”œIf I knew where I were going to die,” remarked an old man, ”œI would never go there.” There is a grain of wisdom in this apocryphal story. Knowing the future could change what we do in the present, yet changing what we do in the present might also change the future. To complicate matters even further, since we cannot know the future, we often look to the past to foretell the future. But the past is often a poor guide to the future. Very few writing twenty-five years ago, I suspect, would have predicted the end of the Cold War, the implosion of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, a massive genocide in Rwanda at the end of the century, the attack against the United States on September 11th, and the deep engagement of the United States on the ground in the Middle East. Yet each of these has had wide- spread and transformative consequences for global security.

Twenty-five years ago, global security issues revolved around the two nuclear superpowers. The Cold War had become hotter after the Soviet Union had sent its forces into Afghanistan. President Reagan drastically stepped up mili- tary spending and the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union ratcheted up. In response to a military exercise of US forces, Soviet leaders put their forces on alert. Around the world, leaders worried about the risk of a nuclear confrontation and Europe was convulsed by demonstrations as governments considered deploying the- atre nuclear weapons.

The global security environment today looks very differ- ent from the highly organized, routinized environment of the long Cold War. Even though that environment was certainly dangerous, it was also structured and predictable after its first few decades. States were the principal protagonists, they con- trolled the most important instruments of warfare, and organ- ized bureaucratic structures controlled strategies of warfare and conflict management. Issues of “high security” trumped the more routine challenges of trade and investment.

Few if any of these attributes will be in place in twenty- five years. States will be only one of several players in the security environment, access to instruments of warfare will be widely diffused, power will be understood differently, the divide between ”œdomestic” and ”œforeign” will disappear into the thickening global networks of connection, and net- works will join hierarchies as the principal forms of organi- zation that control warfare. As a result, the global security environment will become more fragmented, uncertain and complex than it was a quarter century ago. It already is. In this complex and uncertain strategic environment, new adaptive organizational and strategic responses will become essential. States that adapt best will do best.

Some trends will cross the historical divide and continue to strengthen. War ”” its prevention, its management, its resolution ”” is always at the core of any security agen- da. Twenty-five years ago, although the fear of nuclear war was real, war among post-industrial democratic states had already become unlikely. In 1980, it would have been diffi- cult to imagine a war between France and Germany, or between Britain and France. War among democratic states in the next quarter century is now unthinkable. This is a remarkable break in the cen- turies-long history of war.

In the last twenty-five years, civil war became more frequent than inter- state war and killed far more people. This trend, unfortunately, is also likely to continue.

Violence within states will contin- ue to spill across borders and trigger conflict. Much of the last decade was consumed by the efforts of major pow- ers to manage these kinds of violent conflicts that spring from ethnic, tribal and religious cleavages within states. This kind of challenge is likely to per- sist, even intensify, in the next quarter century. The prevention, management and resolution of these kinds of con- flict are already beyond the capacity of even a superpower. The United States, the only superpower of the last fifteen years, may be singularly ill-suited to this kind of task. Other wealthy states will be pushed by the reaction of their publics, in a hyper-connected media environment, to commit resources, inside or outside formal international institutions. International institutions, especially the United Nations, will have to adapt their practices to become much more nimble, adept and flexible as a first line of response to the ripples of civil war and large civilian casualties.

It is not only the nature of war that is changing. Its protagonists are chang- ing as well. Science and technology are already privileging miniaturization, the diffusion of technology and the diffu- sion of power beyond states to other kinds of players. The fundamental form of social organization is evolving from hierarchies to networks and giv- ing the advantage to those that are organized flexibly in flatter structures. These two developments together are changing the terrain on which security is built, and on which the global secu- rity agenda will be contested.

Science and technology have long been enablers, although not deter- minants, of economic, social and political change. We are in the midst of a qualitative change in organiza- tion, led by changes in science and technology. Twenty-five years ago, industrial organizations still dominat- ed in developed countries and multi- national companies were just beginning to take production global. Today, efficiency is no longer achieved through large scale, but through miniaturization, flexibility and speed through distributed networks. We are still in the beginnings of a revolution- ary phase in information and biotech- nology. Developments in both will serve to diffuse power further beyond traditional command and control structures ”” beyond the state.

The capacity of tiny silicon wafers is still multiplying, enabling comput- ing power to grow as its costs per unit decline. Indeed, the revolution in mil- itary affairs was enabled by the capaci- ty to miniaturize and to develop ever smarter software at lower cost. As costs decline, networks will multiply and thicken, software will become ”œsmarter” still and develop the human capabilities of voice and vision. In the next twenty-five years, we will likely see the “death of distance” as people anywhere will be able to connect in real time. Advances in biotechnology and microelectronics will also create new capabilities for connectivity and ”œmicrosensing.”

Some speculate that these tech- nologies will produce a qualitative leap in the gathering of information and in our capacity to understand complex distributed systems. Our environment will become fully interactive and it will become more and more difficult for governments to control information flows. Certainly, power will continue to diffuse as citizens have easier and cheaper access to informa- tion and knowledge. Others with less benign intentions ”” drug cartels, organized crime and ter- rorists ”” will also have the capac- ity to access these technologies. They will have a far greater capac- ity to act globally than they already have. The contest between encryption and decod- ing will intensify, and govern- ments will need to invest heavily in both capabilities. Hierarchically organized, centralized command-and- control will become more difficult than it already is, and monopolies of information virtually impossible.

On September 11, 2001, we wit- nessed the first large-scale vio- lent attack against the United States. Twenty-five years earlier, the only kind of attack that leaders in Washington worried about was a deliberate ”” or accidental ”” attack with nuclear mis- siles from a hostile state. That kind of attack never happened. What did hap- pen was an attack launched not by a state but by a network. The network has become the most pervasive organi- zational image and the dominant form of social organization in post-industrial society. ”œAs a historical trend,” observes Manuel Castells, ”œdominant functions and processes in the infor- mation age are increasingly organized around networks.” Networks also shape processes of terror and violence.

A network is a collection of con- nected points or nodes, generally designed to be resilient through redun- dancy. It can be terminals connected to the Internet, or one expert commu- nicating with another in a common network devoted to a shared problem. Networks, in other words, can be both technological and social. The design of the network determines its resilience, its flexibility, its capacity to expand and its vulnerability.

Removing a single node, or even several, does not destroy the net- work. The network adjusts, reroutes and reforms. In the pure model of a network, such as the Internet, eliminating one node of a network does not imperil other nodes. Analysts have suggested, for example, that one of the reasons why complex financial networks were able to resume operations so quickly after the attack on September 11 was that many of the firms had built operations centres off site after the first attack in 1993. Within hours, many had resumed operations because of the redundancy they had built into their information systems. Such redundancy also explains why e-mail traffic continued to move unimpaired on September 11, while tele- phone traffic ground to a halt in the northeast United States.

Social networks mirror their elec- tronic counterparts in important ways. They too are highly decentral- ized, with different leadership branches that operate with a large degree of autonomy. Unlike the tight pyramids of command-and-control political structures, the hallmark of states twenty-five years ago, networks are ”œflatter,” with leaders who are empowered to act under a minimum of direction and supervision. Using electronic communication, global networks of every kind have multi- plied in the last decade: businesses, civil society networks, journalists, scientists, physicians, lawyers, schol- ars and environmentalists.

The most advanced networks are in the financial sector, where capital flows relatively seamlessly around the world through integrated electronic trading networks. There is an element of ”œplace,” however, within which almost all successful networks work. Even among global financial net- works, as Nigel Thrift has written, major urban centres act as crucial cen- tral nodes where financial expertise and personnel are located. It is for this reason that the city of London occupies such a central role in the global financial economy.

Global networks of terror and crime bear an uncanny resem- blance to their generally benign and productive counterparts. Unlike legiti- mate global networks, they work in secrecy and through illegitimate prac- tices and violence to advance their political purposes. Often with life- cycles of decades, networks of terror thrive on the openness, flexibility and diversity of post-industrial society, crossing borders almost as easily as do goods and services, knowledge and cultures. They have global reach, par- ticularly when they can operate within the fabric of the most open and multi-cultural societies, and through post- industrial organizational forms. Global networks of terror are conceivable only in a world that is tightly interconnect- ed. Without global markets and com- munications, the widespread mobility of people and multicultural, diverse societies, these networks of terror could not survive, much less succeed.

Many hosts of networks of terror, although not all, cling to weak states that can provide a secure environ- ment for the infrastructure and resources that they need. They often depend on states for infrastructure, logistics and training sites. In exchange for the shield pro- vided by a state, a network delivers complex political and financial rewards that help a regime to stay in power. An ideal environment for a ”œhost” of a network of terror is a weak or fractured state where a network can provide critically needed assets in exchange for the capacity to operate ”œin place.” Even with- out a secure physical environ- ment, however, networks can survive; a host can use mobile headquarters, but training, operations and recruitment become more difficult.

Networks of terror, violence and crime will not disap- pear, for they are drawing on the form of social organization which is unique- ly enabled by the global environment. If anything, they are likely to thicken and deepen over the next twenty-five years. They pose new kinds of chal- lenges to the security of citizens and governments, and require fundamen- tal changes in the way states think about and manage security.

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These kinds of networks will change the conception of power over the next twenty-five years. Small groups of determined people, organ- ized as a distributed network and using technologies that will become more and more easily available in the civil- ian sector, can inflict serious damage. They can terrify and paralyze complex and interdependent societies; the more complex and the more intercon- nected societies become, the greater the capacity of these kinds of networks to terrify and disrupt. With relatively few assets, they can disrupt and desta- bilize powerful and wealthy societies.

To respond, governments will have to graft network-like attributes onto their hierarchical structures. They will have to change the way they are organized, the way they share infor- mation, and vastly increase the timeli- ness of their response. Security will be embedded in organizational styles, patterns of information sharing and the timeliness of response. These will be the new determinants of power.

Among the most striking trends in the current global environment is the division of the world by age. To oversimplify only a little, the popula- tion is aging in Europe, Japan and China. In Canada and the United States, the aging demographic is mod- erated only by significant immigra- tion. In poorer countries, even though there have been significant successes in lowering the birth rate, population is still growing and will continue to grow as these societies move through the ”œdemographic tunnel.” The conse- quences of this ”œdivision by age” on economic growth, governance, social inclusion and security are potentially enormous. In both parts of this divid- ed world, societies will look very dif- ferent twenty-five years from now than they do today.

In the aging world, the “grey power” of older people will be an important political force, with a set of expectations from governments that range from enhanced pensions to bet- ter health care, and to improved hous- ing, on a smaller scale. At the same time, the productive labour force in the economy will diminish. Expectations will grow as the size of the productive labour force diminish- es. In this environment, governments will face enhanced demands as the resource base to produce wealth diminishes. It is this expected demo- graphic profile which is already lead- ing policy planners to emphasize the importance of increased immigration of productive young people as a way out of the ”œdemographic trap.”

We are already seeing the escalat- ing social and political tensions that have accompanied increased flows of immigration to Europe. These escalat- ing tensions are not a necessary conse- quence of immigration, but, if they are to be avoided, they require public poli- cy that speaks explicitly to the values and norms of ”œshared citizenship,” the set of mutual and reciprocal obligations assumed by established citizens and new immigrants who would be citizens. Without this kind of policy, immigrants who are badly integrated, inadequately housed, segregated in poor neighbour- hoods, condemned to an underground economy and deprived of political voice can become breeding grounds for social discontent and political alien- ation. At worst, they can become fertile recruiting grounds for those who seek change through violence. They become the nodes of malignant networks that threaten security from within.

The social tensions created by a young population in poorer soci- eties are likely to be even sharper. In the poorest countries, the majority of the population is under 15 years of age. The social impact of a young population is amplified by a growing pattern of global urbanization. Unless there is significant economic growth and opportunity for young people entering the labour markets, twenty-five years from now many societies will face significant social strain, increasing participation in black markets and criminal activity, limited access to the most basic social services of health care, sanitation and education, alienation from government, and openness to participation in violence as an outlet for frustration and grievance. At the extreme, states and governance will collapse under the stress and, as they have in the past, become attractive hosts for networks of terror and crime. The concept of global order will be hollowed out. Among the gravest threats to global security in the next twenty-five years is a large pool of unemployed, humiliated and angry adolescent males, who can be recruited into networks of violence.

The demographic divide interacts with patterns of growing inequality to create potentially malignant conse- quences. If inequality does not dimin- ish in the next twenty-five years, especially in societies where the very young constitute the majority, vio- lence will spill out from societies, cross borders that necessarily must remain relatively open if trade and investment are to flourish, and, operating through networks, take root in societies like our own. No society can remain immune from collapse and violence in another, no matter how remote. Canada in par- ticular is connected through networks of citizens who remain connected to their home societies. ”œThere” is ”œhere.”

Twenty-five years ago, the United States was one of two superpowers. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States became the most significant player in the construc- tion of the global security architecture and in the management of threats. In the next twenty-five years, it will pro- vide and manage the dominant operat- ing software for the security system as well as much of the hardware. It will be the ”œsystems operator.”

The pre-eminence of the United States has greater significance for Canada than for any other society, given our shared borders and our deep- ening dependence on and integration with the American economy and soci- ety. How we manage our relationship with the United States, its government and society, both to enhance and to protect our quality of life is Canada’s most fundamental security challenge.

In the next quarter century, the gap between the United States and its allies will continue to grow, in the development of advanced information systems, in science and technology and in the sophistication of its weapons systems. This is not a unique- ly Canadian problem and we are not alone among the allies of the United States that cannot hope to keep pace. If we are to be credible, we cannot con- tinue to maintain the fiction that we are combat capable across the spec- trum. No military other than that of the United States is, and even the US military faces significant gaps at the lower end of the scale.

If Canada is to be a participant in the new security architecture operated by the United States, it must increase the size of its armed forces, particular- ly its land forces, and its capacity to deploy these forces. Without an inde- pendent capacity to deploy forces, Canada will forfeit any capacity to act both to strengthen the global security architecture and to contribute to a multilateralist impulse within the United States. A capacity to act independently is especially important if, over the next two decades, the United States is largely unilateralist rather than multilateralist in tendency, and is unwilling to assume the burden of sus- taining the global security architecture other than where its interests are directly engaged.

Canada faced these challenges twenty-five years ago, but they are more pressing today and will become even more urgent in the future. They are more important because of the imperative to make optimal use of scarce resources. Canada will have to decide how much voice and autonomy it is willing to cede to align the command structures of its military forces in the air, at sea and on land ”” as well as its police, law enforcement, border security, immigration and refugee policies and intelligence ”” with those of the United States to create a seamless web of continental security. It will have to determine how it can build into the emergent transnational networked security architecture a distinctively Canadian component. These deci- sions will affect not only the structure of the Canadian forces, but Canadian society as well; they will of necessity speak to the core values of Canadians.

A second important issue emerges directly from the networked character of the emergent security architecture. The analysis of the forces driving threats to global security suggests that knowledge of foreign cultures is a vital component in strategic intelligence. It is no longer only foreign governments that matter, as it was a quarter century ago, but foreign societies, their dynam- ics, their social movements, their dissi- dents and the space they provide to hosts of networks. It is not only, or even primarily, military assets or capabilities that must be monitored and evaluated, but social inclusion and exclusion, eco- nomic development, political alien- ation and the emergence of dissident groups and networks that are strongly motivated to challenge the status quo. Intelligence rests, more than ever, on a deep understanding of the political and social dynamics of other societies.

The United States is not necessarily the best equipped, given both its interests and its blinders, to do the analysis of other cultures and sensibili- ties. Canada has unique assets among its diverse and multicultural civilian population, but historically has made extraordinarily poor use of these assets. It has underinvested in the develop- ment of independent intelligence capa- bilities and has relied principally on intelligence sharing, particularly with the United States, with all the atten- dant costs as well as benefits.

Unlike many other countries, it has not partnered systematically with experts within Canadian communities and institutions outside govern- ment to broaden and deepen knowledge and understanding. When information is generally treated as a scarce resource, to be held rather than shared and deepened through exchange, valuable opportunities are lost. This kind of strategy is especially inappropriate in an information-rich society, where expertise is critical to transforming information into knowledge. Canada must make a sig- nificant investment in upgrading its intelligence capacity by broadening and deepening its partnerships within Canadian society if it is to sustain a capacity to act independently in a fragmented and complex security environment.

Finally, I have argued that the proliferation of non-state groups as direct participants in both creating and threatening global security will be the most important attribute of the new security environment. More and more, non-state groups and even individuals will act directly ”” not through states ”” in the global securi- ty arena. The capacity to build and sustain partnerships across sectors will become an essential state capa- bility in ensuring security.

The command-and-control hier- archical model is an increasingly poor fit with societies that connect globally and with the growing importance of networks as the domi- nant form of social organization. Hierarchy, vertical lines of control and top-down forms of command in government fit poorly into the new security architecture. Generically, states across the post-industrial world are reconfiguring themselves to partner with the private sec- tor in public-private partner- ships, and with the voluntary sector to deliver public goods. Emergency and development assistance, for example, is now delivered overwhelmingly by non-governmental organiza- tions. The government must enhance its capacity to partner with the private sector, the voluntary sector and centres of excel- lence to enrich its knowledge base and its capacity to provide security.

Partnering will not succeed unless government relinquishes some control, permits information to flow horizontally outside of gov- ernment and encourages network- like structures to develop. This is no easy challenge for institutions that have been configured as hierarchies with vertical information flows and lines of reporting, embedded in a deep culture of control. Canada will waste valuable resources and forfeit significant opportunities if it is unable to make this shift of culture to network-like thinking and opera- tions. It will hobble its capacity to provide security to Canadians. The global security architecture will reward those that think, communi- cate and act like networks.

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