombreux Ă©tablissements vont se retrouver en difficultĂ©. 

En Ontario, l’UniversitĂ© Laurentienne s’est placĂ©e sous la protection de la loi sur les crĂ©anciers en 2021 et l’UniversitĂ© Queen’s a publiquement fait Ă©tat de ses difficultĂ©s financiĂšres, les attribuant Ă  la rĂ©duction des frais de scolaritĂ©, Ă  l’inflation Ă©levĂ©e et Ă  la baisse des inscriptions d’étudiants Ă©trangers pendant la pandĂ©mie. Les gouvernements interviendront-ils ou verrons-nous d’autres Ă©tablissements suivre le chemin de l’UniversitĂ© Laurentienne ? 

Les Ă©tudiants Ă©trangers devraient jouer un rĂŽle Ă  part entiĂšre dans notre systĂšme d’immigration, mais ils ne devraient pas ĂȘtre utilisĂ©s comme un moyen de maintenir la rentabilitĂ© des Ă©tablissements d’enseignement supĂ©rieur. Les gouvernements doivent rĂ©tablir un financement adĂ©quat des universitĂ©s et des collĂšges. 

Un rapport rĂ©cent d’un groupe d’experts de l’Ontario a recommandĂ© de mettre fin au gel des frais de scolaritĂ© dans la province et d’augmenter le financement par Ă©tudiant, en notant que « de nombreux collĂšges et universitĂ©s ont dĂ©passĂ© le stade oĂč ils pourraient survivre financiĂšrement avec les seuls Ă©tudiants nationaux ». 

Le gouvernement de l’Ontario a rĂ©cemment annoncĂ© une augmentation d’un milliard $ sur trois ans, ce qui est loin de l’augmentation de 2,5 milliards $ recommandĂ©e par le groupe d’experts. 

Les institutions doivent Ă©galement faire leur part. Ils n’ont pas voulu admettre que la diminution du nombre d’étudiants nationaux les obligeait Ă  rĂ©duire leurs activitĂ©s. 

Il est temps de renouer avec la fiertĂ© que nous avions autrefois Ă  l’égard de nos Ă©tablissements d’enseignement supĂ©rieur et de notre systĂšme d’immigration. 

Another blow to freedom of information from the Supreme CourtTEST

The Supreme Court of Canada’s latest ruling on freedom of information (FOI) is bad. The only question is how bad.

In a decision released in February, the court endorsed the Ontario government’s refusal to release the mandate letters sent by Premier Doug Ford to his cabinet ministers in 2018, his first year in office. Ontario argued that doing so would reveal cabinet confidences.

The decision follows in the footsteps of two earlier Supreme Court rulings which also expanded exemptions in FOI laws that allow governments to refuse to release records that relate to legal privilege or policy advice.

The February decision was in a case that began in 2018 when the CBC made a request under the Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act for the mandate letters. The Ford government refused, citing Section 12 of the legislation.

Like similar provisions in other FOI laws in this country, this section allows a government to refuse to release information if that would “reveal the substance of [Cabinet] deliberations.”

These sections were put into the FOI laws to protect the ability of cabinet ministers to have full and frank discussions of important issues without fear of those discussions becoming public.

These sections – and the common law principles on which they are based – were also intended to protect cabinet solidarity, which could be undermined if records were released of cabinet ministers expressing doubts about the wisdom of a particular government policy or course of action before it was adopted.

Mandate letters have been public, in practice

At first glance, the facts in the case would not appear to favour the government’s position.

It has become common in recent years for the federal and some provincial governments to release the mandate letters sent to ministers and make them available on the internet.

The previous Liberal government in Ontario had followed this practice but Ford decided against it after winning the 2018 provincial election. (The letters were later leaked but the government continued to fight against their formal release.)

It isn’t obvious how these 2018 letters setting out what the premier expected from his ministers at that time would reveal cabinet discussions or make ministers more reluctant to express themselves freely in cabinet meetings – the public good that this exception is supposed to protect.

The legal precedents in Ontario on this point were also against the government. Unsurprisingly, the government lost its argument before the provincial information and privacy commissioner, then lost twice more on appeal with a 2-1 decision going against it in the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Despite these failures, the Ford government asked the Supreme Court of Canada for leave to appeal, which was granted.

That was not as surprising as it might seem at first glance.

Open to interpretation

There had been differing approaches to interpreting the cabinet-confidence sections of various provincial FOI laws, with B.C. courts taking a harder line against disclosure in 1996 in a case called Aquasource, while other courts, including in a Nova Scotia case called O’Connor, took a more open stance. Clearly, the Supreme Court thought it was time to clarify the law.

The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in February sets out in no uncertain terms that claims of cabinet privilege will take precedence over provisions in FOI laws in favour of transparency, but several points will probably cause confusion and litigation for years to come.

The majority decision – written by Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, a former clerk of the Ontario executive council, (concurred in by Justice Malcolm Rowe, a former clerk of the Newfoundland and Labrador executive council) – does not refer to either the Aquasource or O’Connor cases.

Instead, the court set out a new approach which is best characterized as deference to claims of cabinet confidence, even if supported by little evidence beyond a bald assertion by a government that the release of the information would reveal cabinet confidences.

The high court found that the Ontario information and privacy commissioner (IPC) had taken into account the need for ministerial candour and solidarity in his decision but said he fell down on two points.

The first was he didn’t give suitable weight to the Ford government’s argument that releasing the mandate letters would impede the efficiency of government decision-making. The court ruling said:

“Despite the submissions of Cabinet Office that disclosure of the mandate Letters could harm the efficacy of the Cabinet decision-making process (A.R., vol. III, at pp. 101-2), the Commissioner did not engage with a core purpose of Cabinet secrecy to promote the efficiency of the collective decision making, nor with the ultimate goal of this constitutional convention: effective government. This was critical context to interpreting s. 12(1). [Paragraph 32]”

The word efficiency comes up repeatedly in the judgment and it appears to relate to the timing of the release of information about the government’s decision-making process. To wit:

“To the extent the IPC required evidence linking the Letters to ‘actual Cabinet deliberations at a specific Cabinet meeting,’ that approach was unreasonable. Such a requirement is far too narrow and does not account for the realities of the deliberative process, including the Premier’s priority-setting and supervisory functions, which are not necessarily performed at a specific Cabinet meeting and may occur throughout the continuum of Cabinet’s deliberative process. [Paragraph 54]”

This approach gives governments the scope to argue that records being sought under FOI laws are part of the cabinet’s “deliberative process,” even if they are not on a cabinet agenda.

The court decision does not provide much guidance to information and privacy commissioners in terms of what evidence a government will have to provide to show that the requested records are part of the government’s deliberative process, except that it does not have to relate to a particular cabinet meeting.

Ministerial mandate letters: Another nail in the coffin of cabinet government

Mandate letters should be kept confidential

The court opened up the scope of what a government can use as justification for resisting the release of documents by stating that the Ontario commissioner failed to give proper consideration to constitutional conventions. It wrote:

“Given the centrality of such traditions and conventions to the proper functioning of our democracy, it was vital that the IPC’s decision meaningfully consider this context. His failure to do so led him to an unreasonably narrow interpretation of s. 12(1) and caused him to mischaracterize the Letters themselves. [Paragraph 21]”

This expansive approach to what is a cabinet confidence is based in part on the court’s citation of this 1966 House of Lords decision and provides an important insight into their reasoning:

“[The premature disclosure of Cabinet secrets] would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political criticism. The business of government is difficult enough as it is, and no government could contemplate with equanimity the inner workings of the government machine being exposed to the gaze of those ready to criticize without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with some axe to grind. [Paragraph 35]”

There is some irony that at a time when the importance of the cabinet in the governing process has been diminished in many Canadian jurisdictions, the Supreme Court has ensured it still has an important role to play in preventing “uninformed” criticism of the government.

Government secrecy is the only winner

There does not appear to be an upside in this decision other than for governments hoping to keep information away from requesters.

If anything, it has added uncertainty about what a government will have to introduce as evidence to an information and privacy commissioner to justify a claim of cabinet confidence, not to mention the wild card of “constitutional conventions,” which commissioners will now have to consider.

As Justice Suzanne CĂŽté pointed out in her separate reasons, the majority decision has even thrown into confusion the standard of review for commissioners’ decisions about cabinet confidences.

“I cannot agree that ‘it is not necessary to finally resolve’ the question of the applicable standard of review,” she wrote, citing Justice Karakatsanis’s decision. “In my view, the scope of Cabinet privilege falls within the already existing Vavilov category of general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole. This question is thus subject to correctness review. [Paragraph 67]”

This decision is a failure in clarifying the law, while also reducing Canadians’ access rights.

The court could have – and should have – done better.

Combat NIMBYism with transparency to help resolve Canada’s housing crisisTEST

When it comes to the cost of putting a roof over your head, those who call Canada home today find themselves adrift in dauntingly uncharted waters.

An average cost of a Canadian home more than doubled in value since 2011. Royal LePage estimates that, by the end of 2024, the median price of a detached single-family house will be roughly $843,000 nationally, $1.48 million in the Greater Toronto Area, and $1.77 million in greater Vancouver. Rents in Canada have become substantially more burdensome at the same time, increasing by nearly 10 per cent from 2022 to 2023.

In short, Canada has a housing crisis.

The federal government has made attempts to alleviate the high cost of homeownership through policies like foreign-ownership bans and the elimination of the GST on purpose-built new rental construction. However, these measures are a drop in the bucket to the larger problem at hand: Canada does not have enough housing supply. Recent estimates suggest that by 2030, the Canadian housing shortage will reach 3.5 million units.

Yet there exists opposition to increasing the supply of new housing in Canada. Scotiabank’s chief economist recently argued that local opposition to housing development remains a considerable barrier to reducing home prices.

Anecdotally, the root cause of this is opposition from so-called NIMBYs. There is, to be sure, ample evidence to support this. Notable Canadians including Margaret Atwood and Galen Weston have voiced opposition to local housing developments.

Such opposition can sometimes be absurdly comical. A movement in Toronto’s East York borough mobilized to prevent the demolition of a parking lot to build affordable housing, saying that it would remove the “heart of the community.”

Who are these NIMBYs? Despite their apparent prevalence in media and behind the scenes, such movements have not been studied extensively.

Some existing research does examine how homeownership shapes NIMBY attitudes: opposition to new housing is rational insofar as existing homeowners oppose the construction of new houses because it increases supply and thus lowers their property values.

But is NIMBYism just a simple investment protection, or a deeper attitude shaped by fundamental values? In our ongoing research, we are able to determine that NIMBYs are only one piece of the puzzle.

How values affect housing policy

What do we mean by values? In our work, we focus on deeper worldviews like egalitarianism, support for free markets, nativism, and traditionalism.

For example, people with egalitarian worldviews may be more supportive of housing to reduce important inequities in society.

Meanwhile, free marketers may value rolling back government red tape and zoning regulations that make it harder to build supply.

Nativists may have concerns about who their new neighbours will be in the context of soaring levels of immigration in Canada.

Traditionalists may see new housing as a threat to traditional single-family neighbourhoods.

We fielded a survey on a representative sample of adults in Canada and asked them about their beliefs, concerns, and support for new housing in their communities and potential government policies to address the crisis.

Canadians have nuanced attitudes towards new housing. On the one hand, they can envision some negative consequences—75 per cent think it will make traffic worse and a slim majority (52 per cent) think that new housing will strain government and social services.

On the other hand, 78 per cent think new housing will increase the diversity and vibrancy of their neighbourhood, while only 39 per cent see new housing as a threat to their neighbourhood character, and only 32 per cent think it will lower the quality of their life. Interestingly, only 31 per cent of homeowners believe new housing will lower their property values.

When asked about a hypothetical housing development in their neighbourhood, 74 per cent of Canadians indicate some level of support. It is lower for high-rises (60 per cent) compared to multi-family homes (75 per cent) and single-family homes (81 per cent), and for developments on their block (65 per cent). Support for developments up to 4 kilometers away goes up to 79 per cent.

Only in the case of high-rise apartments on their block are most Canadians opposed to nearby housing development (52 per cent).

Canadians are far from being in lockstep with NIMBY talking points. Sixty-six per cent support relaxing laws and regulations to permit more housing and 62 per cent even favour the repeal of single-family zoning. Canadians are supportive of measures like foreign ownership bans (74 per cent), higher taxes on vacant homes and secondary residences (72 per cent) and building more affordable housing (87 per cent).

NIMBYs vs the silent majority

Our conclusion is clear: NIMBYs are a small but vocal minority of Canadians. That said, who are they exactly?

Our research suggests NIMBYs are concentrated among some (but not all) segments of the political right. Nativists are more hostile to local housing development, likely out of a fear that such new housing will be populated by immigrants and racial minorities. Traditionalists and social conservatives are also more opposed to new housing and supportive policies, likely because they perceive densification to be a threat to their ideal community.

By contrast, housing makes bedfellows of egalitarians and free marketers. Both favour greater support for local housing development. Housing issues also blur typical left-right political coalitions: the political left is united in favour of more housing, while the right is divided between cultural and economic conservatives.

We can see this dynamic play out in housing policy at the federal and provincial levels. The B.C. NDP have flexed their jurisdictional powers to harness the power of the market to build new housing, including tabling bills to increase density near transit hubs and by changing zoning legislation to facilitate the construction of small-scale multi-unit homes.

Can building more affordable housing be compatible with local democracy?

Tent cities are not just a municipal problem

Four steps to relieving the Canadian housing crisis

The federal Liberals are promoting a housing accelerator fund to incentivize municipalities to reduce red tape for new housing development.

Conservatives are in a trickier position. Previous academic research has found that the political right in Canada is not nearly as ideologically cohesive as the political left, and this shows up in the housing debate, pitting nativists and traditionalists against free-marketers.

Perhaps as a result, conservative actions on housing have occurred in fits and starts. Although initially taking a lead in tackling the housing crisis, Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s strategy has been mostly bark, and little bite. Quebec Premier François Legault also expressed indifference to rising housing prices, seeing it as a sign of greater provincial prosperity.

An exception to this, at least for now, is Pierre Poilievre’s Conservative Party which has increasingly adopted a YIMBY (Yes In My Backyard) posture. This may be viewed as a political risk given that nativists and traditionalists tend to vote Conservative. Poilievre must walk a tightrope to appease NIMBYs in his voter coalition while also putting forward a housing policy that is attractive to new voters.

Opportunity to build for the future

Our work is a first step in developing a deeper understanding of what motivates housing attitudes among Canadians. Although support for new housing is high, and NIMBYism is relatively uncommon, it can still present a major roadblock to addressing the housing shortage in Canada.

Our research offers three policy prescriptions to overcome NIMBYism.

First, governments should move to reduce or eliminate local consultation over housing developments, which only serve to derail housing initiatives. We know that those who attend local consultation meetings are more likely to oppose a housing project than to support it and that the demographic makeup of attendees does not match that of their community. We cannot let a vocal, privileged minority routinely game the system to prevail over the silent majority.

Second, Canadians are much more opposed to high-rise developments than other forms of housing. Policymakers should prioritize the legalization of “missing middle” housing – the development of which has a much wider appeal in the public, while being less likely to trigger NIMBY backlash.

Finally, policymakers need to better explain the value of housing for people with diverse value commitments. Appealing to concerns about fairness and equity may be less effective in conservative constituencies than drawing attention to the tension between zoning regulation and property rights, or to the struggle young couples face to establish and raise their families when they can’t afford a home. This might also mean harnessing the power of trusted messengers for these skeptical audiences, by building a coalition of former politicians, business and non-profit leaders to signal cross-partisan consensus on the need for more housing.

NIMBYism is undoubtedly a challenge, but we have avenues at our disposal to limit their influence and to change minds. In doing so, we will be better placed to tackle one of the most pressing challenges of our time.

Methodology note: The data presented in this article are from a pre-registered online survey of 1,400 adult Canadian citizens conducted between May 5-16, 2023, using the sample provider Abacus. A sample of this size drawn from the population produces results accurate within plus or minus 2.6 percentage points 19 times out of 20. Funding for this study was provided by the University of Toronto.

This article is part of a series called How does Canada fix the housing crisis?

Online Harms Act: a step in the right direction to protect Canadians onlineTEST

(Version française disponible ici)

After years of waiting and cybersecurity policy focusing on infrastructure security , the federal government has at last turned its attention to the digital security of people with the introduction of the Online Harms Act. Fortunately, the worst fears for the bill born of years of poorly thought-out digital policy do not seem to have materialized.

Because the bill is so complex, it will require extensive analysis and democratic debate to ensure the right balance is struck between protecting Canadians against harmful online content and safeguarding fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and privacy. But for the first time in a long time, the government seems, at first glance, to be following the right path. The proposed framework appears to be balanced and to address the fears raised from previous proposals made in 2021.

Contrary to what some critics may claim, the bill in its current form does not bring undue restrictions to freedom of expression, a right that is never absolute. It strengthens existing mechanisms and sanctions against harmful content already prohibited in Canada, such as that promoting terrorism and violent extremism and incitation to hatred. It beefs up measures against child pornography, bullying children or messages inciting them to harm themselves, as well as “revenge porn” and the revictimization of survivors of sexual crimes.

Some amendments will certainly need to be discussed – some proposed penalties, such as life imprisonment, don’t seem appropriate – but the bill doesn’t tread on the dangerous ground of regulating speech that would be “lawful but awful” and might have presented free speech issues.

The core of the bill lies elsewhere, in new obligations for the operators of major digital platforms and the creation of new bodies to support victims.

New rules for digital platform operators

Inspired by expert recommendations and the European approach, the proposed framework centres on a duty to act responsibly, a duty to make certain content inaccessible and a duty to protect children. Generally speaking, operators would have to minimize the risk of exposure to harmful content through their design choices and content moderation mechanisms.

These new obligations would only apply to the largest social networking and content-sharing platforms. While defining the criteria will require careful consideration, private messaging services, such as WhatsApp or Signal, are excluded, except when messages can be broadcast to an unlimited audience. Such an approach should limit the risk to privacy and freedom of expression, while incentivizing platforms to constrain unlimited sharing, and with it the spread of disinformation.

The proposed law would require platform operators to appoint resource persons familiar with internal procedures who could support victims.  It is regrettable that the current bill would not require this resource person to be located in Canada. Although onerous for platforms, such an obligation would guarantee, both for operators and the public, that this person is in tune with the particular local context, values, linguistic realities and Indigenous Peoples.

The government also missed an opportunity to learn from the best privacy frameworks. These resource persons could additionally be “digital safety officers” with guarantees of protection and independence modeled on “data protection officers,” who could act in the event of a problem and influence the organization’s policies.

New bodies to support victims

Following the experts’ recommendations, the draft legislation is supported by the creation of three bodies: a digital safety commission, that would oversee the implementation of the Act, a digital safety ombudsperson and a digital safety office to support both of them.

Composed of three to five members, the commission would have significant powers to investigate and impose orders and sanctions on platform operators. The fact that decision-making power would not rest with a single commissioner, but rather with a commission, seems an excellent proposal that should ensure balanced decisions — depending on the commission’s composition.

Unlike the privacy commissioner in Bill C-27, this commission will not be subject to a new administrative tribunal, which would add delays to the protection of Canadians. To avoid political interference, the commission will also be a truly independent body from the government – unlike Bill C-27’s artificial intelligence and data commissioner.

In addition to its oversight powers, the commission will also have an online safety literacy mandate. This mandate is reinforced by the creation of an independent ombudsperson position to provide support to platform users and defend the public interest in “systemic online safety issues” that remain to be defined.

To avoid any suggestion the commission will finance itself through the large potential fines for operators of up to six per cent of global gross revenue or $10 million, whichever is greater, the fines would be remitted to the Receiver General of Canada, and the bill includes a recommendation for the appropriation of public revenues to fund since no funds were earmarked in the 2023 budget.

A curious and problematic point of the bill remains the mention of possible royalties set by the government that – if we are reading the bill correctly – would have to be paid by platforms to operate in Canada and would be used to fund the commission. While the federal budget is limited, the commission must be seen as an investment for Canadian society. Such a funding mechanism could also have a perverse effect on the quality of information and competition in an ecosystem that already relies on a handful of players.

If lessons are learned from recent attempts to levy digital royalties with bill C-18, some operators could withdraw from the Canadian market, reinforcing existing information oligopolies and cutting Canadians off from certain platforms that are essential in a globalized world. This could be dramatic for not-for-profit platforms such as Wikipedia, which may find themselves regulated but unable to pay royalties.

Unequal protection for whistleblowers

Finally, one of the bill’s biggest shortcomings is the lack of protection for whistleblowers. Several recent cases have demonstrated their essential role in shedding light on operators’ decisions that run counter to the objectives of the law.

While it is true that the bill would oblige the commission to protect the identity of those reporting observations, the same cannot be said of operators’ employees, who would have to request anonymity while specifying what could put them at risk.

An employee who is unfamiliar with surveillance techniques could put themself at risk, as the bill does not provide for protection from reprisals by the employer. In addition, there are no exceptions to provisions of the Criminal Code protecting trade secrets, or to non-disclosure agreements. Employees thus run the risk of criminal or civil prosecution.

In short, there are some missing elements, and as with any bill this complex, the devil is most likely in the details. But, for once, the overall infrastructure of the bill seems to be well thought-out. We now hope the shortcomings will be corrected during parliamentary debates.

The author was a member of the Council of Canadian Academies’ expert group on digital public safety that contributed to the 2023 Vulnerable Connections report advising policymakers.

Le projet de loi sur les préjudices en ligne est un pas dans la bonne direction pour protéger les internautes au CanadaTEST

(English version available here)

AprĂšs des annĂ©es d’attente, le gouvernement fĂ©dĂ©ral a finalement introduit le projet de loi sur les prĂ©judices en ligne. Alors que la politique en matiĂšre de cybersĂ©curitĂ© avait fait la part belle Ă  la sĂ©curitĂ© des infrastructures, elle se penche enfin sur la sĂ©curitĂ© numĂ©rique des personnes. Heureusement, les pires craintes, nĂ©es d’annĂ©es de politique numĂ©rique mal pensĂ©e ne semblent pas s’ĂȘtre concrĂ©tisĂ©es.

Comme ce projet de loi est trĂšs complexe, son Ă©tude nĂ©cessitera une longue analyse et des dĂ©bats dĂ©mocratiques afin d’assurer un juste Ă©quilibre entre la protection contre les contenus prĂ©judiciables en ligne et la protection de droits fondamentaux tels que la libertĂ© d’expression et la vie privĂ©e. Mais pour la premiĂšre fois depuis longtemps, le gouvernement semble avoir visĂ© juste en matiĂšre de numĂ©rique en proposant un cadre qui apparaĂźt Ă©quilibrĂ© et qui rĂ©pond aux craintes de prĂ©cĂ©dentes propositions formulĂ©es en 2021.

Contrairement Ă  ce qu’affirment certaines critiques, le projet de loi ne restreint pas inopportunĂ©ment la libertĂ© d’expression qui, doit-on le rappeler, n’a jamais Ă©tĂ© absolue.  Il renforce au contraire les mĂ©canismes existants et les sanctions contre les contenus dĂ©jĂ  prohibĂ©s au Canada, comme ceux liĂ©s au terrorisme et Ă  l’extrĂ©misme violent, l’incitation Ă  la haine, la pornographie juvĂ©nile, l’intimidation des enfants ou les messages les incitant Ă  se faire du mal, ainsi que la pornodivulgation et la revictimisation des survivants de crimes sexuels. Certaines modifications devront ĂȘtre discutĂ©es – car quelques sanctions proposĂ©es, comme l’emprisonnement Ă  vie, ne semblent pas appropriĂ©es –, mais le projet de loi ne s’avance pas sur le terrain dangereux de rĂ©guler les discours qui seraient lĂ©gaux, mais horribles, et qui auraient pu prĂ©senter des enjeux de libertĂ© d’expression.

Le cƓur du projet est ailleurs : on y retrouve trois obligations pour les opĂ©rateurs des grandes plateformes numĂ©riques et la crĂ©ation de nouvelles instances pour soutenir les victimes.

De nouvelles rÚgles pour les opérateurs des plateformes numériques

InspirĂ© des recommandations d’experts et de l’approche europĂ©enne, le projet met l’accent sur le devoir d’agir de maniĂšre responsable, le devoir de rendre certains contenus inaccessibles et le devoir de protĂ©ger les enfants. De maniĂšre gĂ©nĂ©rale, les opĂ©rateurs devront minimiser le risque d’exposition Ă  un contenu prĂ©judiciable par leurs choix de conception et leurs mĂ©canismes de modĂ©ration de contenus.

Ces nouvelles obligations ne s’appliqueront qu’aux trĂšs grandes plateformes de rĂ©seaux sociaux et de partage de contenus. S’il faudra ĂȘtre vigilant Ă  la dĂ©finition des critĂšres qui dĂ©finiront lesquelles seront assujetties, il faut noter que le projet de loi ne s’applique pas aux services de messagerie privĂ©e, comme WhatsApp ou Signal, sauf dans le cas oĂč les messages peuvent ĂȘtre diffusĂ©s de maniĂšre illimitĂ©e. Une telle approche permettra d’éviter certains Ă©cueils touchant la vie privĂ©e et la libertĂ© d’expression tout en incitant les opĂ©rateurs Ă  limiter les partages de certains messages sur leurs plateformes, qui deviennent souvent des vĂ©hicules de dĂ©sinformation.

Le projet propose aussi la nomination d’une personne-ressource au sein des opĂ©rateurs de plateformes. Celle-ci devra connaĂźtre les procĂ©dures internes et pourra soutenir les victimes. Sur le modĂšle des meilleures pratiques en matiĂšre de vie privĂ©e, on aurait pu espĂ©rer la crĂ©ation de « dĂ©lĂ©guĂ©s Ă  la sĂ©curitĂ© numĂ©rique », pouvant agir en cas de problĂšme et influencer la politique de l’organisation avec des garanties de protection et d’indĂ©pendance, comme les « dĂ©lĂ©guĂ©s Ă  la protection des donnĂ©es ».

Surtout, il est regrettable que la loi n’exige pas que cette personne-ressource soit situĂ©e au Canada. Une telle obligation permettrait de garantir, tant pour les opĂ©rateurs que pour le public, que cette personne soit en phase avec le contexte local particulier, les valeurs, les rĂ©alitĂ©s linguistiques et les peuples autochtones.

De nouvelles instances pour soutenir les victimes

Suivant les recommandations des experts, le projet de loi repose sur la crĂ©ation de trois instances, Ă  savoir une commission de la sĂ©curitĂ© numĂ©rique, qui supervisera la mise en Ɠuvre de la loi, un ombusdman de la sĂ©curitĂ© numĂ©rique et un bureau de la sĂ©curitĂ© numĂ©rique du Canada qui les soutiendra dans leurs efforts.

ComposĂ©e de trois Ă  cinq membres, la commission aura d’importants pouvoirs d’enquĂȘte, d’ordonnance et de sanction Ă  l’encontre des opĂ©rateurs des plateformes. Le fait que le pouvoir de dĂ©cision ne repose pas sur un seul commissaire, mais plutĂŽt sur une commission, semble une excellente proposition qui devrait permettre, sous rĂ©serve de la composition de la commission, d’assurer un Ă©quilibre dans les dĂ©cisions prises.

Contrairement au commissaire Ă  la vie privĂ©e du projet de loi C-27, cette commission ne sera pas soumise Ă  un nouveau tribunal administratif, qui ajouterait des dĂ©lais pour la protection des Canadiens. Afin d’éviter toute interfĂ©rence politique, la future commission sera un vĂ©ritable organe indĂ©pendant du gouvernement, contrairement, par exemple, au Commissaire Ă  l’IA et aux donnĂ©es du projet de loi C-27.

Outre son pouvoir de surveillance, la commission disposera Ă©galement d’un mandat de littĂ©ratie en matiĂšre de sĂ©curitĂ© en ligne. Ce mandat est renforcĂ© par la crĂ©ation d’un poste d’ombusdman indĂ©pendant qui fournira du soutien aux utilisateurs des plateformes et dĂ©fendra l’intĂ©rĂȘt public en ce qui concerne les « enjeux systĂ©miques relatifs Ă  la sĂ©curitĂ© en ligne ». Ceux-ci demeurent toutefois Ă  dĂ©finir.

On pourrait croire qu’en raison des importantes amendes envisagĂ©es (la somme la plus Ă©levĂ©e entre 10 millions $ ou jusqu’Ă  6% du revenu brut global d’une plateforme numĂ©rique), la commission pourrait ĂȘtre tentĂ©e d’imposer des sanctions pour s’autofinancer. NĂ©anmoins, les amendes seront Ă  verser au Receveur gĂ©nĂ©ral du Canada et le projet de loi est assorti d’une proposition de recommandation d’affectation des deniers publics pour financer les organismes Ă©tant donnĂ© que le gouvernement n’avait pas prĂ©vu de fonds Ă  cet effet dans le Budget 2023.

Un Ă©lĂ©ment curieux et problĂ©matique du projet de loi reste la mention de possibles redevances fixĂ©es par le gouvernement et qui– c’est ce qu’on comprend Ă  la lecture du projet de loi – devraient ĂȘtre payĂ©es par les plateformes numĂ©riques pour opĂ©rer au Canada. Un tel mĂ©canisme de financement pourrait d’ailleurs avoir un effet pervers pour la qualitĂ© de l’information et la concurrence dans l’écosystĂšme qui repose dĂ©jĂ  sur une poignĂ©e d’acteurs.

Si on tire des leçons de la plus rĂ©cente tentative de prĂ©lever des redevances numĂ©riques, dans le cadre de la loi C-18, il faut s’attendre Ă  ce que certains opĂ©rateurs pourraient se retirer du marchĂ© canadien, entraĂźnant un renforcement des oligopoles informationnels existants et coupant les Canadiens de certaines plateformes essentielles dans un monde globalisĂ©. Cela pourrait ĂȘtre dramatique pour des plateformes sans but lucratif, comme Wikipedia, qui pourraient se retrouver rĂ©gulĂ©es selon les critĂšres mis en place, mais dans l’impossibilitĂ© de payer des redevances.

Des lanceurs d’alerte inĂ©gaux devant la loi

Enfin, une des plus grosses lacunes du projet de loi est l’absence de protection pour les lanceurs d’alerte. De nombreuses affaires rĂ©centes ont dĂ©montrĂ© leur rĂŽle essentiel pour mettre en lumiĂšre les dĂ©cisions des opĂ©rateurs qui seraient contraires aux objectifs de la loi.

Certes, le projet de loi obligera la commission Ă  protĂ©ger l’identitĂ© des personnes lui communiquant des observations, mais il n’en sera pas de mĂȘme pour les employĂ©s des opĂ©rateurs qui devront demander l’anonymat en prĂ©cisant ce qui pourrait les mettre en danger.

Un employĂ© peu au fait de certaines techniques de surveillance pourrait ainsi se mettre en danger, surtout que la future loi ne prĂ©voit aucune protection contre de possibles reprĂ©sailles de l’employeur. Elle ne comporte aucune exception aux dispositions du Code criminel protĂ©geant les secrets d’affaires ou aux clauses de confidentialitĂ© des employĂ©s qui courent ainsi un risque de poursuites criminelles ou civiles en cas de divulgation.

En somme, il manque des Ă©lĂ©ments, et comme pour tout projet de loi aussi complexe, le diable se cache trĂšs probablement dans les dĂ©tails. Mais, pour une fois, l’infrastructure globale du projet de loi semble bien pensĂ©e pour une fois. EspĂ©rons que ces lacunes seront corrigĂ©es lors des dĂ©bats parlementaires.

L’auteur faisait partie du comitĂ© d’experts du Conseil des acadĂ©mies canadiennes sur la sĂ©curitĂ© publique numĂ©rique qui a contribuĂ© au rapport Connexions vulnĂ©rables publiĂ© en 2023 pour soutenir les politiques publiques canadiennes.

Brian Mulroney and the stealth privatization of the stateTEST

(Version française disponible ici)

The Mulroney government (1984–1993) was a contemporary of the Reagan administration (1981–1989) in the United States and the Thatcher government (1979–1990) in the United Kingdom. All three were characterized by their neoliberal economic policies, which transformed the welfare state that their predecessors had taken decades to build.

So-called « Reagonomics » and Thatcherism were defined by a distrust of the planned economy, government corporations and universal welfare. Reagan made his mark with the famous quote: “Government is not the solution to our problems. Government IS the problem.”

Generally speaking, neoliberalism blames a sprawling, intrusive state for undermining the economy. The economic recessions of 1975 and 1982 seemed to confirm this. Both Reagan and Thatcher championed trickle-down economics: when companies prosper, workers get richer and all of society benefits.

Brian Mulroney showed the same colors from the start of his first mandate, creating the Ministry of State for Privatization and Regulatory Affairs in 1986, a portfolio entrusted to Barbara McDougall. Taking up the project from his predecessor, then prime minister Joe Clark, Mulroney began the withdrawal of the Canadian state as a producer of goods and provider of services.

When the Conservatives came to power, the federal government owned 67 Crown corporations, with a combined value of $50 billion. Nine companies were privatized under Mulroney, including Air Canada, Canadair, Canadian Arsenals and Teleglobe (now a subsidiary of India’s Tata Communications). Privatization of Petro-Canada and Canadian National began (and was completed under the ChrĂ©tien and Martin governments).

The “good” and the “bad” poor

From the third government of William Lyon Mackenzie King (1935–1948) to the second government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau (1980–1984), the welfare state had not been seriously challenged. On the contrary, social assistance, particularly universal health insurance, had become one of the features that set Canada apart from the United States in the eyes of Canadians. Today, it remains one of the cornerstones of Canadian identity.

Let’s recall some of the milestones in the construction of the Canadian welfare state: the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1940, the Family Allowance Program in 1944, the Old Age Security Act in 1952, the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act in 1957, the Canada Pension Plan and Guaranteed Income Supplement in 1965, and the Medical Care Act in 1966.

The 1970s saw no further major initiatives, but programs were reformed to reach more Canadians, and to ensure that basic needs of the population were met.

One of the Mulroney government’s objectives was to improve the strained relations between Canada and the United States that had marked the Trudeau era. The 1987 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) required a semblance of economic uniformity. Competition between companies in the two countries would have been distorted if Canadian companies could afford to offer lower wages, thanks to the existence of social programs that would have offset the income of Canadians. Completely aligning Canada with the U.S. by weakening the welfare state to the American level would not have been a winning formula for the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. Instead, the Mulroney government ended the universality of some welfare programs, reducing some of the differences between the two countries.

Like most of his Conservative contemporaries, Mulroney presented the failure of the welfare state to eliminate poverty as proof of the need for fundamental reform. A line was drawn between the “good poor,” those in real need of state assistance, and the “bad poor,” those who take advantage of the system. The problem was not that social programs were running out of money, but that layabouts, crooks and people who didn’t need the money were absorbing resources.

« Does the man who makes $500,000 a year as bank president need to collect family allowances? » asked Mulroney at a town hall meeting in Vancouver in 1984. The example was extreme, but the message was clear: Some Canadians were receiving government welfare without needing it.

Starting in 1944, all Canadian families had received the same family allowance, regardless of their financial situation. As of 1989, some families had to repay their family allowance, depending on their income. In 1993, the Conservative government abolished universal family allowances, replacing them with the Child Tax Benefit, a selective program available only to low-income households. This new program was presented at the time as an incentive for women to stay at home.

Other programs were slimmed down with the stated official objective to reduce the deficit. Eligibility rules for the employment insurance program were tightened to serve fewer workers; benefit rates were lowered and weeks of eligibility were cut. Old Age Security payments were reduced, based on income. Federal participation in provincial social assistance programs was reduced. Universal benefits were replaced by tax credits.

Their main beneficiaries were not low-income families. The Canadian tax has become increasingly complex, and only a minority of people are able to benefit from all the tax advantages to which they are entitled.

The government’s official objective was always to give more aid to the truly needy, while cutting off assistance to those who were not. There was also a desire to prevent state financial assistance from discouraging recipients from working. “Unemployment insurance was not designed to become a system of income support and supplementation,” states the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance, tabled in 1986.

Discreet, more modest dismantling

According to journalist Linda McQuaig, Mulroney was a quiet disciple of Reagan and Thatcher. While the American and British governments dismantled the welfare state with great fanfare in the name of the economy, Mulroney quietly attacked it, always insisting that the reforms were aimed at a more effective fight against poverty.

When it came to privatization, however, the government was so sure it was rowing in the direction of public opinion that the official discourse exaggerated the scale of the movement. Not only did the government privatize fewer companies than had been officially announced, but new Crown corporations were created under the Mulroney Conservatives without great fanfare.

The Mulroney years were only the beginning of the decline of the Canadian welfare state. Liberals Jean ChrĂ©tien and Paul Martin ended the Canada Assistance Plan and reformed the Employment Insurance program to make it even more restrictive. Between 1993 and 2002, the proportion of unemployed people eligible for EI fell from 57 per cent to 38 per cent. Stephen Harper’s Conservative government raised the minimum age for entitlement to Old Age Security to 67 (a measure since cancelled by the Trudeau government).

By transforming universal programs into selective ones, the Mulroney government changed the spirit of the Canadian welfare state. Liberals and Conservatives alike sought to provide the absolute minimum. They sought to reduce state financial assistance as much as possible, without placing more Canadians below the poverty line. The objective was to save the truly needy without risk of shrinking the labour pool, and to avoiding wasteful spending. Mulroney’s policies may have been less radical than Thatcher’s or Reagan’s, but they opened a door that future governments would walk through.