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In this episode of Demystifying Community Housing, co-hosts Hanan Ali and Natasha Mhuriro speak with Rebecca Schiff, dean of the Faculty of Human Health Sciences at the University of Northern British Columbia; Ray Sullivan, executive director of the Canadian Housing and Renewal Association; and David Hulchanski, a professor in the Faculty of Social Work and the Graduate Program in Planning in the Department of Geography at the University of Toronto. Together they discuss what community housing means, who it serves or should serve, and how to pave the path forward for resilient community housing.
This episode is part of the Demystifying Community Housing Podcast series.
(Version française disponible ici)
The 2018 Quebec provincial election was notable not only because it brought to power a new political party – the Coalition avenir Québec – but because it was a historic defeat for the sovereigntist Parti Québécois, reduced at that time to only 10 seats in the National Assembly. The party suffered a further setback in the vote four years later, winning only three seats.
With the PQ having been all but erased from the provincial political scene, surely that meant the decades-long debate about whether Quebec should remain part of Canada could finally be laid to rest.
Not so fast. Public opinion polls in the province have captured a dramatic change recently. In mid-2023, the PQ experienced an initial boost that saw them pull ahead of the other opposition parties. Then in the fall, an even larger boost propelled them to the top, well ahead of the governing CAQ.
If an election were held today, the polls now project the PQ would return to power with a majority.
And with that shift, we are now talking about a referendum again.
Does the growing support for the PQ signal a resurgence of support for sovereignty in the province?
In a word: no.
The proportion of francophone Quebecers who identify as “mainly a sovereigntist” has changed little over the six years covered by the annual Confederation of Tomorrow survey.
In 2024, only 23 per cent of respondents described themselves as mainly a sovereigntist – which is more than those who said they were mainly a federalist (18 per cent), but not much different from previous years. A slightly greater share (29 per cent) placed themselves in between the two options, while another 23 per cent said they were neither one nor the other.
The same pattern held when Quebecers were asked if they agreed that Quebec sovereignty is an idea whose time has passed. In 2024, 51 per cent of Quebec francophones agreed, which is unchanged not only compared to when this current series of surveys began in 2019 but also to when the question was asked more than 20 years ago.
To the extent that there has been some change, it is that the proportion disagreeing has dropped off somewhat, while the share that is unsure has increased.
The picture is no more encouraging for the sovereignty movement when we look specifically at younger adults. In 2024, only 16 per cent of Quebec francophones aged 18 to 34 identified as mainly sovereignty and only 26 per cent disagreed that Quebec sovereignty is an idea whose time has passed.
In both cases, these proportions are lower than those for older generations today and lower for this same age group two decades ago. Millennial and GenZ Quebecers are less sovereigntist than their GenX or Boomer counterparts.
Even the current supporters of the Parti Québécois were not one-sidedly sovereigntist. Yes, PQ supporters (53 per cent) were more likely than those who support the CAQ (18 per cent) to identify as mainly sovereigntist.
But that still leaves 39 per cent of PQ supporters who said they were either in between the two options or neither, while seven per cent said they were mainly federalist. One in three PQ supporters (33 per cent) agreed that the time for Quebec sovereignty has passed.
So what explains the resurgence of the PQ, if not a renewed interest in sovereignty?
It’s likely a straightforward combination of government missteps and the failure of the other opposition parties to capitalize on them. The proportion of Quebecers dissatisfied with the way things are going jumped 14 percentage points between 2023 and 2024 to 46 per cent from 34 per cent.
Dissatisfaction with the province’s management of the health-care system (which was already high) also grew over the past year.
The proportion seeing the Quebec provincial government as the one that best represents them dropped, while the proportion saying that no government is best more than doubled to 24 per cent from 11 per cent.
The Quebec Liberal Party remains adrift without a leader and Québec solidaire still hasn’t been able to get out of large urban areas. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum and the PQ with its more charismatic leader has been able to fill the empty space.
Before federalists conclude that there is nothing to worry about – that the rise of the PQ in the polls is driven more by nightmares about hospital waiting times than by dreams of independence – it is worth recalling the other side of the coin.
While the proportion of francophone Quebecers who identified as mainly sovereigntist is not trending upward, the proportion who identified as mainly federalist remains small – fewer than one in five.
Only 42 per cent of Quebecers agreed that Canadian federalism has more advantages than disadvantages for their province. As well, for the sixth year in a row, our survey found that roughly seven in 10 francophone Quebecers feel the French language in Quebec is threatened.
The absence of a resurgence in support for sovereignty should not be mistaken for an indication of stronger support for federalism.
This is Part 1 of a two-part series. In the second part, the authors will examine in more detail some of the factors that relate to support for sovereignty in Quebec.
Methodological details
The Confederation of Tomorrow surveys are annual studies conducted by an association of some of the country’s leading public policy and socio-economic research organizations: the Environics Institute for Survey Research, the Centre of Excellence on the Canadian Federation, the Canada West Foundation, the Centre d’analyse politique – Constitution Fédéralisme, the Brian Mulroney Institute of Government and the First Nations Financial Management Board.
The surveys give voice to Canadians about the major issues shaping the future of the federation and their political communities.
The 2024 study surveyed 6,036 adults and was conducted between Jan. 13 and April 13 (82 per cent of the responses were collected between Jan. 17 and Feb. 1) with 94 per cent of the responses collected online. The remaining responses were collected by telephone from respondents living in the North or on First Nations reverses.
The results presented above are based on surveys of 1621 Quebecers, 1297 of whom were francophones.
Survey responses are weighted by age, gender, region, education, Indigenous identity and home language to be representative of the actual distribution of the adult Canadian population.
(English version available here)
Dans un discours qui a beaucoup fait parler lors du Conseil national du Parti québécois à la mi-avril, Paul St-Pierre Plamondon a ramené à l’avant-plan la question de l’indépendance du Québec.
Estimant possible l’élection d’un gouvernement péquiste en 2026, le chef du PQ a laissé entendre que son ascension au poste de premier ministre serait accompagnée d’un référendum sur la souveraineté. Cela représenterait pour les Québécois l’ultime chance « de se donner une pérennité linguistique et culturelle ».
Et nous voilà repartis sur une question que l’arrivée au pouvoir de la CAQ avait évacuée des tribunes! Avec une maigre récolte de trois sièges à l’élection provinciale de 2022, plusieurs avaient enterré le Parti québécois. Son quasi-effacement de la scène politique signifiait certainement que le sempiternel débat sur la souveraineté du Québec pouvait enfin être clos.
Deux ans plus tard, les sondages d’opinion au Québec témoignent d’un spectaculaire revirement de situation. Si des élections avaient lieu aujourd’hui, le PQ finirait en tête, avec environ 33 % du vote. Mieux, en raison de la division de l’électorat québécois en cinq partis, le PQ pourrait même former un gouvernement majoritaire, pour la première fois en plus de 25 ans.
Tout ceci nous amène à reparler de référendum. La résurgence du PQ annonce-t-elle un regain du soutien à la souveraineté dans la province ?
En un mot : non.
La proportion de Québécois francophones qui s’identifient comme « principalement souverainistes » a très peu changé au cours des six dernières années (soit la période couverte par les sondages annuels de la Confédération de demain).
Actuellement, 23 % des Québécois francophones se décrivent comme étant principalement souverainistes. C’est plus que la proportion de ceux qui se disent principalement fédéralistes (18 %), mais pas très différent des années précédentes. Une proportion légèrement supérieure (29 %) se situe entre les deux options, et 23 % disent n’être ni l’un ni l’autre.
La même tendance se dégage lorsqu’on demande aux Québécois s’ils pensent que la souveraineté du Québec est une idée dépassée. À l’heure actuelle, un Québécois francophone sur deux (51 %) est de cet avis, une proportion similaire à ce qui était observé au début de cette série de sondages en 2019, mais aussi au moment où la question a été posée pour la première fois dans le sondage, il y a plus de 20 ans.
Entre-temps, les variations s’expliquent par une faible diminution des Québécois en désaccord avec l’énoncé, au profit des indécis.
Le tableau n’est pas plus encourageant pour le mouvement souverainiste si l’on considère spécifiquement les opinions des jeunes adultes. Seulement 16 % des Québécois francophones âgés de 18 à 34 ans se disent principalement souverainistes, et seulement 26 % ne pensent pas que la souveraineté du Québec est une idée qui a fait son temps.
Dans les deux cas, ces proportions sont inférieures à celles des générations plus âgées, mais également à celles du même groupe d’âge il y a vingt ans. Les Québécois millénariaux et ceux de la génération Z sont donc moins souverainistes que ceux de la génération X ou des baby-boomers au même âge.
Même les partisans actuels du Parti québécois ne sont pas tous principalement souverainistes. Les partisans du PQ (53 %) sont plus susceptibles de s’identifier comme principalement souverainistes que ceux de la CAQ (18 %), par exemple. Mais 39 % des partisans du PQ disent se situer entre les deux options ou n’adhérer ni à l’une, ni l’autre, alors que 7 % se considèrent principalement fédéralistes. Par ailleurs, un péquiste sur trois (33 %) considère que le temps de la souveraineté du Québec est révolu.
Comment expliquer la résurgence du PQ, si ce n’est par un regain d’intérêt pour la souveraineté? La réponse est probablement une simple combinaison des faux pas des gouvernements québécois et canadien, et de l’incapacité des autres partis d’opposition à en tirer profit.
La proportion de Québécois insatisfaits de la direction du Canada a grimpé de 14 points de pourcentage entre 2023 et 2024 (de 32 à 46 %). L’insatisfaction à l’égard de la gestion du système de santé par la province (qui était déjà élevée) a également augmenté au cours de la dernière année. La proportion de personnes considérant que le gouvernement du Québec les représente le mieux a diminué, tandis que la proportion déclarant qu’aucun gouvernement ne les représente adéquatement a plus que doublé, passant de 11 à 24 %.
Pendant ce temps, le Parti libéral du Québec reste à la dérive et sans chef, et Québec Solidaire n’a toujours pas réussi à s’implanter en dehors des grandes zones urbaines. La politique, comme la nature, a horreur du vide, et le PQ, avec un leader plus charismatique, a su remplir cet espace.
Cela dit, avant que les fédéralistes concluent qu’il n’y a pas lieu de s’inquiéter – et que la montée du PQ dans les sondages est davantage motivée par des cauchemars sur les temps d’attente dans les hôpitaux que par des rêves d’indépendance – il convient de rappeler le revers de la médaille.
Alors que la proportion de Québécois francophones s’identifiant principalement comme souverainistes ne tend pas à augmenter, la proportion de ceux qui s’identifient principalement comme fédéralistes reste faible – moins d’un sur cinq. Seulement 42 % des Québécois estiment que le fédéralisme canadien présente plus d’avantages que d’inconvénients pour leur province. Et pour la sixième année consécutive, notre enquête révèle qu’environ 7 Québécois francophones sur 10 estiment que la langue française au Québec est menacée.
L’absence d’une résurgence du soutien à la souveraineté ne doit donc pas être interprétée comme une indication d’un soutien plus fort au fédéralisme.
Ceci est le premier d’une série de deux articles. Dans le second texte, les auteurs examinent plus en détail certains facteurs liés à l’appui à la souveraineté au Québec.
Détails méthodologiques
Les sondages de la Confédération de demain sont des études annuelles menées par un regroupement d’importants organismes de recherche socio-économique et de politique publique du pays : l’Environics Institute for Survey Research, le Centre d’excellence sur la fédération canadienne, la Canada West Foundation, le Centre d’analyse politique – Constitution et fédéralisme, le Brian Mulroney Institute of Government et le First Nations Financial Management Board. Les enquêtes permettent aux Canadiens de s’exprimer sur les grandes questions qui façonnent l’avenir de la fédération et de leurs communautés politiques.
L’étude 2024 consiste en un sondage réalisé auprès de 6036 adultes entre le 13 janvier et le 4 mars 2024 (80 % des réponses ont été recueillies entre le 18 et le 26 janvier); 95 % des réponses ont été recueillies en ligne. Les autres réponses ont été recueillies par téléphone auprès de répondants vivant dans le Nord ou au sein des communautés autochtones.
Les résultats présentés ci-dessus concernent 1621 Québécois, dont 1297 francophones.
Les réponses à l’enquête sont pondérées en fonction de l’âge, du sexe, de la région, du niveau d’éducation, de l’identité autochtone et de la langue parlée à la maison, afin d’être représentatives de la répartition réelle de la population adulte canadienne.
Welcome to Demystifying Community Housing, a special series from the IRPP’s Policy Options Podcast, which explores the different facets of community housing and its role in addressing Canada’s housing crisis.
In this episode, we speak with Yushu Zhu and Meg Holden, professors of urban studies at Simon Fraser University, who are leading the production of this podcast series. Together we talk about their research on community housing, the reason they worked on this podcast and what listeners can expect.
This episode is part of the Demystifying Community Housing Podcast series.
Welcome to Demystifying Community Housing, a special series from the IRPP’s Policy Options Podcast, where we aim to have a broad conversation about community housing, its role in addressing Canada’s housing crisis and how public policy can support the building of a strong and resilient community-housing sector.
Demystifying Community Housing will feature in-depth discussions with residents, researchers, housing operators, service providers and others who make the sector work.
This podcast is a special collaboration between the IRPP and the Urban Studies Program and School of Public Policy at Simon Fraser University.
(Version française disponible ici)
Tense family dinners during the pandemic, the “Freedom Convoy” in 2022 and, more recently, confrontations over the issue of gender identity: all bear witness to social polarization and the spread of disinformation. Such events weaken social cohesion, heighten divisiveness and prejudice and undermine democracy.
The result is a growing chorus of calls for more civic education in the hope of resolving or preventing these social crises. This idea is based on the principle that involved, informed and responsible citizens are essential to maintaining a functioning and resilient democratic society.
Nevertheless, while such a request might seem reasonable, should we not first analyse the quality of the existing services offered before calling for more? That’s precisely the goal of L’Éducation civique mise au second plan, a report that describes Canadian teachers’ perception of this matter. To produce it, 1,922 professional educators across the country were surveyed. Focus groups and one-on-one interviews helped delve deeper into certain aspects of the study.
The conclusion is clear: civic education is seriously undervalued in Canada, which critically jeopardizes its effectiveness. Acting upon this assessment, it’s important to equip teachers in their difficult task of preparing young people for their role as engaged and well-informed citizens.
Civics includes the formal study of political processes, of the role of government as well as of the rights and responsibilities of citizens. However, at a more fundamental level, it concerns community and the way in which we identify with others and interact with them.
It is the teacher’s pedagogical approach that makes all the difference.
A good civic education emphasizes the active participation of students rather than the mere imparting of knowledge, facts and dates.
The best practices stress pedagogical methods that put students in situations where they must observe and experiment; for example: constructive debates on political issues, mock political activities, and civic action programs.
But to get there, teachers need a great deal of time, training and resources to enable them to implement best practices.
On paper, school curricula present active citizenship as one of the most important educational goals, but in the field it’s another matter altogether.
Almost two-thirds of teachers in the report stated that this component is not a priority at their school. This lack of validation within the school system compromises its effectiveness, especially since teachers lack adequate training and sufficient time or resources to teach it.
The report reveals deficiencies in civics training for teachers: 25 per cent of respondents underwent civics training, which is not the case for almost twice as many (48 per cent). So it’s not surprising that many teachers lack sufficient confidence in their ability to teach politics. They feel pressure on them, or a sense of helplessness in the face of weak guidelines from the school system, which includes schools, school service centres, districts or education ministries. This lack of guidance and integration of the program may also give the impression that civic education is an optional skill set, both in the eyes of the teachers and of the students.
And yet, the majority of Canadian study programs set out high expectations on this front. For example, the Atlantic provinces’ social studies curriculum asserts that “social sciences, more than any other curriculum area, is vital in developing citizenship”, embodying “the main principles of democracy.” However, most of these programs fail to offer guidance or specific instructions on how to attain these learning objectives.
Though some teachers benefit from this flexibility by implementing genuine civic education programs, such is not the case for all. Most have instead signaled the need for tangible pedagogical and didactic strategies aimed at reaching the prescribed learning objectives.
Currently, these activities more often than not consist of discussions of current affairs and political issues. Yet active-learning or experience-based pedagogical strategies have proven far more effective, for example properly supervised constructive debates, realistic mock elections or civic action projects allowing students to apply what they have learned in their community.
For young people to become citizens who are involved, informed and active in their communities, civic education must become a priority, both for teachers and for school authorities.
First of all, there must be investment in teacher training at all levels, for both current and future educators. They should be able to develop their own civic knowledge and skills while also mastering evidence-based pedagogical strategies. Training is one of the primary means of learning best practices in the subject, allowing students to engage in constructive debate and participate in authentic and experiential programs.
Secondly, teachers must have access to sound pedagogical strategies and tangible examples of how to incorporate the subject matter into their classroom, whatever the material being taught. This can be achieved with ready-to-use teaching resources that help teachers properly prepare their students for such exercises as a mock-election vote; other tools include guidebooks or lesson plans that help them lead in-class political discussions.
Finally, there must be infrastructure investment to support the creation of a teachers’ network for the sharing of the latest civic-education research, best practices and resources. Despite their best intentions, few educators have the time or the means to keep up with current research in the subject. Access to scientific papers often involves a fee, not to mention the hours of commitment to process the research or use it to implement new pedagogical approaches. We therefore need infrastructure that gathers emerging research in one place and helps educators connect that research to their work, in practical and effective ways.
To obtain a licence to practise in any regulated occupation, newcomers to Canada need to have their foreign credentials recognized by a responsible provincial regulatory body. Although the situation differs from province to province, the process is widely recognized as unjust, expensive and lengthy.
Various provincial and federal initiatives have attempted to resolve the issues since the 1980s.
For example, an evaluation of the federal foreign credential recognition program that aimed to simplify and coordinate foreign credentials recognition and provide loans concluded that skilled newcomers still face a long and complicated process.
Applicants are often forced to spend years in the process. In some cases, they become desperate and take low-skilled jobs to support themselves and their families. Many eventually give up on obtaining their licence and restarting their professional careers in Canada. The problem also hurts all Canadians by effectively reducing the economic contribution of newcomers and their capacity to fill gaps in sectors hard hit by labour shortages.
There is a need to cut down processing time, simplify the application process and make the Canadian work experience more accessible – essentially addressing many of the previously identified barriers encountered by highly skilled newcomers. Those barriers do not only harm the Canadian economy, they contribute to newcomers earning significantly less than the Canadian-born, which harms their mental health, life satisfaction and desire to remain in the country.
The most recent attempt to help solve this problem is the International Credentials Recognition Act, introduced by the B.C. government in November. Premier David Eby says it is intended to fast-track applicants to help fill at least one-third of the one million expected job openings in the province in the next decade.
Andrew Mercier, minister of state for workforce development, describes the legislation as a great advance, saying “We’re making the process fairer and more transparent, so all qualified professionals can work in their chosen fields.”
However, despite some innovative characteristics, the legislation still leaves a lot of loose threads hanging and provides relief to only a small number of professions covered by fewer than half of existing regulatory bodies.
To understand the scope of its limitations, we must first go through the five main changes that the act has introduced.
First, the legislation creates the position of superintendent of international credential recognition, whose job will be to promote fair credential recognition, monitor the performance of regulatory authorities and enforce compliance with the new legislation.
Second, regulatory authorities will have only 14 days after making a decision on credentials to communicate that decision to the applicant – a provision that creates a strict timeline that did not exist previously.
Third, the act attempts to close a “catch-22” by forbidding regulatory bodies from requiring Canadian work experience before approving an applicant’s credentials.
Fourth, the act confronts the issue of overly strict proof of language proficiency by allowing the acceptance of test results up to five years old.
Finally, the legislation requires regulatory bodies to reduce the higher application and certification fees they had previously charged to newcomers to the same level as they charge Canadian-born applicants.
(However, newcomers may still be charged additional fees for any supplementary administrative services they may need.)
These five measures address some of the longstanding flaws of the current process and have the potential to provide better conditions for newcomers.
Ultimately, the legislation’s modest changes will apply to a list of only 29 occupations which include lawyers, engineers, social workers, architects, notaries and biologists. Additionally, out of more than 50 professional regulatory authorities in B.C., the legislation applies to only 18. The government has not explained why some professions were chosen and others excluded.
One more important limitation is that anyone who submits an applications before the legislation comes into force this summer cannot benefit from it – a provision that excludes many highly skilled migrants who are in immediate need.
To achieve its goals concerning transparency, clarity and fairness, the International Credentials Recognition Act should at least cover all the regulatory bodies in the province and all the regulated professions.
Then, new legislation that effectively fast-tracks credential recognition, reduces processing times and simplifies the application process should be passed.
Allocating one-on-one funding to newcomers in the certification process is also necessary and was highlighted by newcomers as a missing link.
Furthermore, it is crucial to make the Canadian work experience more accessible by providing incentives for companies to hire newcomers and promoting the creation of entry-level regulated positions devoted to foreign-trained professionals.
Although the International Credentials Recognition Act is a small step in the right direction, it unfortunately leaves behind a lot of newcomers who otherwise could join the Canadian labour force faster while experiencing fewer unnecessary complications.
By not making bigger changes, Canada and B.C. are acting against their own interests. Both certainly can do better to effectively tackle these prevalent and well-known issues.
Albertans have a distorted view of their political environment right down to what their “typical” fellow citizen is like.
While the origins and persistence of Alberta’s political culture are interesting, its impact on public policy has attracted less attention, even though it shapes voters and influences the type of government they receive.
Our Common Ground team has surveyed thousands of residents and held focus groups throughout the province over the past four years. The first thing we ask group participants is to “draw me an Albertan.” The results of hundreds of drawings are clear: Albertans are more likely than not to picture a cowboy, a farmer or an oil rig worker.
Nearly a dozen of these focus groups consisted of only women. Another in Lethbridge featured a roomful of recent immigrants from Africa. The result was the same. They choose a white, male, middle-aged, blue-collar worker from a rural area. “Joe” is the most common name they applied to him.
Of the dozens of sessions we’ve led, only two groups settled on a woman as a typical Albertan — but even then she is married to an oil and gas worker such as “Joe.”
As ubiquitous as it is, this image doesn’t match with demographics.
Calgary Stampede season aside, an Albertan is far more likely to bump into a teacher or nurse than a cowboy. Indigenous and racialized communities are growing quickly relative to the white population. More than 80 per cent of Albertans live in urban or suburban areas and the largest proportion of them work in the service industry. Yet the cowboy myth persists.
There are many reasons for this. Frontier masculinity has been baked into Alberta’s political DNA through decades of school curriculum, government branding campaigns and election rhetoric. To some extent, many of the people arriving in Alberta in record numbers are attracted to a narrative based on “freedom” or are at least not repelled by it.
This freedom-based political culture masks moderate and progressive tendencies in the electorate. It makes politicians less likely to choose certain policy options and voters less likely to support politicians who advocate for them. It stifles policy innovation or discussion of progressive solutions to big challenges such as climate change, the drug-poisoning crisis and the decline of public education.
We’ve paired our Common Ground focus groups with biannual surveys. Led by my colleague, Feodor Snagovsky, these Viewpoint Alberta polls allow us to assess the gap between who Albertans are as individuals versus how they see themselves as a community.
One set of questions asks people to place themselves and the “average Albertan” – whom we can imagine as “Joe” from the focus groups — on a standard political spectrum on which zero means very left wing and 10 means very right wing.
The results have been consistent since we started asking the question in 2021: Albertans are closer to the centre than they imagine “Joe” to be.
There is room to debate the validity of the left-right spectrum to gauge an ideological position. In this instance, however, respondents are using the same spectrum to compare themselves to the person they perceive to be an “average Albertan.” The fact there is a 12-per-cent gap suggests that Albertans are closer to the political centre than they see their province to be.
Indeed, when asked which terms capture their own political identities, more than half of Albertans tick the “moderate” box (56 per cent). This is higher than both “progressive” (50 per cent) and “conservative” (45 per cent). Participants could select more than one description for themselves.
These disparities also show up in policy issues.
Contrary to the image of their province as a conservative bastion, Albertans are relatively progressive on moving the economy away from oil and gas, maintaining access to safe consumption sites and cutting off public funds to private schools. On all three, support outstripped opposition in a January 2024 Viewpoint Alberta survey.
Yet Albertans fail to see the same level of consensus. Whereas 44 per cent of those surveyed said they either strongly or somewhat supported “transitioning Alberta’s economy away from oil and gas,” when asked to estimate the level of popular support for the transition, the average Albertan pegs it at 28 per cent.
The difference is even larger when it comes to “allowing safe consumption sites to continue operating,” with actual support more than double perceived support. Likewise, while more than half of participants favoured “eliminating provincial funding of private schools,” estimated support was 37 per cent.
We also asked participants if they agreed with proposed changes by the United Conservative Party government that would include schools needing parental approval before allowing students under 16 to change their preferred pronouns.
Some 57 per cent of those surveyed supported mandatory disclosure — up from 13 points from our summer 2023 survey. Yet 69 per cent of the same respondents thought the “typical Albertan” supported the policy.
Albertans appear better at estimating mainstream public opinion on issues core to the UCP government’s agenda. For example, 20 per cent of Albertans supported “further privatizing the health-care system,” just three points lower than the perceived average. Support levels for a provincial police service and pension plan were likewise very low — and Albertans know it.
This presents a large challenge to the government if it wants to advance these plans. It must not only change the minds of voters, but also shift perceptions around the mainstream view.
The survey results show the importance of considering actual and perceived levels of public support when considering policy change. As outlined in the Overton window concept, policymakers are less likely to advance a policy initiative when they think it is offside with public opinion or the prevailing norms embedded in the political culture.
Consider the following reported encounter during the COVID-19 pandemic. On Nov. 28, 2020, a social media user recorded the following exchange with Tyler Shandro, who at the time was Alberta’s minister of health. The conversation happened outside a Calgary coffee shop and there were supporting photos attesting to the exchange.
Wearing a mask himself, Shandro was asked why he didn’t support a province-wide mask mandate. His constituent reported that the health minister responded: “What do I say to the guy in Cold Lake?” The constituent added: “Apparently our provincial policy is based on what you tell ‘the guy in Cold Lake.’” The exchange went viral in Alberta, trending for several days.
Shandro would have been aware of the science behind the effectiveness of mask mandates in stopping the spread of COVID-19. He would also have been aware of polls at the time showing Albertans overwhelmingly favoured masking. Yet concern over how an everyman such as “the guy in Cold Lake” would react kept him from advancing the policy.
The health minister’s idea of the typical Albertan was not far off our own research. More than a few of our participants’ drawings featured small-town men from places such as Cold Lake. In this sense, the power of the perceived typical Albertan holds sway beyond the cabinet room.
Albertans who underestimate support for a particular policy issue – such as energy transition, safe drug supply or redirecting funds away from police or private schools – are less likely to speak in favour of their own position for fear of being labeled extreme. In this “spiral of silence,” they may dismiss candidates or parties that advance those policies.
Public opinion and political culture are not synonymous. Unbeknownst to many, popular attitudes may conflict with age-old conceptions of what is acceptable to say, do or think in a particular political community. When they do, it is important to shine light on the discrepancies so that policymakers and the public can properly assess the right course of action.
Methodology
Under principal investigator Dr. Feodor Snagovsky, Viewpoint Alberta conducted an online survey from Jan. 22 to Feb. 25, 2024, among a representative sample of 1,213 Alberta adults through Leger. The figures are weighted by age, gender and region, according to census data. A copy of the questionnaire is found here. When measuring “perceived” public support for various policy initiatives, we took a pair of approaches. For pronoun mandates, the carbon tax, safe consumption sites, and police budgets, we asked respondents: “To what extent do you think the typical Albertan supports or opposes these policies?” We then combined responses of “strongly support” and “somewhat support” to arrive at the “perceived” figure. For pensions, policing, tax collection, oil and gas transition, PST, privatizing health care and private schools, we asked respondents: “What percentage of Albertans do you think at least somewhat supports the following policies?” We then took the average response as the “perceived” figure.
De quels soutien, formation et outils a besoin un député fédéral pour bien s’acquitter de ses fonctions de législateur et pour bien servir sa communauté ? Quels types de réseaux formels et informels façonnent l’expérience des députés à la Chambre des communes ?
Dans le cadre de la baladodiffusion Les Personnages de la Chambre, le Centre Samara pour la démocratie a interrogé six anciens députés fédéraux sur l’importance des liens qu’ils ont tissés avant, pendant et après leur passage à la Chambre des communes. Au cours de ces entretiens, les libéraux Linda Lapointe, Rémi Massé et Jean-Claude Poissant, les néodémocrates Guy Caron et Matthew Dubé, et le conservateur Stephen Blaney ont tous souligné l’importance que la famille, le mentorat et la formation ont eue pour eux lorsqu’ils siégeaient sur la colline.
Selon ces anciens élus, il est essentiel de tenir compte de ces soutiens pour appuyer et retenir des législateurs efficaces qui aspirent à représenter la diversité de la population canadienne.
En général, les anciens députés estiment que le soutien de leur famille a joué un rôle important, notamment en les encourageant à se présenter aux élections.
Rémi Massé note que même si sa famille lui a initialement demandé « es-tu fou ? », sa réaction aura finalement été « très bonne ».
Quand il leur a fait part de son souhait de faire le saut en politique, certains membres de la famille de Guy Caron ont réagi avec humour. « Quand j’ai dit ça à ma mère initialement, elle m’a demandé pourquoi et si j’étais malade ! » se souvient-il.
« Quand on m’a approché [pour me présenter], la première chose que [ma conjointe] m’a dit c’est : « “ça ne change pas grand-chose, t’es jamais là !” » a pour sa part plaisanté Jean-Claude Poissant.
Les ex-députés précisent que leur famille n’était pas seulement importante lorsqu’ils se sont présentés à une élection, mais qu’elle a aussi joué un rôle essentiel pour survivre à leur passage à la Chambre des communes et en ressortir avec une santé mentale intacte. Steven Blaney souligne d’ailleurs que sans le soutien de sa famille, « ça aurait été impossible ».
À ce sujet, son chef, l’ancien premier ministre Stephen Harper disait : « prenez soin de votre famille pendant que vous êtes en politique, car une fois que vous l’aurez quittée, c’est la seule chose qui vous restera ».
De la même manière, Linda Lapointe avance que « la famille va continuer après la politique… Si tu passes à travers ta carrière politique, mais que tu n’as plus de famille autour de toi, après tu n’as rien accompli dans ta vie. Il faut permettre aux députés d’avoir un équilibre ».
Contrairement à ses collègues masculins, Mme Lapointe pointe du doigt les politiques parlementaires qui affectent la parité à la Chambre des communes. Elle estime que « les femmes en général vont penser plus à l’impact personnel que ça va avoir dans leur vie familiale… S’il y a plus de modèles positifs, si on peut avoir un parlement qui permet plus facilement de vivre [en équilibre]. Si c’est un modèle hybride un peu plus flexible, tant mieux ».
Ensemble, ces points de vue partagés sur l’importance de la famille soulèvent des questions importantes sur la manière dont les politiques de la Chambre des communes devraient évoluer pour mieux soutenir l’équilibre entre la vie professionnelle et la vie familiale des élus. En particulier si l’on considère le fait préoccupant que le taux de divorce chez les députés est deux fois plus élevé que la moyenne nationale.
La courbe d’apprentissage à la Chambre des communes est raide et continue, précisent les anciens députés. M. Massé aurait « aimé entrer en politique avec ce [qu’il sait] maintenant », notant qu’il « aurait été drôlement plus efficace ».
Malgré les formations offertes par le parti et le Parlement, il n’existe pas de cours pour devenir un bon député. M. Blaney décrit les débuts de l’expérience parlementaire comme « un baptême du feu ». Mme Lapointe compare de son côté les trois premiers mois de travail à « un train à grande vitesse [où] tu apprends très vite ».
La rapidité avec laquelle on attend des députés qu’ils se mettent au diapason et au travail a été soulignée par tous les intervenants. M. Dubé raconte que « quand il y a une rencontre, il y a énormément d’informations transmises d’un coup. C’est difficile à tout apprendre ».
« Tu apprends sur le tas et tout le monde est en apprentissage… Tout le monde travaille le pied au plancher », ajoute M. Massé.
Les députés présentés dans Les Personnages de la Chambre reconnaissent la valeur du mentorat formel et informel, de même que le soutien apporté par l’administration de la Chambre des communes. M. Poissant affirme qu’il a reçu « un soutien extraordinaire » alors que M. Caron témoigne d’« un appui incomparable de la part de la Chambre des communes » et « qu’au niveau du parti, on a eu un bon encadrement ».
Massé ajoute que le soutien qu’il a reçu de la part des agents de transition fédéraux était « excellent » et qu’il a « posé beaucoup de questions pendant quatre ans ».
Mme Lapointe, pour sa part, a été inspirée par d’autres politiciennes québécoises, dont elle a suivi l’exemple. « Je me souviens que Pauline Marois était enceinte. Je me disais que si elle est capable, je devrais être capable de concilier le tout », se souvient-elle.
De leur propre aveu, le mentorat a facilité le parcours politique des anciens députés ; si Steven Blaney se confiait à l’ancien député conservateur Jean-Pierre Blackburn, M. Dubé qualifie pour sa part le néodémocrate Malcolm Allen de « papa politique ».
Les réflexions des anciens députés démontrent également les avantages d’une relation étroite avec les chefs de parti. M. Dubé raconte que le défunt chef du Nouveau Parti démocratique, Jack Layton, « a été tellement bon pour nous appuyer, puis de donner crédit à l’implication des jeunes en politique ». Dans la même optique, M. Caron confie qu’il s’est présenté parce qu’il « croyait [en] Jack Layton ».
Blaney a lui aussi bénéficié d’une relation privilégiée avec le premier ministre Stephen Harper. Il précise que son chef était presque trop familier, si bien qu’il avait invité plusieurs fois des électeurs à venir rencontrer le premier ministre Harper après le caucus, et ce, sans préavis. Bien que le premier ministre Harper était partant, cette proximité n’était pas partagée par tous les parlementaires.
À l’inverse, M. Poissant indique avoir très peu communiqué avec le chef libéral Justin Trudeau. M. Massé relève qu’au-delà des réunions du caucus, M. Trudeau a beaucoup à gérer et qu’il « en avait plein les bottines ». Étant donné que le caucus libéral comptait alors 184 députés, « il y avait pas mal de monde à la messe », note M. Massé.
Les défis et apprentissages auxquels sont confrontés les nouveaux députés ne sauraient être réalisés sans une formation adéquate, des mentors et le soutien de leur famille. Les députés interrogés estiment que des investissements dans la formation et le mentorat, de même que l’élaboration de politiques favorisant l’établissement de relations saines à l’intérieur et entre les partis pourraient améliorer l’expérience des futurs parlementaires.
Tous ont exprimé l’immense valeur de leur travail et leur volonté de faire comprendre à leurs successeurs ce que nécessite la fonction de député et l’importance de l’institution qu’ils aspirent à représenter. Compte tenu de tout ce qu’ils consacrent à servir leur circonscription, tous les députés méritent de comprendre les tenants et aboutissants de leur mandat.
“On the question of religious hospitals, despite being a lesbian couple, Patricia and I would tolerate life-size crucifixes in the treatment room if it meant being safe from MAiD.” ~ Catherine Frazee, professor emerita at the School of Disability Studies at Metropolitan University, former chief commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, and co-founder of Disability Filibuster.
Disabled people often talk about being made invisible. This feeling is particularly striking around issues that are specific to us like MAiD, medical assistance in dying. The lobbyists and proponents for Canada’s MAiD regime routinely mischaracterize or, more often, omit mention of disabled people or our reasons for opposition entirely.
Consistent with this, Jocelyn Downie and Daphne Gilbert ridiculed B.C. Health Minister Adrian Dix’s plan for a clinical space for MAiD to be created next to a MAiD-free hospital in Vancouver. In their recent Policy Options article, they call the planned connecting hallway a “corridor of sin” and accuse the minister of making a plan that is church-centred, not patient-centred.
Some health-care providers see MAiD-free spaces as working environments that allow them to respect their conscience and adhere to their professional understanding of doing no harm.
Disabled patients, however, have expressed different reasons for wanting MAiD-free health-care settings.
To start with, we should have the right to receive medical care in places and from people who do not contemplate or participate in killing disabled people as part of a care plan.
Who wants to look up at a doctor from a hospital bed and wonder if they have just deliberately ended the life of someone with a similar condition? Or to overhear conversations in hallways, waiting rooms, nursing stations or on the other side of a curtain, about how a lethal injection preserved a relative’s dignity before she – gasp – became incontinent, like me.
The only MAiD-free spaces left are in faith-based facilities. This is a result of vigorous lobbying by well-funded and privileged groups, and the abandonment of disabled people.
Quebec prevents the creation of MAiD-free spaces, something the Quebec Archbishop is fighting in court. A B.C. hospice that chose to remain MAiD-free had its funding cut by the provincial government.
Deep convictions and deep pockets are needed to fight the MAiD lobby.
Many disabled people can remember a time in their lives when they would or could have agreed to MAiD had it been suggested to them. The reason for this unfortunate common bond is ableism.
A brief and widely adopted definition of ableism Fiona Kumari Campbell explains it as “a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body…that is projected as perfect and species-typical, and therefore essential and fully human.”
As a result, disability “is cast as a diminished state of being human.” It is a short journey from believing disability makes you less human to thinking that it is better to be dead than disabled.
Ableism in Canada is structural, codified, and acts as the rebar in our economy, politics, and culture. It defines and designs access to resources, services, public space, education, housing, health and health care, employment, and fundamental human rights.
Ableism affects how others perceive and treat us and how we perceive ourselves and our experiences. In this way ableism informs how our suffering is interpreted, making causal links that are not supported by evidence.
Medical ableism is often presented as “common sense” instead of bias, University of Alberta professor Heidi Janz says. Part of what allows it to remain unexamined is it exists within a larger contested framework referred to as the medical model of disability. In this model, disability is defined as deficiency, tragedy, and the opposite of health. Suffering is assumed and, because disability is understood entirely as a problem with an individual’s body, knowledge, power, and authority are placed within the medical field.
The result of this is our entire humanity is compressed into our diagnoses. There is no examination of the inherent political oppression or the bias in treatment because the medical model assumes the inequity disabled people experience is a logical result of being disabled.
This also incidentally is one of the many reasons MAiD assessors are ill-equipped to identify social suffering and solutions.
Health-care professionals have a lot of power over disabled people. For many of us, a physician’s signature governs far more than our essential medical care. It determines most aspects of our lives: housing, access to transportation, income, education, recreation, mobility, and other equipment.
That signature is shaped by their perception of us, which is shaped by how well we align with their judgment of us as a “good patient.” In recent years, medicine has moved away from the use of the word compliant to describe whether patients follow medical advice. Now they talk about adherence. But whichever word they use, the power imbalance remains, and patients and family are hesitant to ask questions or raise concerns. As well, in most interactions, patients have just 11 seconds to speak before a physician interrupts them, research has shown.
Physicians conflate disability with suffering. Some bioethicists have likened disabled people to “happy slaves” for daring to suggest that disability is not a synonym for misery. Physicians consistently rate disabled people’s quality of life lower than disabled people themselves do. This is called the disability paradox.
MAiD contagion is already happening. I have been doing research with FAFIA as part of York University’s Creating Spaces project. I listened to stories of disabled women and non-binary people. In one focus group of six people, two had experienced suicidal ideation for the first time because of MAiD and the promotion around it, and in particular its expansion to disabled people who are not dying.
The deluge of emotionally charged MAiD coverage is driven primarily by stories crafted or at least aided by the public relations and lobby efforts by proponents. As part of its recent campaign, Dying with Dignity, a national organization that campaigns for the expansion and liberalization of MAiD, emailed supporters urging them to submit opinion pieces to media organizations and offered the help of its communications team.
The CEO of Dying with Dignity has met with senators and members of Parliament in official lobbying capacity 41 times in the last 12 months. The charity also employs lobbyists at Blackbird Communications.
In a public-relations war, money can create even more imbalance than it does in a courtroom.
But much of the media coverage of MAiD runs counter to the World Health Organization’s guidelines for responsible reporting on suicide. The WHO warns against spreading suicide contagion through prominent placement of stories about suicide, by normalizing it or presenting it as a constructive solution to problems, and by explicitly describing the method used.
Perhaps a lot of the coverage of MAiD ignores contagion protocols because MAiD is a euphemism for assisted suicide or euthanasia.
Chronically ill and disabled Canadians need a say in health-care reforms
Downie and Gilbert focus on St. Paul’s Hospital in Vancouver and offer an anonymous doctor’s fictional scenario of what they imagine a patient might experience while being transferred to another setting to access MAiD. They use the term “forced transfer.”
A former executive director of Dying with Dignity said in a 2019 statement of claim that it was her “creative-thinking” that is responsible for the “ground-breaking” term. The statement was part of an Ontario lawsuit in which the public-relations value of the term was highlighted, noting it has been adopted “nationally and internationally by academics, clinicians, lawyers, and others in the right to die movement.”
Patients are transferred every day to access care, equipment or expertise that is not available where they are.
And it is striking that the term “forced transfer” is selectively applied to MAiD and not, for example, patients forced to move to long-term care facilities not of their choosing, on threat of being billed $400/day by the government if they refuse.
Instead of fiction written by a physician imagining what a patient might feel, I have a real story about real events told by the person who really experienced them.
In 2009, before MAiD was legalized, I was living in North Vancouver. Since the onset of my rare neuromuscular disease several years prior I had been seen by an assortment of specialists at three different hospitals. Approximately two years of that time was spent in search of diagnosis for the multiple and worsening symptoms. At first, I thought I was just run down following a virus, but a turning point was when I had to be helped out of the community centre pool by a lifeguard because I couldn’t catch my breath a quarter of the way into my first lap. Over time, I transitioned from trail runner to using a cane, then walker and eventually a wheelchair. Simultaneously I transformed from being perceived as normal but sick to disabled and “unfixable” – and fat because of the corticosteroids.
No longer able to work and unable to access benefits due to eligibility criteria that declared me a dependent of the boyfriend I had been living with, my economic situation deteriorated.
Soon, my care changed, too. Nurses stopped complimenting me on my shoes, asking about my work, and telling me not to give up. The new answer to every question was a shrug and “you’re disabled.” It took three trips to two different hospitals and a tense standoff to finally be diagnosed and treated for deep-vein thrombosis and a pulmonary embolism following an intravenous immunoglobulin treatment (IVIG).
Meanwhile my condition created a smorgasbord of symptoms and managing one would sometimes worsen or create another. There were complications, “atypical presentations,” systemic infections, superbugs, and an ever-growing list of prescriptions sometimes accompanied by allergic reactions and serious side effects. I was a “high-cost health-care user.” The term is used to describe the five per cent of health-care users who are said to account for nearly two-thirds of health-care costs.
I sensed a growing defeatism among those providing me with care. But I was certain that the danger was at least partially a result of the health-care system’s siloed and almost exclusive focus on the latest acute crisis made worse by under-funding and embedded bias.
With each hospitalization, staff would do just enough to be able to send me home to die.
In between hospital stays, home-care aids and nurses would provide care.
One day I asked one of the visiting nurses if there wasn’t anyone anywhere who would put some effort into trying to prolong my life.
She said that she’d had some other patients like me (who had been given up on). Some had tried St. Paul’s and swore the care there was different. She told me it was probably my last hope.
She was right. St. Paul’s did save my life when others had given up and left me to die and by the time I finally found a way to get there, I was dying.
Unfortunately, no place is free of ableism. St. Paul’s was not the first place someone in a health-care setting told me it would be better if I died sooner rather than later, but it was the first time I was asked to indicate my agreement by signing on the dotted line.
A hospital employee carrying a box of tissues and a clipboard came to my room. After closing the door, she put her hand on mine and expressed her “sincere sadness” for my situation. She raised that my above-mentioned boyfriend had announced he was leaving me shortly after I had been admitted and this meant I would be without money or housing.
She told me I had been through so much and deserved to rest. The rest she was offering me was permanent. She urged me to sign a do-not-resuscitate order.
I declined.
We went back and forth as her veneer of concern peeled away. She was angry. She said she could not understand why I would want to go on living. I told her to get out of my room. I can still see the disgust in her eyes. I hope she can still see the rage in mine.
When the specialist came into my room, I grabbed his hand and told him that I wanted a chance to live. I asked him to please do more than patch me up just enough to make it out of the parking lot. The next day he said he would do everything he could to help me if I agreed to do whatever he told me to do.
We shook on it.
I was at St. Paul’s for nine months. It is too long of a story to share all the good that happened – and all that was lost or undone by the policies of the rehabilitation hospital I was sent to afterward. Not to mention a subsequent denial of treatment.
But 15 years later, I am still alive.
Throughout my long stay at St. Paul’s, there was an Indigenous woman down the hall who had been there longer than me. She had decorated her walls with art and blankets from home. There was a man who was a patient for many months. He had been living outside and had developed a skin infection. His whole body was bandaged.
These were people I had not seen in other hospitals. They were marginalized people who needed more time and more care due to the lack of supports available to them in the community and due to the social and political determinants of health that caused or contributed to their health crises. At St. Paul’s, no one ever asked me if I was Catholic. I never saw a priest or nun. No one brought up religion.
At a follow-up appointment with the specialist I showed him a photo of me on a sailboat. He smiled and then his expression became more serious. He explained that a medication I had been prescribed for years had been, in essence, poisoning me. “You were dying when I met you,” he said. “I know,” I said. I thanked him for not giving up on me.
I knew from the nurses that he had fought to keep me in hospital as long as he did.
He ran me through a strength test, in which I raised my arms. He pushed down on them and was surprised to meet any real resistance. He stepped back and shook his head, marvelling. The real change, though, was number of medications I required: it was declining, not increasing.
Many, if not most, disabled people would prefer the additional option of secular MAiD-free spaces. But Catherine Frazee, whose quote starts this article, has articulated the view of a great many disabled people who fervently want safety from MAiD.
Affirming support for the belief of “better dead than disabled” in health care is dangerous and cruel. Canada has made disabled people a killable class, and hardly anyone has considered the impact this would have on us. This country must maintain MAiD-free health-care spaces.
Six more independent senators have taken their seats in the Red Chamber so far in 2024, ready to provide sober second thought on behalf of their regions without the pressure of following the top-down party directives associated with being part of a partisan caucus.
In the past decade, there has been a gradual yet dramatic transition away from the government-opposition duopoly that had characterized the Senate for nearly 150 years.
However, the current Rules of the Senate do not reflect the new reality, in which 80 out of 96 sitting senators are not affiliated with either the government or the opposition.
The rules continue to lag when it comes to the equitable treatment of these recognized groups. They need to be updated in several areas along the lines of a comprehensive package of proposed changes currently being considered in the Senate.
While senators once were divided along the same party lines as their counterparts in the Commons, there are now three new independent parliamentary groups with no partisan links. In addition, a handful of senators sit with no affiliation to any group.
This new organizational structure stems from the Trudeau government’s decision to create an arm’s-length body to advise the prime minister on Senate appointments, with a focus on diversity and gender balance.
Since 2016, 81 independent senators have been appointed under the new process, while others initially appointed to partisan caucuses have chosen to sit as independents.
The shift in the makeup of the Senate was recognized in May 2017 when its rules were changed to formally recognize and provide certain privileges to parliamentary groups not affiliated with a registered political party.
But the strict framework of the current rules, drafted at a time when there had only ever been two caucuses in the upper house, makes it increasingly difficult for many senators to fully participate.
A former special Senate committee on modernization anticipated this growing challenge in its December 2018 report entitled Reflecting the New Reality of the Senate. It called for changes to both the Parliament of Canada Act and Senate rules to keep pace with this changing dynamic.
One of the committee’s recommendations was realized in June 2022 when federal laws were amended to catch up with the major changes in the Senate. The updated Parliament of Canada Act now recognizes the growing contingent of independent senators and the various groups that they represent.
More than 80 per cent of senators now sit in non-partisan groups but the institution’s rules still do not reflect this reality, despite multiple efforts to do so in the chamber and at committee.
To advance these objectives, the Government Representative’s Office in the Senate has developed a comprehensive package of proposed changes and is seeking consensus to get them adopted this spring. This represents a firm commitment to ongoing modernization and fostering the conditions required for the Senate to continue to thrive.
The three main areas in this proposal are:
One proposal addresses the lack of equity in speaking times. There are now four distinct groups in the Senate, in addition to the three-senator government team which should be enshrined in the rules to ensure the views of all senators are heard. A similar proposal was included as part of a recent report of the standing Senate committee on rules, procedures and the rights of Parliament (RPRD).
Equity is also the focus of proposed changes to extend the powers of vote deferrals and decisions on the length of time for votes to be held to non-partisan parliamentary groups, rather than just the government and opposition groups.
Another proposal would ensure more time is dedicated to chamber business on sitting days. The Senate currently has a two-hour evening break from 6-8 p.m. During the pandemic, the Senate adopted a sessional order to limit the evening suspension to one hour. This should be added to the rules for future sessions.
The package also responds to a proposal currently under consideration at RPRD concerning written questions, which are submitted directly to the Senate’s order paper.
There is currently no time limit for the government to respond. To ensure greater efficiency and accountability, we propose implementing a 60-day limit.
The rules would also be changed to introduce a limit on the number of written questions a senator can have at once and a process to examine cases in which the government fails to respond, in line with existing practices in the Commons.
The new independent Senate is more diverse than ever, making it more reflective of the Canadians it represents and therefore able to offer a broader perspective on the issues under consideration.
Improving the Senate’s role as protector of provincial rights
More than half of all senators are women, there is more Indigenous representation and there is also a broader range of experience and backgrounds, all of which enhance the knowledge and views of the Senate as a whole.
Because they are unincumbered by partisan politics and the electoral cycle, independent senators can study legislation through a lens focused on regional interests, minority rights and constitutional considerations.
The new independent Senate has shown an increased willingness to propose amendments and provide observations to legislation that the government ought to consider, in many cases improving the laws that govern this country.
At the same time, independent senators have retained the principle of democratic deference. Despite advocating for changes to legislation, senators have ultimately accepted the will of the elected Commons.
The new makeup of the Senate calls for changes to ensure all senators have a voice, regardless of independence or partisanship. There has been some recent progress on Senate modernization and there will be other proposals in the future.
But one thing we can do now is move forward with these proposed updates to the rules to help keep pace with the institution’s evolution, to enable greater efficiency in day-to-day operations and ultimately to ensure that all senators can fully serve the Canadians they represent.
(Version française disponible ici)
The Trudeau government’s latest budget contained a number of splashy items, ranging from housing policy to national defence. In the midst of a national housing crisis and with mounting geopolitical threats, it’s no surprise that these policy areas are getting attention.
Another issue that the government sought to address in the budget is Canada’s lagging productivity. It’s perhaps less well understood, but one that will determine Canada’s ability to fund solutions to our most pressing national challenges. Dusting off the industrial policy playbook may be part of the solution.
Canada’s productivity challenges aren’t new, and aren’t news. Economic commentators have been raising flags about them for years. A recent speech by Carolyn Rogers, senior deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, injected some urgency into the discussion.
“You’ve seen those signs that say, ‘In emergency, break glass.’ Well, it’s time to break the glass,” she said.
In other words, productivity is no longer just a problem. It’s an emergency.
But why should ordinary Canadians fixate on productivity? Next to the increased cost of living – particularly the cost of shelter – productivity can seem like an abstract concept. Why spend money trying to make firms more efficient when many households are having trouble paying the bills? It’s an important question that elected officials need to answer.
But productivity isn’t a mere statistical artifact. Nor is it something that just pads the corporate bottom line. It determines how much Canadians can produce, and therefore how much we’re able to enjoy.
Investments in productivity – ranging from big ticket items like cutting-edge machinery to improve manufacturing output, to marginal tweaks like better software to improve agricultural output – mean we’re able to produce more goods and services per hour worked. Put simply, it means we get more output for the same amount of effort. Increased productivity means an increased standard of living, and a greater ability to finance important social programs.
Let’s use housing as an example. Several analysts have estimated that Canada is short over three million housing units. That is a daunting number. To meet that goal, we need more output. Unless we’re going to make a massive push to get young people into the building trades or completely reorient our immigration policy to focus on construction workers, we need to build more housing units per worker. In other words, we need more productivity.
Increasing productivity isn’t easy. If it was, we’d have already done it. It’s easy enough to tell firms that they ought to invest more in equipment or software. But they need to have the right incentives and the right tools at their disposal.
One potential tool to hit the accelerator is industrial policy. It’s a broad concept that means different things to different people. The idea that there is a role for the state to nudge private companies in a particular direction is often thought of as antithetical to a market-oriented economy. In reality, we’ve always done some form of industrial policy. This ranges from past large-scale interventions to build out Alberta’s oilsands to tax credits for research and development.
There’s plenty in the budget that broadly falls under the industrial policy umbrella aimed at bolstering clean technology, artificial intelligence, Indigenous reconciliation and other key priorities.
A cynic could argue that the federal government is merely throwing money at stakeholder groups. Indeed, some skepticism is warranted. After all, if there’s money to be made on something, why doesn’t the private sector just step up?
The trouble is the incentives often don’t line up. Let’s take another example: supply chains. Global supply chains normally work like magic. Our highly globalized economy provides us with an array of goods and services previous generations could only have dreamed of.
However, COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have shown that we can’t take that stability for granted. Geopolitics, natural disasters and infectious diseases, among other things, can disrupt supply chains. That is inconvenient when we’re talking about trinkets from Amazon. It’s a disaster when we’re talking about life-saving vaccines. We need to ensure that we don’t put all our eggs in one basket. No one wants to have to hoard toilet paper again.
This is where industrial policy can come in. Sometimes there are broader public interests that individual firms don’t have the right incentives to address. There’s no shortage of examples. Reshoring or shortening supply chains is expensive and can put companies at a competitive disadvantage; firms might face cost barriers to adopting cleaner technologies; they might not see the monetary value in reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples; and they might not have the ability to undertake heavy upfront costs for research and development on the technologies of the future. This is where governments might have a role to play.
Canada wouldn’t be the first major country to experiment with industrial policy. Countries ranging from China to Germany are pursuing aggressive industrial policy strategies. Even the United States has embraced industrial policy, perhaps best embodied by the American government’s Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act. This have led to an explosion of construction activity.
This new activity isn’t just building widgets for the sake of creating jobs. It means that a share of the most advanced semiconductors on earth will now be built on American soil, helping to reduce the world’s dependence on semiconductors produced in Taiwan. Given geopolitical threats in Asia and lingering worries about supply-chain predictability, having these vital inputs built in North America is an unalloyed good. There’s a reason why even conservatives like U.S. Senator Marco Rubio want to double down on industrial policy.
That isn’t to say that industrial policy is completely uncontroversial, let alone perfect. It’s not hard to find failed examples of industrial policy initiatives. Governments engaging in industrial policy need a sound strategy, good data and rigorous evaluation. They also need to know when to cut their losses. These are all easier said than done.
Quebec needs solutions to its long-term financial challenges
The sheer size of recent industrial policy initiatives, such as multibillion-dollar electric-vehicle battery manufacturing facilities or tax credits for clean-energy investments, should focus our collective minds on getting value for money. While industrial policy may be necessary to maintain or expand a presence in certain heavy industries that are being generously funded by other countries, the costs can be enormous. We can’t simply cut blank cheques. We need to get these investments right more often than not.
Efforts to boost productivity in the medium to long term come at the expense of short-term priorities. Bluntly put, if we’re going to spend a dollar on factory construction rather than health care, we need to make sure there’s a plausible and attractive payback. One of the key objectives of boosting productivity is enhancing our ability to generate the tax revenue needed to pay for services like health care, after all.
While industrial policy might be a promising avenue to boost productivity, we shouldn’t step into it lightly. We need credible, evidence-based policies linked to a coherent strategy rather than ad hoc decisions. We also need strong governance, policy design that attracts private capital rather than replaces it, and effective and timely implementation. It’s good that the government is thinking about productivity, but it’s not a matter of flipping a switch. We need to get the details right.
Getting these details right is what motivates the IRPP’s Building New Foundations for Economic Growth research program. We will continue to produce and share research aimed at bolstering Canada’s productivity long after the budget ink is dry.
(English version available here)
Le plus récent budget du gouvernement Trudeau renferme un certain nombre de mesures qui ont fait jaser, allant d’une politique du logement à la défense nationale. Dans un contexte de crise pancanadienne du logement et de menaces géopolitiques croissantes, il n’est pas surprenant que ces domaines politiques retiennent l’attention.
Dans le budget, le gouvernement s’est aussi penché sur le retard de productivité du Canada. Cet enjeu est peut-être moins bien compris, mais il est déterminant dans la capacité du pays à financer des solutions à nos défis nationaux les plus pressants. Le dépoussiérage de notre politique industrielle peut faire partie de la solution.
Les retards de productivité du Canada ne sont pas nouveaux. Les commentateurs économiques en parlent depuis des années. Dans un récent discours, Carolyn Rogers, première sous-gouverneure de la Banque du Canada, a toutefois souligné l’urgence d’agir.
« Il y a péril en la demeure. Il faut agir », a-t-elle déclaré.
En d’autres mots, la productivité n’est plus qu’un simple problème. C’est une urgence nationale.
À côté de l’augmentation du coût de la vie – en particulier du coût du logement – la productivité peut sembler un concept abstrait. Pourquoi dépenser de l’argent pour rendre les entreprises plus efficaces alors que de nombreux ménages ont du mal à payer leurs factures ? C’est une question importante à laquelle les élus doivent répondre.
La productivité n’est pas une simple technicalité statistique. Ce n’est pas non plus quelque chose qui ne fait que gonfler les résultats financiers des entreprises. Elle détermine la quantité de produits que les Canadiens peuvent produire et, par conséquent, la quantité de biens dont nous pouvons profiter.
Les investissements dans la productivité, qu’il s’agisse d’immobilisations importantes, comme des machines de pointe pour améliorer la production manufacturière, ou d’ajustements marginaux, comme de meilleurs logiciels pour améliorer la production agricole, signifient que nous sommes en mesure de produire plus de biens et de services par heure travaillée. En d’autres termes, cela signifie que nous obtenons plus de résultats pour la même quantité d’efforts. L’augmentation de la productivité se traduit par une amélioration du niveau de vie et une plus grande capacité à financer d’importants programmes sociaux.
Prenons l’exemple du logement. Plusieurs analystes ont estimé qu’il manquait plus de trois millions de logements au Canada. C’est un chiffre impressionnant. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous devons en augmenter la production. À moins que nous investissions massivement pour attirer les jeunes vers les métiers du bâtiment ou que nous ne réorientions complètement notre politique d’immigration pour nous concentrer sur les travailleurs de la construction, nous devons bâtir plus de logements par travailleur. Dit autrement, nous avons besoin d’une plus grande productivité.
Augmenter la productivité n’est pas une mince tâche. Si c’était le cas, ce serait déjà fait. Il est assez facile de dire aux entreprises qu’elles doivent investir davantage dans des équipements ou des logiciels. Mais elles doivent d’abord disposer des bonnes incitations et des bons outils.
La politique industrielle est l’un des outils potentiels permettant d’appuyer sur l’accélérateur.
L’idée que l’État a un rôle à jouer pour orienter les entreprises privées dans une direction donnée est souvent considérée comme contraire à une économie de marché. En réalité, nous avons toujours pratiqué une certaine forme de politique industrielle. Cela va des interventions passées à grande échelle pour développer les sables bitumineux de l’Alberta aux crédits d’impôt pour la recherche et le développement.
Le budget contient de nombreux éléments relevant de la politique industrielle et visant à soutenir les technologies propres, l’intelligence artificielle, la réconciliation avec les peuples autochtones, en plus d’autres priorités essentielles.
Une personne cynique pourrait affirmer que le gouvernement fédéral se contente de jeter de l’argent à des parties prenantes. En effet, un certain scepticisme est justifié. Après tout, s’il y a de l’argent à gagner quelque part, pourquoi le secteur privé n’y intervient-il pas ?
Le problème, c’est que les incitations sont variables. Prenons un autre exemple : les chaînes d’approvisionnement. Normalement, les chaînes d’approvisionnement mondiales fonctionnent rondement. Notre économie hautement mondialisée nous offre un éventail de biens et de services dont les générations précédentes n’auraient pu que rêver.
Cependant, la pandémie de COVID-19 et l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie ont montré que nous ne pouvons pas considérer cette stabilité comme acquise. Le contexte géopolitique, les catastrophes naturelles et les maladies infectieuses, entre autres, peuvent perturber les chaînes d’approvisionnement. Ça n’est pas un réel problème lorsqu’on achète des babioles sur Amazon. Mais c’est un désastre s’il s’agit d’obtenir des vaccins qui pourraient sauver une vie. Nous ne devons pas mettre tous nos œufs dans le même panier. Personne ne veut revivre une pénurie de papier hygiénique.
C’est là que la politique industrielle peut être utile. Parfois, il existe des intérêts publics plus larges pour lesquels les entreprises individuelles n’ont pas les bonnes incitations. Les exemples ne manquent pas. La délocalisation ou le raccourcissement des chaînes d’approvisionnement peut être coûteux et désavantager les entreprises sur le plan de la concurrence ; les entreprises peuvent être confrontées à des obstacles liés aux coûts pour adopter des technologies plus propres ; elles peuvent ne pas voir la valeur monétaire de la réconciliation avec les peuples autochtones, et elles peuvent ne pas avoir la capacité d’engager des coûts initiaux élevés pour la recherche et le développement sur les technologies de l’avenir. C’est là que les gouvernements pourraient avoir un rôle à jouer.
Le Canada ne serait pas le premier grand pays à doubler la mise sur la politique industrielle. Des pays comme la Chine et l’Allemagne poursuivent des stratégies agressives en matière de politique industrielle. Même les États-Unis ont adopté une politique industrielle, dont la meilleure illustration est peut-être leur Inflation Reduction Act et la CHIPS and Science Act. Ces mesures ont entraîné une explosion des projets de construction.
Il ne s’agira pas simplement de construire des gadgets pour créer des emplois. Ça signifie qu’une partie des semi-conducteurs les plus avancés au monde sera désormais fabriquée sur le sol américain, ce qui réduira la dépendance du monde à l’égard de ceux produits à Taïwan. Compte tenu des menaces géopolitiques en Asie et des inquiétudes persistantes quant à la prévisibilité de la chaîne d’approvisionnement, la construction de ces intrants vitaux en Amérique du Nord est une bonne chose. Ce n’est pas pour rien que même des conservateurs comme le sénateur américain Marco Rubio veulent redoubler d’efforts en matière de politique industrielle.
Cela ne veut pas dire que la politique industrielle fait l’unanimité, et encore moins qu’elle est parfaite. Il n’est pas difficile de trouver des exemples d’initiatives de politique industrielle qui ont échoué. Les gouvernements qui s’engagent dans une politique industrielle ont besoin d’une stratégie solide, de données fiables et d’une évaluation rigoureuse. Ils doivent également savoir quand réduire leurs pertes. Tout cela est plus facile à dire qu’à faire.
Le Québec a besoin de solutions à ses défis financiers à long terme
Ottawa sauve la mise en haussant l’impôt sur le gain en capital
Si la politique industrielle peut s’avérer nécessaire pour maintenir ou développer une présence dans certaines industries lourdes généreusement financées par d’autres pays, les coûts peuvent être énormes. L’ampleur des récentes initiatives de politique industrielle, telles que les usines de batteries pour véhicules électriques ou les crédits d’impôt pour les investissements dans les énergies propres, qui se chiffrent à plusieurs milliards de dollars, devrait nous inciter à optimiser nos ressources. Nous ne pouvons pas nous contenter de signer des chèques en blanc. Le plus souvent, nous devons faire en sorte que ces investissements soient judicieux.
Les efforts visant à stimuler la productivité à moyen et long terme se font au détriment des priorités à court terme. Essentiellement, si nous dépensons un dollar pour la construction d’une usine plutôt que pour les soins de santé, nous devons nous assurer que la rentabilité de l’investissement est réaliste et attrayante. Après tout, l’un des principaux objectifs de l’augmentation de la productivité est d’améliorer notre capacité à générer les recettes fiscales nécessaires pour payer des services tels que les soins de santé.
Si la politique industrielle peut être une voie prometteuse pour stimuler la productivité, nous ne devons pas nous y engager à la légère. Nous avons besoin de politiques crédibles, fondées sur des données probantes et liées à une stratégie cohérente, plutôt que de décisions ad hoc. Nous avons également besoin d’une gouvernance solide, d’une conception des politiques qui attire les capitaux privés au lieu de les remplacer, et d’une mise en œuvre efficace et rapide. Il est bon que le gouvernement réfléchisse à la productivité, mais il ne s’agit pas d’appuyer sur un bouton. Il faut réfléchir aux moindres détails.
C’est la recherche de ces détails qui motive le programme de recherche Refonder la croissance économique sur de nouvelles bases de l’IRPP. Nous continuerons à produire et à partager des recherches visant à renforcer la productivité du Canada bien après que l’encre du budget soit sèche.
(Version française disponible ici)
The changing face of Canada and Quebec is leading to a transformation of the labour market. A growing proportion of the population comes from immigrant backgrounds and this trend will accelerate in the coming decades. Statistics Canada forecasts that immigrants and their Canadian-born children will make up nearly half the Canadian population by 2041, accounting for a significant share of the workforce.
While the vast majority of recently arrived immigrants belong to visible minorities, more and more people born here are from diverse backgrounds as well. StatsCan predicts that visible minorities could represent between 38 and 43 per cent of the total Canadian population by 2041.
Data from the 2021 census indicate that close to one in four young Québécois under the age of 25 is from a visible minority, a reality the labour market must now address.
Though the concept of an immigrant is clear, that of a visible minority is less so. Not all members of visible minorities are immigrants and not all immigrants are members of visible minorities, though for some years now the vast majority of recent immigrants (73 per cent in Quebec, 85 per cent in the rest of Canada) are members of a visible minority.
The term “visible minorities” refers to “persons, other than Aboriginal people, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” In Canada, Latino Americans, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, Filipinos, South Asians, Southeast Asians, Western Asians as well as Blacks and Arabs are considered members of a visible minority. Hence, all individuals who emigrate from a Latin American country are deemed a visible minority, even those with white skin. In 2021 in Quebec, visible-minority members were mainly from three groups: Blacks (31 per cent), Arabs (21 per cent) and Latino Americans (13 per cent).
Employment is an important indicator of integration. Many studies have looked into the circumstances of immigrants in the labour market, but the employment integration of people from diverse backgrounds, particularly of Canadian-born young people, is a much less documented phenomenon.
A study by CIRANO fills this gap using publicly available data from StatsCan’s Labour Force Survey and the 2021 census.
The findings are clear: belonging to a visible minority reduces the likelihood of finding employment. Visible-minority individuals born in Canada are the ones with the lowest employment rates, both among those in the 15-64 age group and those aged 15 to 24, as shown in Table 1. The results are qualitatively the same across Canada, with generally lower employment rates than in Quebec.
But more telling are the disparities once adjustments are made, namely the gaps that persist even when one cancels out the role of personal characteristics, other than belonging to a visible minority or having immigrant status, such as age, level of education, gender, attendance at an educational institution, province (for all of Canada), metropolitan area, and marital status. All gaps are statistically significant to 1%.
In Quebec, immigrants who are not members of a visible minority have employment rates that are lower by five percentage points than those of the reference group, all other factors being equal. This difference is even more pronounced for visible-minority immigrants, with employment rates lower by 9.4 percentage points.
Among young people between the ages of 15 and 24, the adjusted gaps are greater than for the overall 15-to-64 age group, even when controlling for differences in several personal characteristics, including school attendance. Thus, even if they were born in Canada, have a good command of French or English, and even if educated here, visible-minority youth appear to struggle to find a place in the labour market.
We also examined the disparities in annual salary, both actually observed and adjusted, meaning the gaps that persist even after cancelling out the effect of several other factors that determine annual salary other than visible-minority or immigrant status.
As shown in Table 2, the adjusted disparities are very different from the observed disparities, reflecting the fact that the four groups do not share the same characteristics.
In the case of native-born individuals belonging to a visible minority, the gap with the reference group decreases from 26.9 per cent (observed) to nine per cent (adjusted). The 26.9 per cent gap means that, initially, native-borns belonging to a visible minority have characteristics unfavourable to them in terms of compensation compared to native-borns who are not part of a visible minority. The nine per cent gap after adjustment is problematic and signals integration difficulties for visible minorities, even if born in Canada.
As for visible-minority immigrants, the salary gaps compared to the reference group widen after adjustment, reaching nearly 24 per cent both in Canada and in Quebec.
The case of immigrants who are not part of a visible minority is unique because of the shift from a positive observed gap to a negative adjusted gap. At first glance, they are better paid than native-borns who are not part of a visible minority. However, after adjustment – and thus with equal characteristics – non-visible-minority immigrants earned on average 15.8 per cent less than native-borns not part of a visible minority.
These findings warrant further analysis to determine if these individuals’ experiences stem from discrimination or other non-observable factors that should be brought to light.
More and more newcomers to the job market will be members of a visible minority. The case of young Canadian-born visible minorities merits special attention, with the goal of preventing their socioeconomic exclusion and the potential consequences for social cohesion.
In a context where Quebec and the rest of Canada rely on immigration to address the labour shortage, logic would dictate that we first realize the full potential of those already present. The integration into the workforce of Canadian-born individuals from ethnocultural minority groups, particularly the young, must be among the priorities of policymakers so as to avoid a situation where integration difficulties are passed on from one generation to the next. Failing this, a growing share of the population risks being marginalized.
Governments, the business community and all relevant stakeholders must work together on this in order to permanently eliminate the barriers hindering the economic integration of these young individuals and preventing them from fully contributing to the progress of society.
(English version available here)
Les repas de famille tendus lors de la pandémie, le « Convoi de la liberté » en 2022 et, plus récemment, les affrontements sur la question de l’identité de genre témoignent de la polarisation sociale et de la propagation de la désinformation. Ces phénomènes fragilisent la cohésion sociale, exacerbent les divisions et les préjugés et affaiblissent la démocratie.
C’est pourquoi l’appel à plus d’éducation à la citoyenneté est devenu un refrain familier dans l’espoir de régler ou de prévenir ces crises sociales. Cette idée repose sur le principe que des citoyens informés, engagés et responsables sont essentiels pour maintenir une société démocratique fonctionnelle et résiliente.
Toutefois, bien que cette demande puisse sembler raisonnable, ne devrions-nous pas d’abord analyser la qualité actuelle des services offerts avant d’en réclamer davantage ? C’est précisément l’objet du rapport L’Éducation civique mise au second plan, qui brosse un portrait de la perception des enseignants canadiens sur le sujet. Pour y parvenir, 1922 professionnels de l’éducation à travers tout le pays ont été sondés. Des groupes de discussion et des entretiens individuels ont permis d’approfondir certains éléments de l’enquête.
Le constat est clair : l’éducation civique est gravement dévalorisée au Canada, ce qui compromet son efficacité. Partant de cet état de fait, il importe d’outiller les enseignants dans leur lourde tâche de préparer les jeunes à devenir des citoyens engagés et bien informés.
L’éducation à la citoyenneté comprend l’étude formelle des processus politiques, du rôle des gouvernements ainsi que des droits et responsabilités des citoyens. Toutefois, à un niveau plus fondamental, elle concerne la communauté et la manière dont nous nous identifions aux autres et interagissons avec eux.
Ce qui fait toute la différence est l’approche pédagogique de l’enseignant.
Une bonne éducation civique privilégie une participation active des élèves plutôt que la simple transmission des connaissances, des faits et des dates.
Les meilleures pratiques mettent l’accent sur des méthodes pédagogiques qui placent les élèves en situation d’observation et d’expérimentation, par exemple des discussions constructives sur des enjeux politiques, des simulations de processus politiques ou des projets d’action civique.
Mais pour y parvenir, les enseignants ont besoin de beaucoup de temps, de formation et de ressources afin de mettre en œuvre les meilleures pratiques.
Sur papier, les programmes scolaires présentent la citoyenneté active comme l’un des plus importants objectifs de l’éducation, mais sur le terrain, c’est une tout autre chose.
Près des deux tiers des enseignants ont déclaré dans le cadre de l’étude que ce volet n’est pas une priorité dans leur école. Ce manque de valorisation au sein du système scolaire compromet son efficacité, notamment parce que les enseignants ne disposent pas de formation adéquate et de suffisamment de temps ou de ressources pour l’enseigner.
L’étude révèle des lacunes dans la formation des enseignants en matière d’éducation à la citoyenneté : 25 % des répondants ont suivi une formation en enseignement à cet effet, ce qui n’est pas le cas pour presque deux fois plus d’entre eux (48 %). Il n’est donc pas surprenant que plusieurs enseignants n’aient pas suffisamment confiance en leur capacité à enseigner la politique, ressentent une certaine pression ou se sentent démunis face au manque de lignes directrices de la part du système scolaire, qui inclut les écoles, les centres de services scolaires, les commissions scolaires, les districts ou les ministères de l’Éducation. Ce manque d’encadrement et d’intégration du programme peut d’ailleurs donner l’impression que l’éducation civique est une compétence facultative, tant aux yeux des enseignants que des élèves.
Pourtant, la majorité des programmes d’études canadiens décrivent des attentes élevées en la matière. Par exemple, les programmes d’études des provinces de l’Atlantique affirment que « les sciences humaines, plus que tout autre domaine du programme, sont essentielles au développement de la citoyenneté », car elles « incarnent les grands principes de la démocratie ». Toutefois, la plupart de ces programmes n’offrent pas de conseils ou des consignes précis sur la manière d’atteindre ces objectifs d’apprentissage.
Si certains enseignants profitent de cette flexibilité pour mettre en œuvre des projets d’éducation civique authentiques, ce n’est pas le cas pour tous. La plupart d’entre eux ont plutôt indiqué avoir besoin de stratégies pédagogiques et didactiques concrètes afin d’atteindre les objectifs d’apprentissage prescrits.
Actuellement, ces activités prennent plus souvent qu’autrement la forme de discussions sur les événements d’actualité et des enjeux politiques. Or, des stratégies pédagogiques d’apprentissage actif ou par l’expérience se sont avérées beaucoup plus efficaces, par exemple des discussions constructives bien encadrées, des simulations authentiques d’élection ou des projets d’action civique qui permettent aux élèves de réinvestir leurs apprentissages dans leur communauté.
Pour aider les jeunes à devenir des citoyens engagés, informés et actifs dans leurs communautés, l’éducation civique doit devenir une priorité, tant pour les enseignants que les autorités scolaires.
Il faut d’abord investir dans la formation des enseignants à tous les niveaux, aussi bien des actuels que des futurs professeurs. Ils doivent être en mesure de développer leurs propres connaissances et compétences civiques, en plus de maîtriser les stratégies pédagogiques fondées sur des données probantes. La formation est l’un des principaux moyens pour apprendre les meilleures pratiques en la matière, qui permettront aux élèves d’avoir des discussions constructives et de participer à des projets expérientiels et authentiques.
De plus, les enseignants doivent avoir accès à des stratégies pédagogiques concrètes et des exemples tangibles sur la manière d’intégrer la matière dans leur classe, quelle que soit la matière enseignée. Cela peut se traduire par des ressources pédagogiques clé en main qui les aident à bien préparer leurs élèves à voter lors d’une simulation électorale, des guides ou encore des plans de leçons qui leur permettent de bien encadrer les discussions politiques en classe.
Enfin, il faut investir dans une infrastructure pour soutenir la création d’une communauté de partage entre les enseignants, qui pourraient alors se partager les recherches émergentes en éducation civique, les meilleures pratiques et des ressources. Malgré leur volonté, peu de professionnels de l’éducation ont le temps ou les moyens de se tenir au fait des recherches actuelles en la matière. Il faut souvent payer pour accéder aux articles scientifiques, et y dédier un certain nombre d’heures pour les synthétiser ou s’en servir pour mettre en pratique de nouvelles approches pédagogiques. Nous avons donc besoin d’une infrastructure capable de rassembler les recherches émergentes et d’aider les pédagogues à lier ces recherches à leur pratique, de manière concrète et réalisable.
Homelessness in Canada is an insidious, growing problem that directly and indirectly affects millions of people. At least 235,000 people experience it every year, according to Statistics Canada.
Based on estimates from the Homeless Hub, a research library, this costs Canada anywhere from $5.45 billion to $30.74 billion per year, including direct costs, such as shelters and services, as well as indirect costs (which economists refer to as externalities), such as increased use of health services, policing and the criminal justice system.
Two overlapping factors are helping to fuel this epidemic, which can appear like an unsolvable riddle.
First, we have a significant housing supply shortfall. In September 2023, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. (CMHC) estimated Canada needs to build 5.8 million housing units by 2030 to restore housing affordability. That’s 3.5 million units more than the current pace.
Second, we have a significant shortage of skilled labour, especially in the construction industry. In Ontario alone, there is a forecast deficit of 23,200 construction workers by 2027.
Many other complex factors also contribute to the homelessness epidemic, making it a compound problem that involves a dozen federal departments and Crown corporations.
But, by design, those government departments operate in silos. This disincentivizes collaboration and leads to a narrow scope of work.
These are issues, however, that necessitate a much broader and more co-ordinated response. Such an overarching shift in approach would better direct resources and ultimately help more people.
Government departments often focus on a single policy area with interdepartmental co-ordination inconsistent and at times non-existent. This siloed approach can have significant ramifications.
A recent example was the federal government’s decision to cap international student visas to decrease pressure on the rental housing market. This decision was made in the absence of adequate co-ordination between the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, and the CMHC.
Had immigration and housing policies been considered in tandem, it is possible that capping student visa permits may never have been necessary.
This example serves as a teachable moment about the importance of shifting to an un-siloed approach to policy management and programs defined by shared governance and funding.
The best, fastest way to meaningfully help low-income Canadians
Two recent examples from Australia show the success of a co-ordinated approach to major policy challenges involving multiple departments.
First, a federal initiative there called “rewiring the nation” aims to transform Australia’s electricity grid. This initiative saw multiple federal agencies collaborate toward the creation and delivery of a fund worth the equivalent of about $17.7 billion Cdn with the equivalent of an additional $6.9 billion Cdn delivered in partnership with the state government of New South Wales for other projects.
Second, New South Wales created its digital restart fund for cross-departmental transformation projects. This fund is worth the equivalent of $1.9 billion Cdn and has led to a whole-of-government approach in areas including workforce capacity-building, shared digital assets and the modernization of outdated systems.
In Canada, there is one example beyond the halls of government that is demonstrating success using a de-siloed approach to help grow the construction workforce, boost housing supply and reduce homelessness.
Launched in 2020, Blue Door’s Construct provides a rapid pathway to secure a stable career in the skilled trades for vulnerable individuals stuck in a cycle of poverty and homelessness.
Blue Door partners with organizations such as LiUNA Local 506 Training Centre, Humber College, Durham College, The Home Depot Canada Foundation, the YMCA, the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, ACCES Employment and Ontario Works to provide a robust employment training program and wraparound support to participants.
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In three years, close to 500 participants have graduated from the program while completing hundreds of high-quality and competitively priced construction jobs in the York, Peel and Durham regions of Ontario. Eighty-two per cent of Construct’s graduates have found employment or a pathway to higher education within six weeks.
Construct also saves money, offering a pathway to self-sufficiency for a one-time cost of $21,000 per participant. By contrast, Homeless Hub estimates that in 2012 (the most recent year for which figures are available), the average monthly cost of a sheltering someone while homeless ranged from $1,932 for a shelter bed to $10,900 for a hospital bed. That is $23,184 to $130,800 per year.
Construct demonstrates that multiple policy problems can be addressed using a concerted approach and can have a positive impact on people’s lives. Governments should take a cue from this experience to address these and other issues at a national scale.
The country desperately needs a Team Canada approach to drastically increase housing supply, with the federal government shifting toward shared governance and funding programs that transcend departmental boundaries.
There would be significant benefit from the creation of an interdepartmental funding program jointly overseen by Infrastructure Canada, and Employment and Social Development Canada to support social enterprises such as Construct. Effectively tackling these complex challenges requires not just know-how but a co-operative approach in place of our current siloed system.
This could be achieved by establishing committees or working groups across departments, fostering collaboration among departments with shared goals and adopting shared-funding mechanisms.
Governments can facilitate this transition by revisiting historical governance policies and frameworks that impede cross-sector financing, thereby enabling more comprehensive solutions to challenges using a whole-of-government approach.
This article is part of a series called How does Canada fix the housing crisis?
Le Québec est le seul endroit en Amérique du Nord où les nouveaux pères ont droit, sous réserve de quelques conditions, à un congé de paternité payé leur étant exclusivement réservé. Si les prestations de paternité sont fort populaires, les plus récentes données du Conseil de gestion de l’assurance parentale (CGAP) montrent qu’une proportion croissante de pères utilisent aussi les prestations parentales partageables au terme de leur congé exclusif.
Ce changement dans les comportements des nouveaux pères pourrait avoir des effets bénéfiques sur les inégalités de genre.
L’arrivée d’un enfant est un moment charnière dans l’édification de ces inégalités. Alors que la transition à la paternité est souvent accompagnée d’un renforcement de la position des hommes sur le marché du travail, celle des femmes est parallèlement fragilisée en raison des nouvelles responsabilités de soins, dont elles assument disproportionnellement la charge. Une meilleure implication des pères dans les congés parentaux aiderait à changer cette réalité.
Il existe en vertu du Régime québécois d’assurance parentale (RQAP) trois principaux types de prestations pour une naissance : des prestations de maternité exclusives à la mère biologique, des prestations parentales partageables entre les parents, et des prestations exclusives pour le père ou le second parent. D’autres prestations exclusives peuvent également s’ajouter dans certaines situations particulières, par exemple lors de naissances multiples où dans le cas où un parent est le seul mentionné à l’acte de naissance.
La durée et la hauteur de ces prestations varient selon le type de régime choisi par les parents. Le régime de base offre une durée plus longue, tandis que le régime particulier est un peu plus généreux quant au montant versé pour les parents qui planifient un congé plus court, comme le montre le tableau 1.
Ailleurs au pays, les nouveaux parents ont également accès à des prestations exclusives pour la mère biologique et des prestations partageables. Depuis 2019, les familles qui choisissent le régime court bénéficient de 40 semaines de prestations pouvant être partagées. Toutefois, chaque parent ne peut prendre plus de 35 semaines. Ainsi, on comprend que des prestations d’une durée de cinq semaines sont également offertes au deuxième parent.
Les prestations québécoises réservées aux pères sont également mieux payées, couvrant de 70 à 75 % du salaire jusqu’à un maximum assurable de 94 000 $ (voir le tableau 1, ci-dessus). En comparaison, ailleurs au pays, les prestations partageables entre les parents remboursent un maximum de 55 % du salaire dans le régime court, et de 33 % dans le régime long. Le revenu maximal assurable est aussi sensiblement moins élevé, à un peu plus de 63 000 $ par an.
Les pères québécois utilisent massivement les prestations de paternité. Au Québec, plus des trois quarts (76,6 %) des pères ont demandé des prestations en 2021, comparativement à seulement trois pères sur 10 (29,9 %) ailleurs au pays.
Plus d’argent pour plus de nouveaux parents
Les changements apportés au Régime québécois d’assurance parentale
Myopie et limites de la politique familiale québécoise
Un des objectifs clés de la refonte de 2020 de la Loi sur l’assurance parentale était de favoriser une plus grande utilisation des prestations par les pères, au-delà de leur congé exclusif. À cette fin, le RQAP propose désormais un nouvel incitatif au partage en « récompensant » les couples dont les deux parents prennent des prestations parentales par l’ajout de semaines additionnelles de prestations.
En vertu du régime long, pour les couples où chacun des parents utilise huit semaines de prestations partageables, quatre semaines sont ajoutées à la durée totale des prestations du RQAP. Les nouveaux parents qui prennent chacun six semaines de prestations partageables en vertu du régime plus court se voient ajouter trois semaines à leur congé payé.
L’initiative portée par le CGAP, qui gère et oriente le RQAP, porte ses fruits.
Parmi les couples où les deux parents étaient admissibles aux prestations du RQAP, le deuxième parent prenait au moins une semaine de prestation dans plus du tiers (35 %) des cas en 2021, alors que ce n’était le cas que pour 20 % des couples en 2006, et 27 % en 2020.
De façon plus ciblée, la proportion de couples utilisant au moins 6 semaines de prestations – le minimum requis pour obtenir des semaines additionnelles de congé – a presque triplé à la suite de l’ajout de semaines de « récompense », passant à 22 % en 2021, après avoir oscillé entre 6 et 8 % pendant les quinze années précédentes.
En d’autres mots, dans 22 % des couples où les deux parents reçoivent des prestations, le deuxième conjoint utilise au moins 6 semaines de prestations parentales partageables, en plus du congé de paternité
Un partage des prestations chez une proportion croissante de couples est évidemment une excellente nouvelle. L’enthousiasme avec lequel les couples se prévalent de cette mesure suscite l’intérêt.
L’utilisation des prestations parentales chez les hommes est déterminée par des facteurs organisationnels, politiques et culturels. Des recherches comparatives ont néanmoins montré qu’offrir aux pères des prestations bien rémunérées non transférables à la mère encourage leur utilisation.
Cependant, la recherche a aussi montré que l’égalité des genres est favorisée par l’octroi de prestations sur une base individuelle, avec une portion partageable limitée, comme c’est par exemple le cas en Islande et en Suède. Au Québec, l’accès aux prestations « bonus » est conditionnel à la qualification des deux conjoints.
C’est bien là ce qui est étonnant dans le succès de l’initiative. En vertu du régime plus long, choisi par huit familles sur dix bénéficiaires du RQAP, les semaines de prestations additionnelles ne sont payées qu’à 55 % du salaire… Or, la recherche montre qu’un taux de remplacement du salaire d’au moins 80 % est nécessaire pour promouvoir l’égalité des genres dans la prise de congés. De plus, l’accès au bonus est tributaire de l’utilisation par les deux parents des prestations parentales, contrairement aux autres types de prestations.
Il est aussi possible que la pénurie de places en services de garde – plus de 30 000 enfants sont en attente d’une place – incite au partage des prestations. Les couples ne trouvant pas de place pour leur enfant décideraient alors de maximiser leur congé. C’est ce qui expliquerait entre autres l’adhésion des pères, en dépit du taux de remplacement du revenu plutôt faible dans le régime long.
La mise en place d’une nouvelle mesure est souvent accompagnée d’un effet d’entrée, directement lié au changement dans l’architecture de la politique. Les effets à long terme de l’incitatif au bonus restent à être documentés. La hausse de la participation des pères au RQAP à la suite de l’instauration des prestations de paternité a ralenti après une dizaine d’années. On ne verra sans doute la pleine mesure de l’incitatif au partage que dans plusieurs années.
D’ici là, on ne peut exclure que les effets positifs de l’incitatif au partage soient aussi liés à d’autres modifications apportées au RQAP, comme la possibilité accrue de gagner des revenus de travail sur une base individuelle tout en étant prestataire, ou encore celle d’étaler sur 18 mois la prise de congés.